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Original Articles

Kenya's power-sharing arrangement and its implications for transitional justice

Pages 307-327 | Published online: 24 Jan 2013
 

Abstract

The power-sharing arrangement that ended Kenya's 2007–2008 crisis seemingly offered a window of opportunity for dealing with past abuses. However, the very nature of this power-sharing deal has proven to be among the greatest obstacles for giving effect to the promises of transitional justice. By facilitating a power-sharing deal between political elites struggling for power and wealth, and allowing these political elites to control the justice tools, the power-sharing deal has enabled a continuation, perhaps even a consolidation, of this political culture, which this article argues poses a serious obstacle to achieving a much needed transition.

Acknowledgments

This article presents a further development of a paper presented at the Expert Seminar on “Law, Power Sharing and Human Rights”, University of Antwerp, Belgium (May 2012). The author wishes to thank the other participants for their comments on the paper, as well as Chandra Sriram, Susanne Mueller and the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

See e.g. Godfrey M. Musila, ‘Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External Prescriptions’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 445–64; Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice in Kenya? An Assessment of the Accountability Process in Light of Domestic Politics and Security Concerns’, California Western International Law Journal 42 (2011): 1–35.

See, generally, Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/PEV%20Report.pdf; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance (2008), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0308web.pdf Ballots to Bullets.

CIPEV, Report, 305.

Ibid., 384–5.

Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Lianna Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya’, International Peace Institute (August 2009), http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/2009/10/A_Choice_for_Peace.pdf, 4.

Ibid., 5.

Meredith Preston McGhie and E. Njoki Wamai, ‘Beyond the Numbers: Women's Participation in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (March 2011): 15–16.

Ibid., 15–16.

Martin Griffiths, ‘The Prisoner of Peace: An interview with Kofi A. Annan’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (May 2008): 3.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 2.

Griffiths, ‘The Prisoner of Peace’, 4.

Ibid., 3; McGhie and Wamai, ‘Beyond the Numbers’, 15–16; and Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’.

The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Signed_National_Accord_Act_Feb28.pdf.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 2.

Ibid., 8.

See Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), ‘Annotated Agenda and Timetable’ (1 February 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Signed_Annotated_Agenda_ Feb1st.pdf; Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Statement of Principles on Long-Term Issues and Solutions’ (23 May, 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/S_of_P_with_Matrix.pdf.

Griffiths, ‘The Prisoner of Peace’, 2.

For a further analysis of these developments in the field, see e.g. Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory’, Oregon Review of International Law 13 (2011): 1–46; Paige Arthur, ‘How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 321–67.

KNDR, ‘Annotated Agenda’, agenda 2.

Ibid., agenda 4.

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Long-Term Issues and Solutions: Constitutional Review Agreement’ (4 March 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/KenyaNationalDialogue_IRC.pdf.

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Agreement’ (4 March, 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/KenyanNationalDialogue_Truth&Justice.pdf.

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, Agreement’ (4 March, 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Agreement_Commission_on_Post_Election_Violence.pdf.

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Independent Review Committee, Agreement’ (4 March 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/KenyaNationalDialogue_IRC.pdf.

See further Evelyne Asaala, ‘Exploring Transitional Justice as a Vehicle for Social and Political Transformation in Kenya’, African Human Rights Journal 10 (2010): 395–404.

See further Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action’ (Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 205, 2009): 1–20; Susanne D. Mueller, ‘The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis’, Journal of East African Studies 2 (2008): 185–210.

See e.g. Wanza Kioko, ‘The Place of Transitional Justice in Kenya's Impending Political Transition’, in Building an Open Society: The Politics of Transition in Kenya, ed. Lawrence M. Mute, Kichamu Akivaga and Wanza Kioko (Nairobi, Kenya: Claripress, 2002), 306.

See similarly Musila, ‘Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya’.

Indicating this expansion of the field, see e.g. Christine Bell, Colm Campbell and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Justice Discourses in Transition’, Social and Legal Studies 13 (2004): 305–28; Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or “Non-Field”’, The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 5–27. For a further discussion of these trends, see e.g. Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice’.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 7.

See e.g. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Receives MacArthur Award for International Justice (21 March 2008), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/42-learn-about-the-responsibility-to-protect/1601-macarthur-foundation-awards-kofi-annan-for-developing-the-principle-of-r2p.

Griffiths, ‘The Prisoner of Peace’, 18.

Kofi Annan statement at press conference on 26 January 2008 in Nairobi as cited in Ben Sihanya and Duncan Okello, ‘Mediating Kenya's Post-Election Crises: The Politics and Limits of Power Sharing Agreement’, in Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections, ed. Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello (Nairobi, Kenya: Society for International Development, 2010), 680.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 22.

Ibid., 17–18.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 12.

Ibid., 17–18.

See further Sihanya and Okello, ‘Mediating Kenya's Post-Election Crises’, 682–3.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 11.

Samwel M. Mohochi, ‘African Union Mediated Peace: The Case of Kenya 2008’, Paper Presentation (SSRN), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898936, 5.

See further Sihanya and Okello, ‘Mediating Kenya's Post-Election Crises’, 672.

See e.g. Linda M. Keller, ‘The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court’, Hague Justice Journal 3 (2008): 12–47; Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Editorial Note – Transitional Justice Globalized’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 1–4.

See e.g. International Center for Transitional Justice, Peace Versus Justice: A False Dilemma, http://ictj.org/news/peace-versus-justice-false-dilemma.

See e.g. Stef Vandeginste and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Power Sharing and Transitional Justice: A Clash of Paradigms?’, Global Governance 17 (2011): 489–505.

See further Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), Policy Brief 2009: Kenya: Temporary Ceasefire or Lasting Peace?, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Kenya_Book_Web.pdf, 3–4.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 8.

See further McGhie and Wamai, ‘Beyond the Numbers’, 16; and Sihanya and Okello, ‘Mediating Kenya's Post-Election Crises’, 672–3.

Griffiths, ‘The Prisoner of Peace’, 9.

McGhie and Wamai, ‘Beyond the Numbers’, 17.

See e.g. CIPEV, Report, 26.

KNDR, ‘Annotated Agenda’, para. 2.

Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Agenda Item Three: How to Resolve the Political Crisis (Tsavo Agreement)’ (14 February 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/14_Feb_08_TsavoAgreement.pdf.

For an analysis of the failures of past commissions – such as the ‘Kiliku Committee’, the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Akiwumi Commission – to promote justice for politically inspired violence, see further CIPEV, Report, 445–54.

See Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 13.

Mohochi, ‘African Union Mediated Peace’, 4.

See Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Agreement (4 March, 2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/KenyanNationalDialogue_Truth&Justice.pdf.

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Act no. 6 of 2008.

Evelyne Asaala, ‘Exploring Transitional Justice as a Vehicle for Social and Political Transformation in Kenya’, African Human Rights Law Journal 10 (2010): 396.

Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), Progress Report to the National Assembly Submitted Pursuant to Section 20(3) of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 6 of 2008 (24 June, 2011), 39–40.

Ibid.

Otieno Otieno, Africa – Hidden Hand Behind Crisis at Kenya Truth Commission, http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=25615.

For an analysis of how the calls for consultations with civil society have been ignored, see International Centre for Policy and Conflict (ICPC), Monitoring Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (April 2008–June 2010): A Case of Concealing Truth to Reward Impunity (2010), 6 (hereinafter ICPC, ‘April 2008–June 2010 Monitoring Report’).

State House (Kenya), Press Release: President Kibaki Appoints Members of TJRC (22 July, 2009), http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/july09/2009220701.htm.

On these allegations, see further Africa Confidential, Bethuel Kiplagat (Profile), http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/360/Bethuel-Kiplagat; Roy Gachuhi, Portrait of Bethwel Kiplagat, Isolated at the Helm of TJRC, http://www.roygachuhi.com/?cat=8.

TJRC, Progress Report, iv.

ICPC, ‘April 2008–June 2010 Monitoring Report’, 8–11.

See Nzau Musau, ‘Kiplagat to Appear before TJRC’, The Star, March 20, 2012.

Mars Group Blog, Desmond Tutu and Other International Justice Figures Call on Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat Kenyan TJRC Chair to Step Down (25 February, 2010), http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/?p=1865.

ICPC, ‘April 2008–June 2010 Monitoring Report’, 8.

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), ‘To Live as Other Kenyans Do’: A Study of the Reparative Demands of Kenyan Victims of Human Rights Violations (July 2009), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Reparations-Demands-2011-English.pdf, 43–4.

See generally ICTJ, ‘To Live as Other Kenyans Do’; The KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011.

See generally Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya?; Susanne D. Mueller, ‘Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29 (2011): 99–117; Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya’, African Affairs (2012): 244–60.

Kenya National Assembly, Motion 144 (22 December, 2010), http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=636&Itemid=.

Ibid.

See e.g. Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Why the Ocampo Six Should Not Become Kenya's Six’, OpenDemocracy, February14, 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-obel-hansen/why-ocampo-six-should-not-become-kenya%E2%80%99s-six.

See e.g. Njeri Rugene, ‘Kalonzo Defends Shuttle Over ICC Trials’, Daily Nation, February 8, 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1103784/-/7ocyvn/-/index.html.

Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/16 ¶ 6 (30–31 January 2011).

Letter from Macharia Kamau, Kenya's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, to the President of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute (28 February 2011), http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/news/general/81922-Kenyas-letter-ICC-President.html.

Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang and Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (31 March 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf.

Ibid., para. 2.

Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (30 May 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078822.pdf; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (30 May 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf.

‘Raila Rivals Toy with Single Candidate Plan’, Daily Nation, January 16, 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+rivals+toy+with+single+candidate+plan++/-/1064/1090904//13rakrr/-/index.html.

The KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, paras 8–9 and Figure 5 (on page 9).

The KNDR Monitoring Project, Review Report: May 2012, 24–8.

See Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya?, 32–5.

At the point, Wamalwa expressed sympathy for Kenyatta's presidential bid, but this support later vanished as he joined another coalition for the March 2013 elections. See http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Mudavadi-and-Wamalwa-reach-new-alliance-deal-/-/1064/1656444/-/155f6w7/-/index.html

‘Conspiracy against The Hague?’, The Standard, March 29, 2012, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000055124&cid=4&story=Conspiracy against The Hague?; ‘Kilonzo Transfer Linked to His Stand on Ocampo Four Cases’, Daily Nation, March 27, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kilonzo+transfer+linked+to+his+stand+on+Ocampo+Four+cases+/-/1064/1375050/-/11gxvad/-/index.html.

See further Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Masters of Manipulation: How the Kenyan Government is paving the Way for Non-Cooperation with the ICC’, Open Democracy, May 2012.

‘Kenya: Who is in Charge Here’, Africa Confidential, May 1, 2009, 10; and The KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, 45.

See generally Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya?

See further KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, 23.

See ‘Ruto: Why I Prefer The Hague Route’, Daily Nation, February 21, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/533390/-/u2h24m/-/index.html.

See Benjamin Muindi, ‘ICC: Uhuru, Ruto Lash Out at PM’, Daily Nation, March 26, 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1133610/-/7q7klt/-/index.html.

‘They Voted for Hague but are now praying with ICC Suspects’, Daily Nation, February 4, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/They+voted+for+Hague+but+now+pray+with+suspects/-/1064/1320534/-/21daw6z/-/index.html.

See Daily Nation, ‘Ruto: Why I Prefer The Hague Route’.

Peter Leftie, ‘Reject Kenya Plea, Orange Asks UN’, Daily Nation, March 13, 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Orange+asks+UN+to+reject+Kenya+plea+/-/1064/1124530/-/v7vewrz/-/index.html.

See e.g. Bernard Namunane, ‘How Raila Plans to Split G7 Supporters’, Daily Nation, June 15, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/How+Raila+plans+to+split+G7+supporters/-/1064/1428630/-/c0xdbiz/-/index.html; Muchemi Wachria, ‘Raila Praises ICC for Freeing Kosgey’, Daily Nation, July 7, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+praises+ICC+for+freeing+Kosgey+/-/1064/1448204/-/114nfs9z/-/index.html.

Musila, ‘Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya’, 450.

See generally Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya?; KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, 37–48.

See e.g. Lillian Aluanga, ‘ICC Trials put Clergy's Conduct under Radar’, The Standard, March 31, 2012, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000055325&cid=289; Jonathan Komen, ‘ICC Tops Agenda at Rift Leaders’ Meeting', Daily Nation, April 3, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ICC+tops+agenda+at+Rift+leaders+meeting+/-/1064/1379642/-/137tfkq/-/index.html.

KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, para. 6.

See International Center for Transitional Justice, The Kenya Transitional Justice Brief, vol. 1, no.2, August 2011: One Year Since Promulgation: Assessing the Reform Process in the new Constitutional Dispensation (September 2011).

See e.g. John Ngirachu, ‘Private Lives of CJ, Deputy Nominees Queried’, Daily Nation, June 7, 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1176526/-/7spse7/-/index.html.

See further KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: January 2012.

The KNDR Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report: April 2011, para. 18.

On the earlier attempts at adopting a new constitution, see generally Tom Kagwe, ‘The Unfinished Reform Agenda and the 2007 General Elections in Kenya’, in Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections, ed. Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello (Nairobi, Kenya: Society for International Development, 2010), 415.

Sihanya and Okello, ‘Mediating Kenya's Post-Election Crises’, 697.

CIPEV, Report, 472–5.

CIPEV required the coalition partners to make and sign an agreement to establish a special tribunal within 60 days after presenting the report to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. See CIPEV, Report, 473.

See further Hansen, Political Violence in Kenya, 9.

See further Hansen, Transitional Justice in Kenya?

Canan Gündüz and Laura Davis, ‘Peace Mediation, Power-Sharing and Transitional Justice: Challenges and Options for the EU’, European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue, October 2011, 2.

Lindenmayer and Kaye, ‘A Choice for Peace’, 1.

See further Stephen Brown, ‘Lessons Learned and Forgotten: The International Community and Electoral Conflict Management in Kenya’, in Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding, ed. David Gillies (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 127–43.

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