The case of Bradley Manning: state victimization, realpolitik and WikiLeaks

Abstract

While the case of WikiLeaks release of classified documents and its founder, Julian Assange, has garnered much popular attention, the formal social control reactions to the alleged involvement of Private First Class Bradley Manning has remained, relatively glaringly absent from the media, public and political discussions. Moreover, while scant criminological attention has been given to the extradition of Assange on sexual charges and the situation of WikiLeaks, there has been no analysis of the control mechanisms that were placed on Manning in an effort to cease the release of US documents and his activity as a whistle-blower. This examination fills this void by adding to the literature on states’ responses to whistle-blowers by highlighting states’ mechanisms including retaliation and redirection to obscure its criminality as well the theoretical framework of realpolitik. While realpolitik has been used previously to explain motivations for state crime, it has not been applied as an explanation for the implementation of controls. Not only is the preservation of state legitimacy and practices of realpolitik central to the reactions of the government to this case of whistle-blowing, but that the responses denied a presumption of innocence and have violated basic human rights tenants, the Uniform Code of Justice, the US Constitution, thus making this a case of state victimization.

Keywords:

• realpolitik
• state crime
• Bradley Manning
• WikiLeaks

Acknowledgement

We thank Jeffrey Ian Ross, Victoria Collins and the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

Notes

1. We suggest his intent was not to aid the enemy, but rather to expose the state’s actions and senseless killings of civilians. This, we suggest, was motivated by the many injustices he saw and experienced in the military setting including those directed at him for his sexuality.

2. Article 51 of the UCMJ requires that for court martialing hearings, the presumption of innocence is mandated. For preliminary hearings, however, the presumption of innocence is not necessarily required. Additionally, the philosophy of the ‘rule of law’ is founded in the presumption of innocence.

3. See Savage, Charlie, The New York Times, 15 December 2010.

4. For story and video clip of the taped comment see Condon (2011). http://www.cbsnews.com/8301–503544_162–20056566–503544.html