Politically Enfranchising the Non-political: Safeguarding Peace through Civic Education and Inclusion? The Civil Defence Forces in Sierra Leone

Abstract

This article considers the nature of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in Sierra Leone as a fighting force, and some of the challenges they faced for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), as well as the challenges posed by a group like the CDF to the DDR process. It considers some initiatives to educate the fighters about democracy, reconciliation and their associated responsibilities that began already during the civil war, as well as mechanisms that were created for the peaceful resolution of conflict by the CDF. Part of these initiatives have survived into the post-conflict period and continues to provide access to redress, but also a framework for political engagement. The article also considers how some of these initiatives undertaken during the war helped facilitate the transformation of the CDF into active civilian members of society, drawing some conclusions from this case for political enfranchisement more broadly.

Notes

 1. Before 1996 civil militias co-operated with the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) that took power in 1992.

 2. For an overview of the early days of the CDF and the Kamajor society, see Patrick K Muana, ‘The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency’, Africa Development XXII/3–4 (1997) pp.77–100.

 3. Hinga Norman was the Chief of Jiama Bongor chiefdom in Bo district.

 4. Many of the senior Kamajor society members were not men with a military background, but important local community members, including chiefs.

 5. The Kamajor initiation drew heavily on traditional beliefs and practices of initiation that combined herbal medicine, Quaranic mysticism and traditional spiritual beliefs. For a more detailed consideration of the role of initiation for mobilisation into the Kamajor society and the CDF, see N. Wlodarczyk, Magic Soldiers and Strategy: Understanding the Strategic Functions of Traditional Religion in Sierra Leone and Beyond, unpublished paper, International Studies Association convention, Honolulu, 2005, online at < http://convention2.allacademic.com/index.php?click_key = 1&PHPSESSID = 76940132a246f3e70776193c70b1f4a0)>.

 6. Daniel Hoffman, ‘Like Beasts in the Bush: Synonyms of Childhood and Youth in Sierra Leone’, Postcolonial Studies 6/3 (2003) pp.295–308, p.303.

 7. Personal communication, ex-CDF Kenema, May 2005.

 8. Personal communication, ex-CDF Freetown and Bo, Jan. 2005, Bo and Kenema, May 2005; Daniel Hoffman, The Kamajors of Sierra Leone, Unpublished PhD thesis in Cultural Anthropology, Duke U (2003) p.77 However, this practice was diverged from during the course of the war as the demand for new recruits increased and standards dropped.

 9. See Daniel Hoffman and Mariane C. Ferme, ‘Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond’, Africa Today 50/4 (Jun. 2004) pp.73–95.

10. According to the Truth and Reconciliation report, the CDF committed six per cent of recorded abuses. The TRC report is not exhaustive and only documents the cases confided in it during the process, but the figure is unlikely to diverge so substantially from reality as to alter this understanding. Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Vol. 2 (Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004) p.38.

11. Personal communication, Freetown and Kenema, May 2005.

12. After the signing of the Lome peace accord in 1999, DDR was begun. The logistics of food distribution to combatants and ex-combatants became a particular source of tension and factions within the CDF showed signs of turning on each other to maximise their own gain. The continued power of the CDF and its commanders regularly came to a head with civil community leaders and chiefs whose power base was challenged as they tried to reclaim some of the ground lost during the war years before Lome. The tension was particularly high between CDF battalion commanders and Paramount Chiefs whose claims to power were directly at odds.

13. Conciliation Resources, ‘Survey of Community Attitudes Towards the Kamajors, Bo, Bonthe and Pujehun Districts’ (Apr. 1999, unpublished).

14. This project was funded by the European Commission/Sierra Leone Resettlement, Rehabilitation Programme (EC/SLRRP).

15. Personal communication, Conciliation Resources West Africa programme manager (London 2005).

16. Frances Fortune, ‘EC/SLRPP Civic Education for CDF: Report on Activities’, Conciliation Resources Sierra Leone (unpublished).

17. Personal communication, BPRM staff (Bo, May 2005), Mariama Conteh, West Africa Programme Co-ordinator, Conciliation Resources Sierra Leone (Freetown, Jun. 2005).

18. E.g., three senior co-ordinators in BPRM are regularly invited to sit on the District Council Planning Committee.

19. Hassan H. Feika, now Co-ordinator of BPRM, was a CDF Operational Battalion Commander, but is also a Quranic scholar, knowledge associated with power and authority.

20. An initial DDR effort was launched in 1996 after the Abidjan agreement, but the continued violence and the 1997 coup halted it and saw many fighters re-enlist.

21. Personal communication, CDF commanders and fighters (Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Jan.–Feb. and May 2005).

22. Some units of the CDF had more sophisticated weapons, particularly those supplied directly by external sponsors like ECOMOG. In these units, AK-47s, lightweight machineguns, rocket propelled grenades and mortars were not uncommon.

23. For a careful consideration of the recycling of combatants in the Mano River Union, see Human Rights Watch, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors (New York: HRW 2005), and Daniel Hoffman, ‘The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention’, African Affairs 103/411 (2004) pp. 211–226.

24. He was also the legal council for the CDF High Priest, Alieu Kondewa, at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. His party, the PMDC, lost the election where the opposition APC won the presidency.

25. For a more detailed consideration of the DDR process as a whole in Sierra Leone and its shortcomings, see Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer and Patrick Coker, Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, Monograph No. 80 (Pretoria: ISS, Mar. 2003) or Hoffman (note 6).

26. Personal communication: CDF ex-combatants Freetown and Kenema (Jan. and May 2005); Frances Fortune, Regional Director, Search for Common Ground Freetown (May 2005).

27. The CDF national co-ordinator Samuel Hinga Norman, the Director of War Moinina Fofana and the High Priest Alieu Kondewa were all indicted by the Special Court for Sierra; Hinga Norman died while in custody before his trial was concluded, but Fofana and Kondewa were both found guilty and given long prison sentences.

28. The RUF were given both amnesty and senior positions in government controlling key resource industries, but neither agreement held despite these concessions.