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Abstract
The year 2015 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. Two particular events, however, overshadowed the annual commemorations at the Potočari Memorial Centre. The arrest of the former Bosnian army commander, Naser Orić, in the run-up to the commemorations, and the attack on the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, in Potočari, not only detracted from the victims and their suffering. These events also highlighted the heavy politicisation of Srebrenica and its memorialisation. The purpose of this article, thus, is to explore possible bottom-up ways of memorialising Srebrenica’s dead and missing as a complement to the annual state-led commemorations. Drawing on the field of ‘green criminology’, it introduces the concept of ‘green’ transitional justice and the concomitant idea of ‘green’ memorials. The article’s central argument is that incorporating nature and the environment into the process of dealing with the past creates opportunities for more inclusive forms of transitional justice – and specifically memorials – that empower victims and local communities. To develop the concept of green memorials, it utilises the notion of civic ecology.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Janine Natalya Clark is a Reader in Gender, International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice in the School of Law at the University of Birmingham. She has been conducting fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia since 2002 and she recently completed a Leverhulme Research Fellowship on the long-consequences of the mass rapes committed during the Bosnian war.
Notes
2. Ibreck, for example argues that ‘There are ways in which Rwanda’s genocide memorials, and especially the annual commemorations, are shaped by RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] interests. Memory is neither plural, nor openly contested. The post-genocide state has a dominant role in setting limits on whose lives are to be remembered publicly and how.’ Rachel Ibreck, ‘The Politics of Mourning: Survivor Contributions to Memorials in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, Memory Studies 3 (2010): 330–43, at 330. Similarly, in post-war Sri Lanka, Short notes that ‘The families of LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] fighters killed during the civil war have been prohibited from commemorating or mourning their dead, a policy which functionally extends to much of the civilian Tamil population.’ Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and Ecocide (London: Zed Books, 2016), 121.
3. As one illustration, Oomen underlines that ‘The rise in the number of countries essentially governed by outside forces has … led to a lot of work being done on prefabricated “justice packages” like criminal codes ready to be implemented in situations as diverse as Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia.’ Barbara Oomen, ‘Donor-Driven Justice and Its Discontents’, Development and Change 36 (2005): 887–910, at 891.
4. This, however, is a broader problem that is not specific to transitional justice. In the context of state-building in post-conflict societies, for example, Kurz is highly critical of how ‘ … interveners view state-formation in war-torn countries through analytical frameworks that do not allow them to fully understand the realities on the ground’. Christof P. Kurz, ‘What You See is What You Get: Analytical Lenses and the Limitations of Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4 (2010): 205–36, at 206.
5. Alexander Boraine, ‘Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation’, Journal of International Affairs 60 (2006): 17–27.
6. Lorenzo Natali, ‘The Contemporary Horizon of Green Criminology’, in Routledge International Handbook of Green Criminology, ed. Nigel South and Avi Brisman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 73–84, at 74.
7. UN Security Council Resolution 819, adopted on 16 April 1993, demanded, inter alia, that ‘ … all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act’. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/819
8. Judgement, Tolimir (IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, §198.
9. Ibid., §291.
10. Judgement, Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, §331. In the recently concluded ICTY trial against the former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, the Trial Chamber found that in one location alone (the Kravica warehouse) on 13 July 1995, ‘between 755 and 1,016 Bosnian Muslim men were killed by members of the Bosnian Serb Forces … ’. Judgement, Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-T), Trial Chamber, 24 March 2016, §5286.
11. See ICTY, ‘ICTY Remembers: The Srebrenica Genocide, 1995–2015’, http://www.icty.org/specials/srebrenica20/?q=srebrenica20/
12. Tolimir, the former Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian Serb Army Main Staff, died in his cell at the UN Detention Unit in Scheveningen on 8 February 2016.
13. UN, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf
14. A. James McAdams, ‘Transitional Justice: The Issue that Won’t Go Away’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011): 304–12, at 304.
15. Sandra Rubli, ‘(Re)Making the Social World: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi’, Africa Spectrum 48 (2013): 3–24, at 9–10.
16. Vamik D. Volkan, ‘Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity’, Group Analysis 34 (2001): 79–97.
17. Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, The European Union and the Politics of Compromise’, East European Politics and Societies 28 (2012): 163–79, at 165.
18. See Judgement, Orić (IT-03-68-T), Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006; Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Judgment, 3 July 2008.
19. Refik Hodžić, ‘Twenty Years since Srebrenica: No Reconciliation, We’re Still at War’, 29 June 2015, https://www.ictj.org/news/twenty-years-srebrenica-no-reconciliation-we%E2%80%99re-still-war
20. Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, §598.
21. Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 190.
22. Radio Free Europe, ‘UN Officials Use “G-Word” to Describe Srebrenica Massacre’, 2 July 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/serbia-bosnia-russia-srebrenica-genocide-un-commemoration/27105458.html. Although the Serbian Parliament adopted the ‘Srebrenica Declaration’ in 2010 and apologised for events in Srebrenica, it avoided using the word genocide and referred only to ‘the crime against the Bosniaks of Srebrenica’. Dragović-Soso, moreover, submits that ‘Rather than symbolising a change in the official approach towards the war crimes issue, this apology is more accurately understood as an instrument of foreign policy, whose primary audience is the European Union and whose main aim is to aid Serbia’s project of European integration.’ Dragović-Soso, ‘Apologizing for Srebrenica’, at 164–5.
23. D. Džidić, ‘Srebrenica Commander Orić Extradited to Sarajevo’, 26 June 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/srebrenica-commander-oric-arrives-in-sarajevo
24. Sara Correia, ‘The Politics of Memory in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska’, in Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values, ed. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Bologna: Longo Editore Ravenna, 2014), 329–50, at 349.
25. See Janine N. Clark, International Criminal Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
26. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘Main News Summary’, 12 April 2003, http://www.nato.int/sfor/media/2003/ms030412t.htm
27. BBC, ‘Srebrenica “Genocide Vote” to Take Place at UN’, 7 July 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33430951
28. The Guardian, ‘Russia Vetoes Srebrenica Genocide Resolution at UN’, 8 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/russia-vetoes-srebrenica-genocide-resolution-un
29. Denis Džidić, ‘Russia Vetoes UN Srebrenica Genocide Resolution’, 8 July 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-vetoes-un-srebrenica-genocide-resolution
30. Haris Halilovich, ‘Long-Distance Mourning and Synchronized Memories in a Global Context: Commemorating Srebrenica in Diaspora’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35 (2015): 410–22, at 418.
31. Trial Judgment, Orić.
32. Appeal Judgment, Orić, at §189.
33. Ibid.
34. In Serbia Network Foundation, ‘Interpol Serbia Issues International Arrest Warrant for Naser Orić’s Arrest’, 4 February 2014, http://inserbia.info/today/2014/02/interpol-serbia-issues-international-warrant-for-orics-arrest/ The ICTY’s judgments against Orić do not refer to this crime. A footnote in the Trial Chamber Judgment simply states that an attack by the Bosnian army on the village of Ježestica on 8 August 1992 was ‘aimed at Glogova [a village in the municipality of Bratunac] and was coordinated with the attack on Zalazje in which he [Orić] participated’. Trial Judgement, Orić (2006), at n1679.
35. Hodžić, ‘Twenty Years since Srebrenica’.
36. World Bulletin, ‘Switzerland Not to Extradite Bosnia’s War Hero’, 22 June 2015, http://www.worldbulletin.net/bosnia/161041/switzerland-urged-not-to-extradite-bosnias-war-hero
37. For many Bosniaks, Orić is a hero who defended his people. Simić, for example, notes that ‘His sudden release from detention was mistakenly interpreted by Tihić [a member of the BiH presidency] and a majority of Bosniaks as evidence of his innocence. Orić’s meeting with a member of the BH presidency [Sulejman Tihić] was reported by major TV stations and press in the country, and sparked a number of welcomes spontaneously organised by Bosniak citizens’. Olivera Simić, ‘Bringing “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War Criminals and the Interaction between the Cosmopolitan and the Local’, German Law Journal 11 (2011): 1388–407, at 1394. Orić was not, however, in Srebrenica when the enclave fell. According to Rhode, ‘Naser insists the Bosnian government barred him from returning to the enclave. The Bosnian government insists that they ordered Naser to return, but that he refused.’ David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 353.
38. Maja Zuvela, ‘Organisers Threaten to Cancel Srebrenica Anniversary Event over Swiss Arrest’, 23 June 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bosnia-srebrenica-idUKKBN0P31SX20150623
39. Katharina Bart and Maja Zuvela, ‘Bosnian Serb Leader: Srebrenica was 20th Century “Greatest Deception”’, 25 June 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbia-arrest-idUSKBN0P51OL20150625
40. State Court of BiH, ‘Indictment Confirmed in the Case v. Naser Orić et al.’, 14 September 2015, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/index.php?id=4159&jezik=e
41. Denis Džidić, ‘Srebrenica Commander Naser Orić Charged with War Crimes’, 27 August 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/srebrenica-commander-oric-charged-with-war-crimes-08-27-2015
42. State Court of BiH, ‘Pritisci na sud Bosne i Hercegovine moraju prestati’, 27 January 2016, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/index.php?id=4266&jezik=b
43. Jakub Salkić, ‘Dženaza u Potočarima: Žrtve ponovo izigrane’, Dani 944, 17 July 2015, 14–17, at 15.
44. Šešelj’s trial at the ICTY began on 7 November 2007. He was indicted on nine counts in total – three for crimes against humanity (persecution, expulsion and inhumane acts) and six for war crimes (murder, torture, cruel treatment, destruction of villages without a military motive, deliberate destruction of religious or educational objects and pillaging of public or private goods). On 31 March 2016, the Trial Chamber acquitted him on all counts. He was charged with being part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), the goal of which was to force non-Serbs to permanently leave around one-third of Croatia, large parts of BiH and areas of Vojvodina. Judgment, Šešelj (IT-03-67-3), Trial Chamber, 31 March 2016, §222. The majority, however – Judge Lattanzi dissenting – found that the Prosecution had failed to establish the existence of a JCE (§281). Šešelj was also charged with being individually responsible for certain crimes, and specifically persecutions, through the speeches that he gave in Croatia and in Vojvodina (in Serbia). The majority adjudged that, again, the prosecution had not established its case. One of the issues was that even if Šešelj’s speeches were narrowly construed as targeting non-Serb civilians, there was insufficient evidence regarding their impact (§284).
45. Jutarnji List, ‘Video: Ovako je pričao mladi radikal Vučić prije dvadeset godina – “Ubijte jednog Srbina, mi ćemo stotinu Muslimana”’, 11 July 2015, http://www.jutarnji.hr/ovako-je-govorio-vucic-prije-dvadeset-godina--ubijte-jednog-srbina--mi-cemo-stotinu-muslimana-/1380990/
46. European Commission, ‘Statement by President Juncker on the Twentieth of the Srebrenica Genocide’, 11 July 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5357_en.htm
47. Al Jazeera, ‘Serbian PM to Attend Srebrenica Genocide Commemoration’, 8 July 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/serbian-pm-attend-srebrenica-genocide-commemoration-150708000922904.html
48. Tamara Nikčević, ‘Vučić u Srebrenici’, Dani 944, 17 July 2015, 20.
49. Cited in ‘Ja sam uvijek kriv’, Dnevni Avaz, 12 July 2015, 6.
50. Author’s translation from Serbian. Cited in Nikčević, ‘Vučić u Srebrenici’, at 20.
51. See Janine N. Clark, ‘Transitional Justice as Recognition: An Analysis of the Women's Court in Sarajevo’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 10 (2016): 67–87.
52. These conversations took place in Tivat in Montenegro between 24 and 28 September 2015. The author attended the Women’s Court in May 2015, and was given the opportunity to subsequently participate in the regional evaluation workshop in Tivat.
53. Author’s translation from Serbian. ‘Budala ima u svakom narodu, moja ruka ostaje ispružena’, Dnevni Avaz, 12 July 2015, 6.
54. Ibid.
55. Denis Džidić and Katarina Panić, ‘Attack on Vučić at Srebrenica Widely Condemned’, 13 July 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-srebrenica-attack-brings-new-instability-for-region
56. Cited in Kenan Kešmer, ‘Somun: To je bilo huliganstvo na nivou ISIL-a!’ Dnevni Avaz, 13 July 2015, 4.
57. Kora Andrieu, ‘“Sorry for the Genocide”: How Public Apologies can help Promote National Reconciliation’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38 (2009): 3–23, at 21.
58. Patricia Lundy and Bill Rolston, ‘Redress for Past Harms? Official Apologies in Northern Ireland’, International Journal of Human Rights 20 (2016): 104–22, at 107.
59. BBC, ‘Serbian PM Vučić Returns to Srebrenica Memorial after Attack’, 11 November 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34788014
60. BBC, ‘Serbian and Bosnian Governments Hold Historic Joint Session’, 4 November 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34720815
61. Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, ‘Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified Defence of Public Apologies’, Saskatchewan Law Review 65 (2002): 139–62, at 143.
62. Author’s translation from Serbian. ‘Napadnute su majke Srebrenice!’ Dnevni Avaz, 12 July 2015, 5.
63. ‘Ovo se nikada nije trebalo dogoditi!’ Dnevni Ayaz, 12 July 2015, 5.
64. Author’s translation from Serbian. Cited in Erol Avdović, ‘Majka pomirenja’, Sedmica, 18 July 2015, 3.
65. Dnevni Avaz, ‘Ovo se nikada nije trebalo dogoditi!’, at 5.
66. In 1986, for example, Argentina’s Madres de Plaza de Mayo – composed of mothers whose sons were ‘disappeared’ during the period of the military junta from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s – split in two. As a result of this schism, two new organisations came into existence, the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo–Línea Fundadora. Fernando J. Bosco, ‘The Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Three Decades of Human Rights Activism: Embeddedness, Emotions and Social Movements’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 19 (2002): 342–65, at 352.
67. Simon Robins, ‘Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the Disappeared in Postconflict Nepal’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011): 75–98, at 76.
68. As McEvoy and McConnachie point out, ‘Once major legal edifices are created and underpinned by an emerging body of law, it is all too easy for powerful political, institutional and professional needs of lawyers to come to be viewed as synonymous with those of victims.’ Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’, Social and Legal Studies 22 (2013): 489–513, at 494.
69. Alexander L. Hinton, ‘Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Transitional Justice’, in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Alexander L. Hinton (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 1–22, at 9.
70. According to Lambourne’s research, for example, ‘In Sierra Leone, people seemed less concerned about the role of truth in providing a sense of justice or peace … Whilst interviewees did seem to appreciate that the TRC hearings had contributed to peacebuilding, they were more concerned with the immediate needs of socioeconomic and political justice than with promoting peacebuilding in the country.’ Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 28–48, at 41.
71. Jonathan Doak, ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions’, International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011): 263–98, at 297.
72. See, for example, Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’, Journal of Law and Society 34 (2007): 411–40; Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up’, Journal of Law and Society 35 (2008): 265–92; Anna Eriksson, ‘A Bottom-Up Approach to Transformative Justice in Northern Ireland’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 301–20; Robins, ‘Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice’.
73. Susan Opotow and Susan Clayton, ‘Green Justice: Conceptions of Fairness and the Natural World’, Journal of Social Issues 50 (1994): 1–11, at 2.
74. Lena Dominelli, Green Social Work: From Environmental Crises to Environmental Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
75. Paul Hamilton, ‘The Greening of Nationalism: Nationalising Nature in Europe’, Environmental Politics 11 (2002): 27–48.
76. Michael J. Lynch, ‘Reflections on Green Criminology and Its Boundaries: Comparing Environmental and Criminal Victimization and Considering Crime from an Eco-City Perspective’, in Routledge International Handbook of Green Criminology, ed. Nigel South and Abi Brisman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013): 43–57, at 45.
77. Buckley-Zistel, for example, notes that in post-genocide Rwanda, the government uses ingando – or civic education camps – as ‘an opportunity to disseminate its particular version of the past and to influence a large number of participants according to its unification agenda’. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, ‘Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History after the Rwandan Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research 11 (2009): 31–53, at 44.
78. Selma Leydesdorff, ‘Stories from No Land: The Women of Srebrenica Speak Out’, Human Rights Review 8 (2007): 187–98, at 190.
79. Short, Redefining Genocide, at 4.
80. Some scholars have discussed the idea of green criminology in both top-down and bottom-up terms. Emphasising corporate influences, for example, Lynch and Stretsky maintain that ‘Corporate constructions of green have led to widespread reinterpretations of what it means to “be green” and to take a “green” position.’ Michael J. Lynch and Paul B. Stretsky, ‘The Meaning of Green: Contrasting Criminological Perspectives’, Theoretical Criminology 7 (2003): 217–38, at 220. However, the authors also look at green criminology and what it means through a bottom-up focus on environmental justice movements (at 225).
81. Short, Redefining Genocide, at 194.
82. The research project focused on the long-term consequences of the mass rapes committed during the Bosnian war.
83. See http://www.snagazene.org/
84. According to Frumkin, ‘Horticultural therapy evolved as a form of mental health treatment, based on the therapeutic effects of gardening.’ Howard Frumkin, ‘Beyond Toxicity: Human Health and the Natural Environment’, American Journal of Preventive Medicine 20 (2001): 234–40, at 236.
85. According to Helphand, ‘The empirical health benefits of contact with elements of the natural world are real – even just pictures of nature have a salubrious effect.’ Kenneth I. Helphand, Defiant Gardens: Making Gardens in Wartime (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 2006), 12. Similarly, Pretty et al. underline that ‘There is growing evidence to suggest that exposure to nature and green space positively affects human health, by providing accessible urban and rural spaces for recreation and interaction with nature.’ Jules Pretty, Carly Wood, Rachel Bragg and Jo Barton, ‘Nature for Rehabilitating Offenders and Facilitating Therapeutic Outcomes for Youth at Risk’, in Routledge International Handbook of Green Criminology, ed. Nigel South and Avi Brisman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 184–96, at 185.
87. Claire Moolin-Doos, ‘Intercultural Gardens: The Use of Space by Migrants and the Practice of Respect’, Journal of Urban Affairs 36 (2014): 197–206, at 201.
88. Cited in Helen Babbs, ‘Soil Stained Survivors: How Gardening is Helping those Caught up in the Balkan Wars’, 22 February 2011, http://www.theecologist.org/green_green_living/gardening/781586/soil_stained_survivors_how_gardening_is_helping_those_caught_up_in_the_balkan_wars.html
89. T. Donnais and A.C. Knorr, ‘Peacebuilding from Below Versus the Liberal Peace: The Case of Haiti’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 34 (2013): 54–69.
90. Helphand, Defiant Gardens, at 248.
91. See http://www.fambultok.org/
92. Andrew R. Iliff, ‘Root and Branch: Discourses of “Tradition” in Grassroots Analysis’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2012): 253–73, at 263.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., 263–4.
95. Kailahun is where the war in Sierra Leone began.
96. Lyn Graybill, ‘Traditional Practices and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: The Effectiveness of Fambul Tok’, Conflict Trends 3 (2010): 41–7, at 46.
97. Ibid.
98. See, for example, Janine N. Clark, ‘Reconciliation through Remembrance? War Memorials and the Victims of Vukovar’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 7 (2013): 116–35; Ibreck, ‘The Politics of Mourning’; Paul Williams, ‘Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 18 (2004): 234–54.
99. Andrew Charlesworth and Michael Addis, ‘Memorialization and the Ecological Landscapes of Holocaust Sites: The Cases of Plaszow and Auschwitz-Birkenau’, Landscape Research 27 (2002): 229–51, at 230.
100. Ibid., 240.
101. Ibid., 246.
102. Ibid.
103. Leslie Dwyer, ‘Building a Monument: Intimate Politics of “Reconciliation” in Post-1965 Bali’, in Transitional Justice, ed. Alexander L. Hinton, 227–48, at 231.
104. Ibid., 236.
105. Ibid., 235.
106. Ibid., 238.
107. K.G. Tidball, M.E. Krasny, E. Svendsen, L. Campbell, and K. Helpland, ‘Stewardship, Learning and Memory in Disaster Resilience’, Environmental Education Research 16 (2010): 591–609, at 594.
109. E.S. Svendsen and L.K. Campbell, ‘Living Memorials Project: Year 1 Social and Site Assessment’, September 2005, http://www.fs.fed.us/ne/newtown_square/publications/technical_reports/pdfs/2005/ne_gtr333A.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015).
110. See http://www.hikeforkatreena.org/
111. In Northern Ireland, in contrast, memorialisation has assumed a more bottom-up form. Brown, for example, describes how ‘A preferred approach is to create narratives (through speeches, oral history, publications and drama) on how the conflict affected everyday life and ordinary members of the community. These processes are then spatially flagged in the everyday present by means of plaques, memorials, ritual and the display of posters.’ Kris Brown, ‘“What It Was Like to Live through a Day”: Transitional Justice and the Memory of the Everyday in a Divided Society’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2012): 444–66, at 453–4.
112. Tidball et al., ‘Stewardship, Learning and Memory’, at 593.
113. According to Waller, ‘Resilience, simply stated, is positive adaptation in response to adversity.’ Margaret A. Waller, ‘Resilience in Ecosystem Context: Evolution of the Concept’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 71 (2001): 290–7, at 292.
114. Tidball et al., ‘Stewardship, Learning and Memory’, at 599. The authors explain that ‘memories of trees and other living things that have died or been left behind, or that in symbolic terms represent place, hope, life, and rebirth, seem to play an important role in resilience at multiple levels following disaster’ (at 593).
115. Helphand, Defiant Gardens, at 7.
116. According to Nagy, reconciliation ‘is best understood as an ethical solidarity or bond that remains respectful of difference’. Rosemary Nagy, ‘After the TRC: Citizenship, Memory and Reconciliation’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 38 (2004): 638–53, at 640.
117. Clark, International Trials and Reconciliation.
118. E. Alison Holman and Roxanne C. Silver, ‘Getting “Stuck” in the Past: Temporal Orientation and Coping with Trauma’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998): 1146–63.
119. Short, Redefining Genocide, at 61.
120. Matthew Hall and Stephen Farrall, ‘The Criminogenic Consequences of Climate Change: Blurring the Boundaries between Offenders and Victims’, in Routledge International Handbook of Green Criminology, ed. Nigel South and Avi Brisman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 120–33, at 129.