Comoros: The Search for Viability

Abstract

The Comoros archipelago has had a troubled political history with territorial division at independence and, for the state of Comoros, repeated coups and a recent attempted secession. The article analyses the structural and contingent factors behind the susceptibility to conflict. It finds that the political and economic weaknesses that provoke conflict remain unaddressed and that these have been exacerbated by a failure of governance by government and civil society. Consequently, Comoros has failed to achieve viability and with it stability. The conclusion asks whether state viability in the western sense can be achieved or whether a hybrid form of governance should be supported. Currently the unresolved post-conflict issues look likely to spark further political crises and possibly violence.

Notes

 1. Those individuals and organisations interviewed included: Organisation Patronale des Comores; members of National Assembly; sales manager, Compeche; Directeur Enterprise Generale de Terrassment; Directeur Général Police of island police (Ngazidja); Director of Union Security; Président Universite des Comores; Directeur des Relations Universitaires Internationales; Président National 2008, JCI (Junior Chamber International); Ahmed Said ben Djafar, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mohamed Bacar Dossar, Directeur de Cabinet de la Défense; Représantant de l'Union Africaine aux Comores; Directeur Géneral, Al-Watwan; Directrice des Hirondelles; Mourad Taiati, UN Resident Coordinator; Idi Nadhoim, Vice President and Minister of Transport, Posts, Telecommunications and Tourism; Moussa Toybou, President of Nzwani; Bastoine Soulaimana, Minister of Justice, Nzwani; The Co-ordinator of Human Rights Nzwani; seven members of Cabinet Nzwani; Col. Daoud Mataba, AND Commander, Nzwani; President of National Assembly; First Secretary, South African Embassy, Union of Comoros; Mohamed Ali Toihir, Ministere de l'Éducation Nationale et la Reserche, Directeur de Cabinet du Ministre.

 2. See for example C. Goetze and Degan Guzina, ‘Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding – Turtles All the Way Down’, Civil Wars 10/4 (2008) pp.319–47.

 3. Ali Alwahti, ‘Prevention of Secessionist Movements in a Micro-state: International Mediation in the Comoros Islands’, A Journal of International Affairs 13/1 (2003) pp.65–83; Chrystantus Ayangafac, ‘Situation Critical: The Anjouan Political Crisis’, ISS Situation Report, 5 Mar. 2008; Richard Cornwell, ‘Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean’, African Security Review 7/3 (1998), online at < www.iss.co.za/ASR/7No3/AfricaWatch.html> accessed 16 Jun. 2008.

 4. Constitution, 2001.

 5. It is worth noting that three of the four states that initially offered troops have secessionist, or potentially secessionist groups operating in their territory: Tanzania (Zanzibar); Sudan (Darfur, southern Sudan, Nuba); and Senegal (Cassamance).

 6. Comorian government requests for Bacar's extradition were turned down by the French courts on the grounds that he faced a real risk of persecution given that Comoros retains the death penalty (and has four persons awaiting capital punishment). A Comorian request that he should face charges at the International Criminal Court was also rejected by France, and to date has not been pursued by Moroni.

 7. D. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics 2/3 (1970) pp.337–63.

 8. Harriet Ottenheimer, ‘Spelling Shinzwani: Dictionary Construction and Orthographic Choice in the Comoro Islands’, Written Language and Literacy l4/1 (2001) pp.15–24.

 9. Iain Walker, ‘What Came First, the Nation or the State? Political Process in the Comoros Isalnds’, Africa 77/4 (2007) p.587.

10. Iain Walker, ‘What Came First, the Nation or the State? Political Process in the Comoros Isalnds’, Africa 77/4 (2007) p.600.

11. Jeremy Allouche, State-Building and U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies 2008), online at < http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick_allouche_audit.html> accessed 15 Nov. 2008.

12. Vincent da Cruz, Wolfgang Fengler and Adam Schwartzman, Remittances to Comoros (Washington, DC: World Bank 2004), online at < www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp75.pdf> accessed 17 Jun. 2008.

13. International Monetary Fund, 2006, online at < www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0942.pdf> accessed 4 Aug. 2009.

14. ADB, Union of the Comoros: Proposal For Arrears Clearance under the Arrears Clearance Programme and Post-Conflict Country Facility (2007) p.iii, online at < www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Financial-Information/00157383-EN-COMOROS.pdf> accessed 4 Aug. 2009.

15. ‘Comoros, concerns over possible social unrest’, IRIN, 22 Aug. 2008 < www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId = 79944>accessed 23 Aug. 2008.

16. IRIN, 22 Aug. 2008

17. Brendan O'Leary, Debating Partition: Justifications, Critiques & Evaluation, Mapping Frontiers, Plotting Pathways, Working Paper No. 28 (Dublin: Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin 2006), online at < www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/WPpdffiles/MFWPpdf/w28_bol.pdf> accessed 16 Jun. 2008.

18. The vocabulary of the press release of a Franco-Comorian high-level working group on migration in 2007 was instructive. For the Union it was a matter of facilitating the ‘circulation’ of Comorian citizens between the four islands without recourse to ‘illegal’ and/or dangerous methods. For France, the core issue was the curtailment of ‘clandestine’ migration into French territory.

19. In 2007, the Comorian GDP per head was measured at $1,143, whilst on Maoré GDP per head was $4,900 in 2005 and has certainly risen since.

20. Deporting 14,000 illegal migrants in 2007 and 500 between 1 May and 13 May 2008 (Malango Actualité 13 May 2008). The author witnessed a flight-load of migrants arriving back in Nzwani on a Comores Aviation aircraft dedicated to repatriating illegal migrants from Maoré. Officials from the Nzwani government recounted the story of a legal resident from the Maoré countryside coming into Mamoutzou and being arrested and summarily deported to Nzwani where he was forced to sleep rough and rely on handouts until he could persuade French diplomats on the island that he had been deported in error.

21. France's constitution allows French citizenship, albeit with conditions, to those born on French territory. A child born on Maoré is French from birth but only if born after 2 August 1975 with a parent born in Maoré or another French territory, or born in the former French colonies before independence. Otherwise, the child would have to apply for citizenship through residence and only after the age of 13. The proposal to amend this provision in the case of Maoré would reverse the tradition that citizenship in France is through territorial birthright and not through blood. The argument that having a child born on Maoré ensures that the migrant will not be deported is apparently belied by the 2,000 minors deported from Maoré in 2007.

22. Walker (note 9) p.596.

23. Walker (note 9) p.597.

24. Walker (note 9)

25. X. Renou, La Privitisation de la Violence (Paris: Agone 2006).

26. Pierre Caminade, ‘La France et l'Union des Comores: saboteur et protéger’, Multitudes 17 (2004) pp.119–22.

27. da Cruz et al. (note 12) p.17.

28. da Cruz et al. (note 12) p.17

29. Union of the Comoros, Ministry of Finance, Budget and Planning, and UNDP, Report of The Union of The Comoros VII African Governance Forum (AGF-VII), Ouagadougou, 24-26 October 2007 (2006) p.22, online at < http://64.233.169.104/search?q = cache:oiaGeW35_OIJ:www.undp.org/africa/agf/documents/en/country_reports/Comoros-AGF7%2520CountryReportEnglish.pdfplus;Comors+president,+2005,+decree+freezing+further+employment&hl = en&ct = clnk&cd = 2&gl = uk> accessed 13 Jun. 2008.

30. da Cruz et al. (note 12) p.16.

31. da Cruz et al. (note 12) p.14.

32. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Report-Comoros 2007, online at < www.freedomhouse.org> accessed 19 Jun. 2008.

33. Kamal Edine Saindou, ‘Polices des iles: le spectre des soldats négligés’, Kashkazi June/July 2008.

34. US Department of State, Human Rights Country Report: Comoros, 2007 (Washington, DC: US Department of State 2008).

35. Reporters Sans Frontiers, ‘Editor Spends Week-end in Prison under Police Pressure to Reveal Sources’, 26 Mar. 2008, online at < www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article = 16873> accessed 14 Jun. 2008.

36. Al-Watan (Moroni) 21 Oct. 2008.

37. As part of Sambi's policy of looking beyond the former colonial power for trading and diplomatic partnerships, the contract with the French firm Comaco to operate the archipelago's ports and harbours was not renewed, but awarded to Al Marwan and Gulftainer, companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The largest tourist resort and casino complex on Ngazidja, Le Galawa Beach Resort and Casino, is being developed by Dubai World Africa, a state-owned company from the UAE. In the oil supply industry the contract to manage the country's supplies, formerly managed by Total, was not renewed. The contract was given to the nationalised Société Comorienne des Hydrocarbures, amid signs that Sambi was looking to Iran to secure supplies of diesel and petrol. Sambi's friendly diplomatic relations with Tehran have been the subject of much speculation. Sambi received religious instruction in Iran and was clearly influenced by his time there. He is known locally as the ‘Ayatollah’ mainly because his apparel and beard are distinctively Iranian in appearance, but also as a result of his open affection for Shi'ism. Claims that he has secretly converted to Shi'ism are denied, but still circulate in a country in which 98 per cent of the population practice the Shafi'i Sunni faith. More controversially, Iran provides security consultants to Sambi and the heart of his personal bodyguard comprises Iranian military personnel.

38. V. Boege, A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan, On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’ (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 2008) p.2, online at < www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/boege_etal_handbook.pdf> accessed 15 Nov. 2008.

39. Patrick Chabal, States and Societies: Why is State Formation so Difficult? Presentation for ODI Seminar Series: (Re)building Developmental States: From Theory to Practice, London, 1 Mar. 2006, p.1, online at < www.odi.org.uk/events> accessed 9 Jun. 2008.

40. David Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2/1 (2008) p.71.

41. P. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 17/1 (1975) pp.91–112; C. Clapham (ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power: Politica Clientelism in the Modern State (London: Pinter 1982); R. Sklar, ‘The African Frontier for Political Science’ in R. Bates, V. Mudimbe and J. O'Barr (eds) Africa and the Disciplines: The Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities (Chicago: U of Chicago P 1993) pp.83–110; M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997); R. Sandbrook, ‘Patrons, Clients, and Factions: Explaining Conflict in Africa’ in P. Lewis (ed.) Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998) pp.64–83; U. Engel and G. Erdmann, ‘Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45/1 (2007) pp.95–119.

42. Boege et al. (note 38) p.10.

43. Author interview with minister of justice, Nzwani, 14 Jul. 2008.

44. Ibid.

45. A conference in December 2008 organised by the government and UNDP drew together world experts to develop a holistic disaster response plan. One vulcanologist said that Karthala's known threats were lava flows, poisonous gases, mudslides, earthquakes and possibly the collapse of half the mountain into the sea causing tsunamis (IRIN, 8 Dec. 2008). The volcano last erupted in 2005.