Immutable clauses and judicial review in India, Brazil and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts' authority

Abstract

The development of immutable constitutional rights in India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) is an historical response to violence and oppression. Such rigidity, however, institutes a deep distrust of the legislature and the sovereignty of future generations, unbalancing the delicate democratic stability supporting the system of judicial review. This article discusses the lively jurisprudence of IBSA and notes that the courts adopt the formal shielding of the immutability theory selectively and not homogeneously if compared with each other when they are confronted with critical issues for the parliament and the executive. Nevertheless, it is contended that, as to the judiciary's institutional power and prerogatives, all IBSA's constitutional courts overall embrace activist interpretation based on immutable clauses to extend their jurisdiction and entrench their power over the other branches of government.

Keywords:

• India
• Brazil
• South Africa
• constitutionalism
• immutable clauses
• judicial review
• social rights
• judicial activism

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Natalie Rosen for her insights and constructive criticisms on the earlier versions of this article. I also want to extend my appreciation and acknowledgement to Dr Laura Niada of the University of Westminster for her precise comments and suggestions. Responsibility for eventual errors is mine alone.

Notes

Ronald Dworkin, ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy’, European Journal of Philosophy, no. 3 (1995): 2.

Frank Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 4–5.

Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991): 11.

Ibid.: 11. Ackerman refers to Alexander Bickel's expression.

See Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008): ix–x and Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’, Yale Law Journal, no. 115 (2006): 1354.

Jeremy Waldron, 'The Core of the Case against Judicial Review', Yale Law Journal, no. 115 (2006): 1353.

Ibid.

William Marbury v. James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, 5 US 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352. Marbury v. Madison is usually remembered as the landmark case inaugurating the power of judicial review.

See IBSA trilateral agreement, www.ibsa-trilateral.org//index.php (access 27 July 2009).

The Brasilia Declaration (2003), www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/ibsa_brasilia.htm (access 27 July 2009).

See IBSA Project at www.conectas.org/IBSA/ibsa.htm (accessed 20 August 2009).

Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008): 19–20.

Rodrigo Brandão, ‘Direitos Fundamentais, Cláusulas Pétreas e Democracia: uma proposta de justificação e aplicação do Art. 60, par. 40 da CF/88’, Revista Eletrônica de Direito do Estado, www.direitodoestado.com.br/codrevista.asp?cod=191 (accessed 17 July 2009): 2.

Ibid.: 3.

Cass R. Sunstein and Stephen Holmes, ‘The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe’ in Sanford Levinson (ed.) Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 290.

Theunis Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’, in Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies (London: Ashgate, 2004): 92.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC and O'Cinneide, ‘The Effective Protection of Socio-Economic Rights’, 20.

Michel Troper, ‘The logic of justification of judicial review’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, no. 1 (2003): 115.

Ibid., 116.

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 221–222.

Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: Norton, 1999), 304.

John R. Vile, ‘The Case against Implicit Limits on the Constitution Amending Process’ in Sanford Levinson (ed) Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 200.

Oscar Vieira, A Constituição e sua Reserva de Justiça (São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 1999), 19.

Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 21.

Vieira, A Constituição, 246–247.

Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 24.

Ibid: xi.

Ibid: 79.

Ibid at p.23

Ibid at p.228

See Margit Cohn and Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, no. 18 (2005): 335.

Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: 34.

Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 9–10. Tushnet classifies this distinction as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ constitutions.

Evidently constitutional amendments are never a simple process. They have a high price in democracy and politicians balance the necessity with the political cost.

S. P. Sathe, ‘India: From Positivism to Structuralism’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 215.

Burt Neuborne, ‘Constitutional court profile: the Supreme Court of India’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, no. 476 (2003): 476.

The Constitution of India (1949), art. 368. This article was altered by the twenty-fourth amendment in 1971.

Ibid, arts. 3, 4, 11, 105(3), 120, 196(3), 345 and 348.

Ibid at article 368.

Indian Constitutional Assembly documents. CAD, Vol 9, 1195, apud Sathe, ‘India: From Positivism to Structuralism’: 229.

Sathe, ‘India: From Positivism to Structuralism’: 228.

Shankari Prasad v India 1951 AIR 1951 SC 458 and Sajjan Singh v Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845

I. C. Golaknath and others v State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1643.

S. P. Sathe, Judicial activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006): 8.

For more on the ISC positivist approach in early years see Sathe, ‘India: From Positivism to Structuralism', 242; and Neuborne, ‘Constitutional court profile’, 479.

Golaknath, 8.

Ibid, 99–100.

Keshavanada Bharti v State of Kerela (1973) 4 SCC 225.

Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1980): 12.

Constitution of India, art.124.

Neuborne, 'Constitutional court profile', 480–481.

Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.

Ibid.

Sathe, Judicial Activism in India, 87.

The Ninth Schedule is a protection against judicial review authorised by article 31B of the Indian Constitution that states ‘none of the Acts and regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule … shall be deemed to be void … on the ground that such Act … is inconsistent with … any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or Tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force’. Constitution of India, art. 31B.

I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 7 SCC 580.

Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC 1.

Coelho (1999), paragraph 152, iii–iv.

For cases in which the basic structure doctrine has been successfully invoked, see Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, P. Sambamurthy v. A.P., L. Chandra Kumar v. India and S.R. Bommai and others v. Union of India and others.

Anirudh Burman, ‘Locating Post-Modern Constitutionalism in India: The Basic Structure Doctrine’, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006621 (accessed 30 July 2009): 16.

R. Sudarsham, ‘Courts and Social Transformation in India’ in Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo and Theunis Roux (eds), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006): 165.

Brazilian Constitution, article 60(2).

Brazil has 27 registered political parties, of which 19 have representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, www.tse.gov.br/internet/partidos/index.htm (accessed 12 August 2009).

Brazilian Constitution, article 60(4).

For an overview of the Brazilian Charter of Fundamental Rights, see Oscar Vieira, ‘The Brazilian Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Brief Introduction’ (2008) working paper for the Courting Justice IBSA Conference, Delhi, April 2008, www.conectas.org/IBSA/Paper_Introduction.doc (accessed 14 July 2009).

ADI 939/93 DF, p.275.

ADI 3105/DF p.164–169.

Luis R. Barroso, ‘Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade Democrática’ (2008), Editora OAB, www.oab.org.br/oabeditora/users/revista/1235066670174218181901.pdf (accessed 19 July 2009): 1.

Ibid, 2.

Julio Rios-Figueroa and Matthew Taylor, ‘Institutional Determinants of the Judicialisation of Policy in Brazil and Mexico’, Journal of Latin American Studies, no. 38 (2006): 749 and Barroso, ‘Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade Democrática’, 3.

O. Vieira, ‘Supremocracia’ (2008), Revista de Direito do Estado 12, apud Barroso, ‘Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade Democrática’, 3.

The following are able to propose the abstract judicial review: President, Senate, Chamber of Deputies, states Chamber of Deputies, states Governors, Attorney-General, Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, political party and national syndicates and professional associations.

The full list on www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=jurisprudenciaSumulaVinculante> (accessed 26 January 2011).

Rios-Figueroa and Taylor, ‘Institutional Determinants’, 745–746. External independence reflects the extent to which justices can reflect their preferences in their decisions without facing retaliation measures from other branches of government, whereas internal independence refers to the extent to which lower court judges can make decisions without taking into account the preferences of their hierarchical superiors.

Carlos Santiso, ‘Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing Independence with Accountability’, in Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (eds.), Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies (London: Frank Cass, 2004): 163.

See RE 267612/RS, RE 267612/RS, AI 570455/RS, and RE 198265/RS.

Action of Disconformity with Fundamental Precept – ADPF n.45. This is one type of instrument to propose judicial review in Brazil.

Ibid, 6.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Daniel Wang, ‘Escassez de recursos, custos dos direitos e reserva do possível na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal’, Anual Papers, Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association (ALACDE), Berkeley Program in Law & Economics (2007), http://repositories.cdlib.org/bple/alacde/050207-16/, (accessed 16 August 2009). The author discusses 12 cases ruled by the BSFT concerning the right to heath.

ADI 3510/DF.

Although the final result was 6x5, some Justices had partial agreement with the law. The disagreement referred to the extent of the conditions imposed by the Court.

ADI 3510/DF.

410 U.S. 113 - 93 S. Ct. 705; 35 L. Ed. 2d 147; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 159.

MS 24849/DF.

MS 26602/DF (2007).

See also, for example, the provisional decision of the ADI 4048 MC/DF. The request of judicial review was filed against the use by the president of the Republic of provisional measures to create extraordinary credit for the Union budget law.

See for instance the constitutional amendments number 19, 29, 39 and 52 overruling BSFT decisions.

Barroso, ‘Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade Democrática’, 4–5.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC and O'Cinneide, ‘The Effective Protection of Socio-Economic Rights’, 20.

Heinz Klug, ‘South Africa: From Constitutional Promise to Social Transformation’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 267.

Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 15.

Ibid, 92.

Ibid, 98.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1993), s.73(1).

Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation’, 109.

Certification of the Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, 1996 CCT 23/96.

Curiously, this evaluation of the mere formal compliance of the National Assembly with the court's rulings is also expressed in the Court's official website www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thecertificationprocess.htm (accessed 14 August 2009).

Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation’, 112.

Klug, ‘South Africa’, 278.

Constitution of South Africa s.74.

Electoral Commission of South Africa, www.elections.org.za (accessed 14 August 2009).

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s. 74, 80 and 84 (2) b, c.

For instance, see the second constitutional (and immutable) principle, from which it is possible to construe the absolute protection of any civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights: ‘Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution ….’

Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation’, 136–137.

Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KWaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), par.36.

2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).

Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation’, 98.

The New National Party Of South Africa v. The Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SALR 191 (CC).

Ibid at par. 15.

Roux, ‘Legitimating Transformation’, 127.

MS 26602/DF (2007).

Floor crossing was a system under which members of parliament, members of provincial legislatures and local government councillors could change or form a new party without losing their seats (the system was abolished in January 2009).

Ibid, par.12.

Richard Calland, Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power Today? (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006): 226.

Iain Currie, ‘Judicious Avoidance’, South African Journal on Human Rights, no. 15 (1999): 147.

See the above discussed Brazilian cases CPI dos Bingos and party fidelity.

I. C. Golaknath and others v State of Punjab and others AIR 1967 SC 1643.

Keshavanada Bharti v State of Kerela (1973) 4 SCC 225.

See ADI 939/93 DF.

Klug, ‘South Africa’, 282.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.

MS 26602/DF (2007).

Beyond what is originally established by the constitutions.