https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1898-8008
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ABSTRACT
This study examines how the Chinese government has adopted authoritarian digital populism to justify its political programs through its official social media sub-accounts. Through discourse analysis, we investigate textual material concerning the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) posted on a representative WeChat account, Xiakedao. We find Xiakedao performing digital populism through stylistic-emotional manipulation to portray the benefits of the BRI to China, BRI countries, and the world, or, put succinctly, to legitimize the BRI. Specifically, in 2014–2016, through mixing informal and formal language, Xiakedao based its legitimization on stirring up a sense of hegemonic superiority by painting it as a strategy capable of significantly advancing China’s interests. Since 2017, Xiakedao has shifted to emphasizing its massive global contribution to stimulate nationalist pride and exploiting a trauma complex to bestow a counter-hegemonic aura on it. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, we argue that Xiakedao has utilized the terms “China” and “BRI” as an empty signifier and a floating signifier, respectively. We unravel its discursive strategies of fixing their meanings and (re)drawing antagonistic frontiers to legitimize the BRI during different periods. The study contributes to theoretically understanding how an authoritarian state legitimizes the same political programs from disparate stances.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Or, to put it differently, an empty signifier is “a signifier which is always potentially empty and has no essential meaning” (Eklundh, Citation2022, p. 338). For more information, see the section “Research Methodology and Analytical Framework.”
2 Thus, in the following text, expressions like “since 2014” or “during 2014–2016” actually mean the period beginning with that date.
3 Note that 2017’s first three months should be seen as a transitioning process showing mixed features, swinging between the two standpoints.
4 The number of meaning units included.
5 All extracts in this paper were originally written in Chinese by Xiakedao, and their English translations are provided by the author of this paper.
6 The article was published on November 9, 2014.
7 The latter corresponds to the code “promoting global common development,” as shown in .
8 See articles published on August 12, 2016, July 23, 2015, January 4, 2016 and August 31, 2016, respectively.
9 For example, one meaning unit phrased BRI-related investments as “helping address the problem of surplus capital” and the other phrased them as “showing China’s financial influence and rule-making power.”
10 See the article published on May 15, 2017.
11 For research about interdiscourse and interdiscursivity, see Fairclough’s (Citation1993) work.
12 For example, American conservatism under Trump hindered free trade.
13 See the article published on June 6, 2017.
14 Note that the official tone was originally set for external instead of domestic propaganda, and then Xiakedao’s relatively slow reaction is understandable.