Destruct, direct and suppress: Sputnik narratives on the Nordic countries

ABSTRACT

Projection of strategic narratives to gain competitive advantages is a central feature in the global competition for status and power. This article presents a comparative narrative analysis of how the Russian state sponsored news platform Sputnik narrates Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 2014–2019. The objectives are to uncover what negative work strategic narratives can perform and to decipher how adverse narratives are constructed. The findings suggest that Sputnik uses a mix of standard strategies and tailor-made narratives, working to destruct, direct and suppress the Nordics. The analysis exposed distinct differences as Sputnik narrated Sweden and Denmark more negatively than Norway and Finland. The narratives can serve to divide and weaken the Nordics and the EU, and undermine international reputations of each state. The strategy of division through narratives is particularly problematic as polarization challenges Western democracies and the EU. The article furthers narrative research by testing a recently crafted analytical framework and by presenting findings that indicate a need for a broadened research agenda. Whereas previous research has primarily centred on how malign information influence can harm democracy, our results indicate that narratives can cause a broader variety of harms.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategic narratives
• narrative analysis
• information influence
• Nordic countries

Introduction

Scholars have warned of the consequences of the information revolution for international security, highlighting how new technologies can be used to the detriment of others (Bennett and Livingston 2018; Walker 2018). Using information as an offensive endeavour has been characterized as part of a general movement in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states. Walker (2018:, 13) suggests the notion sharp power to capture aggressive communication targeting institutions in culture, media, academia and publishing.

Yet, narrative contestation makes up the normal basis of democracy, and any actor can resort to malign narration unduly impairing others. Developing ways to decipher such narratives is essential. Demonstrating how a military alliance can be impaired by strategic narratives, Roselle (2017, 108) stresses that the study of narrative (re)construction in global security is crucial to understanding international order and the study of alliances.

While previous research has focused on how malign information influence and narratives are spread (Till 2020; Watanabe 2017; Breuer and Johnston 2019), there is a need for more analysis of how narratives are constructed to be able to assess their harmful capacity. Research has developed knowledge on how individual states are subjected to malign information influence (Bjola and Papadakis 2020; Szostek 2018; Colliver et al. 2018), albeit comparative studies that put the narratives and otherings of individual countries into a larger perspective is still lacking (for exceptions, see Ramsay and Robertshaw 2019; Thornton and Karagiannis 2016).

Our study builds on a recently developed framework for deciphering pro-Kremlin narratives (Wagnsson and Barzanje 2019). The framework is generally applicable and it is an empirical question if an actor – an authoritarian state, a terrorist organisation or a democratic state – projects a strategic narrative that can harm another actor. A focus on Russian narratives is warranted here as the development described above coincides with a deterioration in Russia-Western relations (DeBardeleben 2018; Schiffers 2015). Most of the confrontation occurs in the information landscape, where actors use social and traditional media to destabilise the other (Levite and Shimshoni 2018). This uncertain and conflict-ridden communication environment is especially threatening to states within Russia’s sphere of influence, as defined by the Kremlin. However, fears of destabilising effects are even more widespread (Szostek 2018; Galeotti 2017). A variety of antagonistic measures are directed at the Nordic countries, including organised pro-Russian street protests (Pomerantsev 2015), forged telegrams and letters (Thurfjell 2015) and fake news or troll armies targeting journalists and experts (Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness 2019).

The analytical framework enables structured narrative analysis focused on three main strategies: ‘suppression’, ‘direction’ and ‘destruction’. It was developed from a single case study and will now be put to work on additional cases as we apply it to the Russian state media Sputnik’s reporting on four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 2014–2019. Widening the empirical scope will further test the framework’s applicability and fruitfulness.

Our objectives are to unearth how antagonistic narration is constructed and to expose what harms it can yield. We pose the research questions: How does the pro Kremlin information apparatus narrate the Nordics through the independent yet state controlled media outlet Sputnik? How do the narratives serve to suppress, direct and destruct the Nordics? What similarities and differences can be exposed?

We contribute to the literature that uses narrative frameworks to explain phenomena related to international relations (see Hagström and Gustafsson 2019), and more specifically to research on strategic narratives (see Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2017). The narrative concept has been underdeveloped in research and it tends to be superficially applied as a synonym to rhetoric or discourse (Hagström and Gustafsson 2019, 388; Spencer 2016). In contrast, we contribute to this research by putting a novel framework to work and conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis furthering the understanding of how strategic narratives can be used to inflict harm. Much research on antagonistic messaging (Walker 2016; 2018; Bennett and Livingston 2018; Hanouna et al. 2019) has focused on the vulnerability of the media and other institutions in democracies. Our findings indicate that a broadening of the focus and of the research agenda is warranted.

Analysing antagonistic strategic narratives

Although there is no solid evidence of Russian intentions to inflict harm through strategic narration, the Kremlin views information as a national security tool (Russian Government 2015). The 2016 Information Security Doctrine warns of the use of information to undermine international security and proposes measures to strengthen Russian national interests in the information sphere (Russian Government 2016). Scholars see the Russian support of projection of information as part of an endeavour to harm and undermine others (Yablokov 2015; Watanabe 2017, 139; Ramsay and Robertshaw 2019; Szostek 2020). Szostek highlights how Russian pundits see media reporting as a ‘zero-sum game in which they must fight their hostile Western rivals for supremacy’, including by projecting disinformation and aggressively criticising other states (2020, 2729, 2740). Thus, much indicates that the Kremlin backs strategies of aggressive narration. It is, then, not far-fetched to infer harmful intentions. While the projection of Russia’s strategic narrative could be characterized as public diplomacy (Szostek 2020), more crude labels are justified. The Russian narration should be contextualised and seen against the background of a strife to reinstate Russia as a global force, a project interlinked with historical views of past and present (Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017). Perceptions of Western threat to Russia is suggested as the rationale (Pynnöniemi 2018).

The framework used to decipher Sputnik’s narrative was originally presented in Wagnsson and Barzanje (2019). The framework suggests that suppression, destruction and direction are principal techniques at work in antagonistic narration. Suppression can alter the status of a state in the international arena. This can be done by belittling an actor’s moral standards, way of life, or religion. Status seeking is central phenomenon to global affairs. State leaders strive for recognition, desiring confirmation of their identity as state leaders and of their state’s identity as sovereign and respected (Ringmar 1996). The Nordics might be particularly vulnerable to narratives that suppress, since they are motivated by moral status-seeking, striving towards a reputation as reliable partners to great powers to maintain the order of international institutions (Neumann and Carvalho 2015, 1–2).

We find destruction in stories dwelling upon weaknesses or peculiarities within a state’s military, drawing attention to domestic divisions, or exposing demographic or economic problems rendering states frail. Destruction works to diminish deterrence capacity, military reputation, governability or ability to attract alliance partners. It may harm an actor’s reputation, making it appear unattractive, unorganised or lacking military assets, resolve and international partners.

Finally, direction can steer the narrated towards preferred behaviour. Jakobsen’s theory (2016) on coercive diplomacy posits that states use carrots and sticks to influence an adversary’s behaviour. In strategic narration, narrative inducements are used to direct the narrated from unwanted to preferred behaviour. Behaviour beneficial to the narrator is amplified, whereas negative behaviour is ignored or downplayed.

These strategies work together in the same text, serving different purposes. Suppression can undermine cultural and other similar assets, whereas destruction targets material assets such as military resolve, economic strength, and governmentality. This draws upon Neumann’s (2014) argument that to gain status, a state needs to be recognised as capable by virtue of material capabilities and civilizational fulfilment (cultural power). Neumann argues that two mechanisms are at work in international life. One is based on the Weberian tradition, stressing material resources as source for power. The other is based on the Durkheimian tradition, emphasising cultural or symbolic power. Thus states are vulnerable regarding their material and cultural reputation. Whereas suppression undermines a state’s reputation as a ‘good’, reliable and morally attractive state, destruction erodes its image as solid, strong and capable. Suppression and destruction can go hand in hand.

Narrators may use additional strategies, yet these three strategies are likely to be common, as they reflect general security driving forces: status seeking; maximising of capabilities through the destruction of the other’s capabilities in an imagined zero-sum-game, and a drive to manipulate the behaviour of others. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to determine how typical the strategies are and whether additional ones are in use.

Applying a narrative lens

Lately scholars have tried to explain phenomena related to international relations by using narrative frameworks (Hayden 2013; Mahood and Rane 2017; Golan, Arceneaux, and Soule 2019). Applying a narrative lens means that to navigate in life we need to be able to make sense of the world. Meaning can be provided through narratives appearing in media articles. Such narratives are ‘socially construct reality’ helping humans ‘make sense of and situate themselves in the world’ (Shanahan et al. 2018, 174, 182). Narrative construction becomes powerful when it is linked to known stories (Spencer 2016).

Narrative analysis was initially used to deconstruct literary texts (Burke [1963] 1964). In contemporary media ecology societies are saturated by competing narratives and this has increased their fields of application. Alongside processes of militarisation and conflict, another phenomenon has developed – broader in scope than disinformation, not as structured, strategic or military dominated as information operations and lacking the negative connotations and simplicity of propaganda. We use the concept strategic narratives to denote this phenomenon.

We follow Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle’s (2017, 6) definition of strategic narratives as ‘ … a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors.’ Strategic narratives are characterised by intent since they are ‘ … crafted by political actors with a specific intention in mind: influencing an audience’ (Schmitt 2018, 488). As such, strategic narratives are appealing as they hold the potential to position states, peoples and the self in relation to the other in world politics (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2017).

This study focuses on how strategic narratives work to destabilise polities and societies making them more insecure. Our object of study is news articles as carriers of strategic narratives. By applying a narrative lens to how a state sponsored media outlet portrays other states, we add to the literatures of political communication, security politics and media-political relations by focusing not merely on what is said about a foreign state or society but on how stories are being told.

Method

We employ a narrative analysis grounded in a social constructivist epistemological perspective and an inductive mode of inference. This requires a careful qualitative reading of empirical data rather than working with large data sets and quantitative tools. Our focus on written texts means that we did not analyse visuals, which can be a limitation, given the importance of visual communication in influencing perceptions of global politics (Crilley and Chatterje-Doody 2020; van Noort 2020). Nevertheless, we find it less problematic since we did not aim to analyse audience perceptions or effects (cf. Bjola and Papadakis 2020). Even without visuals, we managed to distil clear subplots from the comprehensive material we gathered. We follow Polkinghorne’s (1995) ideas on narrative analysis as a way to arrange various data into coherent entities, thus unearthing an underlying story that has not yet been made explicit. The research was carried out by three researchers using the same methodology and coding instructions, jointly coding of the data. To assure inter-coder reliability, we handed our coding instructions to 20 master students in 2020 and instructed them to do sample coding. The results of the Master’s students were consistent with our own results.

Data selection

The empirical data was found in Sputnik News, a Russian broadcasting company launched in 2014 and clearly related to Russian Government and state policy. It is part of Russia Today, which was constructed through the 2013 merger of the international radio channel Voice of Russia and the nationally focused news agency Ria Novosti. As such, Sputnik and its modus becomes a part of an antagonistic narration in line with supporting Russian politics while also being an instrument in promoting Russia in its security and conflict policy arena. Although overall media consumption patterns of Russian media in the Nordic countries is low, there are indications that pro-Kremlin news outlets are more influential in certain target groups. Ongoing research shows that 6% of people aged 18–29 in Sweden read or watch RT weekly (Wagnsson and Nilsen forthcoming). Furthermore, previous studies hold that narratives of Russian state controlled media appear in Swedish far right news outlets (Colliver et al. 2018). News reports also reveal how such outlets are financed by fraudulent Russian and Ukrainian companies (Sköld and Carlsson 2017).

To perform a narrative analysis of how four countries are narrated by a media outlet over six years, we had to decrease our data entries by selecting a representative sample of articles relevant for our research objectives. It was important that as many articles as possible primarily discussed the Nordic country in question. First, we searched for articles published in Sputnik 2014–2019 with the country’s name in the heading. We searched headings rather than article texts to delimit and focus our searches to articles that earnestly dealt with our cases. We selected articles with the state name rather than e.g., Nordic or Scandinavian to be able to unearth specifically how Sputnik treats individual countries, and to see potential variations. This did not lead us to overlook articles dealing with our selected countries, as articles that did not refer to the subject matter in the title were scarce. The decision to only use articles with state names in the heading thus did not lead to major implications for the analysis or results.

To be able to follow stories within a given timeframe, corresponding to general media working ways and logics, we included articles published over the period of one month, rather than for instance selecting a certain day or week. We selected the month of October so we could access articles pertaining to day-to-day coverage, rather than for instance holiday festivities or other yearly reoccurring events.

Articles from 2014 to 2018 were retrieved from the global news search engine Factiva. For 2019, we retrieved articles directly from https://sputniknews.com/. Research on the reliability of news databases show how limitations in databases affect samples. Examples include change of headlines or articles disappearing. These problems are applicable for news databases in general (Sabelhaus and Cawley 2013; Driedger and Weimer 2015). Thus we contend that the choice of database did not affect the sample in a notable way. A wider use of databases would give us a larger sample, but we conclude that our sample is sufficient and focused enough for us to demonstrate the narrative techniques in use and to unearth how the narratives are constructed.

We analysed 104 articles for Sweden, 88 for Norway, 55 for Finland, and 46 for Denmark. We delimited our empirical searches to 2014, which is the year Sputnik was created. Moreover, the Russian annexation of Crimea occurred in 2014, which according to most accounts (e.g., Renz 2016) is the year Russian disinformation against Western Europe intensified.

Data analysis

We read each selected article. Articles were then approached by asking several questions. The questions were used to categorise the data into six codes according to Table 1.

Table 1. Questions posed to data and code.

Question posed to the data	Code
Who are the actors involved?	Actors/characters
What are the events?	Events
What are the spaces?	Space
How do the stories emerge, continue, and change over time?	Temporality
What is the problem posed? What are the reasons behind the problem?	Problem/Conflict, Positioning
What are the suggested solutions?	Solution

After answering each question, we employed analytical tools developed by Somers (1994) targeting the tacit meaning of the subplots. The first component is the relationality and connectedness of parts, which is about making events understandable by spelling out their connections to other events and thus by determining the actors, spaces and connections they share. Secondly, we have the causal emplotment, which regards how the chain of events are ordered in time. The third analytical tool is known as temporality, sequence, and place, which requires an analysis of how subplots are placed in temporal and spatial relation to one another. The fourth component is the selective (temporal) appropriation, which deals with how episodes are appropriated and given meaning, while other seemingly equally salient stories are silenced (Somers 1994: 616). This part of the analysis ended up in a number of subplots referring to each country. The final analytical step was to, based on the subplots, unearth the main narrative, i.e., the main story told during the period studied, which will henceforth be labelled ‘the grand narrative’. Here we were guided by the seemingly simple questions of: What are the stories being told? How are they being told? How do they relate to one another, building up to and serving to strengthen a main narrative?

Presenting the empirical findings, we specify typical examples of the narration within parenthesis. These are, with a few exceptions, not single occurrences but indicators of a larger number of articles. A version including additional references is available at the journal’s website online, as supplementary material. The investigation of the narrative on Sweden is particularly brief, since it builds upon Wagnsson and Barzanje (2019), yet extends their empirical analysis with one year (2019).

Case studies

The cases in this comparative analysis share features such as their geographical location, high GDP per capita, and small and homogeneous populations. All states are influenced by liberal democratic values and guided by administrative welfare state objectives. A noteworthy variation is that Norway and Finland share direct state borders with Russia, which has been suggested as a reason for diplomatic restraint and at times compliance (Wegge 2017; Innola and Pynnöniemi 2016). In Norway’s case, however, military cooperation with Russia ended after the annexation of Crimea (Norwegian Government 2016). Important differences appear in how the countries take part in foreign and security policy cooperation. Norway and Denmark are staunch members of NATO, while Sweden and Finland remain outside the alliance. Consequently, NATO debate in the non-member states tends to become polarised and ideological, and thus a hotbed for malign and contesting narratives, while polarising NATO in long time member states Norway and Denmark is likely to be futile. Moreover, Norway is the only case that is not an EU member, which makes it resistant to disinformation connected to the EU. Recently the EU has been challenged by political crises such as the Ukraine crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, and the Covid-19 pandemic. These international crises displayed opposing views and self- centeredness among EU members rather than altruism. An important part of the Kremlin’s divide and rule strategy is to reinforce EU skepticism and infighting (Orenstein and Kelemen 2017). Plausibly, such campaigns rub off more on EU members than on non EU members.

Finland

Grand narrative: the favoured yet threatened small state

Sputnik’s grand narrative of Finland deals with the underlying threat of asymmetric power relations between the huge neighbour and the small state. Finland’s well-being is tied to its relationship with Russia, which is based on an underlying threat: Finland should not hinder collaboration with Russia or side with the West/NATO against Russia (Sputnik 2017a). This comes to light in an interview with President Niinistö, who is quoted saying ‘Today, not many Finnish people fear that Russians will come here. I personally don't believe in it just like I don't believe that they will attack Poland or the Baltic states’ (Sputnik 2017b). The fact that the President comments on potential Russian aggression can be seen as a threatening prevision of what could happen if compliance is not met. Underlying threats also appear as a foreign-affairs commentator at Finland's largest newspaper is quoted saying ‘Russia will never attack unless provoked’, while at the same time stating that ‘[s]eeking membership in the [NATO] alliance is […] considered […] a provocation’ (Sputnik 2017c). What constitutes the provocation thus lies in the eyes of the provoked.

Subplots

A special partnership: Finland connected to Russia

The first subplot deals with the allegedly special partnership between Finland and Russia. The basics of this subplot is laid out in a 2014 article headlined ‘Russia-Finland Relations an Example of Good Neighborliness’ (Sputnik 2014). Relations are described as special, strong and broad in scope, covering collaboration within UN high politics, economy, security, as well as local business (Sputnik 2014) and joint local emergency exercises (Sputnik 2017d). The temporal build-up is that of the ‘time-tested policy’ of ‘Eastern relations’ dating far back and offering mutual gains (Sputnik 2016a). Despite the current slump due to Russian sanctions, the future looks bright with mutual benefits and new initiatives (Sputnik 2018a). The partnership is strong as decades of collaboration cannot be easily reduced (Sputnik 2014).

Tensions with Russia: Russophobia and sanctions politics

European sanctions on Russia is the key event and underlying problem in need of solution in the second subplot (Sputnik 2014). EU is the villain in this script and the temporal build-up is selectively attributed regarding what is included and left out. Sanctions are described as turning up from nowhere. Reasons are not mentioned, or described as ‘alleged’, and thus made-up (Sputnik 2016a, 2018a). In a 2017 piece, the narrator explains how the story unfolded: EU and the West were the first aggressors, making false and ‘absurd’ accusation of Moscow being involved in the Ukraine conflict and Crimea's ‘reunification’ (Sputnik 2014). Further events build up the Russophobia subplot, such as EU countries accusing Russia for cyber threats (Sputnik 2017e), military threats (Sputnik 2017c) or simply obstructing Russia’s successes in energy policy and trade (Sputnik 2017a). There is also the story of authorities taking children from Russians residing abroad. Here Russia is portrayed as constructive, while Finland is depicted as arrogant and unwilling to engage (Sputnik 2016b).

NATO – a looming threat to mutual relations

The NATO subplot involves stories where the narrator tries to tie Finland closer to Russia while driving a wedge between Finland and the West. Here NATO is pulling Finland and Sweden closer, despite their official non-alignment policies (Sputnik 2016c). Essentially, Finland, once a neutral and nonaligned country with a longstanding relationship with Russia, is now, alongside Sweden, pressured by NATO lobbyists and ‘eyeing’ membership. NATO uses false allegations of Russian aggression as an excuse for building military presence close to Russian borders, destabilising the region. This masterplan develops incrementally by regional rearmament projects, Swedish-Finnish military cooperation, heightened military budgets and military exercises based on ‘a fictitious enemy from the east bearing striking similarities to Russia’ (Sputnik 2017f).

A major player and voice of reason in an unsound environment

One foundation of the grand narrative rests on the portrayal of Finland as a major global player thanks to its special relationship with big neighbour Russia. Here Finland is more developed, better and fundamentally different from its northern neighbours, albeit the country cannot fully escape the Nordic modernity of migration, gender ideology and Russophobia (Sputnik 2018a). The subplot suggests Russia would not be interested had Finland not been a developed and cutting-edge partner working e.g., with unique technology (Sputnik 2015a). Finland is the maverick that cannot be pressured by Brussels to support ‘anti-Russian sanctions’ (Sputnik 2016a). Migration is an unwelcomed problem forced on Finland by the EU (Sputnik 2015b). The greater problem here is migration challenging traditional Finnish values (Sputnik 2018b). Yet, Finland goes against the grain in migration politics too, as its authorities are ‘busting myths’ of refugee statistics on migrants’ age, origin and gender (Sputnik 2015c) and launching Facebook campaigns advising migrants to stay away (Sputnik 2015d).

Sweden

Grand narrative: an ultraliberal state in decay

In the Swedish case, the grand narrative crystalises as one of a state of decline. The story is temporally selective, where the ‘once-upon-a-time’ is a distant past when Sweden was strong and prosperous with solid values, while it now has become weak, plagued by disorder and decadence. The grand narrative contrasts the old socialist utopian Sweden against a new transformative state with immigrants taking centre stage. For example, the article ‘Who Is Surprised?’ ‘Daesh Recruiter’ Reportedly Runs Free School in Sweden’ (Sputnik 2018c), reports on how far Sweden has sunk due to its naïve immigration policy. The narration of Sweden violating the human rights of WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange on inaccurate grounds also exemplifies Sweden’s shift from righteousness to moral decay (Sputnik 2015e). Over time, the grand narrative becomes more multifaceted, with the emergence of six subplots focusing on problems that augment the grand narrative’s strength and coherence.

Subplots

A conflict-torn space

This subplot highlights Sweden’s averse relations to surrounding states and its internal divisions. Groups are pitted against one another; refugees against the rest of the population; feminists against men; traditionalists against liberals; the Swedish Democrats (SD) against other parties, the population against authorities, climate activists, led by Greta Thunberg, against opponents (Sputnik 2019a). In 2019 a business leader is cited, describing Sweden on the brink of ‘internal wars’ (Sputnik 2019b). Moreover, Sputnik narrates a Sweden at odds with its Nordic neighbours, great powers and other states (Sputnik 2017g) prompting the image of an unattractive and unreliable ally.

Immigration and crime: an Invaded and unsafe space

While in the Finnish case, Sputnik largely ceased reporting on migration after 2015, it upholds this focus regarding Sweden, above all in the subplots on an ‘Invaded’ and ‘Unsafe Space’. The ‘unsafe space’ focuses on migration policies causing Sweden’s downfall, increasing crime rates, Islamisation and terrorism (Sputnik 2017h). Agency is characterised by poor leadership allowing for a vast inflow of migrants and ensuing its consequences. The villains – immigrants, Islam, criminals – are unruly, while politicians hide the truth from the victims, i.e., the Swedish population, or the anti-immigration Swedish Democrats. Sputnik reiterates that ineffective authorities have lost control to the detriment of Swedish taxpayers (Sputnik 2016d) and even to the despairing Prime Minister (Sputnik 2015f).

Exaggerated liberal values: an (un)sexy, decadent and ultra-modern space

Three more subplots build upon the denigration of Sweden as an overly untraditional country. Whereas the (un)Sexy and Decadent subplots focus on liberal values, the Ultra-Modern subplot zooms in on modernist practices and technical innovations (Sputnik 2017i). Stories serve to strengthen the grand narrative of an extreme, odd country on a solitary path towards the unknown. Of special concern is the Swedish population, lost, and experiencing rootlessness (Sputnik 2017j). One story features Sweden’s first religion-neutral cemetery, juxtaposing tradition to neo-atheism (Sputnik 2016e). Another one features a ‘polarizing debate on polygamy’ where feminists and Islamists are lumped together to contrast traditionalist values (Sputnik 2017k). The ‘Decadent place’ plot is strengthened by reports on demographic problems where the once attractive Sweden is weakened as people leave the countryside and birth rates decrease (Sputnik 2016f). The situation deteriorates further as the once homogenous population becomes diversified due to immigration (Sputnik 2019c).

Denmark

Grand narrative: Denmark weakened by the EU

The Danish grand narrative characterises Denmark as weakened by the EU. The EU is to blame for problems, including cross-border crime, sexual crimes, and ISIS fighters. Part of the grand narrative is that EU is disintegrating. Member states are pitted against each other as they choose different paths in crisis management prioritising self-gains before collaboration (Sputnik 2015g, 2015h). The grand narrative is constructed of three subplots: the moral decay of Denmark in specific, and the EU in general, due to crime, sexual abuse and Islamization; Denmark as an international although insignificant security actor; and Russophobia and unfair treatment of Russia.

Subplots

Moral decay, crime and migration

An evident chain of related stories constructs the subplot of Denmark as a decadent place in moral decay mostly caused by immigration and the EU. Stories of immigration and sexual crimes are connected to stories of EU cross-border third party country crime, and more general accounts of crime (Sputnik 2016g), linked to a lapse Danish punishment culture (Sputnik 2017l). This creates the narrative of a state lacking morals and maintaining rather than fighting crime.

Denmark is portrayed as a country with serious migration problems. Causal emplotment places the influx of migrants in 2015 in relation to sexual crimes, although the mentioned statistics precede the 2015 migration crisis (Sputnik 2015i). Later we see a more general story of transnational cross-border crime committed by EU citizens or third party country citizens (Sputnik 2018d). These problems are connected to naïve EU open-door policies and to weak domestic criminal policy. Sputnik describes Nordic prison conditions as ‘known across the world for its mild prison conditions’ and Denmark’s crime politics as ‘well-known for using a human touch’ (Sputnik 2017l). Denmark also gets to represent Nordic countries responding to rapes committed by migrants with naïve information campaigns or artefacts such as anti-rape belts or tampons (Sputnik 2015i).

The moral decay subplot is pushed in reports on public dissections of animals in Danish Zoos. A mere year after international outcry following the public killing of Marius the Giraffe, we are presented a state and citizenry lacking morals and showing no understanding that displaying animal dissections to children might cause upset. Apparently clueless officials state that: ‘Children are so curious they practically crawl into the carcass’ (Sputnik 2015j). Similarly, we have a Danish school informing kids about food production by beheading chickens (Sputnik 2017m). Taken together, Denmark lacks a moral compass and child protection. Another example is the story on lawmakers ‘giving green light to high drivers’ by replacing zero tolerance policy of marijuana in traffic with a stepladder model. This rational change is tied to ‘Christiania’, hardcore drug use and hippie culture (Sputnik 2016h). In 2019, however, the narration shifts as Denmark departs on a hardline path, pushing through legislation enabling withdrawal of Jihadist passports (Sputnik 2019d) or politicians across the board supporting enhanced surveillance, tougher punishments for possession of explosives and increasing border protection (Sputnik 2019e).

Denmark as an (insignificant yet annoying) international security actor

Here the narrator builds a story of Denmark as a country participating extensively in international missions (Sputnik 2017n). Initially, focus was on fighting Islamism, while later on more attention is payed to Russia (Sputnik 2017o; 2017n). However, increasing military funding is, somewhat contradictory, not presented as threatening as added funds still mean that Denmark will be ‘a far cry from NATO's overall objective of 2.0 percent of GDP’. The narrator adds that funds have not been added and sprinkles the article with ironic statements on underfinanced budgets (Sputnik 2017o). Overall, the narrator recognises the role of Denmark as an international security actor, while also pointing out when it gets in trouble. Sputnik thus narrates Denmark as an insignificant state, unsure about its actions. Thus Denmark needs not to be taken seriously and does not pose a threat to Russia.

Russophobia in energy policy

This subplot exposes tensions between Russia and Denmark. Here energy politics emerges as an area where Russia is treated unfairly. Denmark seems to go out of its way to derail the ‘great Nord Stream 2 project’, framing it as a national security threat (Sputnik 2017p) and siding with the US and Ukraine (Sputnik 2019f). The narrator describes Nord Stream 2 as a neutral infrastructure project benefiting all parties (Sputnik 2017p). The narrator also engages in causal emplotment connecting the case to other examples of energy politics involving Denmark. The energy narrative includes the environment perspective with ‘green’ stories, e.g., future bans on diesel and petrol cars, which ends up in a critique towards Danish extreme environmental policy (Sputnik 2018d).

Norway

Grand narrative: friend or foe? An erratic neighbour

Our fourth grand narrative centres on whether Norway is with or against Russia. Norway is clearly against as an enemy allied to the US but also ideally on Russia’s side as a friend and neighbour. The grand narrative centres on issues of friendship and animosity. It consists of three subplots; the enemy narrative, the friendly narrative and the ambiguous one that centres on the government as an enemy, which is not supported by important parts of the Norwegian society and polity that are more balanced and open minded regarding Russia.

Subplots

Norway as an enemy

The enemy subplot focuses on US deployment on Norwegian territory, as in ‘Norway to step up military presence in region bordering Russia’ (Sputnik 2017q), or in a 2019 story stating that ‘Russia will take NATO’s increased presence in Norway into account in its military planning’ (Sputnik 2019g). According to the enemy subplot, Norway’s approval of US/NATO deployment is changing the NATO-Russian power balance. Norwegian decisions thus have effects far beyond its own borders. This becomes evident in an article headlined ‘NATO increases Baltic Presence as Norway Approves US Marines at Vaernes Base’ (Sputnik 2016i). Numerous articles describe animosity to Russia. In one story, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson links Norway’s decision to permit US troop in Norway with ‘anti-Russian hysteria’ (Sputnik 2016j). In another, Norway is portrayed as an important country powerful enough to disrupt Russian national interests and security (Sputnik 2017q).

Norway as a friend

The contrasting subplot of Norway as a friend describes how the two countries share borders in a friendly and cooperative fashion. Numerous stories focus on existing or future cooperation. Here we learn that Norway and Russia are developing trade deals and facilitating visa agreements. One such story is the article ‘Alley of friendship planted in Nikel on border of Russian and Norway’ (Sputnik 2018f). The subplot also includes stories describing Norway as accepting Russia’s position on Crimea. A story in 2017 tell of a UN report on human rights violations in Crimea. However, a delegation of Norwegian politicians and businesspeople, not mentioned by name nor position, claim violations have not occurred. They are cited as intending to initiate discussions in Norway on the issue, although it ‘won’t be easy’ (Sputnik 2017r).

The ambiguous subplot

The narratives of Norway as an enemy and friend are pitted against each other in the third subplot, which describes negative actions taken by the Norwegian government. One example is the 2018 military exercise Trident Juncture, described as a ‘part of a new cold war’ (Sputnik 2018g). In the article, a critical Norwegian expert underlines that the drill ‘must be seen as one of numerous factors increasing the tension between Norway and Russia’. It is further stated that the drill has been condemned by Russia and that ‘Russia (and many Norwegian politicians) believe Norway is violating its self-imposed ban from 1949 on foreign bases on Norwegian soil’ (Sputnik 2018h). The article cites two Norwegian politicians critical to the government, arguing that the US will not protect Norway if war comes. In another story, Sputnik reports on the Parliament being unaware of Norway’s plans to host 300 US marines (Sputnik 2016k). Another story describes a Norwegian opposition politician questioning the prudence of US aircrafts on Norwegian soil. Sputnik refers to unspecified ‘Norwegian defense sources’ critical of the idea, as it would provoke Russia (Sputnik 2018h). In 2019, Sputnik reports on Norway’s refusal to participate in NATO’s missile defence shield, a project that causes tension between Norway and Russia. Here, the narrator highlights that NATO’s Secretary General used to oppose the missile defence network when he headed Norway’s Labour party. Hence, this is a story of Norwegians being divided, with some working against, and some working more in line with Russian interests (Sputnik 2019h).

Concluding discussion

This article asked how the pro-Kremlin information apparatus, represented by independent yet government controlled online media outlet Sputnik, narrates the Nordic countries. The analysis demonstrated both similarities and differences. The reporting largely focused on dysfunction, except regarding Finland and to a lesser extent Norway. This is in line with Ramsay and Robertshaw (2019:, 91), who demonstrated that over 80% of Sputnik’s and RT’s coverage of a large number of European countries contained issues related to … ‘conflict within politics and society, the failures of public bodies, or alienation within the democratic system.’ In our cases, all countries are characterized by moral decay, indicating that the narrator adopts a ‘standard strategy’ thought to work to undermine the Nordics. A narrative technique is to group the Nordics together to make a point of naivety or dysfunctionality (Sputnik 2017l). This is noteworthy, especially as we used individual state names as keywords rather than keywords that grouped the countries together.

Yet, there are also differences. The Russian presence varies in the narratives, looming particularly strong in the Finnish narrative, while being quite absent in the Swedish case. A common theme is that Nordics are Russophobes and to varying extent in perpetual conflict with Russia. However, as Finland historically has been part of Russia’s field of interest, it is only put down in a minor way. Sweden is treated more roughly. Norway is treated more delicately, possibly due to its close US/NATO-relations, although, the NATO-membership does not to do any good for Denmark. Many reports portray Denmark’s shortcomings as dependent on the country’s position in the EU. Thus, Denmark is used as a means to get to the EU by representing what is rotten in the EU. The states are attributed different roles in the narratives. Finland comes close to a role model, although in need of direction. Denmark is a bad and annoying, although insignificant apple. Sweden is a lost case, not to be imitated. Norway is mostly narrated as an antagonistic part of ‘the other’ (the US/NATO). Yet, Norway is also a potential friend and neighbour.

This pattern is reflected in the narrative strategies applied; Sweden and Denmark are treated most roughly through suppression and destruction strategies. Suppression dominates the narrative on Sweden, yet Denmark is also frequently suppressed in stories on moral decay. This narrative strategy is sometimes, although much less frequently, applied also to Norway and Finland. The same goes for destruction. Sweden is described as weak, ungovernable and in a state of chaos, Denmark is also narrated as a rather failed state, pressured by immigration and crime. In contrast, Norway and Finland appear more stable in the narratives. The narrator is inclined to direct Norway and Finland towards better behaviour by highlighting positive issues, particularly in relation to co-operation with Russia and when they go against mainstream EU politics. This exposes that while Sweden and to some degree Denmark are seen as ‘lost cases’, Sputnik struggles to keep Finland and Norway on Russia’s side.

We need to relate these results to the Russian government’s identification of Russia as a force to be reckoned with. What used to be a legitimate sphere of influence is now part of EU and NATO. Weakening border-states’ positions in this collaboration is therefore essential in the narratives working to destruct and suppress. Nevertheless, that analysis is limited in the assumption that the strategic narration aims to harm only the target country. A likely additional rationale is to weaken the EU, to divide the Nordics and undermine the Nordics’ international reputation. This is in line with Roselle’s findings (2017), indicating that Russian narratives on the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis aimed to weaken international alliances by undermining internal cohesion. Such efforts are especially harmful as Western democracies are challenged by societal polarisation and institutional crises (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Lehman 2018). Therefore, it is not surprising that even seemingly strong democracies feel vulnerable to malign narratives (cf. Bjola and Papadakis 2020).

These results suggest that Sputnik uses a mix of standard strategies and tailor-made narratives to increase the impact of their narration. The findings are especially useful as they go beyond a superficial focus on what is said, and instead centre on how and why it is said. We thus offer scholars and policy professionals a reliable way of receiving insight into muddled processes. This article also contributes to the strategic narrative theory by highlighting that antagonistic strategic narratives can do a broad range of damage to diverse actors and referent objects. Walker’s notion of sharp power (Walker 2016, 2018) and much other work on the manipulation of elections and media environments (Bennett and Livingston 2018; Corner 2017; Hanouna et al. 2019) centre on the risk of distorted news eroding democracy. For instance, applying the sharp power framework, Hanouna et al. (2019, 110) state ‘Foreign political meddling in Twitter in election campaigns aims at manipulating and poisoning the democratic process, posing a serious challenge to Western democracies and their values, as well as their societal resilience.’ Yet, our results show that strategic narratives can do many kinds of harm, including eroding national security, undermining actors’ status in international society and manipulating behaviour using sticks and carrots.

However, a limitation of this study is that the results do not expose actual effects. Some important work has been done on effects on information influence in general, including how it spreads and takes root (Guess, Nagler, and Tucker 2019; Szostek 2017). Still, we lack studies investigating effects specifically of strategic narratives (see however Schmitt 2018; Crilley and Chatterje-Doody 2020). Future scholarly works need to scrutinise effects of strategic narration, for example studying how narrative emplotment affects interpretation (Colley 2017) and how the reader gets absorbed into a story through imagery, affect and attentional focus through the narrative mechanism of transportation (Green and Brock 2000).

In closing, this study demonstrated how the Nordics are subjected to Pro-Kremlin narratives by applying a newly developed framework for unmasking antagonistic narrative strategies. We found the strategies highly enlightening and applicable in all cases. However, the hazards exposed are in need of more elucidation. Future research should look beyond Russian narration. Breuer and Johnston’s (2019) study of a US meme for instance demonstrates that democracies can also support antagonistic narratives that spur conflict. Empirical and comparative studies are needed to develop knowledge on how similar phenomena are in play in other geographical settings. This includes countries that may be even more vulnerable to antagonistic narration, as well as states using similar destructive strategies to enhance their own power to the detriment of the receiver.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap.

Notes on contributors

Edward Deverell

Edward Deverell is senior lecturer in political science at the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm. He holds a PhD from Utrecht University's School of Governance. His research focuses on topics such as institutional crisis management, public management reform and public agency communication. Deverell has published his research in journals such as Public Management Review, Defence Studies, Risk Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management.

Charlotte Wagnsson

Charlotte Wagnsson, professor of political science, is the author of several articles and books on European security. She specializes in political communication in the sphere of security. She is co-author of The NATO intervention in Libya: Lessons learned from the Campaign (Routledge) and European Security Governance (Routledge) and author of Security in a greater Europe: The possibility of a pan-European Approach (Manchester University Press) and has published in various journals including for example Media War and Conflict, New Media and Society, Journal of Common Market Studies, European Security and International Political Sociology.

Eva-Karin Olsson

Eva-Karin Olsson is a professor of political science at the Swedish Defence University. Her research interests include crisis management, political communication and international organizations. She has published her work in journals such as Journalism, International Journal of Press/Politics, Public Administration, and Media, War and Conflict.