Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004

Abstract

“The UN's once-vaunted peace operation in Timor-Leste achieved many successes, overcoming a major humanitarian crisis and laying basic foundations for the future state's governance institutions. However, in the critical areas of police and military reform, the UN failed to exploit its unparalleled civil authority and relatively benign operating environment. Poor leadership, negligible planning and altogether unqualified UN police contingents produced security services devoid of adequate institutional development and woefully lacking in any democratic oversight. Largely as a result of the UN's failings in this regard, the unrest that erupted in May 2006 witnessed the total collapse of the Timorese police force.”

Notes

 1. The author extends his gratitude to Bernice Masterson, Gillian Nevins and in particular Edward Rees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors are those of the author alone. The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the author, and not necessarily those of the US Department of State or the US Government.

 2. The country of East Timor became formally known as Timor-Leste on achieving independence on 20 May 2002.

 3. The concept of security sector reform (SSR) appears to be little known beyond UN headquarters, Western aid agencies and a handful of think tanks. Despite the international community's considerable involvement in the establishment and development of Timor-Leste's security institutions, an informal poll by the author in 2003–4 found that only a small fraction of those involved were aware of SSR per se, and nobody could define it.

 4. UNTAET's mandate derived from Security Council Resolution 1272 of Oct. 1999, and lasted from Oct. 1999 to May 2002 (UNTAET's initial mandate was to 31 Jan. 2001 which the Security Council extended to 19 May 2002).

 5. UNMISET's mandate derived from Security Council Resolution 1410 of May 2002. The first phase of UNMISET ended in May 2004, with the second phase concluding in May 2005. UNOTIL, a ‘political’ mission with a one-year mandate to May 2006, replaced UNMISET.

 6. UNTAET's achievements, however, should be understood in the context of other recent post-conflict situations. As Jarat Chopra notes, ‘there were conditions for success that are rarely available to peace missions. The belligerent power had completely withdrawn… an effective multinational force could credibly guarantee internal and external security… the local population openly welcomed the UN [and] there was a single interlocutor with which to negotiate – National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) – rather than a myriad of unstable factions.’ Jarat Chopra, ‘The UN's Kingdom of East Timor’, Survival 42/3 (Autumn 2000) p. 28.

 7. UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999), paras. 1 and 2(b).

 8. In 1974, as Portugal moved towards democracy, it announced it would grant independence to East Timor. A conflict erupted between pro-Indonesian and pro-independence political parties and in Dec. 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor. Following this occupation, an armed wing (FALINTIL) of the leading pro-independence party (FRETILIN) waged guerrilla warfare on the Indonesian forces. After five years of intensive fighting, much of FALINTIL was wiped out in 1979–80. This period also saw enormous suffering on the part of the East Timorese population. Indonesia's heavy-handed occupation continued until the UN-managed popular consultation of Aug. 1999. The United Nations did not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and continued to consider Portugal as the administering power. The General Assembly passed resolutions between 1976 and 1982 and, while the margin of support was variable, Indonesia was not able to remove East Timor from the UN agenda. The world's attention shifted elsewhere until the infamous Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, the capture of FALINTIL's supreme commander, Xanana Gusmao, by the Indonesian military in 1992, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, two of the leading champions of East Timor's struggle for independence. These events saw renewed and more intense UN interest. This, coupled with political change in Indonesia and Australia, led to a UN-brokered agreements between Indonesia and Portugal in May 1999. See John Taylor, East Timor: the Price of Freedom ( London: Zed Books 1999).

 9. Despite the campaign of intimidation, 98.6 per cent of eligible voters participated in the popular consultation.

 10. Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2001) pp.94–101.

 11. Gusmao's decision was made in the interests of preventing the Indonesian military from claiming that there was a civil war in the territory.

 12. Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-building (Oxford: OUP 2004) pp.138–9.

 13. Frente Revolucionária de Liberatação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste).

 14. Namely the CIVPOL commissioner and deputy SRSG.

 15. Given the significant difference in size and scope of the two phases of UNMISET, the post-UNTAET UN DPKO presence in Timor-Leste is here divided into UNMISET I (May 2002 to May 2004) and UNMISET II (May 2004 to May 2005). A political mission, UNOTIL, succeeded UNMISET with a one-year mandate to May 2006.

 16. Several thousand Timorese worked in the junior ranks of POLRI, the Indonesian police during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation. In addition, there were two battalions of East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military (TNI) at various points during the occupation.

 17. Security Council Resolution 1272 of Oct. 1999.

 18. The PNTL was known for much of the UNTAET period as the ETPS (East Timor Police Service) and was briefly renamed the Timor-Leste Police Service (TLPS) in 2002.

 19. Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG), A Review of Peace Operations: the Case for Change (International Policy Institute, King's College London 2003) paras. 90–91.

 20. Information provided by UNMISET DSRSG Atul Khare (Aug. 2004).

 21. Supplemental Arrangement between UNMISET and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on the Transfer of Policing Responsibilities to the ETPS (Dili, May 2002).

 22. Security Council Resolution 1543 (May 2004), para. 3(ii)

 23. The British ambassador participated in the mission, as did officials from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), and a United States ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Assistance Programme) official. Both UNDP and AusAid funded independent policing experts to participate in the mission.

 24. Report of the Joint Assessment Mission carried out by the Government of Timor-Leste, UNMISET, UNDP and Development Partner Countries for the Timor-Leste Police Service (Dili, Nov. 2002) pp.8–9.

 25. CSDG (note 20).

 26. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FALINTIL largely took place through the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), which was funded largely by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). A Final Evaluation Report of the FRAP was prepared by John McCarthy under USAID auspices in June 2002.

 27. Australia, the USA, UK, Malaysia, Thailand, Portugal and other countries contributed advisers.

 28. It should be noted that the first development ideas for the PNTL, which hardly constituted a development plan, were written in 2002 in English and never translated for the benefit of the East Timorese.

 29. Security Council Resolution 1410 (May 2002), para. 2(b).

 30. Eirin Mobekk, Law-enforcement: Creating and Maintaining a Police Service in a Post-conflict Society – Problems and Pitfalls (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2003).

 31. CSDG (note 20).

 32. CSDG (note 20) para. 74.

 33. In an interview with the author in Aug. 2004, the PNTL officer in command of the police academy in Dili voiced frustration at the failure of senior CIVPOL officers’ to deploy suitably qualified CIVPOLs with training experience at the academy. He said that many unqualified officers (particularly from Portugal) were sent so that they would not have to serve in remote district police stations.

 34. CSDG (note 20) paras. 100–101.

 35. Edward Rees, Under Pressure: FALINTIL – Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste: Three Decades of Defense Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1975–2004 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2004) p.53.

 36. Mobekk (note 31) pp.8–9.

 37. Eirin Mobekk, ‘Policing Peace Operations: United Nations Civilian Police in East Timor’ (London: King's College 2001) pp.45–9.

 38. Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (note 25) pp.8–9.

 39. CSDG (note 20) para. 101.

 40. Former UNMISET and UNTAET senior officials have commented on the poor quality of mission planning by DPKO in late 1999, pointing to the dearth of institution-building expertise in DPKO, the failure to benefit from UNAMET's experiences, and the institutional rivalry between DPKO and the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which organised the UNAMET mission. See, for example, Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, ‘The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building’, International Peacekeeping 12/1 (Spring 2005) pp.125–45; Chopra (note 7).

 41. The ‘East Timor Police Service Development Plan’ of July 2002, which was presented to the JAM members in November of that year, was a six-page document which discussed the planned handover of districts from CIVPOL to PNTL, the command and control issues pertaining thereto, and three specialised police units. There was no mention of any strategic approach to the PNTL institutional capacity building, or to projects or programmes to build and/or improve the police's management and administrative systems, or policy and planning capabilities.

 42. Interview with former Dili-based CIVPOL, now a DPKO Civilian Police Division official, Aug. 2004 (New York).

 43. Mobekk (note 31) pp.8–9.

 44. Rogerio Lobato, the brother of a resistance era hero killed by the Indonesian military, became Minister of Internal Administration in May 2002, following his involvement in protests by veterans in early and mid-2002. This ministry was later divided into two, and Lobato became Minister of Interior with responsibility for the PNTL and other emergency services. Lobato remains a controversial figure in East Timorese society, with several observers concerned about his tight control of the PNTL. See Rees (note 36).

 45. Edward Rees cites UNTAET's failure to adequately consult East Timorese leaders on the PNTL's development as the overriding UN shortcoming in police development. Interview, Dili, Aug. 2004.

 46. The reports of Ray Murray (see note 57), senior adviser to the Institution and Capacity Building Committee and the Minister of Interior, allude to the tremendous pressures and distractions imposed on senior and mid-level PNTL officers by UNMISET's rushed and ill-conceived ‘Institution Strengthening Plan of Action’.

 47. The individual in question told the author and other members of the JAM in Nov. 2003 that he held the position on account of his friendship with an official in DPKO's Civilian Police Division in New York.

 48. These 100 advisors were known as the Civilian Support Group (CSG). UNMISET II had a CSG comprising 58 advisers, none of whom worked with the PNTL.

 49. The CIVPOL commissioner spent no time with the mission and its members, and did not appear to want to cooperate with the mission. The UNDP-retained policing consultant did not even have an opportunity to shake hands with him. The CPD representative, in the estimation of the core JAM members, added no value to the inquiries and work of the mission.

 50. JAM member Bernice Masterson, a highly experienced AusAid policing consultant, drafted the report with significant input from UNMISET Human Rights Officer John Tyynela and the author. Masterson continues to be heavily involved in PNTL development as part of the 2004–2008 Australia-UK programme of support to the PNTL.

 51. The Office of the DSRSG was inexplicably eager to include this equipment wish list (which was one of several such CIVPOL and/or PNTL lists presented to the JAM). JAM members argued that their remit did not include compiling lists of equipment; moreover, they said, it was unwise to throw such wish lists at donors when the police had no strategic vision and minimal capacity to maintain such equipment. Indeed, the very donors which some officials in UNMISET hoped would provide equipment had participated in the mission and believed that the list's inclusion was altogether inappropriate!

 52. Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (note 25) pp.8–9.

 53. Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (note 25) p. 9.

 54. The author was asked to comment on the CIVPOL Commissioner's draft list during a meeting with an Office of the DSRSG staff member in March 2003. The author was critical, and urged that an all-East Timorese committee be formed.

 55. Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Planning and Finance, and Ministry of Justice.

 56. Ray Murray, Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Advisor to the ICB Committee: Mid-term Monitoring and Review, July 2003; Ray Murray, Report to the Minister of the Interior on the Progress of the Current Plan of Action: Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste, July 2003; and Ray Murray, Advisor Report on the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste and the Institutional Capacity Building Working Group for the Period 1 June to 31 August 2003, Sept. 2003.

 57. The Government of Japan provided US$90,000 (through UNDP) for these workshops and related activities.

 58. The latter workshop took place partly on account of concerns about the performance of the PNTL's riot control police in disturbances in Dili in Dec. 2002 that resulted in two shooting fatalities and several injuries, as well as donors’ concerns over the government's plan – with UNMISET blessing – to form a further special, heavily-armed police unit for rural insurgencies.

 59. Less than one per cent of East Timorese speak English. Approximately five per cent speak Portuguese. Nevertheless, Portuguese is the working language of the Timor-Leste government. The majority of Timorese speak Tetum and Bahasa Indonesian.

 60. As of mid-2004, there were approximately 11,200 civil servants in Timor-Leste, of which approximately 3,050 are PNTL officers.

 61. Such donors include Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, the USA and the UK, as well as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

 62. The author engaged in many conversations with numerous embassy officials on this subject throughout 2003.

 63. The author was privy to a number of donor meetings with senior UNMISET officials vis-à-vis PNTL development.

 64. The author was privy to discussions involving UK and Australian diplomats in 2003 in which shock was expressed at UNMISET officials’ ignorance of the TSP process.

 65. Several UNTAET officials called for urgent action on the question of FALINTIL's future in 1999–2000, notably John Bevan, the Aileu district administrator.

 66. FRETILIN's dominance of both the executive and legislative branches of government prevents the latter from serving as an effective counterweight to the former. Additionally, the National Parliament's members are, for the most part, inexperienced in legislative processes, including oversight.

 67. ‘Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (for the period from 10 November 2004 to 16 February 2005)’, New York 18 Feb. 2005.

 68. Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, Aug. 2000 < www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations> (accessed Nov. 2005).

 69. Interview with official, DPKO's Best Practices Unit, Aug. 2004.

 70. In interviews with the author in Aug. 2004, three different UNMISET and DPKO officials provided three different explanations for the selection of the head CIVPOL in UNMISET II, all concerning his nationality, the nationality of the other candidates, and/or the nationality of the head of Civilian Police Division at UN HQ. The individual's qualifications and institution-building expertise – or lack thereof – were not a factor. The Australian CIVPOL commissioner in 2003–2004 was the exception to this regrettable rule, though her scope for positive change was handicapped by CIVPOL's dwindling manpower and the Office of the DSRSG's micromanagement of PNTL development.

 71. With reference to the UN's inaction regarding the generally recognised lacklustre performance of a CIVPOL commissioner in 2002–3, a senior UNMISET official explained (to the author in an interview in Aug. 2004) that criticism of a senior UN appointee was tantamount to criticism of his/her country, and thus improper. Additionally, observers were stunned to note that the UNMISET CIVPOL institutional and capacity building adviser's contract was renewed in 2003 despite his wholly inadequate performance in 2002–3. See note 50 above.

 72. CIVPOL's operational capabilities were found to be lacking on 4 Dec. 2002 when Dili was hit by riots during which CIVPOL was unable to stop several hundred students and troublemakers from looting and burning buildings throughout the city for more than seven hours. Scores of off-duty CIVPOLs were not summoned because nobody had their mobile phone numbers. The entire day was marked by indecision by UNMISET senior personnel, with scores of CIVPOLs waiting for hours for orders to deploy in the city.

 73. The UN combined the role of UNMISET DSRSG and UNDP Resident Coordinator, a move designed to emphasise sustainable development as a critical focus of UNMISET.

 74. See, for example, Ludovic Hood, ‘The UN Must Let Talent Rise’, International Herald Tribune, 13 Aug. 2004.

 75. The Outcome Document from the Sept. 2005 world leaders’ summit is illustrative of the challenges the UN faces in this regard. The Secretary-General and certain member states (particularly the US) sought to strengthen the Secretary-General's administrative prerogative by reducing the General Assembly's Fifth Committee's de facto micromanagement of the UN Secretariat's operations. However, a coalition of developing states blocked this attempt to strengthen the SG's prerogative in management, hiring, promotions and so forth.