https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0542-3574
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ABSTRACT
The role of civil society as a democratising force, both under authoritarian regimes and during political transitions, has received renewed attention in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. Considerable praise has been reserved for Tunisia, whose civil society played a prominent role in the country’s successful transition. However, as a thorough analysis of the Tunisian example illustrates, this contrasts sharply with its relatively marginal role in the pre-2011 period. Indeed, Tunisian civil society has not always been a pro-democracy force, its functions shifted with the political context, and different types of civil society organisations (CSOs) played widely different roles. Tracing the evolution of civil society in Tunisia from the establishment of the Ben Ali regime in November 1987 until after its fall in January 2011, the article develops a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of its roles before, during, and after the revolution. More specifically, it shows that before the revolution, only a handful of CSOs served as islands of political resistance, while the majority functioned as vehicles of regime resilience, helping to strengthen authoritarian rule in the country. During the revolution, members of more critical CSOs played an important supporting role in the spread, organisation, and continuation of protests. Finally, in the post-revolutionary period, former oppositional CSOs, together with a plethora of newly created CSOs, were crucial not only in successfully steering the country towards a democratic transition but also in strengthening the nascent democracy. Civil society should thus be understood in its variety and particular political context.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the participants of the 2016 American Political Science Association MENA workshops, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous drafts of the article. I am also extremely grateful to the Tunisian civil society activists who agreed to share their story with me and to Noora Lori and Janis Grzybowski for their support and feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The fourth organisation, Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts (Union tunisienne de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat, UTICA), was historically close to the Ben Ali regime and invited to participate in the initiative to achieve greater inclusiveness and representation as earlier unilateral attempts by UGTT to launch a ‘National Dialogue’ process were unsuccessful.
2 Informal social groups and social movements, as well as political parties, which are also occasionally considered part of civil society, are excluded here to avoid generating a catch-all category that encompasses virtually any form of collective action.
3 Density of about 1 association for 1,000 inhabitants.
4 Organic law no. 88-90 of 2 August 1988.
5 Organic law no. 92-25 of 2 April 1992.
6 For an overview of the situation 10 years after Ben Ali took power, as well as a comparison with the regime of Habib Bourguiba, see Alexander (Citation1997).
7 See for example Geyer (Citation1998).
8 Law no. 59-154 of 7 November 1959, as modified by Organic law no. 88-90 and Organic law no. 92-25.
9 Upon the publication of the association’s details in the Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic.
10 Organic law no. 92-25.
11 Article 8 of law no. 59-154.
12 Organic law no. 92-25.
13 Law no. 69-4 of 24 January 1969 regulating public meetings, processions, parades, demonstrations and gatherings.
14 Law no. 2010-35 of 29 June 2010 amending Article 61bis of the Tunisian Penal Code.
15 Interviews with oppositional civil society activists, Tunisia, 2014–2016.
16 See for example Gobe (Citation2013).
17 Members of CSOs could also be chosen to fill the seats nominated directly by Ben Ali (Constitutional act no. 2002-51 of 1 June 2002).
18 The fund, also known as ’26-26’, was infamous for its abuse by the Ben Ali family. For more information, see Hibou (Citation2011).
19 Chapter II of Law no. 59-154.
20 Interviews with ATFD members, Tunis, April 2016. The sentiment was also echoed by many UGET and UGTT members, especially those in extreme left political parties.
21 Amnesty International and Arab Institute for Human Rights operated also in Tunisia.
22 Interview, Gafsa, March 2015.
23 This is in line with developments in many other Arab countries (Langohr Citation2004).
24 Interview, Tunis, April 2016.
25 Ibid.
26 Interview with Mondher Cherni, Vice-President of ALTT, Tunis, June 2015.
27 For an overview of the role of human rights organisations in Tunisia, see Chouikha and Gobe (Citation2009).
28 ATFD had about 150–200 members (Interview with ATFD executive committee member, Tunis, June 2015).
29 Interviews with senior ATFD members, Tunis, May–June 2015.
30 Ibid.
31 Interview, Tunis, December 2014.
32 Interview with a national UGTT representative, Tunis, April 2016.
33 Estimate provided by an active unionist and illegal extreme left political party member (Interview, Gafsa, March 2015).
34 Point re-iterated also by many civil society and political activists.
35 More ‘rebellious’ sections – like the primary and secondary education, health, and postal services sections, as well as some regional unions – often had a higher number of oppositional political party members also at higher organisational levels (Interviews with UGTT members, Tunisia, 2014–2016).
36 Ibid.
37 Interviews with former UGET activist, Gafsa, April 2015.
38 Interviews with former UGET activists from Tunis, Gafsa, Bizerte, Kairouan, and Sousse, 2014–2015.
39 Ibid.
40 Previous attempts to establish the organisation took place in late 1990s and early 2000s (Interview with UDC executive committee member, Tunis, July 2015).
41 Interviews with UDC activists, Gafsa and Tunis, March-July 2015.
42 Ibid.
43 For an analysis of the lawyers as a profession and their political role prior to the revolution, see Gobe (Citation2010, Citation2013) and Gobe and Ayari (Citation2007).
44 Ibid.
45 Interview with an oppositional lawyer, Tunis, June 2015.
46 Ibid.
47 Estimate provided by Tunisian media sociologist Riadh Ferjani (Interview, Tunis, November 2014).
48 Interviews with oppositional journalists and senior SJT members, Tunis, June 2015.
49 Ibid.
50 Interview with prominent anti-regime judge Mokhtar Yahyaoui, Tunis, June 2015.
51 Ibid.
52 Interviews with illegal political party members, Tunisia, 2014–2016.
53 Interview, Tunis, June 2015.
54 This is not to say that they initiated the revolution or comprised most of its supporters. According to the 2011 Arab Barometer, only a little over one fifth of those who participated in the revolution were members of CSOs (Beissinger Citation2017, 363). On the sequencing and underlying causes of the revolution, see for example Mabrouk (Citation2011) and ICG (Citation2011).
55 Interviews with the lawyer and several UGTT members, Sidi Bouzid, May 2015.
56 Interviews with protest participants, Sidi Bouzid, May 2015.
57 Ibid.
58 See also Mabrouk (Citation2011).
59 Interviews with participants, Tunis, 2014–2016.
60 For more information, see Yousfi (Citation2015).
61 Interview with a national UGTT representative, Tunis, April 2016.
62 Interviews with participants from both groups, Tunis, 2014–2016.
63 Monthly overviews of social movement developments are provided by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (Forum tunisien pour les droits économiques et sociaux, FTDES).
64 A prominent example is the Manish Msameh (I will not forgive) movement, which opposed economically motivated amnesty for former regime officials and business elites.
65 Interview with UNFT president, Tunis, April 2016.
66 This was true especially for the UGTT, which faced vigorous attacks for trying to ‘hijack’ the revolution and derail the transition (Yousfi Citation2015).
67 Decree-law no. 2011-6 of 18 February 2011. For more information about CSO involvement during the transitional period, see for example Antonakis-Nashif (Citation2016).
68 Interviews with activists from smaller CSOs, Tunis, April 2016.
69 The former as Organisation Against Torture in Tunisia (Organisation contre la torture en Tunisie, OCTT).
70 This seems to be the case especially for journalists (Interviews with former oppositional journalists and representatives of international CSOs, Tunis, April 2016).