Beyond the limits of the law: a Christological reading of Christopher Nolan's The Dark Knight

Abstract

Close readings of popular culture texts can illuminate the complexities of the narratives of law and justice that influence our legal imaginary, and provide a means for re-reading our concepts of legality. This article explores Christopher Nolan's The Dark Knight Trilogy not as a depiction of a traditional superhero who conservatively operates to supplement the legal system's goal of justice and restore the social order disrupted by criminals, villains or some other extraordinary threat, but as a non-hero who proposes a critique of justice and legality itself. It reads Batman as a Christological figure specifically because of his actions at the conclusion of the second film, The Dark Knight, in taking the blame for the murders committed by District Attorney Harvey Dent. In exploring what is an uncomfortable conclusion to the second film, I unpack how Nolan ‘makes strange’ the traditional superhero mythos and the narratives they tell of justice, law and legality. In this sense, The Dark Knight can be read as a Christological response to, as much as an expansion and fulfilment of, the rise of the superhero film and the superhero as a figure of the exception beyond the law.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank and acknowledge Professor William MacNeil, Dr Kieran Tranter, Dr Edwin Bikundo and Rev Dr Andrew Peters for their helpful comments on early drafts of this article, as well as the extremely insightful comments and interventions from the three anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to Dr Cassandra Sharp for the invitation to contribute to this special issue.

Notes

¹Consisting of Batman Begins (2005), The Dark Knight (2008) and The Dark Knight Rises (2012).

²See, for example, O'Neil (2012).

³Žižek (2012a), Žižek (2012b).

⁴Žižek (2012a).

⁵This reading of the superhero conforms to Joseph Campbell's notion of the hero myth: see Campbell (1973); Peters (2007). See also Lawrence and Jewett (2002) on the American monomyth.

⁶On ‘making strange’ as a mode of Cultural Legal Studies, see Peters (2016).

⁷As such, this article follows the work of William MacNeil and others who seek to explore texts of popular culture as a means of re-reading and resignifying law and legal theory. See MacNeil (2007) and MacNeil (2012).

⁸Christiansen (2000), p 107; Shaun Trent noted in 2009 that since 2001 more comics-based superhero movies have been released than in all prior years combined: Trent (2009), p 105. The number and intensity of films released since then has, if anything, increased with the range of Marvel films in the Avengers Franchise (Iron Man 2 (2010), Thor (2011), Captain America (2011), Marvel's the Avengers (2012), Iron Man 3 (2013), Thor: The Dark World (2013), Guardians of the Galaxy (2014), Captain America: Winter Soldier (2014), Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015)) the Superman reboot with Man of Steel (2013) (and Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice coming in 2016) and Spider-Man reboot with The Amazing Spider-Man (2012) and The Amazing Spider-Man 2 (2014 ) and not to mention the conclusion to Nolan's trilogy The Dark Knight Rises (2012). See also Gray and Kaklamanidou on the ‘superhero decade’: Gray and Kaklamanidou (2011), p 1.

⁹For a recent discussion of superheroes in wartime, see Bainbridge (2015).

¹⁰‘It is the first true, post 9/11 superhero movie; one that looks at the use of chaos as a tool of terrorism while exploring the paper thin line between good and evil.' Crouse (2009).

¹¹Ackerman (2008); Klavan (2008); Allen (2008); Bolt (2008); NY Times Editorial Board (2008). See the discussion of these claims by Ip (2011).

¹²See in particular Klavan (2008), Ackerman (2008) and Bolt (2008).

¹³Cogitamus (2008); Orr (2008); Yglesias (2008). See also Ip (2011) who specifically analyses the post-9/11 context of The Dark Knight and proposes it as a critique of the Bush Administration's tactics.

¹⁴Trent (2009); Phillips (2010); Žižek (2010), pp 59–61; Schlegel and Habermann (2011); Muller (2011); Gaine (2011).

¹⁵Ip (2011), p 213.

¹⁶As Ip notes, the Joker, however, is an imperfect fit for Osama Bin Laden (despite the claims of critics like Klavan) and instead Ra's Al Ghul, the villain from Batman Begins, is a better fit. See Ip (2011), p 213, note 20. See also Marano (2008) referred to by Ip.

¹⁷Ip (2011), p 213.

¹⁸Nichols (2011), p 236; Cohn (2001), p 42.

¹⁹Nichols sees Nolan's The Dark Knight in particular as an updated version of the combat myth with Batman representing democratic society and the Joker, chaos and terrorism: Nichols (2011), pp 236–237. See also Reynolds discussion of the ‘extra effort’ motif in the superhero genre: Reynolds (1992), pp 41, 65–66.

²⁰For a discussion of the interdependence of the superhero and the supervillain in relation to law see Peters (2012).

²¹Vollum and Adkinson (2003), pp 100–101; Reyns and Henson (2010), p 51.

²²Vollum and Adkinson (2003), pp 100–101; Reyns and Henson (2010), p 51.

²³Bainbridge notes that Spider-Man in particular spends as much time trying to avoid the police as fighting the supervillains and Miettinen refers to Frank Miller's The Dark Knight Returns where Superman pontificates about Batman's acceptance of the superheroes as criminals. See Bainbridge (2012), pp 225–226; Miettinen (2011), p 135; Miller et al. (1986).

²⁴Schmitt (2005); Agamben (1998); Agamben (2005). The use of Agamben's work on the ‘state of exception’ to analyse superheroes in general, and particularly based on the status of their super-powers, is taken up by Miettinin and Bainbridge: see Miettinin (2011); Bainbridge (2012); Bainbridge (2015). The connection of Agamben's broader work on the concept of homo sacer is also examined by Nayar (2006) (referred to by Bainbridge) and Spanakos (2011) (in relation to the Incredible Hulk). McGowan also draws on Schmitt and Agamben in his ‘exceptional’ (pun intended) analysis of The Dark Knight: McGowan (2009).

²⁵Bainbridge (2012), pp 218–219, 226–227. McGowan also claims the non-conformity to the ‘laws of nature’ as a basis for the exceptionality of superheroes such as Superman: see McGowan (2009), paras 3–4.

²⁶Though see McGowan's reference to Hegel who describes the hero (who is a law unto himself) as the antithesis to modern law: McGowan (2009), paras 4–5.

²⁷Schmitt (2005), p 5.

²⁸Ip (2011), p 227.

²⁹Agamben (2005), p 47.

³⁰See Sharp (2012), p 360. See also Taslitz (2004) referred to by Sharp.

³¹Schmitt (2014).

³²Agamben (2005), p 41.

³³Agamben (2005), p 42.

³⁴Nissen (1877), p 105, quoted in Agamben (2005), p 45. Nissen goes on to say

When the law was no longer able to perform its highest task – to guarantee the public welfare – the law was abandoned in favor of expediency, and just as in situations of necessity the magistrates were released from the restrictions of the law by a senatus consultum, so in the most extreme situations the law was set aside. Instead of transgressing it, when it became harmful it was cleared away; it was suspended through a iustitium. (Nissen 1877, p 98 quoted in Agamben 2005, p 45)

 

³⁵Agamben (2005), p 46 quoting Nissen (1877), p 76.

³⁶A point which Rachel Dawes makes, clarifying Harvey's reference to Rome by noting that ‘the last man that they appointed to protect the republic was named Caesar and he never gave up his power'. See also Ip (2011), pp 227–228.

³⁷Agamben (2005), p 50. See Peters (2014), p 122 and pp 117–125 where this analysis was initially developed. Jason Bainbridge has recently made a similar claim in relation to the role of a number of superheroes more generally such as Captain America (see Bainbridge (2015), pp 12–13) and, as noted above, has attempted to think the superhero in general through the concept of the state of exception (Bainbridge (2012) and Bainbridge (2015)). However, whilst superheroes, by their very nature, tend to respond to emergencies and extreme acts beyond the law, this does not mean that they are always (or even regularly) ‘appropriating the sovereign decision’ – rather, in many cases they are either part of the mechanisms of the state (even if only loosely tied) or engaging in criminal activity. In considering Batman's actions in relation to the roles of dictatorship and the doctrine of the state of exception the debate moves away from the ‘criminality’ of his actions (which, of course, is the initial response) because the issue of sovereignty is not about criminal law but constitutional law (though this emphasises the ambiguous and exceptional relation of the sovereign to the order of law itself). The question of the ‘legitimacy’ of Batman's actions, in the same sense, is founded not on an operation with the police or a popular proclamation of Roman dictator, but Batman's appropriation of the sovereign decision – his ability to stand in the place of the sovereign and declare the state of exception. This claim is problematised in the film where Harvey Dent at the press conference acknowledges that Batman is an outlaw who, one day, should answer for the crimes he has committed. What is interesting, however, is the way Agamben ties the figure of the ‘outlaw’ to the ‘sovereign’ – see Agamben (1998), pp 104–115.

³⁸For a consideration of the way Nolan's films transform or cross genre boundaries see McGowan (2012). See also Johnson (2014) who discusses a number of ways that Nolan's construction of Batman differs quite specifically from the superhero canon and mythos. On the concept of ‘making strange’ see Peters (2016).

³⁹See Peters (2007).

⁴⁰See Genesis 18: 16–33.

⁴¹In Batman Begins, Ra's Al Ghul (known at the time as Ducard) explains to Bruce Wayne that ‘[c]rime cannot be tolerated. Criminals thrive on the indulgence of society's “understanding”.’

⁴²Bellinger (2009), para 5. Cf. Nichols (2011), p 238.

⁴³Bellinger (2009), paras 5–6, 9.

⁴⁴Bellinger (2009), para 9.

⁴⁵Žižek (2010), p 60.

⁴⁶McGowan (2009), para 23.

⁴⁷McGowan (2009), para 24; Kant (1998), p 59; Kant (1996).

⁴⁸As McGowan notes, ‘adherence to the law designed to procure some object or some ultimate good leaves one inevitably bereft of freedom'. (2009), para 30. Kant outlines this point in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals where he claims that

[i]f the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law – consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects – heteronomy always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. (Kant 1996, p 89; quoted by McGowan)

 

⁴⁹In this sense, McGowan argues that the Joker encompasses a truly consistent ethical position. That is, following the Kantian position, the Joker encourages or provides the opportunity for individuals to make a decision that is not about their own self-interest but a following of the moral law for the sake of the moral law (that is, an adherence to the categorical imperative). McGowan acknowledges that the Joker himself would appear to hold a position that Kant believes cannot exist for humanity (that of the figure of diabolical evil who elevates evil to his good). However, he also points out (drawing on Alenka Zupančič’s reading of Jacques Lacan's famous essay ‘Kant avec Sade’) the structural identity between the position of diabolic evil and the supreme good. That is, the person who follows the law for the sake of the law is structurally the same as the person who commits evil not for any gain but for the sake of evil itself: McGowan (2009), para 30; Zupančič (2000), p 92; Lacan (1989). Following McGowan, then, one way of reading the outcome of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ on the ferries, where neither the ferry of criminals nor the ferry of citizens actually pulls the trigger, is to see this as a breaking out of the calculating mechanisms of a utilitarian pathology (though McGowan notes the way Nolan complexifies the naïve version of this reading in the film). As such, the decision not to blow each other up could be read as a following of the moral law for its own sake. The problem, again, with that reading is that if we turn to game theory (from which the prisoner's dilemma scenario itself arises), then it is directly because of one's self-interest that we should take the more noble action (in the prisoner's dilemma of not ratting out your partner in crime, in this circumstance of not blowing up the other boat). As such, despite the supposed potential for the Joker's actions providing a means to a deontological ethics, the scenarios themselves are still based on consequentialist actions – which indicates that the Joker (and this is hardly surprising) is not really encouraging or embodying a Kantian ethic at all.

⁵⁰McGowan (2009), para 46.

⁵¹Later in the film, when the Joker eventually provides the addresses where Harvey Dent and Rachel Dawes are being held, he provides the correct addresses but inverts them. The result is that Batman's decision to save Rachel results in him saving Harvey. Finally, in Batman's concluding showdown with the Joker, there are a number of hostages trapped in a high-rise building. The police are about to enter the building as they can see who they believe to be the hostages being held captive by men with clown masks (as were used by the Joker's men in the bank heist at the beginning of the film). However, it is the hostages that are wearing the clown masks with guns taped to their hands. This would have resulted, without the intervention of Batman, in the police killing the hostages when they failed to down ‘their’ weapons.

⁵²It is important to note that McGowan's analysis of this scene is based on a print version of the script of the film and not the film itself. In the script, the Joker opens this dialogue with ‘I don't have a plan.’ In the film itself, this is transfigured into the question posed to Harvey ‘Do I really look like a guy with a plan?’ The change is important (and goes to Ledger's brilliant interpretation of the character) because it fits with the Joker's play on the truth. See McGowan (2009), para 29.

⁵³The question raised by Dent is accusatory, indicating that it was the Joker's plan that resulted in the death of Rachel (which of course is true). The Joker magnificently deflects this accusation by posing the question above and asking Dent to make a judgment about whether the accusation makes sense. He never answers the question himself.

⁵⁴See, for example, Phillips (2010), pp 33–35, McGowan (2009) note 15 and Nichols (2011), p 241 who describes this as a neat summary of ‘the Joker's sole motive’.

⁵⁵See Hobbes (1952) chapter XIII, pp 84–86.

⁵⁶Hobbes (1952) chapters XIII and XVII, pp 84–86, 99–101 (in particular pp 100–101).

⁵⁷Milbank (2003), pp 36–38 and chapter 2 in general. For the two classic analyses of the relation between violence and the law see Benjamin (1986) and Cover (1986).

⁵⁸Hobbes (1952) Introduction and Chapter XVII, pp 47, 99–101.

⁵⁹Agamben (1998), p 106; Hobbes (1952), chapter 21, pp 112–117 (in particular pp 113–114).

⁶⁰Agamben (1998), p 109. Note also that in his qualification of Hobbes, Agamben claims that the political realm is not constituted in relation to citizens’ rights, free will and social contracts, but that ‘from the point of view of sovereignty only bare life is authentically political’. That is, ‘Sovereign violence is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the state.’ Agamben (1998), pp 106–107.

⁶¹See, for example, Alan Moore's Batman: The Killing Joke, which works through the structural similarities of The Joker and Batman: Moore et al. (1988).

⁶²For discussion of the connections between justice and penance in Western law see Sharp (2011).

⁶³As such, Batman's ethical stance in refusing to kill the Joker itself shows the radicality of the position of the Batman. This is in contrast to the supposed ethical nature of the Joker. It is also in contrast to the previous filmic rendition of the showdown between Batman and the Joker in Tim Burton's Batman (1989) where the Joker, in the end, does fall to his death.

⁶⁴RICO refers to the US Racketeer Influenced and Criminal Organizations (RICO) Act 18 United States Code chapter 96. Whilst this is a federal Act (and thus Harvey Dent, as a District Attorney, would not be able to bring proceedings under it) most US States have enacted similar legislation. See, for example, the New York Penal Code Article 460.

⁶⁵In this sense, we see a reference to another pop culture icon, ranging from Atticus Finch to Perry Mason. It is interesting to note this connection, which becomes quite specific in The Dark Knight, of the role of the superhero and the role of the heroic lawyer. Whilst in the Batman franchise these characters are divided between Batman and Harvey Dent, comic books have demonstrated more explicitly this connection in the roles of lawyer-superheroes such as Daredevil and She-hulk. For discussion of the ‘heroic lawyer’ in popular culture see, for example: Asimow (1996); Bainbridge (2006); Kamir (2005); Kamir (2009). Kamir notes the connection between the ‘heroic lawyer’ in popular culture and the genre of ‘the western’, a connection which Manderson pushes forward to the superhero genre. See Kamir (2005) and Manderson (2011). For a discussion of Daredevil as lawyer and superhero see Bainbridge (2007) and Sharp (2012). For an analysis of She-Hulk, see Mitchell (2015).

⁶⁶See, for example, Berger's discussion of the precariousness of the criminal law's ability to determine justice itself: Berger (2008), pp 107–112.

⁶⁷In a number of early scenes in the film, we find Harvey leaving what would be important decisions up to a toss of his father's lucky coin. After he confesses to being Batman and is being taken into custody he gives the coin to Rachel and the audience learns that it is a two-headed coin. Instead of leaving things to chance Harvey ‘made his own luck’ (via the process of appearing to leave things to chance). After Rachel's death, one side of the coin is disfigured leaving a clear head on one side and a scarred/blackened image on the other – as such, the odds have changed.

⁶⁸In one sense, Dent's invocation of the justice of chaos is a hearkening back to the medieval ‘trial by ordeal’ where the judgment occurs as a result of a particular process without decision-making occurring by a (human) judge. Rather, the outcome of the trial is supposedly determined by God in heaven. On earth, all we receive is the evidence of the decision one way or another (if someone thrown into the lake sinks and drowns then they were not a witch and will enter into heaven; if they float then they are witch and should be burnt at the stake and thus sent to hell).

⁶⁹The challenge of this is the inability of law to provide meaning to the suffering of the victim. See Berger (2008), pp 107–112. On the question of evil as meaningless suffering, see Jefferey (2008), pp 13–32.

⁷⁰On the consideration of the toss of the coin as an objective system comparative to the law, see Giddens (2015). On a reading of Harvey Dent as an archetype of the criminal prosecutor, see Rendleman (2009).

⁷¹Harvey's criticism of Commissioner Gordon is of Gordon's pragmatism by working with cops that had been investigated for corruption by Harvey when he was in Internal Affairs. In the end, it was the corruption of the police force that enabled the Joker and the mob to infiltrate and kidnap both Rachel and Harvey. John Milbank, in his analysis of the writing of Saint Paul outlines the contrast between trusting others and the supposed guarantees provided by law, courts and political constitutions. He notes that while trust may appear as a weak recourse in comparison to these guarantees, ‘since all these processes are administered by human beings capable of treachery, a suspension of distrust, along with the positive working of tacit bonds of association, is the only real source of reliable solidarity for a community'. Milbank (2010), p 53.

⁷²As Fitzpatrick notes, the law's determinateness always requires ‘something other’ in order to carry it out. The Law ‘becomes the combination of determination with what is beyond determination'. Fitzpatrick (2001), p 76.

⁷³Agamben (2005), pp 36–37; cf. Fitzpatrick (2001), pp 73–75.

⁷⁴Agamben (2005), pp 39–40. See also Agamben (1998), p 20 where he notes

[t]he validity of a juridical rule does not coincide with its application to the individual case in, for example, a trial or an executive act. On the contrary, the rule must, precisely insofar as it is general, be valid independent of the individual case.

See also Fitzpatrick (2001), pp 73–78 discussing Derrida (1992) in relation to the determinateness of the law with its responsiveness in relation to the decision of the judge.

⁷⁵That is the law has to ‘originate in each act of legal decision'. Fitzpatrick (2001), p 81. See also pp 74–75 where he quotes Derrida: ‘each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely’ Derrida (1992), pp 23–24.

⁷⁶It is worth noting here that this process of leaving decisions to the toss of a coin shifts in the film. Prior to his disfigurement, Dent would appear to leave certain decisions – whether he or Rachel would cross-examine a witness, or whether he would go through with the decision to turn himself in as Batman – up to the toss of the coin. However, whist these decisions had the appearance of chance (for which Rachel rebukes him), because the ‘lucky coin’ was two-headed, Harvey was in fact manipulating appearances to present an otherwise pre-determined decision as undetermined. When the coin is disfigured, the odds change and the tossing of the coin does become left to chance. This shift symbolises Harvey's critique of the legal system – the supposed ‘fairness’ of trials provided by the courts in Gotham City too-often being corrupt and thus decisions being predetermined and subject to the manipulation of appearances. The transformation of the ‘loaded’ coin into a two-sided coin represents Harvey's shift from working within a system that manipulates appearances to one where justice can be delivered via the objective mechanism of a ‘fair’ toss of the coin. Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for emphasising this point.

⁷⁷Derrida (1992).

⁷⁸Which, as Sharp has demonstrated, follows certain general public perceptions and attitudes about law and justice. See Sharp (2012).

⁷⁹See Bainbridge (2007) and Sharp (2012).

⁸⁰Which is often embodied in the messianic presentation of Superman, particularly on film. See Schenck (2005) and Barkman (2013). For a Nietzschean reading of Batman, which compares him to the ‘messianic’ presentation of Superman see Robertson (2005).

⁸¹For example, Fort Apache (1948) and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962).

⁸²See Žižek (2010), p 61. For a discussion of the connections between the superhero genre and the Western in relation to law, see Manderson (2011).

⁸³That is, in Who Shot Liberty Valence that Ransom Stoddard (James Stewart) shot Liberty Valence when it was in fact Tom Doniphon (John Wayne). In Fort Apache, that Captain York's (John Wayne) acknowledgement that Colonel Thursday (Henry Fonda) fought a glorious battle against the Apaches when in fact his arrogant tactics stupidly resulted in the death of most of his men.

⁸⁴From the perspective of Christian orthodoxy, the accusations against Jesus were for blasphemy where he claimed equality with God. However, if one takes the Christian belief that Jesus was the Son of God (which is the perspective presented in the Gospels themselves), then the accusations of blasphemy are false. At the same time, the Gospel Narratives show the challenge of finding any crime to convict Jesus of and that the law of blasphemy was not punishable by death (at least whilst under Roman rule). See Milbank (2003), pp 95–96.

⁸⁵Milbank (2003), p 95.

⁸⁶Milbank (2003), pp 92–93, 97; Agamben (1998).

⁸⁷See Matthew 26:57–27:26; Mark 14:53–15:15; Luke 22:66–23:25; John 18:12–19:16, ESV. Matthew, Mark and John's Gospels depict Christ as being questioned by the Jewish authorities (the Sanhedrin and the High Priest) and then being sent to Pilate. Luke also includes an account of Pilate sending Christ to Herod and then being sent back to Pilate again. Milbank notes that

[t]he only consistent thread in these narratives is that Christ was constantly handed over, or abandoned to another party. Judas betrayed his presence; the disciples deserted him; the Sanhedrin gave him up to Pilate; Pilate in turn to Herod; Herod back to Pilate; Pilate again to the mob who finally gave him over to a Roman execution, which somehow, improperly, they co-opted. Even in his death, Jesus was still being handed back and forth, as if no one actually killed him, but he died from neglect and lack of his own living space.

Later he notes that ‘[h]e was shuttled back and forwards, with an undercurrent of indifference, as though not really dangerous … ’ Milbank (2003), pp 82, 96. In addition, Milbank critiques the anti-Semitic readings of ‘the mob’ and the Passion narratives: Milbank (2003), pp 83–84, 87–89.

⁸⁸That is, he died ‘the death which any of us, under sovereign authority, in exceptional circumstances which always prove the rule, may possibly die'. Milbank (2003), p 96.

⁸⁹Milbank (2003), p 97. At the same time, Milbank questions Agamben's analysis of homo sacer as not being offered as sacrifice rather noting that ‘[a]ll that is certain is that he was to be killed without ritual purification – but this is still consistent with a total offering, as indeed the Israelite examples attest: totally unclean towns were to be offered to Yahweh'. See Milbank (2003), p 92.

⁹⁰Milbank (2003), p 96.

⁹¹Milbank (2003), p 99. This is not a pacifist refusal of violence (which in the end, engages in the violent gaze of the onlooker who does nothing about the violence he observes) but rather an identification of the futility of fighting finite potency with finite potency. Rather ‘In refusing violence, Christ also exercised a militant opposition to violence.’ Milbank (2003), p 100. See also Milbank (2003), chapter 2.

⁹²As Milbank notes, ‘Jesus only submits to being handed over because he is in himself the very heart of all transition as really loving gift, and thereby able to subvert every betrayal and abandonment.’ Milbank (2003), p 99.

⁹³Milbank (2003), p 98.

⁹⁴McGowan pinpoints this form of envy in his analysis of the ‘fake Batmen’ who want to help. McGowan argues that the problem of the exception itself is that it continues to expand the realms of exceptionality (everyone wants to participate in this exceptional relationship to the law). For McGowan, this is the reason that Batman must become the figure of evil, in order to quell the desire for an exceptional relationship to law. See McGowan (2009), paras 15–16, 47–59.

⁹⁵The point about not being a hero is made by Alfred earlier in the film. When Harvey initially turns himself in as being the Batman (in an attempt to quell the crowds and draw out the Joker for Batman to take down), Rachel is distraught as to why Bruce did not come forward to set the record straight. Alfred responds by saying ‘[p]erhaps both Bruce and Mr Dent believe that Batman stands for something more important than the whims of a terrorist, Ms Dawes. Even if everyone hates him for it. That's the sacrifice he's making. He's not being a hero. He's being something more.’ Rachel does not seem to understand this point by claiming that Bruce ‘letting Harvey take the fall … is not heroic at all'.

⁹⁶In Batman Begins we see quite specifically Bruce's confrontation and challenge to Ra's Al Ghul is based on compassion (which Ra's criticises him for). This compassion thus becomes foundational for all his actions as Batman. See discussion in Peters (2007).

⁹⁷For a discussion of this type of violence or counter-violence, see Milbank (2003), chapter 2.

⁹⁸Whilst Dent turns to his rage and his now misplaced sense of ‘justice as chance’ as a way of avenging Rachel's death, Batman is acknowledging both that Rachel's death was not a result of chance but a result of actions that were taken (by Batman, Harvey and Gordon as much as by the Joker) and that Harvey, at a later time would likely regret the action he was about to take to hurt the boy. That is, Rachel's death was a result of their specific decision to act and, as such, they bear the responsibility for those actions – actions that engaged in preventative violence in the sense of the prevention of the commission of violence, rather than the punishment of the criminal: See Milbank (2003), chapter 2, in particular pp 36–43.

⁹⁹A point that The Dark Knight Rises misses, with Gordon in his speech (read by Bane) calling Dent a monster who threatened his son.

¹⁰⁰For the theological framing of this turn to trust as opposed to legality, see Milbank (2010) in particular pp 48–58.

¹⁰¹See McGowan (2009), paras 4–5.

¹⁰²Tina Turner ‘We Don't Need Another Hero (Thunderdome)’ by Terry Britten and Graham Lyle., Mad Max: Beyond The Thunderdome, Original Motion Picture Soundtrack, Capitol Records, (1985).