Switching from Indiscriminate to Selective Violence: The Case of the Peruvian Military (1980–95)

Abstract

This essay asks why the Peruvian military switched from indiscriminate to selective violence during Peru's internal conflict (1980–95). It discusses three answers suggested by the literature, to be called the ‘self-learning,’ ‘reaction’ and ‘adjustment’ arguments. For the self-learning argument, the switch occurred because the military realised that indiscriminate violence was counterproductive. For the reaction and adjustment arguments, by contrast, the switch was a response to external constraints. In the reaction argument, the constraints prompted the military to review its fighting preferences and abandon indiscriminate violence as a policy option. The adjustment argument disagrees. From its perspective, there was neither a review process nor a change in preferences: the military simply adjusted its behaviour to a new environment. These three arguments are tested using the method of process tracing. It is concluded that only the adjustment argument explains the Peruvian case.

Notes

 1. Carlos Iván Degregori, ‘Return to the Past’ in David Scott Palmer (ed.) The Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994).

 2. Jeremy Weinstein, ‘A New Threat of Terror in the Western Hemisphere’, SAIS Review XXIII/1 (2003) p.4.

 3. Stathis Kalyvas, ‘The paradox of terrorism in civil war’, The Journal of Ethics 8/1 (2004) p.98.

 4. Ibid. p.99.

 5. Ibid.

 6. Ibid. p.101.

 7. Ibid.

 8. Ibid. p.106.

 9. Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars’, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 (2002) pp. 462–3, 482.

10. Jeff Goodwin, ‘The Limits of Repression: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Counterinsurgency’, paper prepared for the conference on ‘Mobilization and Repression: What We Know and Where Should We Go From Here?’, University of Maryland, College Park, USA, 21–4 June 2001; Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres in Algeria’, Rationality and Society 11/3 (1999) p. 251; Stathis Kalyvas, ‘The logic of violence in civil war’, paper presented at the first meeting of the Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes (LiCEP), Duke University, Durham, USA, 21–3 April 2000.

11. Lewis Taylor, ‘Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso, and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996’, Bulletin of Latin American Research 17/1 (1998) pp.50, 53; James Ron, ‘Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation’, Journal of Peace Research 38/5 (2001) p.587.

12. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú (CVR), ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’, in Informe Final. Sección Segunda: Los actores del conflicto (Lima: 2003) pp.272–91.

13. As the absence of references suggests, the adjustment argument, unlike the self-learning and reaction explanations, has not been explicitly or implicitly proposed before (at least to the author's knowledge). It is, however, an intuitive variation of the reaction argument (which does appear in the literature) and a straightforward application of rational choice logic to the problem at hand.

14. See, for example, Azam and Hoeffler (note 9); Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless?’ and ‘The logic of violence in civil war’ (note 10); Elisabeth Jean Wood, ‘Sexual Violence during War: Explaining Variation’, paper presented at the Order, Conflict and Violence conference at Yale University, 30 April to 1 May 2004.

15. Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless?’ and ‘The logic of violence in civil war’ (note 10).

16. CVR, ‘Compendio Estadístico’ in Informe Final (note 12) Anexo 2, p.84. The statistics of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission have the advantage of distinguishing among perpetrators, which makes it possible to assess the human cost of military operations. Their limitation, however, is that they refer to ‘war-related casualties’ and so do not distinguish between rebel and civilian fatalities.

17. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Policiales’ in Informe Final (note 12) pp.142–53.

18. US Embassy in Lima, ‘Guerrilla and terrorist violence 1986–87’ (10 June 1987) paragraph 36; ‘Embassy visit to Ayacucho’ (11 May 1988) paragraph 2; Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: a history of the millenarian war in Peru (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1999); Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, ‘La Marina de Guerra del Perú en la lucha contra el terrorismo (1980–1997)’, Revista de Marina (January–March 2002) pp. 12–15.

19. US Department of Justice, ‘Report on Sendero’ (30 November 1983) p.6.

20. Robert Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International 2006) pp.40–1.

21. Ibid.

22. Daniel Masterson, Militarism and politics in Latin America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso (New York: Greenwood Press 1991) p.283.

23. Roberto Noel Moral, Ayacucho: Testimonio de un soldado (Lima: Publinor 1989); Ortiz Sotelo (note 18) p.16.

24. Quoted in Taylor (note 11) p.43.

25. Quoted in ibid.

26. Philip Mauceri, ‘Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru’, Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 33/4 (1991) p.91; Philip Mauceri, ‘Insurgency and the State in Peru’ in Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs (eds.) The Counter-Insurgent State (London: MacMillan Publishing 1997) pp.162–3; see, as well, US Embassy in Lima, ‘Embassy visit to Ayacucho’ (note 18) para.15.

27. Carlos Iván Degregori, ‘Harvesting storms: peasant rondas and the defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho’ in Steve J. Stern (ed.) Shining and other paths: war and society in Peru, 1980–1995 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1998) p.144.

28. CVR, ‘Compendio Estadístico’ (note 16) p.84.

29. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) p.269.

30. CVR, ‘Compendio Estadístico’ (note 16) p.84; Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, Peru: Time of Fear (London: Latin American Bureau 1992) p.6.

31. CVR, Las Fuerzas Armadas (note 12) p.271; Mauceri, ‘Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru’ (note 26) p.96.

32. CVR, ‘Compendio Estadístico’ (note 16) p.84.

33. CVR, ‘El Poder Legislativo’, in Informe Final (note 12) p.220.

34. Gordon H. McCormick, Sharp dressed men: Peru's Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand 1993); CVR, ‘El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru’ in Informe Final (note 12) pp. 388–401.

35. Ron (note 11) p.569.

36. Carlos Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: dos estrategias y un final (Lima: IEP 1996).

37. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.285–6.

38. CVR, ‘Compendio Estadístico’ (note 16) p.84. Unsurprisingly, the figure declined during the last two years of the conflict (1994–95) to 159 or 0.22 per day.

39. Taylor (note 11) p.49; Tapia (note 36).

40. Carlos De Izcue, ‘Peru's Shining Path and MRTA Analyzed with the Manwaring Paradigm’, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 12/2 (2004) pp.54, 56.

41. Taylor (note 11), pp.50, 53; Ron (note 11) p.587.

42. Kalyvas, ‘The logic of violence in civil war’ (note 10) pp.6–7.

43. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.272–91.

44. See Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, ‘Process Tracing in Case Study’, paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 17–19 October 1997.

45. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.272–91; Ron (note 11); Taylor (note 11); Tapia (note 36).

46. ‘EZ’ stands for ‘emergency zone’ and ‘SL’ for Sendero Luminoso.

47. US Embassy in Lima, ‘Peru Overview of Terrorism Developments’ (2 July 1986) para.3.

48. Taylor (note 11) p.44.

49. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.274–5; Mauceri, ‘Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru’ (note 26) p.95.

50. US Embassy in Lima, ‘Reaction within army to removal of generals’ (19 September 1985) para.2.

51. US Embassy in Lima, ‘Military Announces Terrorist Attacks’ (26 September 1985) para.2; Taylor (note 11) p.46.

52. CVR, ‘El Poder Legislativo’ (note 33) pp.216–18.

53. The fact that the massacre can be considered an act of selective violence does not make it less of a crime, however. As mentioned before, a discriminating operation may involve human rights violations and, in this case, it did.

54. CVR, ‘El Poder Legislativo’ (note 33) p.220.

55. Analyses of this handbook can be found in CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) and Tapia (note 36).

56. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.286–91.

57. Ricardo Uceda, Muerte en el Pentagonito: Los cementarios secretos del ejército peruano (Bogotá: Planeta 2004).

58. Kalyvas (note 3) p.129.

59. CVR, ‘La Estrategia de Pacificación en la Margen Izquierda del Río Huallaga’, in Informe Final. Sección tercera: Los escenarios de la violencia (Lima: 2003) p.397. The italics are from the original. The quotation is the author's translation. The original text, in Spanish, reads as follows:

Cuando los comandos llegaban al monte y se encontraban con población supuestamente civil, ellos no podían identificar ¿quién era quién? En ese momento, los comandos optaron por utilizar la táctica ejecutiva (arrasar), aprendida en su preparación para desarrollar la operación. La lógica de estos actos violentos se basó en la idea preconcebida de que toda la población era senderista y en demostrar la ferocidad de las fuerzas armadas frente al enemigo.

60. Ibid. p.406.

61. US Department of Justice, Profile series: Peru. Human Rights and Political Developments through December 1994 (Washington 1995) p.61.

62. CVR, ‘La Estrategia de Pacificación …’ (note 59) pp.394–5.

63. Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, ‘United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance’, International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999) pp.187–8.

64. Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, ‘Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies’, World Politics 41/2 (1989) pp.144–6.

65. US Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Washington: 2004); Steve Garrison, ‘The U.S. Foreign Aid Program and Civil Wars: Evaluating the Impact of U.S. Economic and Military Aid’, paper prepared for presentation at the 44th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, 25 February–1 March 2003.

66. Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: from civil strife to civil peace (Boulder: Westview Press 1995) p.148.

67. Cynthia McClintock, ‘The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a critical caveat on democratic standards’, working paper (June 2000) p.20.

68. See Masterson (note 22).

69. McClintock (note 67) p.20.

70. US Embassy in Lima, ‘FY 1992 Security Assistance Reporting Requirements (Part I)’ (13 April 1990) p.3; see, as well, US Department of State, ‘Summary of PCC on Military Assistance and the Andean Strategy in Peru’ (2 May 1990).

71. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) pp.338–42. In September 1991, the human rights NGO American Watch denounced, ‘the Bush administration's willingness to discount the human rights conditions contained in the International Narcotics Control Act (INCA) of 1990’.

72. Mauceri, ‘Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru’ (note 26) p.100.

73. See Kenneth Roberts and Mark Peceny, ‘Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Peru’ in Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri (eds.) The Peruvian Labyrinth (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997).

74. CVR, ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas’ (note 12) p.342; see also Carol Wise, Reinventing the State: Economic Strategy and Institutional Change in Peru (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2003).

75. IDEHPUCP, Antecedentes y situación actual de la educación militar en derechos humanos en el Perú (Lima 2004).

76. Max Manwaring, ‘Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 15/1 (2004) pp.73–4; George H. Franco, ‘Battling Narcoterrorism: The Peruvian Experience in the Ucayali’, Orbis 48/3 (2004) p.516; W. Alejandro Sanchez, ‘The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 14/3 (2003) p. 193–4. ‘Primer Ministro peruano advierte de la reactivación de Sendero Luminoso’, El Mercurio (20 October 2005).