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Abstract
Some might argue that the origin of the civil war in Iraq can be traced back to the attack on the Samara mosque setting sectarian divisions aflame in February 2006. Others might point to Viceroy Paul Bremer's decision to disband the Army, de-ba'athify the Civil Service, and privatize state industries. Together these decisions put over half a million unemployed on the street overnight. Some might argue the looting, combined with weapons caches spread throughout the country, helped create a culture of anarchy over which US-led forces never quite regained control because there were too few troops. Others will point to the inability to seal the borders and thus prohibit support to insurgents. These were critical events in the slide to civil war, no doubt, but this article argues that the military strategy of the United States was compromised before the armed forces left US soil for two reasons. First there were irreconcilable tensions between US grand strategy and its military plans. Second, a fatal flaw in US grand strategy, which conflated al-Qaeda with Saddam Hussein, encouraged Washington into an unnecessary war of choice that had no relationship to the very real and present dangers confronting America. Using Clausewitz as a guide, this article suggests some alternative options for America's long-term security.
Notes
1. President George W. Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Cincinnati Museum Center, 7 Oct. 2002, < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html>.
2. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House 2002) p.15.
3. The rejection of offensive war as a sovereign right (option) culminated in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (UN) but had various antecedents including the League of Nations and the Concert. The trend in international norms and law that led to the UN charter is widely accepted to have its origins in the rejection of Napoleon's adventurism by his conquerors. See F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: CUP 1963) p.213 and passim.
4. Bush (note 2).
5. Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, < www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/index.html>, quoted in Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2004) p.34.
6. Record (note 6) p.35.
7. John Adams, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part 1, Article XXX, adopted in 1780, < www.mass.gov/legis/const.htm>.
8. Thomas Paine, Common Sense [1776] (London: Penguin 1976) p.98.
9. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press 2004) p.200.
10. Bush (note 2) p.14.
11. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House 2002) p. 385.
12. Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York: Verso 2005) p.183.
13. Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York: Verso 2005) p.183 p.240.
14. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, 8th ed. (Princeton UP 1984) p.597.
15. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, 8th ed. (Princeton UP 1984) p.597 p.579.
16. Bush, ‘Outlines Iraqi Threat’ (note 2).
17. President George W. Bush, ‘The State of the Union Address’, Capitol Building: Washington DC, 28 Jan. 2003, emphasis added < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html>.
18. President George W. Bush, ‘The State of the Union Address’, Capitol Building: Washington DC, 28 Jan. 2003, emphasis added < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html>
19. Lawrence (note 12) pp.52 and 234.
20. Lawrence (note 12) pp.52 and 234 p.118.
21. Lawrence (note 12) pp.52 and 234 pp.234–5.
22. Clausewitz (note 14) p.77.
23. Clausewitz (note 14) p.77 p.93
24. ‘X’ (George Kennan), ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947) pp.566–83.
25. Lawrence (note 12) p.48.
26. This is interesting because it suggests Afghan mujahedin were fighting in Somalia. Lawrence (note 12) pp.54–5, emphasis added.
27. Professor Fawaz Gerges explains ‘Al-Hijaz is the western province of Saudi Arabia where Mecca and Medina are located. He appears to be referring to expelling the U.S. military presence from Arabia, but U.S. forces are normally stationed in the eastern provinces. By specifying al-Hijaz bin Laden is misleading naïve viewers into thinking that American troops are in physical control of Mecca and Medina.' Fawaz A. Gerges, Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: CUP 2005) p.85.
28. Lawrence (note 12) p.241.
29. Lawrence (note 12) p.241
30. Lawrence (note 12) p.241 p.242.
31. Regarding the ‘new Rome’ label see Lawrence (note 12) p.212.
32. Clausewitz (note 14) pp.88–9.
33. Clarke (note 9) pp.30–1.
34. Clarke (note 9) pp.30–1 (note 10) pp.30–4. See also Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006) p.77.
35. Powell never explicitly rejected the idea, he only warned against its consequences.
36. Record (note 6) p.20.
37. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (London: Penguin 2004) p.212.
38. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (London: Penguin 2004) p.212 p.211.
39. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) pp.11–12.
40. Paul Wolfowitz, ‘The United States and Iraq’, in John Calabrese (ed.), The Future of Iraq (Washington DC: Middle East Institute Press 1997) p.111.
41. Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz, ‘Overthrow Him’, Weekly Standard, 1 Dec.1997.
42. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books 2006) pp.13–14.
43. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books 2006) pp.13–14 p.13.
44. Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House 2002) p.105.
45. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster 2002) pp.83–5.
46. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.17.
47. Clarke (note 9) pp.32–3.
48. Clarke (note 9) pp.32–3, p.30. Emphasis added.
49. Ron Suskind has argued that Vice President Cheney was so shaken by 9/11 that he lost his perspective and ability to take the long view evident in much of his long career in public service. Consequently, Cheney would be concerned about a possible threat even if there was a only a ‘one percent chance’ it might materialize. This would explain why evidence of a link between Saddam and AQ was not necessary to justify war against Iraq. For Cheney, there mere abstract possibility was enough evidence. See the argument in Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006), passim.
50. President George W. Bush, ‘Remarks by President Bush and President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia in Photo Opportunity’, The Oval Office, 25 Sept. 2002 < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html>.
51. Vice President Richard Cheney, ‘Remarks by the Vice President to the Heritage Foundation’, 10 Oct. 2003, < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031010-1.html>.
52. President George W Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat (note 1).
53. Secretary of State Colin Powell, ‘Addresses the UN Security Council’, 5 Feb. 2003, < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html#42>.
54. US State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (Washington DC, 30 April 2001), ‘Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism’, < www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441.htm>.
55. Mann (note 37) p.310. Note here also the inductive logic – looking for evidence to match the hypothesis. National security intelligence so derived is more likely to be fallible when it is cherry picked to suit an argument rather than forming a view based on the evidence.
56. Secretary of State Colin Powell, ‘Secretary Powell's Press Conference’, 8 Jan. 2004, State Dept., Washington DC, < www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/28008.htm>.
57. President George W. Bush, Press Conference by the President, White House, Washington DC, 21 Aug. 2006, < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html>.
58. Pew Research Centre Poll, ‘Americans Thinking About Iraq, But Focused on the Economy’, 10 Oct. 2002, < http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID = 645>.
59. Washington Post poll cited in Record (note 6) p.128.
60. Clausewitz (note 14) p.600.
61. ‘Rumsfeld foresees swift Iraq war’, BBC News, 7 Feb. 2003, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2738089.stm>.
62. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) pp.92–6, 100–3. See corroborating story in Gordon and Trainor (note 42) pp.78–83.
63. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.129.
64. Quoted in Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.92, emphasis added.
65. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.101.
66. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.101 pp.102–3.
67. Gordon and Trainor (note 43) p.82.
68. Record (note 6) p.103.
69. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.102.
70. Record (note 6) pp.76 and 112.
71. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair, Friday 9 May 2003, < www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html>.
72. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.77.
73. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.77
74. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.77 p.78.
75. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.77 p.79.
76. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone (NY: Random House 2006); Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (NY: Free Press 2004); Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (NY: Times Books 2005); James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq (NY: Vintage 2006); Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006); Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (NY: Pantheon Books 2006); Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (NY: Cornell University Press 2006); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (London: Penguin 2004); Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (NY: Random House 2002); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (NY: Penguin Press 2006); George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2006); David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside The Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (NY: Perseus Books 2006); Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2004); Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006); Bob Woodward, State of Denial (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006).
77. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27.
78. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27 p.4.
79. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27 p.32.
80. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27 p.98.
81. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27. p.110.
82. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27 p.140.
83. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.179.
84. See for two classic examples Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency [orig. La guerre moderne 1961] (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2006); and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2006).
85. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.77.
86. Ricks (note 76) p.163.
87. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.76.
88. Woodward, State of Denial (note 34) p.206.
89. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.71.
90. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.71 p.77.
91. Hashim (note 76).
92. See in particular their discussion of the battle for Nasiriyah.
93. Hashim (note 76) p.15.
94. Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, US Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wednesday, 15 Nov. 2006, < armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427>.
95. ‘US Iraqi forces raid radical Shiite stronghold of Sadr City’, an Associated Press report, on ABC News, 25 Oct. 2006, < www.abcactionnews.com/stories/2006/10/061025iraq.shtml>.
96. Assessment of 8 Nov. 2006, leaked to New York Times, see < www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/29/news/web.1129text.php>.
97. Clausewitz (note 14) p.90 emphasis in the original.
98. Hashim (note 76).
99. See Amit R. Paley, ‘Most Iraqis favor immediate US pullout, Poll shows’, Washington Post, 27 Sept. 2006, p.22.
100. See Amit R. Paley, ‘Most Iraqis favor immediate US pullout, Poll shows’, Washington Post, 27 Sept. 2006, p.22
101. Gen. John Abizaid, US Army, CENTCOM Commander, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed. 15 Nov. 2006, < http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427>.
102. Director of National Intelligence, ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States’, (April 2006), < www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf>.
103. Testimony given to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed., 15 Nov. 2006, < http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427>.
104. Gen. John Abizaid (note 102).
105. Lt. Gen. Maples (note 94).
106. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs 78/4 (July/Aug. 1999) p.1.
107. It should be remembered here that Iran's influence is limited inside Iraq by the Persian–Arab divide.
108. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, TV interview, ‘This Week with David Brinkley’, ABC network, 7 April 1991.
109. On the dimensions of strategy see Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999), Chapter 1, for this quote, p.6.
110. Clausewitz (note 15) p.92, emphasis in the original.
111. Director of National Intelligence, Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (April 2006), < www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf>.
112. Gen. John Abizaid (note 102).
113. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, US Air Force, Director CIA, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed., 15 Nov. 2006, < http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427>.