Extreme cosmopolitanisms defended

Abstract

Some theorists hold that there is no serious, significant issue concerning cosmopolitanism. They hold that cosmopolitanism is either the anodyne doctrine that we have some duties to distant strangers merely on the ground of shared humanity or the absurd doctrine that we have no special moral duties based on special-ties such as those of friendship, family, and national community. This essay argues against this deflationary position by defending (1) a very extreme cosmopolitan doctrine that denies special-tie moral duties altogether and (2) a slightly milder but still extreme form of cosmopolitanism that allows that there might be special-tie moral duties to intimate associates such as friends and family members but denies that broader social group associations such as those of subjection to a national state or national or ethnic community memberships ever constitute special ties that ground special moral duties. The defense proceeds by rebutting bad arguments leveled against extreme cosmopolitanisms.

Keywords:

• cosmopolitanism
• extreme cosmopolitanism
• social justice
• national partiality
• reciprocity

Acknowledgments

I thank Andrea Sangiovanni for helpful discussion of association-based accounts of justice and Carl Knight and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful criticism of this essay.

Notes

1. Risse (2012a, p. 267).

2. Scheffler, ‘Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,’ in his (2001). Scheffler comments, ‘Whereas the moderate versions of cosmopolitanism may strike some people as being so obvious as to be vacuous or platitudinous, the extreme versions may seem so implausible as to be difficult to take seriously.’

3. On the idea that some minimal duties are owed to people as such and more demanding social justice duties to fellow countrymen or those who share membership in a state, see Nagel (2005), Dworkin (1986), Rawls, (1999), Blake (2001), Miller (1998), and Sangiovanni (2007). On the idea that association grounds or triggers social justice obligations, see Blake and Risse (2008), Risse (2012b), Sangiovanni (2007), and Julius (2003).

4. This formulation is borrowed from Kolodny (2010b), who cites Thomas Pogge as its source.

5. See Caney (2011) and Tan (2004).

6. The locus classicus on this topic is still Scheffler (1982).

7. Samuel Scheffler, ‘Relationships and Responsibilities,’ in Scheffler (2001).

8. McMahan (1997, p. 118).

9. Here I follow Railton (1984).

10. Kolodny (2010a, 2010b).

11. Kolodny (2010a, p. 183).

12. But for a contrary view, see Kolodny (2003).

13. Hurka (1997). For criticism of Hurka’s arguments, see Arneson (2013a).

14. Miller (1995, 2000, 2013).

15. Blake (2001).

16. This formulation of the principle is from Nozick (1974, p. 90). (Nozick himself rejects the principle.)

17. See Arneson (1982, 2013b).

18. Another possibility that would deflate the common sense conviction would be a finding that on reflection, the duties of national partiality we are inclined to accept are morally binding as instrumental to fulfilling other moral goals and lack noninstrumental significance. Of course, if national attachments are instrumentally valuable to increasing our conformity to cosmopolitan justice, then perhaps we should promote such attachments – as means to impartial goals, not as intrinsically morally desirable.