Political guidance or autonomy in peacebuilding? EU police reform in Afghanistan and Kosovo

ABSTRACT

Reviewing findings from the recent institutional turn in peacebuilding research, this article identifies two conflicting arguments with respect to institutional designs that affect the performance of peace operations. One perspective favours functional decentralization and mission latitude, while the other perspective argues that a lack of political guidance strips mission leadership of their authority vis-à-vis local power brokers and reduces the likelihood of a ‘robust’ approach. Comparing two EU crisis management missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the article asks which of the two perspectives is supported by the institutional design and performance of EU peace operations. Unlike the UN – the focus of most previous research – the EU’s institutional framework is highly centralized. This provided member states with ample opportunities for political guidance, but such guidance was, in fact, negatively associated with performance. This finding suggests that the political guidance thesis must be treated with caution. Because member states’ interests vis-à-vis a conflict state rarely converge, the conditions for meaningful political guidance are absent. The article, therefore, finds that increasing managerial latitude provides the more promising avenue to enhancing peacebuilding performance. Addressing policy-makers, my findings speak to the urgent need for the EU to review and potentially reform its crisis management system.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to all interviewees who generously gave their time to inform this research. He also expresses his appreciation to his colleagues at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, at the University of Munich (LMU), in particular Christoph Knill, Ronny Patz and Jan Zimmermann, and to two anonymous reviewers for their first-rate comments and suggestions that helped improve the manuscript. The research underpinning this article was funded by the Center of Excellence at the University of Konstanz, Germany.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Steffen Eckhard is senior researcher at the University of Munich (LMU) where he coordinates the research unit ‘International Public Administration’ and a non-resident fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. He is author of ‘International Assistance to Police Reform. Managing Peacebuilding’ (2016, Palgrave Macmillan).

Notes

1 Breakey and Dekker, ‘Weak Links in the Chain’; Dijkstra, ‘Efficiency versus Sovereignty’; Junk, ‘Function Follows Form’; Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations’; and Lundgren, ‘Conflict Management Capabilities’.

2 Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives’, 525.

3 Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich, No Will, No Way; Putzel and Di John, Meeting the Challenges; and Breakey and Dekker, ‘Weak Links in the Chain’.

4 Mattelaer, ‘CSDP Mission Planning Process’; Holland, ‘Bridging the Capability–Expectations Gap’; Greicevci, ‘EU Actorness in International Affairs’; Malesic, ‘Civilian Crisis Management’; Dijkstra, ‘Military Operation of the EU’; Dijkstra, ‘Planning and Implementation’; and Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security.

5 Keohane, ‘Lessons from EU Peace Operations’, 217.

6 Ibid.

7 Simon, Administrative Behavior; and Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.

8 Page, Policies without Politicians, vii.

9 Coombes, ‘Place of Public Management’.

10 Budäus and Grüning, ‘New Public Management’.

11 Pollitt, Managerialism and the Public Services.

12 Aucoin, ‘Administrative Reform in Public Management’, 118.

13 Most well known among the various normative approaches that were developed is the concept of ‘new public management’ that emphasized alternative forms of political guidance such as contract management (Pollitt and Talbot, Unbundled Government). New public management reforms influenced large numbers of public organizations around the world, both at the domestic (Pollitt and Bouckaert, Public Management Reform) and the international level (Knill and Balint, ‘Explaining Variation in Organizational Change’; Bauer, ‘Introduction’; and Geri, ‘New Public Management’).

14 Aucoin, ‘Administrative Reform in Public Management’, 116.

15 Dingwerth, ‘Global Democracy’; Grigorescu, ‘International Organizations’; and Scharpf, Regieren in Europa.

16 Perrow, Organizational Analysis.

17 Da Costa and Karlsrud, ‘“Bending the Rules”’, 293.

18 Junk, ‘Function Follows Form’.

19 Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations’.

20 Guéhenno, Robust Peacekeeping.

21 Breakey and Dekker, ‘Weak Links in the Chain’, 319.

22 Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich, No Will, No Way; and Putzel and Di John, Meeting the Challenges.

23 Aucoin, ‘Administrative Reform in Public Management’.

24 Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity’.

25 Gutner and Thompson, ‘Politics of IO Performance’.

26 Howlett et al., Studying Public Policy.

27 De Coning, ‘Planning for Success’; IPI, Management Handbook; and Paffenholz and Reychler, Aid for Peace.

28 IPI, Management Handbook; Jones, ‘Challenges of Strategic Coordination’; Natsios, Clash of Counter-Bureaucracy; and Döring and Schreiner, ‘What Makes Inter-Organizational Collaboration’.

29 Meharg, Measuring What Matters; OSCE, OSCE Handbook; and Paffenholz and Reychler, Aid for Peace.

30 ZIF, Friedenseinsätze 2014/15.

31 Holland, ‘Bridging the Capability–Expectations Gap’; and Greicevci, ‘EU Actorness in International Affairs’.

32 World Bank, World Development Report; and Eckhard, Zwischen Ertüchtigung und Wertewandel.

33 Mayntz, ‘Mechanisms in the Analysis’, 241; and George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.

34 Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics’.

35 Gerring, Case Study Research.

36 Interview transcripts based on author's notes. The author contacted individuals in the capacity of a researcher without any governmental affiliation.

37 The EU Council maintains a committee structure of over 150 committees and working groups under the nine main council configurations. For an overview see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/council-configurations/list-of-council-preparatory-bodies?lang=en (accessed 22 March 2016).

38 Mattelaer, ‘CSDP Mission Planning Process’.

39 EU Council, Council Document on Suggestions; interviews 042/B, 25 April 2012, 027/B, 27 April 2012.

40 There is a similar unit for military missions, called the EU Military Staff.

41 EU Council, Council Joint Action on the European Union, Art. 8(5).

42 For an overview over these regulations, there is a 400-page synoptic presentation available on the EU website, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/syn_pub_rf_modex_en.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the rules applying to contract procedures associated with EU external action, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/practical_guide/previous_versions/index_en.htm (both accessed 22 March 2016).

43 Interviews 082/A, 15 Feb. 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012.

44 EU Council, Council Joint Action on Establishment, Art. 10.

45 Grevi et al., European Security and Defense Policy, 30.

46 UN Security Council, Proceedings of the 4469th Meeting.

47 Interviews 059/A, 1 June 2011, 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012.

48 Interviews 058/D, 7/12 June 2012, 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012.

49 US Government, ‘Our Take on Afghanistan Objectives’.

50 EU Council, Approval of the Crisis Management Concept concerning the future Crisis Management Operation in Afghanistan.

51 Ibid.

52 Interviews 077/A, 1 June 2011, 078/A, 4 June 2011, 076/A, 14 Feb. 2012, 071/A, 16 Feb. 2012, 087/A, 21 Feb. 2012.

53 US Government, ‘Afghan Police Training’.

54 US Government, ‘OSCE Interest in Afghanistan’.

55 NTM-A, Year in Review.

56 Interviews 056/D, 2 July 2012, 098/A, 2 June 2011, 081/A, 6 June 2011/15 Feb. 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012.

57 United Kingdom, ‘EU's Afghan Police Mission’.

58 Ibid, 30.

59 Klees Klompenhover (public statement, United Kingdom parliamentary hearing, 2011).

60 Interviews 040/B, 26 April 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012.

61 See the respective announcements on the EUPOL website: http://www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=node/177. Construction works were concluded in spring 2014: http://www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=police-training (both accessed 22 March 2016).

62 Interviews 071/A, 16 Feb. 2012, 045/B, 26 April 2012.

63 Interviews 089/D, 14 Jan. 2013, 040/B, 26 April 2012.

64 Interviews 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012, 040/B, 26 April 2012.

65 UN Secretary-General to President of the UN Security Council, ‘Ahtisaari Plan’, para. 4.

66 Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Romania were all struggling with separatist movements in their own backyards. They consequently ruled out any support for Kosovo's unilateral independence as a matter of principle (ICG, ‘Kosovo’).

67 EU Council, Approval of the Crisis Management Concept Concerning the Future Crisis Management Operation in Kosovo.

68 Dijkstra, ‘Planning and Implementation’.

69 Interviews 011/K, 16 Nov. 2011, 012/K, 17 Nov. 2011, 026/D, 30 Nov. 2011.

70 EULEX, EULEX Programme Report 2009.

71 Bennet et al., Building the Police Service; and Dijkstra, ‘Planning and Implementation’.

72 De Wet, ‘The Governance of Kosovo’, 96.

73 US Government, ‘Kosovo’.

74 Interview 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011, 012/K, 17 Nov. 2011, 027/B, 27 April 2012.

75 Interviews 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011, 037/K, 24 Nov. 2011, 109/K, 11 June 2013.

76 Interviews 038/K, 15 Nov. 2011, 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011.

77 US Government, ‘KOSOVO/EULEX’.

78 Interviews 002/K, 17 Nov. 2011, 041/K, 17 Nov. 2011, 004/D, 26 June 2012.

79 Interviews 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011, 044/B, 26 April 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012, 027/B, 27 April 2012.

80 Serbia eventually received the status for candidacy to the EU in March 2012. One position paper by the German delegation supports the principal notion about Germany's political priorities, Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Sachstand Kosovo – Serbien’. The political relevance of Serbian EU membership was reaffirmed during interviews with EU officials in Kosovo and Brussels (interviews 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011, 041/K, 17 Nov. 2011, 016/B, 24 April 2012, 096/K, 26 Jan. 2011).

81 As confirmed by one interviewee, EULEX had managed to open the Mitrovica court building in 2010, which had been looted during protests on 17 March 2008. Since 2011, however, the Mitrovica court building remained closed and the court was relocated to the more southern city of Vushtrii (interview 032/K, 16 Nov. 2011).

82 Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives’, 538.

83 Interview 108/B, 3 Dec. 2013.

84 Keohane, ‘Lessons from EU Peace Operations’, 202.

85 Junk, ‘Function Follows Form’; and Allen and Yuen, ‘Politics of Peacekeeping’.

86 Cox, ‘The Executive Head’.

87 Seibel, ‘Peace Operations’; Junk, ‘Function Follows Form’; Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations’; and Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives’.

88 Stone, Controlling Institutions.

89 Guéhenno, Robust Peacekeeping, 8.

90 Koremenos et al., ‘Rational Design of International Institutions’.

91 Breakey and Dekker, ‘Weak Links in the Chain’; Dijkstra, ‘Efficiency versus Sovereignty’; Junk, ‘Function Follows Form’; Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations’; and Lundgren, ‘Conflict Management Capabilities’.

92 Interview 042/B, 25 April 2012.

93 Gutner and Thompson, ‘Politics of IO Performance’.

94 Sedra, ‘An Uncertain Future’.

95 UN DPKO, Lessons Learned in Kosovo; Council of Europe, Assessment Report.

96 European Court of Auditors, European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law, para. 29; and The Guardian, EU's Biggest Foreign Mission in Turmoil Over Corruption Row.