![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The Chapter VII resolutions on Libya by the United Nations Security Council (2011) and the UNSC-approved French-led intervention in Mali (2013) and the absence of a consensus on Syria ever since the popular uprising have reminded us of the ‘why-not-Rwanda-but-Kosovo’ type of a challenge used to identify the objective determinants for the trans-boundary use of force to stop mass atrocity crimes. I adopt a legalistic approach in finding ways to pursue consensus on R2P Pillar Three operations; and through the available state practice and body of international law in general, I illustrate the normative progress to argue that a sound foundation has emerged to suggest that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansings are of erga omnes character wherever they happen; whereas the International Criminal Court has been emerging as a capable and legitimate institution for bringing the most odious perpetrators to justice and providing legal background for the use of force against ‘manifestly failed’ governments.
Acknowledgements
This article has been part of a wider research project, generously supported with a scholarship funded by Magdalena Yesil at the Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, between August 2012 and June 2013. The author is thankful to Professor Judith Kelley and Professor Bruce Jentleson for their numerous feedback and advisorship, without which this research would not have seen the light. The project has also hugely benefitted from the unwavering support of the (former) Dean, Professor Bruce Kuniholm and enriched by discussions with the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy – Professors Peter Feaver, Francis Lethem, Natalia Mirovitskaya, Catherine Admay, Francis Webb and others contributing to all stages of my research, all of whom I am fully indebted to.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan has a PhD in Political Science and is Adjunct Lecturer at the American University of Armenia. Dr Nikoghosyan specialises in human rights and international security, having a keen interest and research experience in human rights and armed conflicts, the United Nations, state sovereignty and intervention, just war theory, international criminal responsibility for erga omnes crimes, as well as Responsibility to Protect. He publishes on conflicts and human rights, and is a co-author of the ‘Global Problems for Global Governance' report, published by the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2014.
Notes
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
2 Don Hubert, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Preventing and Halting Crimes against Humanity’, in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 89–108.
3 Note: As observed by Jennifer Welsh, the UN World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, in fact, established the list of ‘R2P crimes', whereas the original ICISS report was making the case solely for crimes incurring ‘large scale loss of life’. Jennifer Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP’, Ethics & International Affairs 25 (2011): 255–262, doi:10.1017/S0892679411000207.
4 Note: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged in Bosnia v. Serbia that obligations of genocide or atrocity prevention cannot be imposed as ‘binding obligation’ on states. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro); Judgment of 26 February 2007. [para. 430] http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf
5 Edward C. Luck, ‘Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experience', in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 108–28 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/308 (14 September 2009), UN Doc. A/RES/63/308.
7 Note: The terms ‘doctrine’ and ‘concept’ with reference to the responsibility to protect are used interchangeably and as synonyms in the text.
8 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘Operationalizing Protective Interventions: Alternative Models of Authorization', in The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Andy W. Knight and Frazer Egerton (London: Routledge, 2012), 87–103, at 99.
9 ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All'. Report of the Secretary-General, 2005. UN Doc. A/59/2005.
10 UN Security Council 6917th Meeting, Press Release, UN Doc SC/10913, 12 February 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sc10913.doc.htm (accessed 5 August 2014).
11 Statement by the President of the Security Council, adopted 12 February 2013. UN Doc. S/PRST/2013/2.
12 Note: For instance, the United States National Security Strategy in 1994 singled out four necessary preconditions to ‘guide decisions on when to use force'; those were: (1) considerations of national interests; (2) commitments to allies and their security; (3) support of public opinion and political consensus; (4) ‘reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds’. None of them was suitable for Rwanda, as the permanent five (P5) states voted to reduce the capabilities of UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) in Rwanda (S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994), as genocide was unfolding before the eyes of the international community, that left no other available means for General Romeo Dellaire than to ‘shake hand with the devil’. Romeo Dellaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004).
13 For example, Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, ‘From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrating Our Understanding of the Moral Use of Force’, Ethics & International Affairs 27 (2013): 87–106. doi:10.1017/S0892679412000792.
14 Jennifer M. Welsh and Maria Banda, ‘International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities?’, in The Responsibility To Protect and International Law, ed. Alex Bellamy, Sara Davies, and Luke Granville (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 119–39.
15 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60.
16 Note: In the Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain, 1970) the ICJ ruled that beyond genocide, certain other crimes, such as piracy, apartheid, racial discrimination and slavery are also unlawful assaults against the international community as a whole. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf.
17 ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', Report of the UN Secretary-General, 12 January 2009; UN doc. A/63/677, para. 9d, http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf. Note: The UNSG also urged in his report not to extend the R2P cover to ‘other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters’, which would eventually lead to renegotiation of ‘2005 consensus’. This research will align with the same position.
18 Note: A general international consensus emerged in 2008 after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar that natural disasters do not give rise to R2P obligations of the international community, despite France fiercely advocating for that.
19 Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 32–7.
20 Note: The Report of the UN Secretary-General about the situation in Yugoslavia equated the policy of ethnic cleansing to crimes against humanity. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 48. Note: Although the UNGA resolution on the former Yugoslavia (A/Res/47/121 – http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r121.htm) on a political level claimed that ‘ethnic cleansing … is a form of genocide’, the legalistic approach dictates that there is a difference between these two, particularly with regard to the gravity and intentions of perpetrators. For the difference between the gravity of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide, see the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case of Jorgic v. Germany (12 July 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.
21 For more discussion of the Velásquez Rodríguez case, see: Tessa Davis, ‘Taking International Law at its Word and its Spirit: Re-envisioning Responsibility to Protect as a Binding Principle of International Law', Florida State University Law Review 38, no. 4 (2011), http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/384/Davis.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
22 Para. 172 of the court's ruling stated: ‘Thus, in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention [American Convention on Human Rights – H.N.] carried out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable to the State. However, this does not define all the circumstances in which a State is obligated to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations, nor all the cases in which the State might be found responsible for an infringement of those rights. An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention'. Velásquez Rodríguez case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm
23 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts', The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1981): 416–39, http://www.jstor.org/stable/759535.
24 Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, ICTY Appeals Chamber. Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 141, http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm. Note: This quote also appears in: George J. Andreopoulos, ‘Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and Threats to International Peace and Security', in From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent (Tokyo, New York: United Nations University Press, 2004), 80–100.
25 Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’.
26 The Permanent Court of International Justice concluded in the Lotus case (France v. Turkey) that ‘International law governs relations between independent sovereign States. The rules of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law … .' (emphasis added), http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf. However, for example, Libya did not join the ICC Rome Statute, but the case of mass atrocity crimes was referred to the court by the UNSC, in fact, in violation of the ‘free will’ principle. This is exactly the example that shows that the sovereignty issue is now amended by emerging R2P doctrine, placing ‘R2P crimes’ above the sovereignty issue.
27 The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] Judgment, ICJ General List No. 91, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
28 Note: It is remarkable, that Judge Skotnikov – himself a Russian national – dissented the ruling of the ICJ by arguing that ‘there is no such a thing as State criminal responsibility’ as long as states are ‘organized entities’ where individuals act on behalf of the state, and not the state ‘as such’, and states only have duties to prevent genocide if it is ‘committed within the territory where it exercises its jurisdiction or which is under its control’. Judges Shi and Koroma also issued a joint declaration, where they questioned the judgment and called it ‘inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention', that ‘State[s] can be held directly to have committed the crime of genocide'. Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf. Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13695.pdf.
29 ‘Senegal: Hissène Habré Court Opens’, Human Rights Watch, 8 February 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/08/senegal-hissene-habre-court-opens.
30 Note: The ICC Rome Statute considers ‘torture’ as a crime against humanity or war crime, depending on the background of the alleged violation (Art. 7(1), 8(2)).
31 Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment (20 July 2012)], http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
33 Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) .
35 Note: The ICJ confirmed in Belgium v. Senegal (2012) that the prohibition of torture had become a jus cogens norm in customary international law (Judgement, para. 99). Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) .
36 Note: Allan Kuperman suggests that the emerging doctrine of R2P, at least, has a negative side-effect of provoking retaliation from the government against any rebellion, which ‘causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur'. Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’, International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 49–80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29734224.
37 Note: The ICC prosecutor partly relied on the ‘publicly-available sources (international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the media)' information when suggesting the arrest of then-incumbent president of Côte d'Ivoire on charges of crimes against humanity before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III. Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, 15 November 2011. (Corrigendum) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1268605.pdf. Note: The UNSC Res. 2042 (2012), which suggested the six-point-plan for political transition in Syria, included the restoration of the right of journalists to freedom of movement as a basic and important point in the negotiations with the incumbent regime, which meant yet another credit to the work of the media in voicing atrocities elsewhere. For the full text see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/six_point_proposal.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
38 For example, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights is a prominent campaign hub, based in London, UK, that provides daily casualty figures in Syria for the international media, and is actively quoted by leading media companies, such as the BBC. However, as the New York Times revealed, ‘despite its central role in the savage civil war, the grandly named Syrian Observatory for Human Rights is virtually a one-man band’, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/middleeast/the-man-behind-the-casualty-figures-in-syria.html. Olivia Lang, ‘Profile: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights’, BBC News, 28 December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15896636 (accessed 5 August 2014).
39 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber Judgment (2001), para. 46, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf.
40 William Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 98, no. 3 (2008): 953–82.
41 Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision', Leiden Journal of International Law 23 (2010): 855–73, doi:10.1017/S0922156510000415 (accessed 5 August 2014).
42 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf.
43 Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, 15 November 2011. (Corrigendum) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1268605.pdf.
44 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras 135, 188–90.
45 Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, paras 23–5.
46 The ‘actual or apprehended’ dimension of atrocity crimes, particularly of genocide, has been suggested by the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia, 2007.
47 ‘Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit', BBC News, 22 February 2011, last updated at 18:03 Eastern Time (ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624 (accessed 5 August 2014).
48 Wheeler and Dunne, ‘Operationalizing protective interventions’, 87–103.
49 Note: The term ‘internationally recognised human rights’ was first introduced by Professor Sean D. Murphy of George Washington University, who effectively argued that the human rights concept may vary from state to state, whereas all states have certain international obligations in part to relevant international treaties of humanitarian law, and altogether those are ‘internationally recognised human rights’, and not just ‘human rights’, which in some cases may mislead. For more, see: Sean Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
50 ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic', UN Human Rights Council, 23 November 2011. UN Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, paras 5–6, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/17/docs/A-HRC-S-17-2-Add1.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
51 UN Human Rights Commission Doc. A/HRC/19/68; ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’.
52 Communique of the 261th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 23 February 2011, http://ps.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2011_feb_23_psc_261stmeeting_libya_communique_en.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014).
53 ‘Arab League: Violence Against Protesters Must Come to an End', Voice of America, 21 February 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/libyas-gadhafi-vows-to-not-to-leave-116663264/135426.html (accessed 5 August 2014).
54 Note: Though the UNSCR 1970 referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, suspecting crimes against humanity being perpetrated during the civil war, and subsequent arrest warrants to prominent leaders of the regime, including Qadhafi himself (case terminated after his death), the ICC prosecutors still have to find hard and sufficient evidence that erga omnes crimes had been committed.
55 Statement delivered on behalf of all special procedures mandate-holders of the United Nations Human Rights Council at the Nineteenth Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic Geneva, 1 June 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12211&LangID=E (accessed 5 August 2014).
56 Jill Dougherty, ‘Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Coalition', CNN world, 12 December 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/world/us-syria-opposition (accessed 5 August 2014).
57 Rick Gladstone, ‘Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions’, New York Times, 19 July 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html (accessed 5 August 2014); Michelle Nichols, ‘Russia, China Veto U.N. Security Council Resolution on Syria’, Reuters, 19 July 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719 (accessed 5 August 2014).
58 ‘“Syria is not Libya” – Lavrov’, Russia Today, 5 December 2012, http://rt.com/politics/syria-russia-chemical-weapons-nato-lavrov-314/ (accessed 5 August 2014).
59 Jennifer Welsh's explanation of Sino-Russian abstention on UNSCR 1973 seems to be rather close to the reality; Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya’, 255–62.
60 Ibid.
61 UN Doc. S/PV.6498.
62 Note: ‘We simply cannot accept a document … that would open the path for the pressure of sanctions and further to external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs’, explained Ambassador Churkin to the Council. Quoted by: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719 (accessed 19 July 2012).
63 Zhang Yuwei and Li Lianxing, ‘Beijing Against Sanctions on Syria', China Daily, 2 February 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/02/content_14521923.htm.
64 Note: The ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo declined calls to start prosecution of British soldiers in Iraq in February 2006, who had allegedly committed war crimes, on the basis of the lack of ‘sufficient gravity’, comparing the situation in Iraq with Northern Uganda, DRC and Darfur. Above legal opinions, this has also shown the political limitations of the court. The Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 9 February 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.
65 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (24 February 2006), ¶¶ 41–54, full text available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.PDF (accessed 5 August 2014) (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Dyilo).
66 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 56.
67 SáCouto, Susana and Katherine A. Cleary, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court', American Journal of International Law 23, no. 5 (2008): 807–54.
68 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras 59–60.
69 Ibid, para. 62.
70 Ibid., para. 94.
71 Ibid., para. 94.
72 Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978), European Court of Human Rights, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57506.
73 Note: The death toll alone is not the most objective indication of the situation on the ground, as some interventions happen in anticipation of greater atrocities. For example, in Libya the ICC estimate of civilian deaths for February 2011 is between 500 and 700 civilians; but on top of likely plans of further atrocity crimes, that was ‘sufficiently’ grave to warrant ICC referral by the UNSC and international engagement in March 2011. Marlise Simons and Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Hague Court Seeks Warrants for Libyan Officials’, New York Times, 4 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/africa/05nations.html (accessed 5 August 2014).
74 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 203.
75 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras 117–28.
76 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries. Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001), vol. II, Part Two, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
77 Note: DASR Art. 15 also foresees state responsibility in cases when the isolated acts, over time, would show a continuing pattern and transform into a composite act, punishable under international law.
78 Report of the Commission of Experts on breaches to Geneva Conventions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, para. 52.
79 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries.
80 For example: The United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), International Court of Justice (1980), para. 74, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6291.pdf.
81 Velasquez Rodriguez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1988), paras 174–6, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm.
82 Note: The Special Court for Sierra Leone had gone a step further to establish in its statute that amnesty to those ‘falling within the jurisdiction' of the court ‘shall not be a bar to prosecution' (Art. 10), thus warranting itself from political manipulations and guaranteeing effective punishment for the alleged criminals. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 (accessed 5 August 2014).
83 Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Turkey, Armenian Issue – Allegations/Facts, http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,32379/chronolgy.html (accessed 5 August 2014).
84 ‘Orhan Pamuk's Victory', Slate Magazine, 12 October 2006, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/recycled/2006/10/orhan_pamuks_victory.html (accessed 5 August 2014); ‘Publisher and PEN Member Ragip Zarakolu Released in Turkey Pending Trial', Pen America, 10 April 2012, http://www.pen.org/press-release/2012/04/10/publisher-and-pen-member-ragip-zarakolu-released-turkey-pending-trial (accessed 5 August 2014).
85 Richard Goldstone, ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court’, in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 55–69.
86 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras 183–4.
87 Donald Kipkorir, ‘Waki Report Breaks New Ground, But Will it be Implemented?', Daily Nation, 17 October 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808/481268/-/3mepxg/-/index.html (accessed 5 August 2014).
88 UN Doc. S/PV.6491 (26 February 2011).
89 UN Doc. S/PV.6498 (17 March 2011).
90 Note: Though the ICC seems to be the legitimate avenue that the P5 nations have employed on various occasions, it shall not be forgotten that out of all other institutions of global order, the ICC represents normative and value-based conflict among the P5 nations, at best. Among those states, only France and the UK joined the court and ratified the Rome Statute, whereas Russia and the US are among the most vocal critics of the court, questioning its measures and legal competence at all. ‘Russia against Handing “Syrian dossier” to ICC', Voice of Russia, 19 January 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_19/Russia-against-handing-Syrian-dossier-to-ICC/; Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, ‘The ICC and Russian Constitutional Problems', Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, no. 3 (2005): 621–6, doi:10.1093/jicj/mqi048; Curtis A. Bradley, ‘U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty', American Society of International Law (May 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm; Ruth Wedgwood, Anne-Marie Slaughter, John Bolton, and Kenneth Roth. ‘Toward an International Criminal Court?’, Council on Foreign Relations, July 1999, http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/toward-international-criminal-court/p3202.