Of hearsay and beyond: is the Italian criminal justice system an adversarial system?

Abstract

An Italian criminal case (the murder of Meredith Kercher) has once more attracted attention over the shape of the Italian criminal justice system. Is the Italian system a mixed system or an accusatorial one? In the past decades Italy has often been taken as a case study in comparative criminal law for its transplant of the common law adversariality into the classic French continental structure. The author discusses the features of the Italian system and what features make a system accusatorial or adversarial. He argues that the hearsay law remains the crucial point to understand the adversariality of a system and that the Italian rules are not too distant from the English rules on hearsay.

Keywords:

• accusatorial
• adversarial
• hearsay

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Michele Panzavolta is associate professor of criminal law at the University of Leuven and part-time assistant professor at the University of Maastricht, where he has been a Marie Curie Fellow for research on intelligence. He graduated from the University of Bologna (Italy) and obtained his doctorate at the University of Urbino (Italy). He was postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bologna and visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge. He is a qualified attorney at the bar of Bologna (Italy) and has experience as a practicing criminal lawyer in Italy. He is specialised in European and international criminal law and in comparative studies on criminal law and procedure. In recent years his research interests are mostly in the field of intelligence studies (surveillance, intelligence analysis, relationship between police and judicial bodies and intelligence services, cybercrime, etc.), financial crimes and asset recovery, juvenile justice and, more generally, the protection of individual rights in criminal matters.

Notes

1. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 34; Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, ed. Matthias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 339–82; James Gordley, ‘The Functional Method’, in Methods of Comparative Law, ed. Pier Giuiseppi Monateri (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 107–19.

2. Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II)’, The American Journal of Comparative Law 39, no. 1 (1991): 1; Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II)’, The American Journal of Comparative Law 39, no. 2 (1991): 343.

3. David Nelken, ‘Toward a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’, in Adapting Legal Cultures, ed. David Nelken and Johannes Feest (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 7–54, at 25. See also David Nelken, Comparative criminal justice (London: Sage, 2010), 10; and David Nelken, ‘Using Legal Culture: Purposes and Problems’, in Using Legal Culture, ed. D. Nelken (London: Wildy, Simmonds and Hill, 2012), 1–51.

4. Although it would probably be more correct to state that comparative law is characterised by a ‘methodological pluralism’, where the method changes depending on the goal of the study. See Julie De Coninck, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law: Quo Vadis’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 74 (2010): 318–50, at 321.

5. David Slansky, ‘Anti-Inquisitorialism’, Harvard Law Review 122 (2009): 1634–704.

6. See further Julia C. Mirabella, ‘Scales of Justice: Assessing the Italian Criminal Procedure through the Amanda Knox Trial’, Boston University International Law Journal 30 (2012): 229–60. For the offence of calumnia, see Codice Penale, art.368.

7. Elisabetta Povoledo, ‘Italy's Highest Court Set to Rule in Amanda Knox Case’, New York Times 25 March 2010, A10.

8. The code of 1859 was preceded by the code of 1847. On the influence of French law over the reforms in Piedmont, see Federico Sclopis, Histoire de la legislation Italienne, III (Paris: Durand, 1861), 243–307, 304.

9. Matteo Pescatore, Sposizione compendiosa della procedure civile e criminale nelle somme sue ragioni e nel suo ordine naturale, vol. I (Part II) (Turin: Utet, 1864), 104–46.

10. Giuseppe Salvioli, Storia della procedura civile e criminale, in Storia del diritto italiano, vol. III (Part II) (Milan: Hoepli, 1927), 799.

11. Adhemar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1913), 528.

12. Franco Cordero, Procedura penale (Milan: Giuffré, 2006), 68–9.

13. Giovanni Leone, Trattato di diritto processuale penale, vol. I (Naples: Jovene, 1961), 28. See also Giorgia Alessi, ‘Le contraddizioni del processo misto’, in La costruzione della verità giudiziaria, ed. M. Marmo-L. Musella (Naples: Cliopress, 2003), 13–52.

14. Massimo Nobili, Il principio del libero convincimento del giudice (Milan: Giuffré, 1974), 22, 221.

15. Ennio Amodi, ‘The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy’, American Journal of Comparative Law 52 (2004): 489–500.

16. See Loredana Garlati, L’inconscio inquisitorio. L’eredità del codice Rocco nella cultura processual penalistica italiana (Milan: Giuffrè, 2010).

17. See John R. Spencer, ‘Introduction’, in European Criminal Procedures, ed. M. Delmas-Marty and John Spencer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8–9.

18. Francis Pakes, Comparative Criminal Justice (London: Routledge, 2010).

19. Paolo Ferrua, Il ‘Giusto Processo’ (Bologna: Zanichelli, 2012).

20. Michele Panzavolta, ‘Reforms and Counter Reforms’, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 30 (2004–2005): 577–623, 585.

21. Ibid., 584.

22. Decreto penale di condanna (where the accused is convicted under art.459 of the code on the basis of investigative evidence without being heard but can oppose the conviction and require that the case be taken to trial), and oblazione (disposing of the case by a fine under articles 162 and 162-bis of the code).

23. See on these issues, Riccardo Montana, ‘Paradigms of Judicial Supervision and Co-ordination between Police and Prosecutors: The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2009): 309–33.

24. Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione (Bari: Laterza, 1989).

25. On these issues, see Panzavolta, ‘Reforms and Counter Reforms’, 577–623.

26. For a critical overview, see Carlo Guarneri, ‘The Judiciary in the Italian Political Crisis’, West European Politics 20 (1997): 157–75.

27. William T. Pizzi, ‘Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform’, Ohio State Law Journal 54 (1993): 1325–73.

28. See Regio Decreto Legislativo, 31 May 1946, n.511.

29. See the reflections of Elisabetta Grande, ‘Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance’, American Journal of Comparative Law 48 (2000): 227–59.

30. See for example in England and Wales, the Criminal Procedure Rules, SI 2014/1610, r.1.1(1): ‘The overriding objective of this new code is that criminal cases be dealt with justly.’

31. Alan Watson, Legal Transplant: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993); Maximo Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’, Harvard International Law Journal 45 (2004): 44–64.

32. See Panzavolta, ‘Reforms and Counter Reforms’, 577–623.

33. See articles 195 and 500.

34. Giulio Illuminati, ‘The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988)’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 4 (2005): 567–81; Giulio Illuminati, ‘The Accusatorial Process from the Italian Point of View’, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 35 (2009–2010): 297–318.

35. John R. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (London: Hart Publishing, 2014), 5.

36. Ibid.

37. Salvatore Carnevale, Artt. 234–243, in G. Conso- G. Illuminati, Commentario breve al codice di procedura penale (Padova: Cedam, 2014), 914.

38. Ibid.

39. Documents are hearsay if they contain an assertive statement as defined by section 114(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Consequently, identifying documents and travel documents should not fall in the hearsay prohibition. There are cases of documents containing statements that are more complicated. Nevertheless see in this respect Spencer, Hearsay Evidence, 63 ff.

40. Carnevale, Artt. 234–243, at 916.

41. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence, at 120 and 124.

42. On the English rule against narrative see ibid., 13, 64.

43. For details on this, see Ferrua, Il ‘giusto processo’.

44. Ibid.

45. Another exception relates to the (rather infrequent) case of prior statements of witnesses collected during the preliminary hearing: they too can be used substantively to decide the case (article 500 section 6).

46. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence, 99 ff.

47. See Panzavolta, ‘Reforms and Counter Reforms’, 597 and 612, for an account of how the rule changed.

48. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence.

49. Bracci v. Italy, App. No. 36822/02, 13 October 2005; Majadallah v. Italy, App. No. 62094/00, 19 October 2006.

50. Corte di cassazione (sezioni unite), 25 November 2010 [rv. 250199]. See also Corte di cassazione (1° sezione), 4 April 2012, Vrapi [rv. 252269].

51. Al Khawaja and Thaery v. UK, App. No. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 15 December 2011.

52. Corte di cassazione (6a sezione), 16 November 2013, Frangiamore [rv. 257771].

53. See for instance William T. Pizzi, ‘Sentencing in the US: An Inquisitorial Soul in an Adversarial Body?’, in Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context, ed. J. Jackson, M. Langer, and P. Tillers (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 65–79; Mirabella, ‘Scales of Justice’, 229–60.

54. Rosemary Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844–1994: Appeals against Conviction and Sentence in England and Wales (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); John Spencer, ‘Quashing Convictions, and Squashing the Court of Appeal’, Justice of the Peace (14 October 2006): 790–3.

55. Constitutional Court, 24 January 2007, n.26.

56. Mirjan R. Damaska, ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’, Yale Law Journal 84 (1974–1975): 480; Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1986).

57. A new line of case law is developing in order to protect the rights of the defendant acquitted in first instance during the appeal procedure. Taking inspiration from some decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Dan v. Moldova, App. No. 8999/07, 5 July 2011), the Italian Supreme Court is now inclined to require that the appeal judge must hear the incriminating evidence if it finds that the previous acquittal could be overturned.

58. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority.

59. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, 27 November 2008.