British ‘Post-Conflict’ Operations in Iraq: Into the Heart of Strategic Darkness

Abstract

British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however threatens to compromise this reputation. The insurgency remains intense, civil war threatens to engulf the country, British troops are dying in numbers and some troops have been accused of war crimes. How are we to explain the failures in Iraq? In this article I offer a version of events based on a Clausewitzian framework. I demonstrate that British troops in Iraq are deployed in a ‘strategic void’ as a result of political failures in both the UK and US, which means troops are compromised, vulnerable and strategically aimless. Their actions are crucially detached from higher political objectives. Failure to heed Clausewitz's admonitions has led to a situation in which British ‘strategy’ amounts to hope, wait and see, while British troops fight, do and die.

Acknowledgements

For all their suggestions, comments and advice, I would like to thank Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Rhiannon Vickers, Nick Rengger. Paul Snell, Matthew Waldman, Susie Hall, Steve Clarke, Andrew Mumford, Ben Richardson, Adam White and Joanna Bakewell.

Notes

  1. John Keegan, The Iraq War: The 21-Day Conflict and its Aftermath (London: Pimlico 2005) pp.1–7.

  2. Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage 2003) p.116.

  3. William Polk, Understanding Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris 2005) p.xi.

  4. As John Newsinger notes, ‘The overall perception…is that Britain's counterinsurgency campaigns have been conducted with considerable success…This is a distortion. First of all, the British postwar record includes important defeats…Second…the British took the decision to withdraw rather than confront full-scale rebellion and insurgency.’ British Counter-insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2002) p.1.

  5. See Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military Review 85/6 (Nov./Dec. 2005) pp.2–15.

  6. The Brookings Institution, ‘Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Sadaam Iraq’, 28 Sept. 2006, p.23 < www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>.

  7. Iraq Body Count counts only those deaths ‘which can be unambiguously attributed to the invasion and which have been reported by two independent news agencies’. George Monbiot, ‘The Media are Minimising US and British War Crimes in Iraq’, The Guardian, 8 Nov. 2005.

  8. Iraq Body Count counts only those deaths ‘which can be unambiguously attributed to the invasion and which have been reported by two independent news agencies’. George Monbiot, ‘The Media are Minimising US and British War Crimes in Iraq’, The Guardian, 8 Nov. 2005 and Iraq Body Count, < www.iraqbodycount.net>, last viewed 28 Sept. 2006.

  9. See International Crisis Group, ‘The Next War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict’, Middle East Report, No. 52, 27 Feb. 2006.

 10. Economist, ‘A task for the honest and brave’, 11 May 2006.

 11. Economist, ‘Mayhem in the south too’, 12 Aug. 2006.

 12. House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations, Sixth Report of Session 2004–05, 16 March 2005 (London: The Stationary Office 2005) p.36.

 13. A theme explored recently by General Sir Rupert Smith in his book, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane 2005), also available in Penguin 2006 edition.

 14. Thomas E. Lawrence, ‘A Report on Mesopotamia by T.E. Lawrence’, Sunday Times, 22 Aug. 1920.

 15. For example see: Simon Jenkins, ‘Suez and Iraq, two of a kind’, The Times, 22 April 2005; Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘The Eden of our time’, The Guardian, 11 July 2006; Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris (London: C. Hurst 2005) p.55; John Kifner, ‘Britain Tried First. Iraq Was No Picnic Then’, New York Times, 20 July 2003; and Charles Clover, ‘Lessons of 1920 Revolt Lost on Bremer’, Financial Times, 17 Nov. 2003.

 16. For example see John Mueller, ‘The Iraq Syndrome’, Foreign Affairs 84/6 (Nov./Dec. 2005) pp.44–54 and Melvin R. Laird, ‘Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam’, ibid. pp.22–43.

 17. Edward H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1990) pp. 20–21.

 18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman's Library 1993) p.199. For detailed treatments of Clausewitz's conception of history see: Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton UP 1985) pp.331–55 and Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War (Boston: Prentice Hall 1985) pp.196–213.

 19. Jeremy Black, The Dotted Red Line: British Defence Policy in the Modern World (London: Social Affairs Unit 2006) p.22.

 20. Colin S. Gray, ‘Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World’, in Contemporary Essays, The Occasional No. 47 (Shrivenham: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 2004), p. 6.

 21. Clausewitz, ‘Author's Preface’ in On War (note 18) p.69.

 22. Colin S. Gray, ‘How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?’, Parameters 35/1 (Spring 2005) p.14.

 23. Gray, ‘Future Strategic World’ (note 20).

 24. Economist, ‘Special Report: Arab world, Iraq and al-Qaeda’, 26 Nov. 2005.

 25. Clausewitz (note 18) p.718. Italics added.

 26. As contrasted with his conception of the nature of abstract ‘absolute war’, which is defined by its tendency towards extremes. See, Clausewitz (note 18) pp.83, 86 and pp.700–3.

 27. As contrasted with his conception of the nature of abstract ‘absolute war’, which is defined by its tendency towards extremes. See, Clausewitz (note 18) pp.83, 86 and pp.700–3 p.101.

 28. As contrasted with his conception of the nature of abstract ‘absolute war’, which is defined by its tendency towards extremes. See, Clausewitz (note 18) pp.83, 86 and pp.700–3 p.698.

 29. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, Parameters 25/3 (Autumn 1995) pp.9–20.

 30. Clausewitz (note 18) p.101.

 31. Clausewitz (note 18) p.101 pp.717–18.

 32. Clausewitz (note 18) p.101 pp. 731–7.

 33. See Michael Howard, ‘War as an Instrument of Policy’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen & Unwin 1966); Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz’, War in History 1 (Nov. 1994) pp.319–36; and Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (London: Cassell 1974).

 34. assford, ‘Trashing Clausewitz’ (note 33).

 35. Howard, ‘War as an Instrument’ (note 33) p.194.

 36. Clausewitz (note 18) p.731.

 37. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.30.

 38. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.30 p.17.

 39. Clausewitz (note 18) p.734.

 40. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press 2004) p.2.

 41. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr, ‘How to Win in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005) p.87.

 42. Gray, Modern Strategy (note 37) p.50.

 43. Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal hierarchy and the licence to use force’, in David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Bice Maiguashca, Force and Legitimacy in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP 2005) pp.84–5.

 44. Martin van Creveld, ‘The Fate of the State’, Parameters 26/1 (Spring 1996) pp.4–18.

 45. International Crisis Group, ‘Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?’, Middle East Report, No.38, 21 March 2005.

 46. Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2004) pp.162–8.

 47. As Bruce Hoffman notes, the first of the six principles of British counter-insurgency doctrine, as laid out in their 1995 Field Manual, is ‘Political Primacy and Political Aim’. ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, RAND National Security Research Division, Occasional Paper, June 2004, p.7.

 48. Ignatieff, Empire Lite (note 2) p.24.

 49. Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing Iraq (London: Picador 2006).

 50. Clausewitz (note 18) p.97.

 51. See International Crisis Group, ‘Reading the Iraqi Insurgency’, Middle-East Report, No.50, 15 Feb. 2006, p.17; and House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism’, Fourth Report of the Session 2005–06, 2 July 2006 (London: The Stationery Office 2006) pp. 88–9.

 52. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: C. Hurst 2006) pp.329–33.

 53. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Vintage 2001) p.205.

 54. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (London: Penguin 1998) pp.313–14.

 55. Ignatieff, Virtual War (note 53) pp. 206–7.

 56. See William Shawcross, ‘We're not Bush's poodles: we're fighting on the right side of history’, The Times, Online Comment, April 2004 and House of Commons Defence Select Committee (note 12) p.12.

 57. For recent books dealing with US counter-insurgency failures, see in particular: Paul Rogers, Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency 2004/2005 (London: I.B.Tauris 2006); Zaki Chehab, Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency (London: I.B.Tauris 2006); and Hashim (note 52) pp.271–344.

 58. Hashim (note 52) p.325.

 59. Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 1 March 2006). Available online.

 60. The US Army's new field manual, drawn up by General David Petraeus, will emphasize the need to secure moral legitimacy and that sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. Sarah Baxter, ‘Hug an insurgent: US's new plan to win in Iraq’, Sunday Times, 16 July 2006. See also, Economist, ‘Special report: American military tactics’, 17 Dec. 2005.

 61. Colin S. Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, Parameters 32/1 (Spring 2002) pp.5–14.

 62. Although we should be careful not too impute too much strategic continuity in this trend given the episodic nature of revolutionary war. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’ in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: OUP 1986) pp.818–19.

 63. Although we should be careful not too impute too much strategic continuity in this trend given the episodic nature of revolutionary war. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’ in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: OUP 1986) pp.818–19 pp.815–16.

 64. Smith (note 13) pp. 267–305.

 65. Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 (London: Routledge for IISS 2006) p.7.

 66. Colin S. Gray, ‘The RMA and Intervention: A Sceptical View’, in Colin McInnes and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Dimensions of Western Military Intervention (London: Frank Cass 2002) p.55.

 67. Freedman (note 65) p.42.

 68. Lt. Col. Robert M. Cassidy, US Army, ‘The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture’, Military Review 75/3 (May–June 2005) pp.53–9.

 69. For more on these issues see in particular: John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002); Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counter-insurgency 1919–60 (NY: St. Martin's Press 1990); Newsinger (note 4); Cassidy, ‘The British Army and Counter-insurgency’ (note 68); [Brig.] Gavin Bulloch, ‘Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective’, Parameters 26/2 (Summer 1996) pp.4–16.

 70. Richard Holmes, Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War (London: Harper Press 2006) pp.106, 137.

 71. Chehab (note 57) pp.125–6.

 72. Black, Dotted Red Line (note 19) p.68.

 73. Clausewitz (note 18) p.85.

 74. Clausewitz (note 18) p.85 p.101.

 75. Clausewitz (note 18) p.85 p.98.

 76. Clausewitz (note 18) p.85 p.84.

 77. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge 2005) pp.81–2.

 78. Clausewitz (note 18) p.216.

 79. Clausewitz (note 18) p.216 pp.84–5.

 80. Paul Saurette, ‘You dissin me? Humiliation and post 9/11 global politics’, Review of International Studies 32 (2006) p.521.

 81. Gray, ‘The RMA’ (note 66) p.54.

 82. Clausewitz (note 18) p258.

 83. See Michael Smith, ‘Iraq battle stress worse than WWII’, Sunday Times, 6 Nov. 2005 and Ian Herbert, ‘Are British Troops at Breaking Point in Iraq?’, Independent, 18 Oct. 2005.

 84. Carey Schofield, ‘Army chief says guilt factor is hitting morale’, Sunday Times, 2 Oct. 2005.

 85. Michael Smith, ‘Army hit by 3,000 front line shortfall’, Sunday Times, 16 July 2006. On the subject of overstretch, see House of Commons Defence Committee, UK Operations in Iraq, Thirteenth Report of Session 2005–06, 10 Aug. 2006. The report states that, ‘The MoD's confidence that the UK Armed Forces are not overstretched contrasts with what we are hearing from service personnel on the ground.’

 86. For wider discussions of the impact of the media in war see: Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War (NY: Palgrave 2000); Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester UP 1993); and Daya K. Thussu and Des Freedman (eds.), War and the Media (London: Sage 2003).

 87. See Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport Warfare: The West and Contemporary Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner 2002).

 88. Ignatieff, Virtual War (note 53) p.191.

 89. Carruthers (note 86) p.8.

 90. Ignatieff, Virtual War (note 53) p.193. See also Ignatieff's, Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Vintage 1998) pp.9–33.

 91. Between March 2003 and March 2006, 86 journalists and media assistants have been killed and 38 kidnapped. Reporters Without Borders. ‘Slaughter in Iraq’, March 2006. See also Orville Schell, ‘Baghdad: The Besieged Press’, New York Review of Books, 6 April 2006.

 92. Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, Media at War: the Iraq Crisis (London: Sage 2004) p.162.

 93. The Labour Party, despite being voted back into power in 2005, received the backing of barely one fifth of the electorate.

 94. Freedman (note 65) p.24.

 95. Freedman (note 65) p.24 p.78.

 96. Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

 97. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (NY: Univ. of Rochester Press 1996) pp.220–35.

 98. Jeremy Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century (London: Continuum 2004) pp.13–17.

 99. McInnes (note 87) p.29.

100. Black (note 19) pp.76–9.

101. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver and Jason Reifler, ‘Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’, International Security 30/3 (Winter 2005/2006) p.8.

102. Freedman (note 65) p.41.

103. Nicholas Rengger, ‘The judgement of war: on the idea of legitimate force in world politics’, in Armstrong et al., Force and Legitimacy (note 43) p.147.

104. Mazower (note 54) p.294.

105. Steven Kettell, Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq (London: Zed Books 2006).

106. On the enduring character of world politics post 9/11, see Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, ‘Apocalypse Now? Continuities or disjunctions in world politics after 9/11’, International Affairs 82/3 (2006) pp.539–52.

107. Hammes (note 40) p.40.

108. Clausewitz (note 18) p.100.

109. McInnes (note 87).

110. Clausewitz (note 18) p.708. Italics added.