From problem to solution? Why it is difficult to restrict the remit of public broadcasters

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the conditions for making policy change, and, more precisely, factors explaining why policy change is often hard to achieve even when key policy actors explicitly throw their weight behind it. It draws on a comparative analysis of two specific review processes in Britain and Norway, addressing the future remits of the public service broadcasters BBC and NRK. In both cases, the processes were initiated by governments explicitly stressing the need for radical change, but ambitions were not met although some changes took place. The article combines theories of advocacy coalitions and multiple streams to discuss how key stakeholders within the two processes operated to promote and inhibit change by defining – and re-defining – problems and solutions.

KEYWORDS:

• Advocacy coalitions
• BBC
• media policy
• multiple streams
• NRK
• public service broadcasting
• stakeholder analysis

Introduction

This article discusses the conditions for policy change, and, more precisely, factors explaining why change is often hard to achieve even when key policy actors explicitly throw their weight behind it. It draws on a comparative analysis of two specific review processes in Britain and Norway between 2013 and 2017, addressing the future remits of the BBC and the NRK. Both processes were initiated by governments initiating radical change, but the ambitions were not successful, although some change took place. While the cases differ in size, organization, governance and market context, both institutions represent the heartland of public service broadcasting and occupy central political and cultural positions (Van den Bulck and Raats 2018). The article asks: which factors can explain stability within public service policy-making and what are the lessons for policy change more generally?

Theoretically, the article combines approaches on stakeholder and advocacy coalitions (Van den Bulck and Donders 2014) with theories of policy formation and ‘multiple streams’ (Kingdon 1995). While the first approach explains the persistence of value-based alliances opposing and defending public broadcasters, the latter sheds light on how key actors navigate to promote (and inhibit) change, by defining (and re-defining) policy problems and solutions, and create (and close) policy windows. The combined perspective helps to identify long-term ideological alliances as well as short-term and pragmatic policy adjustments adapted by key stakeholders.

In the article, we analyze the review processes through three stages in each country: an initial phase of positioning and controversy, a middle stage of negotiations, and a closing stage where agreements are reached. In addition to comparing stakeholder positions, the article emphasis the dual significance of public broadcasters within a broader political framework: to what degree public broadcasting is seen as a problem for other stakeholders, and to what degree it is seen as a solution to problems. Many stakeholders, such as media industry actors, typically hold a dual position; they see public broadcasters as a solution in terms of commissioning content, but as a problem in terms of competition, and may chose the most strategically rewarding position. We discuss the framing of the public service remit, and, furthermore, how the two broadcasters manage to re-define themselves as solutions rather than problems, most notably by pointing to digital intermediaries as the ‘real problem’, shifting the criticism originally directed at them towards a ‘common enemy’ for the media industry.

Public broadcasting is a favoured research object, and many have chartered the transition from public service broadcasting to public service media (Moe 2011; Iosifidis 2007; Gulyas and Hammer 2013). Contrary to an ongoing narrative of doom for legacy media, several studies have shown that public service institutions remain a significant force in many countries (Horowitz and Clark 2014; Tambini 2015), continue to engage a broad range of stakeholders (Isofides 2010; Ibarra, Nowak, and Kuhn 2015), and remain dependent on regulatory decisions in regional or national contexts (Donders 2012; Brevini 2013). In the article, we are also informed by studies focusing specifically on media policy reviews and criticism of public service broadcasting in the UK and Norway (Blumler 2016; Gibbons 2017; D’Arma 2018; Sjøvaag, Pedersen, and Owren 2019; Enli et al. 2019; Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019). However, few studies apply a uniform comparative framework to two cases, and articles combining stakeholder perspectives with multiple streams are almost non-existent (see, however, Herzog and Karppinen 2014; Steemers 2017).

Theoretical approach: multi-stakeholderism and multiple streams

A common trait in studies of media policy is that they identify an increasingly complex context for public broadcasting. The term ‘multi-stakeholderism’ describes the erosion of sector boundaries: Not just the public broadcasters and governing bodies are partners in negations over policy; instead, a broad range of rival media actors are empowered as legitimate discussion partners. The European Union is an active advocate of this trend, by stressing the necessity of involving ‘third parties’ in policy procedures regarding, among others, public broadcasters (Donders and Raats 2012; see also Donders 2012; Horowitz and Clark 2014). The interest of external stakeholders in the structure and obligations of public broadcasters is not new, but in the current situation, public broadcasters are reviewed against a backdrop of immense transformations, an ongoing crisis in both traditional print media and commercial broadcasting, as well as a multitude of complaints about their privileges and duties. While the dominant actors in previous reviews were cultural, political or broadcasting industry operators, now, in principle, the entire media industry claims to have a stake.

For many stakeholders in the private sector, the success of public broadcasters is not measured in the degree to which they fulfil their social and cultural obligations, but to what degree they are seen to facilitate or prevent growth in the media ecosystem (Raats and Pauwels 2013, see also Donders 2013). As sector boundaries break down, business models fault in the newspaper industry, and businesses struggle to get customers to pay for digital content, the activities of public broadcasters are viewed with a more critical eye (Brüggeman et al. 2016). Similarly, legacy commercial broadcasters see their business models under pressure from global streaming services (Evens and Donders 2018). However, a narrative seeing public broadcasting as a problem is not the only ideological position in the debate; it is paralleled by a coalition seeing public broadcasting as a solution, or at least an instrument to achieve social and cultural goals. A robust public broadcaster may, for example, be seen as a vehicle to sustain a functioning democracy (Curran and Aalberg 2012), or a mechanism to raise overall quality in the media market (Nielsen et al. 2016). In this article, we emphasize demands from three types of stakeholders; rival media businesses, creative industry actors representing potential partners and civil society stakeholders demanding greater content diversity. Although stakeholders’ interests differ and fluctuate, they tend to cluster in their dominant outlook, described by Van den Bulck and Donders (2014) as ‘advocacy coalitions’; long-term alliances characterized by deeply held beliefs. While traditional stakeholder analyses may be a bit short-sighted, the term advocacy coalitions acknowledge that opposing views on public broadcasting may be grounded in more fundamental perspectives on state intervention and what constitutes a good society (see also, Van den Bulck 2019).

Advocacy coalitions are useful for identifying alliances, but less helpful in analyzing the dynamics of specific processes. The second theoretical strand, the multiple streams approach (Kingdon 1995), goes beyond public broadcasting and focuses on the conditions for political change in general, that is, ‘how policies are made by government under conditions of ambiguity’ (Zahariadis 2014, 27). It is part of a field centred on the framing of ideas through social process and how these ideas shape political possibilities (Steen-Johnsen, Sundet, and Enjolras 2019), and its starting point is that policy-making is characterized by ambiguity and complexity where policymakers work under time constraints with multiple policy problems competing for attention (Kingdon 1995). Framing a problem and a given solution in a way that gains attention and seems efficient is therefore vital to promote policy change (Zahariadis 2014). The new media context exemplifies a situation where stakeholders fight to define the most prominent problems and the most adequate solutions.

The multiple streams approach includes five key terms to explain which problems and solutions set the policy agenda. The problem stream refers to conditions interpreted as problems requiring attention by policymakers, citizens, industry or critical organizations. In any given time, there are more problems than can be solved, and a central political accomplishment is to construct a condition as a problem. The policy stream consists of alternative solutions to the problem, often worked out in advance by specialists in policy communities, including bureaucrats and academics. Policymakers tend to favour problems that seem ‘solvable’, even though these are not necessarily the most important (Zahariadis 2014, 33). The politics stream, refers to the broader political context and zeitgeist (Zahariadis 2014, 34), that is ‘macro-political issues such as election results, changes of administration, interest group campaign or changes in public opinion, which makes one solution more applicable than the others’ (Herzog and Karppinen 2014, 421).

The multiple streams approach describes how the three streams often develop independently of each other and follow their own dynamic. Policy windows open up when the three streams join together, that is, when a problem is being singled out as important, a policy solution is available, and the political climate is pro-change (Cairney and Jones 2016, see also Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Whether policy change takes place in such windows depends on the skills and manoeuvring of policy entrepreneurs; individuals or organizations that manage to couple the three streams and pursue their goals (Mintrom and Norman 2009). As argued by Zahariadis (2014), the more successful entrepreneurs are those who have resources and access to policymakers and couple their interests in ways that address more overreaching problems. Public broadcasters have historically been resourceful policy entrepreneurs, successful in forming coalitions and defining collective frames on what the real problem is and how to solve it (Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019).

In this article, we combine the two approaches to capture conditions of policy change. While the advocacy coalitions framework theorizes and empirically tests change (Van den Bulck 2019), the focus is more on ideology than pragmatism, which in turn is better captured by the multiple stream approach. In sum, the combined perspective allows for analyses of how key stakeholders (entrepreneurs) seek value or ideological constellations to advance their arguments and interest, and how they work more practically to link political problem definitions (problem stream) to solutions (policy stream) to try to enable policy-makers (politics stream) and promote (or inhibit) change through policy windows.

Cases and method

The archetypical case in comparative politics is the nation-state or political subfields within such states (Gerring 2013, 5). Comparisons require that cases have something in common while differing on central variables. While Norway has been discussed as a ‘democratic corporatist’ state with a high degree of state intervention and support for public broadcasters, Hallin and Mancini (2004) placed the UK in the ‘liberal’ category, same as the US. Recent studies refine the categories but continue to place the two systems at some distance. Brüggemann et al. (2014) deem the ‘Nordic’ a distinct cluster, with Norway as its prototype, characterized by an inclusive press market, generous press subsidies and powerful public broadcasting (1056), while the UK is included in a ‘Central’ cluster with strong public broadcasting and low press subsidies (1056). In the Nordic ‘media welfare state’, there is a strong emphasis on consensual solutions (Syvertsen et al. 2014), whereas in Britain, the two-party system leads to more polarized debates.

The BBC and the NRK both have a broad remit, occupy a central cultural position, and are among the few PSBs without advertising (Van den Bulck and Raats 2018). In both countries, public service principles also guide the operations of some (semi-)commercial broadcasters. The most obvious difference is the volume of the domestic market: BBC serves 64 million people and exports globally, NRK serves 5 million Norwegian-speakers. A large domestic market and linguistic commonality is a great advantage in television. On the other hand, while there is in Britain a multitude of companies producing quality content, NRK occupies a more unique position in Norway, not least in its role as producer of acclaimed television drama.

This article applies a thematic policy analysis (Johannessen, Rafoss, and Rasmussen 2018). Sources are, first, political documents. In Britain, the DCMS Green paper (2015) and White Paper (DCMS 2016a) are the most important, but documents from the Parliament, BBC Trust, Ofcom and other bodies are also consulted. In Norway, the Government’s political platform (2013) is deemed the initial document paralleling the Green paper, whereas the hearing on NRK obligations (KUD 2014), the White papers on public service broadcasting (Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015), Meld. St. 15 (2016–2017)), and the Agreement on public service broadcasting (2016) are the most vital. The Green paper on media diversity (NOU 2017, 7), marks the end of the process analyzed. Documents on intervening policy streams, including the regulation of the commercial PSB-company (TV 2), are also consulted. Second, we have considered submissions from stakeholders. This is an overwhelming amount and more so in the UK, where only the main hearing attracted more than 190 000 responses (DCSM 2016b). Submissions from these categories are consulted in each country: a) rival media businesses (press, commercial broadcasting) b) creative industry actors representing potential partners for BBC/NRK (such as art, music, sports, digital platforms and the production sector), and c) civil society stakeholders (cultural, minority, education etc.). We have used the summaries provided and selected submissions to include vital actors in each category and have used media reports to get an overview. Third, we have considered the most important submissions from BBC (2015) and NRK (2014a; see also NRK Beta 2014).

Analysis

We turn now to the analysis of the two review processes, limited to 2015–2017 and 2013–2017 respectively. The BBC process is easier to delineate due to its regulation through a time-limited Royal Charter, whereas an unspecified Statement of Commitments regulates the NRK. The two processes have in common that a policy window opens after a general election and a political shift to the right. As noted in multiple streams literature, a change of government can give ‘motive and opportunity to turn solutions into policy’ (Cairney and Jones 2016, 40). We discuss each process through three stages: 1) Governments position themselves for change and the window opens, 2) mobilization and negotiations, where various advocacy coalitions mobilize to define ‘the real problem’ and offer solutions, 3) agreements are reached and debates ensue on how to resolve unsettled issues. In both cases, parallel and intervening policy streams influence how problems and solutions are framed. Stakeholders struggle to link (and de-link) various streams – problem, policy and politics – to mobilize for various solutions, while the BBC and the NRK, as professional policy entrepreneurs, work to construct coalitions where they appear less of a problem for competitors and more of a solution to the increasing presence of global platforms. The processes take place against a backdrop of significant changes in media landscapes, including global competition from streaming and internet-services, challenges to national media governance and the licence fee as a funding mechanism, and a broad array of criticism against media and broadcasters concerning issues such as impartiality, diversity and uneven playing fields.

The BBC charter review 2015 – 2017

Phase 1: positioning for radical change

Numerous problems and solutions compete for politicians’ attention, but for a policy window to open, several factors must coincide. In our analysis, the May 2015 election where the Conservative party came back with an overall majority, is seen as the opening of a policy window. The election represented a shift to the right and John Whittingdale, a former advisor to Margaret Thatcher was appointed Secretary of Culture, Media and Sports. Whittingdale had heard extensive criticism of the BBC in his previous role as Chairman of the parliamentary committee and made no secret of his neo-liberal views: ‘I am a free-market Conservative, and therefore begin with the presumption that generally things operate better if they are in private ownership and operate in a market’ (quoted in Wintour 2015). He saw BBCs broad remit to be ‘unnecessary in today’s world of proliferating choice – and indeed undesirable, as it disadvantaged commercial broadcasters lacking the BBC’s enormous funding advantage’ (ibid). As the BBC charter was about to expire, there was a historic opportunity for change. While the focus is on the Charter review, parallel policy streams influenced the construction of problems and solutions, most notably the ongoing Ofcom review (2014) of public service broadcasting. Ofcom discussed the role of public broadcasters in view of massive growth in online platforms and an increasingly competitive market, argued for a rebalancing of the relationship between the BBC and the production sector to strengthen creative industries, and questioned the extent to which public broadcasters met the needs of diverse and multicultural audiences, all problem definitions which played into the process.

In July 2015, a Green paper was launched questioning the BBC’s scope and remit. The paper pointed to the BBC as one of the nations ‘most trusted institutions’ (DCMS 2015, 2) and ‘much-loved by audiences’ (3), yet argued that ‘the level of public funding gave the BBC an unfair advantage and distorted audience shares in a way that undermined commercial business models’ and that ‘its provision of extensive free online content risks impacting a wider range of players’ (9). The rhetoric emphasized the BBC as a problem, too big, not distinct enough, a perspective that reflected the views of rival press and commercial television seeing the BBC as guilty of ‘online imperialism’ (Stanistreet 2015). The conservative papers greeted the Green paper wishing that ‘the BBC should emerge slimmer, more efficient and more accountable to those who pay its bills’ (The Times) and claimed that its activities were ‘crushing plurality and stifling debate’ (The Daily Mail) (cited from Greenslade 2015). A further indication of a shake-up was the expert panel appointed to aid the ministry, which included representatives of rival corporations without including outspoken defenders of the BBC (Barraclough 2015). Immediately before the Charter review, a controversial decision was also made that the BBC should take the cost of free licences for those over 75s from 2020, a substantial expense (House of Lords 2016).¹

Phase 2: consultations and negotiations

The BBC review was extensive with almost two hundred thousand submissions, extensive polling, focus groups, industry panels etc. As the summary notes, ‘the response was one of the largest ever received to a government consultation’ (DCMS 2016b, 2). The review also mobilized other institutions to set up inquiries that went beyond the agenda of the Green paper: The BBC governing body, the BBC Trust (2015, 6) drew on more than 50 000 responses in its consultations, the House of Lords (2016) conducted its own hearing, far more sympathetic to the BBC, hence the title ‘Reith not Revolution’, and an independent inquiry charged by film producer Lord David Puttnam (Freeman and Goblot 2018). These reviews mobilized academics, industry experts and civil society groups representing an advocacy coalition more supportive of the BBC, yet also channelling demands for areas where the BBC should reform.

In the consultations, three types of criticism of BBCs interpretation of its remit are paramount. First, there is criticism from rival media businesses seeing the BBC as a competitor and wanting to restrict its remit. For example, ITV argued the case for a BBC ‘which thinks and acts differently to the commercial market’ (ITV, 9) and stakeholders such as Sky and the Guardian Media Group claimed that BBC One and BBC Online were becoming less distinctive, crowding out commercial services with soft-focus content. The News Media Association claimed that the BBCs activities ‘risks damaging the local press sector, which is currently in transition to a sustainable digital world’ (DCMS 2016b, 14). Second, there is criticism that the BBC did not sufficiently support creative industries and potential partners. This also included criticism from competitors seeing the BBC both as a problem and a solution, for example, the Commercial Broadcasting Association wanting the BBC to commission more externally (22) and Virgin Media complaining that popular BBC content was not made available on its platform (14). While potential partners criticized the BBC, they also emphasized its massive contributions (see for example UK Music and Creative Industries Federation quoted in DCMS 2016, 13). The third type of criticism was also more pro-BBC, while demanding a more diverse output. Many criticized the BBC for not adequately serving ‘young people, less well-off people and those from Black or other minority ethnic communities’ (16). The Campaign for Broadcasting Equality argued for specific diversity obligations (17).

When the evidence is weighed up, it becomes clear that policy entrepreneurs from rival businesses muster little support beyond their own ranks. An overwhelming majority of respondents favoured a universal licence fee, supported BBCs expansion, believed that the BBC had a mostly positive impact on the market and that its content ‘is sufficiently high quality and distinctive from that of other broadcasters’ (DCMS 2016b, 19). ‘Fewer than 3 per cent felt that the BBC should not seek to be universal’ (9). The evidence submitted shows how the BBC and its supportive advocacy coalition appropriate the criticism that represents the least disruption, circumvent areas where the BBC is seen as a problem and present the BBC as a solution to other problems: it can nurture the creative industries, be a platform for strengthening Britain’s tech interests against global giants, and assume a greater role in serving minority audiences and extending diversity (see also D’Arma 2018). As a professional policy entrepreneur, the BBC feeds its own definitions of problems and solutions into the policy stream. In its submission, it is explicitly self-critical, stating for example that it needs ‘to become a better partner working in a more genuinely collaborative way with like-minded institutions, with suppliers, individuals and competitors’ (BBC 2015, 16). The submission mentions cultural and educational institutions, but also competitors, local newspapers and other suppliers. The BBC also suggests establishing its production arm as commercial subsidiary and remove in-house guarantees (10).

It is also noteworthy how expert reports commissioned by the Government retain some of the initial problem formulations while also helping to reframe the problem. The report on market impact and distinctiveness (Oliver & Ohlbaum and Oxera 2016) suggested that the BBC may have a negative market impact, especially for individual operators, yet also stressed that the BBC is ‘just about the only UK organisation with the scale and brand resonance to counter the potentially negative consequences of the forces of globalisation and convergence in the UK’ and that the BBC was ‘the only UK media brand with any hope of gaining traction and influence overseas’ (25).

Phase 3: (Temporary) closure: a moderate solution

When the Government White Paper emerged in May 2016, the radical proposals were significantly moderated. The Economist (2016) titled its story: ‘Leaving Auntie Alone: The BBC dodges an Existential Crisis’ and other media echoed. The result did not reflect a national mood change, referring to the notion that ‘a fairly large number of individuals in a given country tend to think along common lines and that the mood swings from time to time’ (Zaharidas 2014, 34). Yet, there are concessions to each type of criticism and unsettled issues left to future bodies to decide.

First, although the White paper proposes no limitations to the remit, it warns the BBC to ‘tread more lightly and considerately around its commercial competitors’ and ‘promote positive outcomes for others as well as for itself whenever possible’ (DCMS 2016a, 64). No quotas were proposed and there should still be ‘full range of subjects and stories’, yet there is criticism of ‘soft’ content in online services (36). The government also expects the BBC to support and invigorate local news provisions through partnerships (73). Second, the BBC is required to extend its role as a cornerstone in the creative industry. Although there are ‘unintended’ negative consequences, the White Paper states that BBC can be ‘a force of good for the broadcasting sector and the creative industries as a whole’ (64). Referring to Google, Netflix, Amazon, it says that it wants a ‘thriving, successful BBC enabling a thriving, successful and diverse UK media landscape’ (66). A key measure, and the most radical change in the White Paper, is to open all BBC funding for television except news and current affairs to competitive tender (previously limited to 50 per cent) (71). Third, the White Paper mentions several new public interest objectives for the BBC including supporting learning for people of all ages, reflecting UK cultures and values abroad, and reflecting, representing and serving diverse communities (31). There is a strengthened obligation to serve minority ethnic and regional audiences better and a commitment to diversity is enshrined in the Charter (7).

Although no restrictions are proposed in the remit, a change in the regulatory oversight of the BBC implies that the thorny issues do not go away. The government proposes that the BBC’s market impacts ‘are assessed more widely and effectively’ by abolishing BBC Trust and hand all regulatory oversight to Ofcom (6), adopting the views of an expert commission (Clementi 2016) and supported by the production sector’s central lobby organization (PACT). Ofcom (2016) in turn promises ‘a clean break with the old regime’ (2). The potential risk of politicization of BBC Governance represented by this measure stands in contrast to the situation in Norway, where the NRK is externally regulated, but where attempts were made to depoliticize regulation and oversight (below).

The proposals are broadly welcomed. A Labour Party representative is relieved that Whittingdale has ‘not got his way’, the Creative Industries Federation is positive that ‘the BBC’s role and obligations at the heart of the UK’s creative industry has been expressly recognized for the first time’ (Mann 2016), and the extended obligation towards diversity is welcomed by campaigners (Plunkett 2016). The Director-General of the BBC says that the White paper: ‘delivers a mandate for the strong, creative BBC the public believe in. A BBC that will be good for the creative industries – and most importantly of all, for Britain’ (BBC 2016). And on 1 January 2017, the new Charter comes into force for 11 years.

The NRK media policy review 2013 – 2017

Phase 1: positioning for radical change

In the NRK case, the process to be analyzed also begins with a general election and a turn to the right; in 2013 a government was formed by the Conservative and right-wing Progress Party. After eight years with a Social Democratic and ‘NRK-friendly government’, the newcomers declared that the NRK’s funding model should be reviewed and that it would limit the NRK’s ‘ability to use its secure financial position to weaken the activities of independent institutions’ (Norwegian Government 2013, 52, see also Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019). Both government parties criticized the NRK’s broad remit, but historically, the Progress party was the one to stand outside the consensus; in its 2013 action plan, it suggested privatizing the NRK and turning it into a commercial corporation (FrP 2013, 83). Thorhild Widvey, the Secretary of Culture from the Conservative Party, said that she would be guided by Conservative principles of ‘increased competition, faith in the market and freedom for the individual’ (quoted in NRK 2014b), yet also expressed hope that the debate would lead to ‘the broadest possible consensus on NRK’s role’ (Widvey 2014).

In Norway, the analysed process begins with the government declaration, followed by a hearing on the obligations of NRK and a White paper on public broadcasting (Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015)) and reaching a temporary closure with a White paper on NRK (Meld. St. 15 (2016–2017)), although issues concerning NRK was also discussed in the report from the Media Diversity Commission (NOU 2017, 7) published a few months later in 2017. Intervening policy streams helped frame the definition of the problem also in the NRK’s case, for example, the ongoing discussion of how to aid a struggling national press, which resulted in a separate decision on zero-rated VAT on digital media in 2016 (Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019; Enli et al. 2019), and the ongoing discussion of how to handle the commercial public broadcaster TV 2’s financial situation. These intervening policy streams contribute to a problem construction that initially circulates across the field, particularly that the NRK’s broad remit is a problem threatening online business models (see also Sjøvaag, Pedersen, and Owren 2019). A report from the Media Businesses’ Association claimed that the NRK was ‘a giant in the Norwegian media market’, and, if not curbed, would reduce media diversity (MBL 2014a, 4) and one tabloid claimed: ‘NRK is about to become the only fat sow in the Norwegian media industry’ and ‘NRK is as much a threat to pluralism as it is a guarantor’ (Ramnefjell 2015).

Phase 2: consultations and negotiations

While in Britain there were several parallel inquiries in connection with the charter renewal, the Norwegian pattern is rather one of sequential inquiries; difficult questions are pulled out of the initial hearing and left to new committees, as consensus builds slowly. In the spring of 2014, the Government begins hearings in preparation for a White paper and organises a consultation process, the first element, while a second element is a 2014 separate hearing on NRK obligations. The White paper is published in June 2015 (Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015)), and already in September the same year, a Media Diversity Commission is appointed to deal with unresolved issues, publishing its final report in March 2017 (NOU 2017, 7), a third element. This commission included representatives from all major media companies, including NRK and TV 2, and the industry lobbyist (MBL). Hence, the very question of public-private collaboration and competition – and NRK’s role in it – was handed to the players to solve, and in a context where the NRK was outnumbered. However, an element, a spontaneous intervention from a parliamentary majority (minus the governments’ own Progress Party) profoundly limited the mandate of this commission by passing a resolution in support of the NRK in February 2016 (below). Fifth, a last building block is the political treatment of the White paper on NRK (Meld. St. 15 (2015–2017)), published by the Government in December 2016 and debated in Parliament the following autumn. Throughout these many processes a broad range of stakeholders present their views, the NRK conduct its own hearing, and there are widespread polling and numerous expert commissions.

The three types of criticism concerning competition, creative industry and content diversity, are present also in Norway, although to a lesser degree, and with different nuances. First, the strongest criticism comes from rival media businesses seeing the NRK as a competitor, supporting the governments’ ambition to restrict its remit. In their submissions, commercial television and news media companies criticized the NRK for getting too dominant and stressed the need to downscale and define NRK’s core activities (e.g. MBL 2014b; Schibsted 2014; MTG 2014; TV 2 2014). In particular, they wanted to restrict NRK’s remit online. The two other types of criticism are more loyal in stressing the NRK’s important position but wanting more in terms of partnership and content. Concerning creative industries, submissions from Norwegian music producers demanded that the NRK should be required to play 50 per cent Norwegian music (quoted in Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015), 68) and external producers demanded a much higher level of externally commissioned content (117). Concerning the third type of criticism from minorities and regional interests, the White Paper notes that ‘The consultation shows many interest groups and groups representing specific interests wanting to continue, change or clarify NRK’s content obligations’ (67). Yet, the only concerted criticism comes from the lobby of disabled demanding a much greater responsibility to design services of universal accessibility (63), although the NRKs responsibility for linguistic and ethnic minorities are also discussed.

As the process moves on, some issues are solved, some problems are abandoned, others are pushed to the next stage, but the general picture is that the advocacy coalition supporting NRK is gaining strength. Despite criticism in the hearing on NRK obligations, a large majority of respondents supports that the NRK keep its broad remit. The 2015 White paper strengthened some of the NRK obligations (see phase 3) but proposed no restrictions of the remit; the NRK should continue to produce popular programmes as well as using online platforms to fulfil its public service mandate. The intervention in 2016 by a parliamentary majority intervention stated that they wanted ‘a strong and innovative NRK’ (Agreement on public service 2016), pointing the finger at the industry’s complaints, stating that ‘it will be a great fallacy to blame a strong NRK for the difficult situation of the printed newspapers’ before concluding: ‘On the contrary, it is important to have a media policy that can address the need for both strong newspapers and a strong NRK, in the face of tough international competition on television, online and in social media’ (ibid). The 2017 Media Diversity Commission concluded by giving NRK a robust room of manoeuvring, while, at the same time, suggesting increased state support for private media players (NOU 2017, 7). Finally, the 2016 White paper summed up NRK’s obligations without making any great changes or limitations in its remit (Meld. St. 15 2016–2017).

The result is also attributable to the fact that expert evidence went against the government’s initial presumptions. The Secretary of Culture commissioned several reports and analyses during 2014, addressing, among others, the consequences of different funding models for the NRK (Skogli et al. 2014), and NRK’s competitive effect on the media market (Gabrielsen et al. 2015, see also Osloeconomics 2015a, 2015b; Sjøvaag, Pedersen, and Owren 2019), but none of these supported the initial agenda that the NRK’s remit should be radically changed or sharply narrowed.

Through these many reviews, the NRK operates as a skilled and resourceful policy entrepreneur, attending public and written consultations and policy meetings, presenting key frames and interests in news interviews and op-eds, and, not the least, having the Broadcasting Director represented in the Media Diversity Commission. Consequently, NRK had several channels to present its framing of the main problem and the best solutions. For instance, NRK incorporated the criticism from various stakeholders and argued for a broader definition of its remit to ‘secure NRK the opportunity to develop content dynamically according to the audiences’ interests’ (NRK 2014a, 1). Furthermore, NRK consequently framed the large, international players – Facebook, YouTube, Google and Netflix – as the real problem and stressed: ‘Norwegian media has gone from a Norwegian competition to world championship when it comes to peoples’ time and attention. In this situation, public service broadcasters are one of the most important media and cultural policy instrument the state has’ (2, see also NRK Beta 2014). This view drew support by a broad alliance of stakeholders. In short, NRK successfully fostered a collective frame that highlighted its importance as a bulwark against international players, serving not only the audience but also the media industry and the larger society (see also, Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019).

Phase 3: (Temporary) closure: a moderate solution

The third phase is more drawn-out in Norway; there is not one final solution, but several milestones. As we have noted, the government’s initial problem formulation, that the NRK was a problem for private operators, is driving the early phase of the White Paper, and when it is not solved there, is pushed to the Media Diversity Commission, but still with no result in terms of a proposal to restrict the NRK’s remit. Instead the advocacy coalition in support of the NRK manifests itself, first in the stakeholder mobilization in the 2014 hearing on NRK obligations, and second in the intervention by a parliamentary majority. We have also seen how the radical agenda is circumvented by measures to support private and commercial media, an intervening policy stream which lessens the pressure on the NRK.

Although no restrictions were made to NRK’s remit, concessions were made to appropriate criticism. First, the NRK competitors got an end to NRK’s right to have online advertising, which was not acted on by the NRK, but nevertheless was an annoyance (Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015), 110). They also got a clause obliging the NRK to take ‘an independent responsibility for contributing to the Norwegian media diversity’ (10), exemplified by a duty to direct traffic to local newspapers. Second, changes were suggested in terms of partnerships and creative industries, as NRK was obliged to play more Norwegian music and increase commissioning from external producers. In line with the suggestion from NRK, the share should be increased to 40 per cent by the year of 2020 (67). Third, the NRK’s responsibility for designing services of universal accessibility was written into the remit (65).

In Britain’s case, there was a change of governance to Ofcom as regulator, which may lead to more politicized regulation. The comparative analysis shows that the regulation of NRK is already politicized, several bodies intervene: government, parliament, and the Norwegian Media Authority, which oversees public service obligations. In the Norwegian case, attempts were made to make the regulation of the NRK less politicized and alternative governance models were discussed (KUD 2014), however, it came to nothing (Meld. St. 38 (2014–2015)). We also see that the political interventions are mostly in support of, and not to the detriment of the NRK.

The 2015 White paper was well received by stakeholders. NRK’s Broadcasting Director claimed that the white paper ‘provides a basis for developing a modern, innovative and independent public broadcaster’ (Eriksen, quoted in Staude 2015). The CEO of Schibsted, one of Norway’s the largest media companies, complemented the paper for ‘emphazising NRK’s responsible for providing media diversity’ (Munch, quoted in Staude 2015). In fact, the only strongly disappointed stakeholder was the Progress party in government, still outside the consensus.

Conclusion: entrepreneurs, coalitions and policy windows

In this article, we explore factors explaining why policy change is often hard to achieve even when policy actors explicitly throw their weight behind it, drawing on the recent reviews of BBC and NRK. Combining the approaches of multi-stakeholderism and advocacy coalitions with that of multiple streams, we discuss how key stakeholders operated to promote and inhibit change by defining – and re-defining – problems and solutions. Combining the two approaches allows us to identify both long-standing ideological alliances between key stakeholders as they emerge in policy debates, but also how stakeholders operate more pragmatically in these debates by coupling the separate streams of problems, policies, and politics.

Three key findings can be drawn from our analysis: First, we find the public service institutions to be skilful entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), both in terms of shifting collective frames on what the real problem is and how to solve it and in terms of mobilizing stakeholder coalitions (Van den Bulck and Donders 2014). The analysis shows how the two public broadcasters resourcefully monitor and feed their own interest into the problem and policy streams, and how they access policy-makers through public consultations, press debates, and even, in the case of NRK, public commissions. Consequently, both public broadcasters have several arenas to couple their frames of problems and solutions and influence politics. Evidently, the analysis identifies how the two corporations re-define themselves as solutions rather than problems in a broader cultural sphere: both stress their role as attractive partners for the creative industry and as vehicles of diversity, learning and integration. Both the BBC and the NRK also seize on the frame that the real problem is the global platforms and argue that these are a more significant threat to diversity than public broadcasters, thus widening the problem frame (see also, Sundet, Ihlebæk, and Steen-Johnsen 2019).

Second, and closely connected, we find the issue of the public service remit to mobilize broad coalitions of stakeholders: from rival media businesses to creative industry actors and civil society stakeholders. Although stakeholders’ interests cluster around different positions, we find an overwhelming number in support of a broad public service remit: In the BBC case, less than 3 per cent of the submissions felt the public broadcaster should not seek to be universal, while a large majority supported the same view in the hearing on NRK’s obligations. In sum, these findings indicate that the governments failed to couple their initiatives for radically changing the public service remit with solutions that fit the ‘national mood’ in the politics stream (Zahariadis 2014, 34). Moreover, strong advocacy coalitions seem to impair radical shifts in policy-making as they build on long-standing ideological alliances, which are not easily changed.

Third, we find the combination of public broadcasters as skilful entrepreneurs and advocacy coalitions to be efficient tools for closing policy windows, by re-defining problem and policy streams, and defocusing politics streams. As the analysis show, the main goal of the BBC and the NRK in the current processes was not to promote change through policy windows, but rather to inhibit change, and find ways to un-couple or at least re-define the problem and policy streams. In sum, the combined perspective has allowed us to analyze how key stakeholders (entrepreneurs) seek value or ideological constellations to advance their arguments and interest, and how they work more practically to link political problem definitions (problem stream) to solutions (policy stream) to try to enable policy makers (politics stream) and promote (or inhibit) change through policy windows.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Research Assistant Eva Frederiksen Solum, Research Director Kari Steen-Johnsen and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments to previous versions of this manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Norges Forskningsråd [259161].

Notes on contributors

Vilde Schanke Sundet

Vilde Schanke Sundet (PhD) is a researcher in media and communication at the University of Oslo, and a guest researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo. She has published extensively on topics of media production, television, active audiences and media policy, in journals such as European Journal of Communication, Media, Culture and Society, Media History and Critical Studies in Television. Sundet has a forthcoming book on television drama and streaming (Palgrave, 2021). See more: http://www.vildessundet.org

Trine Syvertsen

Trine Syvertsen (PhD) is a professor of media studies at the University of Oslo. She has published extensively on topics of online media, television, media policy, media history and media resistance. Syvertsen is author of several books including Digital Detox: The Politics of Disconnecting (Emerald, 2020) and Media Resistance: Dislike, Protest, Abstention (Palgrave, 2017). She is co-author of The Media Welfare State: Nordic Media in the Digital Era (Univ. of Michigan Press, 2014). See more: http://www.hf.uio.no/imk/personer/vit/trinesy/

Notes

1. BBC introduced the new licence scheme for those over 75s August 2020, after some delay because of the Covid-19 pandemic (BBC 2020).