Iraq – Quo Vadis?

Abstract

Shi'a revolutionary activism, on the other hand, is essentially a spent force.1

Nearly four years after the US-led invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein, extreme violence continues to define the immediate political landscape of what was once referred to as Mesopotamia. The military and political battles being fought out in Iraq today, battles which often in their complexity defy an easy nomenclature such as ‘insurgency’ remain, nonetheless grounded in decades of conflict and domestic strife.2 While it is true that 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces in Iraq remain relatively quiescent, the same cannot be said of the violence that afflicts the four remaining and indeed most populous provinces where the levels of bloodshed have gone from bad to worse. This includes not only attacks against coalition forces, but a growing spiral of sectarian violence among and between religiously-based militias, almost nihilistic in its savagery. With central government either unable or indeed unwilling to intervene to counter such bloodshed, many regard Civil War as now defining the political reality as, in the absence of security structure loyal to the state, militias – Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish – struggle over land, people and resources. This may appear a somewhat alarmist observation. After all, on the political front, Iraq has managed to hold several elections and to create a federal government despite the extreme partisan nature of political and religious affiliation throughout the county. This is no small achievement, but it is clearly not enough to make the transition to a system of political institutionalisation whereby adversarial politics are played out in a peaceful way. The essays in this special issue therefore represent a modest attempt not only to explain the multiple dynamics that have come to inform the violence in Iraq, but equally, to shed light on how the role of both external and internal actors, both state and non-state have come to impact on the very idea of Iraq as a sustainable, viable entity at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Notes

 1. Vali Nasr, ‘Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq’, Washington Quarterly 27/3 (Summer 2004) p.14. Ely Karmon, edited and updated version of two presentations given, ‘ Is a Coalition Viable in the Islamist Camp? The Sunni–Shi'a Divide’, at the Proteus Futures Academic Workshop, ‘Analyzing Future National Security Challenges’, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USA, 22–24 Aug. 2006; and ‘ Radicalization of the Sunni–Shi'a Divide: from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf’ at the Sixth Annual International Conference on Global Terrorism of The Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzlyia, Israel, 11–14 Sept. 2006.

 2. See for example Fouad Ajami, The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq (NY: Free Press 2006). See in particular Chapters 1 (pp.15–48), 2 (pp.49–86) and 6 (pp.189–240).

 3. Bernard Lewis, lecture at the ‘Crystal Serenity’, Hillsdale College, USA, 16 July 2006.

 4. Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes: And other Occupational Hazards of a year in Iraq (London: Harcourt 2006) pp.31–52 and pp.53–70; Mark Allen. Arabs: A New Perspective (London: Continuum 2006) pp.131–42.

 5. Lewis (note 3).

 6. Nasr (note 1) pp.10–18.

 7. Nasr (note 1) pp.10–11.

 8. Peter Grier, ‘Iraqi war draws foreign jihadists, but not in droves’, Christian Science Monitor, 3 Oct. 2006.

 9. Christian Science Monitor, 3 Oct. 2006. See also Magnus Norell, ‘Islamic militants in Europe: a growing threat’, Terrorism Monitor 3/8 (21 April 2005) at < www.jamestown.org/publications.php>; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘ Of course Iraq made it worse’, Washington Post, 29 Sept. 2006.

10. ‘Iraqi police accused of aiding insurgents’, Associated Press, International Herald Tribune, 4 Oct. 2006, < www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/04/news/iraq.php >.

11. This revival also includes perceived Shi'a successes in Lebanon (through Hizballah's war against Israel) as well as recent events during the last years in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-countries where Shi'a minorities have managed to gain more rights. As pointed out earlier, these ‘successes’ are often seen as problematic by the Sunni majorities in the same countries. Not to mention the Sunni minorities in countries where the Sunnis still rule but where the Shi'a constitutes a majority of the population, such as in Bahrain.

12. Christian Science Monitor, 3 Oct. 2006.

13. The letter was recovered in the rubble of the Iraqi house where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006. The letter can be accessed at the West Point's Counter Terrorism Center at < www.ctc.usma.edu>. See also Austin Bay, ‘Al Qaeda narrative of doubt’, Washington Times, 6 Oct. 2006.