Devolving Ethnic Conflicts: The Role of Subgroup Identities for Institutional Intergroup Settlements

Abstract

Institutions can contribute to regulating interethnic conflict; however, in many cases, they fail to bring about lasting peace. The article argues that the negligence of subgroup identities accounts for some of this failure. Ethnic groups are often treated as unitary actors even though most consist of various linguistic, tribal, or religious subgroups. When interethnic conflict is settled, subgroup differences may come back to the fore. This ‘resurgence’ can lead to subgroup conflict about the political and economic resources provided through intergroup institutional settlements. This can in turn undermine the peace-making effect of intergroup arrangements. Different subgroup identity constellations make such destructive effects more or less likely. The article focuses on self-government provisions in the aftermath of violent interethnic conflict and argues that lasting intergroup arrangements are especially challenging when they involve ‘contested’ ethnic groups.

Notes

 1. For an overview of current research on the role of institutions in divided societies see: Matthias Basedau, Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Menu of Institutional Engineering, GIGA Working Paper, 171, 2011; and Stefan Wolff, ‘Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center’, The International Studies Encyclopedia 2 (2010) pp.535–56.

 2. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1985) and Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press 1977).

 3. Dawn Brancati, ‘Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?’, International Organization 60/3 (2006) pp.651–85; Stephen M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton, ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985–1998’, Comparative Political Studies 35/1 (2002) pp.103–29; and A. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship’, African Affairs 108/432 (2009) pp.453–73.

 4. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke and Lee J.M. Seymour, ‘Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/1 (2012) pp.67–93.

 5. Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945’, International Political Science Review 14/2 (1993) pp.161–201; and Horowitz (note 2).

 6. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Explaining Interethnic Cooperation’, The American Political Science Review 90/4 (1996) pp.715–35.

 7. Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35/1 (1993) pp.27–47; Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security 20/4 (1996) pp.136–75; Saideman et al. (note 3); and Shiping Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict’, Review of International Studies 37/2 (2011) pp.511–36.

 8. As is the case in most literature on the role of institutions in conflicts, I am referring here to formal state institutions only.

 9. Horowitz (note 2); and Benjamin Reilly, ‘Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers’, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) pp.118–39.

10. Philip G. Roeder, ‘Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing’ in Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild (eds) Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice, (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press 2011) pp.51–81.

11. Lijphart (note 2).

12. Kaufmann (note 7).

13. Brancati (note 3); Frank S. Cohen, ‘Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies 30/5 (1997) pp.607–30; John Gerring, Strom Thacker and Carola Moreno, ‘Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry’, American Political Science Review 99/4 (2005) p.567; and Saideman et al., ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict’ and Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier, ‘Rules That Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity–Conflict Nexus’, Journal of Peace Research 45/2 (2008) pp.183–203.

14. Basedau (note 1).

15. Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics 1/3 (2003) pp.475–94.

16. T. Camber Warren and Kevin K. Troy, ‘The Logic of Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Group Fragmentation in the Shadow of State Power’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (Forthcoming).

17. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers 1995); and Francis Mading Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1995).

18. Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press 1996); and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

19. Gurr (note 5).

20. Theodore McLauchlin and Wendy Pearlman, ‘Out-Group Conflict, In-Group Unity? Exploring the Effect of Repression on Intramovement Cooperation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/1 (2012) pp.41–66.

21. Kalyvas (note 15).

22. Paul Staniland, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/1 (2012) pp.16–40.

23. Cunningham et al. (note 4).

24. In this article, I am focusing on one specific disaggregation of ethnic groups: the differentiation of various subgroup identities. However, further disaggregation might be possible and helpful in understanding the role of institutions in ethnic conflicts – for example, a differentiation between elites, organizations and ‘the masses’ in ethnic groups.

25. Wolff (note 1).

26. Thus, I am focusing on the so-called ‘consociational’ approach to institution-building in divided societies rather than on institutions that reflect the recommendations of power-dividing and centripetalist approaches, see Basedau (note 1) and Wolff (note 1).

27. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; James D. Fearon, ‘Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country’, Journal of Economic Growth 8/2 (2003) pp.195–222; and Kanchan Chandra, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).

28. Joane Nagel, ‘Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture’, Social Problems 41/1 (1994) pp.152–76.

29. Gurr (note 5); and Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology Of’ and Victor T. Le Vine, ‘Conceptualizing “Ethnicity” and “Ethnic Conflict”: A Controversy Revisited’, Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID) 32/2 (1997) pp.45–75.

30. Chandra (note 27).

31. Gurr (note 5).

32. Fearon and Laitin (note 6); and Nagel (note 28).

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35. Faleh A. Jabar, ‘Religion, Sect, Ethnicity and Tribe – The Uncertainties of Identity Politics in the New Society’ in Ali Paya and John Esposito (eds) Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World (New York: Routledge 2011).

36. Julie Flint, Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 2010); and Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 2007).

37. M. Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/1 (2002) pp.29–54; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90; Tanja Ellingsen, ‘Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228–49; and Lars Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer, ‘Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?: New Data and Analysis’, World Politics 62/1 (2010) pp.87–119.

38. Cunningham et al. (note 4).

39. Jean-Paul Azam, ‘The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research 38/4 (2001) pp.429–44; and Michelle R Garfinkel, ‘On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 21/1 (2004) pp.43–68.

40. Cunningham et al. (note 4); and Staniland (note 22).

41. Certainly, subgroup conflicts are not confined to identity cleavages. They may also relate to other issues, such as political ideologies. Various previous studies have stressed the role of such cleavages and the challenges they pose for intergroup settlement (see for example: Cunningham et al. (note 4); Colin Jennings, ‘Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to northern Ireland’, Defence and Peace Economics 22/1 (2011) pp.63–83; and Warren and Troy (note 16). However, I argue that subgroup splits will tend to emerge in accordance with different subgroup identities. Furthermore, I assume that such identity splits tend to entail greater risks due to the potential for mobilization based on ethnic identities. The reasons for this correspond to those already briefly outlined for ethnic conflicts in general.

42. Warren and Troy (note 16).

43. Various identity categories and constellations may become salient in the aftermath of intergroup settlements – depending on the interplay of the historical, social and political contexts and elite engagement. Thus, rather than referring to a fixed group characteristic, I refer to identity categories and constellations that actually become reapparent in the run-up to intergroup settlements. These constellations will most likely shape subgroup conflict and determine its impact on the interethnic arrangements.

44. Paul Collier, Implications of Ethnic Diversity’, Economic Policy 16/32 (2001) pp.127–66; Tanja Ellingsen, ‘Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228–49; M. Reynal-Querol, ‘Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars’, Defence and Peace Economics 13/6 (2002) pp.465–83; and Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 13).

45. Most analyses of the role of ethnic diversity juxtapose fractionalization, dominance and polarization. The latter refers to states with two or more equally strong groups. However, the concept of ‘polarization’ does not adequately capture situations with one strong group (not constituting an absolute majority) and various small subgroups. Such a constellation may have similar effects to those of actual polarization. The existence of one strong group increases smaller groups' motivation to build coalitions, thereby leading to de facto polarization, with two strong rivals pitted against each other.

46. Lars Erik Cederman, Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer, ‘Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?: New Data and Analysis’, World Politics 62/1 (2010) pp.87–119.

47. I use examples from a specific sample only: ethnic minority ‘groups’ that have been engaged in violent action for self-government in the name of a distinct ethnic identity. ‘Subgroups’ are any ethnic identity groups within the former. These examples are meant to illustrate how subgroup factors may influence intergroup arrangements. Thus, the explanations focus only on the dynamics within single ethnic groups.

48. Volker Böge, ‘Peacebuilding and State Formation in Post-Conflict Bougainville’, Peace Review 21/1 (2009) pp.29–37; and Anthony J. Regan, ‘Resolving the Bougainville Self-determination Dispute: Autonomy or Complex Power-Sharing?’ in Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger (eds) Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Leiden and Boston: Brill 2008) pp.125–59.

49. Böge, (note 48); Regan, (note 48); and Edward P. Wolfers, Bougainville Autonomy – Implications for Governance an Decentralisation, State Society and Governance in Malenesia (Canberra: Australian National University 2006).

50. Yash Ghai and Anthony J. Regan, ‘Unitary State, Devolution, Autonomy, Secession: State Building and Nation Building in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea’, The Round Table 95/386 (2006) pp.589–608.

51. Ronald James May, ‘Turbulence and Reform in Papua New Guinea’, Journal of Democracy 14/1 (2003) pp.154–65; Anthony J. Regan, Conflict Among Bougainvilleans 1988–1998: Implications for the Peace Process, Working Paper (Canberra: Australian National University 1999); and Anthony J. Regan, ‘Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict’, The Journal of Pacific History 33/3 (1998) pp.269–85.

52. Regan, ‘Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict’ (note 51); and Regan, Conflict Among Bougainvilleans 1988–1998 (note 51).

53. Anthony J. Regan, ‘“Traditional” Leaders and Conflict’ in Sinclair Dinnen and Allison Ley (eds) Reflections on Violence in Melanesia (Sidney: Hawkins Press/Asia Pacific Press, 2000) pp.290–304; Regan (note 48); and Böge (note 48).

54. John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy and Leah Dunn, Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville (Canberra: Australian National University Press 2010); Regan, Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict (note 51); Regan, Conflict Among Bougainvilleans 1988–1998 (note 51); and Edward P. Wolfers, ‘Challenges of Autonomy in Papua New Guinea's Autonomous Region of Bougainville’, The Journal of Pacific Studies 30 (2007) pp.1–22.

55. Timo Kivimäki and Ruben Thorning, ‘Democratization and Regional Power Sharing in Papua/Irian Jaya: Increased Opportunities and Decreased Motivations for Violence’, Asian Survey 42/4 (2002) pp.651–72, doi:10.1525/as.2002.42.4.651; Jaap Timmer, Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua, Discussion Paper (Canberra: Australian National University 2005); and ICG, Indonesia: Hope and Hard Rality in Papua, Asia Briefing 126 (International Crisis Group 2011).

56. Kivimäki and Thorning, (note 55).

57. Jaap Timmer, ‘Erring Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua’ in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds) Renegotiating Boundaries, (Leiden: KITLV Press 2007) p.470.

58. ICG, Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia Briefing 66 (International Crisis Group 2007).

59. Timmer, ‘Erring Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua’ and Rodd McGibbon, Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Chance and the Papua Conflict, Policy Studies (East-West Center 2004).

60. Susanne Schröter, ‘Acehnese Culture(s): Plurality and Homogeneity’ in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter and Edwin Wieringa (eds) Aceh: History, Politics and Culture, (Singapore: ISEAS 2010) pp.157–79.

61. Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26/4 (2003) pp.241–71.

62. Schröter (note 60).

63. Stefan Ehrentraut, Dividing Aceh? Minorities, Partition Movements and State-Reform in Aceh Province, Working Paper Series 137 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore 2010).

64. Ibid.

65. For example, Kathleen Cunningham and Nils B. Weidmann, ‘Shared Space: Ethnic Groups, State Accommodation, and Localized Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly 54/4 (2010) pp.1035–54.

66. K.N. Jena and Bindu Ranjan Chakama, ‘Inter-Tribal Conflicts in the Northeast India and the Problem of Social Exclusion – The Reangs’ Imbroglio of Mizoram’ in Madhu Rajput (ed.) Understanding North East India: Cultural Diversities, Insurgency and Identities (Delhi: Manak Publications 2011) pp.209–20.

67. D.V. Kumar, ‘Explaining Mizo Ethnicity: The Relevance of Oppositional Approach’, Man In India 89/1–2 (2009) pp.37–49.

68. Subir Bhaumik, Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-option and Chance, Working Paper No. 10 (Washington DC: East-West Center 2007); and Namrata Goswami, ‘The Naga Narrative of Conflict: Envisioning a Resolution Roadmap’, Strategic Analysis 31/2 (2007) pp.287–313.

69. Kumar (note 67).

70. Sajjad Hassan, Building Legitimacy – Exploring State-Society Relations in Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2008).

71. Bhaumik (note 68).

72. Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, ‘State and Politics in Ethiopia's Somali Region Since 1991’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 6/1 (2008) pp.25–49.

73. Human Rights Watch, Collective Punishment – War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Ogaden Area of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State, Report (Human Rights Watch 2008).

74. Asnake Kefale Adegehe, ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions’ (Doctoral thesis, Leiden University 2009); and Tobias Hagmann, ‘Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political Disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991–2004’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43/4 (2005) pp.509–36.

75. John Markakis, ‘The Somali in Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy 23/70 (1996) pp.567–70; and Abdis M. Abdullahi, ‘The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of Its Struggle in Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy 34/113 (2007) pp.556–62.

76. David H. Shinn, ‘Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?’, Annales d'Ethiopie 20/1 (2004) pp.239–59, doi:10.3406/ethio.2004.1077.

77. Raphael K. Badal, ‘Political Cleavages Within the Southern Sudan – An Empirical Analysis of the Re-Division Debate’ in Sharif Harir, Terje Tvedt and Raphael K. Badal (eds) Short-cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan, (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 1994) pp.104–24; and Shinn (note 76).

78. See John Young, The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 2006).

79. Shinn (note 76); and Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43/1 (2005) pp.1–20.

80. Badal (note 77); and Branch and Mampilly (note 79).

81. Martin van van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish Nationalism and Competing Ethnic Loyalties’, Méditerranéens 68–69 (1994) pp.11–37.

82. Ofra Bengio, ‘Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective’ in Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds) The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press 2006) pp.174–85.

83. Iqbal Jhazbhay, Somaliland – An African Struggle for Nationahood and International Recognition (Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue 2009).

84. Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Indiana: Indiana University Press 2008); and Ahmed Y. Farah and Ioan M. Lewis, ‘Making Peace in Somaliland’, Cahiers D'études Africaines 37/146 (1997) pp.349–77, doi:10.3406/cea.1997.3518.

85. Farah and Lewis, (note 84).

86. Bradbury (note 84).

87. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’.

88. Alexander B. Downes, ‘More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars’, SAIS Review 26/1 (2006) pp.49–61.

89. Bhaumik (note 68); and Jacques Bertrand, ‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile’, Pacific Affairs 73/1 (2000) pp.37–54.

90. Such arrangements may be embodied on the inter-group level (peace agreements, national law, national constitution) or on the subgroup level (subnational laws or regulations, subnational constitutions). The first approach would provide for additional assurance to various (minority) sub-groups as their rights would be safeguarded on the national level. One the other hand, the second approach would be more in line with the basic principles of devolution, whereby subnational administrative units are in charge of matters relating to local level conflicts. A middle path might be a third option: the basic principles of intra-group arrangements could be ensured on the intergroup level serving as a guarantee for sub-group contestants. In line with self-government provisions, more detailed design and implementation, however, would be confined to the subnational level.