Rebel Organisation and Local Politics: Evidence from Bouna (Northern Côte d'Ivoire, 2002–10)

Abstract

Scholars have begun to show how variations in the organization of rebellion in war can impact outcomes related to the violence used against civilians, military effectiveness of armed groups and the post-conflict transitions. This article suggests that existing approaches in this literature overlook sub-group variations in relationships between national-level leaders of armed movements and local commanders. Exogenous factors that explain organizational variation and organizational effects are generally argued to be group wide. By focusing on the local level, I argue that many of the presumed downstream effects of variation in rebel organization can also contribute to the organizational choices leaders make for controlling local actors. This article demonstrates this argument through the case of Bouna in north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire, where a tax revolt against the local Forces Nouvelles (FN) administration, led by local Lobi youth, forced a restructuring in the relationship between Soro and the local FN commander, Morou Ouattara.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting in Washington DC in November 2011, the International Studies Annual Meeting in San Diego CA in April 2012 and in the Department of Political Science, Concordia University in January 2012. I would like to thank the following for providing insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article: Ceren Belge, Stephanie Ferrara, David Hornsby, Michael Lipson, Amy Poteete, as well as two anonymous reviewers. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Notes

 1. Guillaume Soro, Pourquoi je Suis Devenu un Rebelle: La Côte d'Ivoire au Bord du Gouffe (Paris: Hachette 2005) pp.106–07.

 2. Ibid. p.104.

 3. ‘Forces Nouvelles: Après Deux ans d'exil, Koné Zakaria de Retour en Zone CNO’, L'Inter 15 Mar. 2011.

 4. Global Witness Organization, Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fuelled the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (Washington, DC: Global Witness 2007) p.38

 5. Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP 2007).

 6. Patrick Johnson, ‘The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence From Liberia and Sierra Leone’, Security Studies 17/1 (2008), pp.107–37.

 7. John Ishiyama and Anna Batta, ‘Rebel Organizations and Conflict Management in Post-Conflict Societies 1990–2009’, Civil Wars 13/4 (2011), pp.437–57.

 8. Paul Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents and Wartime Political Orders’, Perspectives on Politics 10/2 (2012) pp.243–64.

 9. Anders Themnér, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships (Oxon: Routledge 2011); ‘Former Mid-Level Commanders in Big Man Networks’ in Mats Utas (ed.) African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks (London and New York: Zed Books 2012) pp.205–23.

10. For summaries of the Côte d'Ivoire's peace process see: Matthew I. Mitchell, ‘Power-Sharing and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects’, Conflict, Security & Development 12/2 (2012) pp.171–91, Gilles Yabi and Andrew Goodwin, ‘From Linas-Marcoussis to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement: The Tortuous and Open-Ended Peace Agreement’ in H. Besada (ed.) From Civil Strife to Peace Building: Examing Private Sector Involvement in West African Reconstruction (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier UP 2009) pp.17–32.

11. This is a notable difference compared to some other parts of the North controlled by the FN after 2002. See Kathrin Heitz, ‘Power-Sharing in the Local Arena: Man – A Rebel-Held Town in Western Côte d'Ivoire’, African Spectrum 44/3 (2009) pp.109–31; Till Förster, ‘Maintenant, on sait qui est qui: Statehood and Political Reconfiguration in Northern Côte d'Ivoire’, Development and Change 41/4 (2010) pp.699–722.

12. Johnson (note 6) pp.112–15.

13. Weinstein (note 5) p.139; Neil J. Mitchell, Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War (New York, NY: Pargrave 2004) p.52.

14. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Columbia and Afghanistan’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33/9 (2010) pp.836–53.

15. Johnson (note 6).

16. Weinstein (note 5).

17. Krijn Peters, War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP 2011) p.116.

18. Patrick Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War (New York, NY: Cambridge UP 1983) pp.77, 107–10.

19. Øystein Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan During the 1990s (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2005) p.66.

20. Mats Utas, ‘Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts’ in Mats Utas (ed.) African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks (London, UK: Zed Books 2012) pp.1–34; Antonio Giustuzzi, ‘War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan's Strongmen’, International Peacekeeping 14/1 (2007) pp.75–89.

21. Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London, UK: Routledge and Keegan Paul 1978) p.21.

22. Ibid. pp.57–64.

23. Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP 2003).

24. Boone writes ‘according to the World Bank (1978: 148) the planning process constituted “a major exception” to the norm in Côte d'Ivoire in that it “took place outside of the regular planning process and involved political bodies in the provinces to a meaningful extent. Local officials were able to stress regional goals and to exercise greater control [than elsewhere in Côte d'Ivoire] over the allocation of funds”’. Ibid. p.272.

25. Ibid. pp.272, 210.

26. Weinstein (note 5) p.177.

27. Barbara Geddes, ‘How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis 2/1 (1990), pp.131–50; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sydney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1994)

28. John Gerring, ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good for’? The American Political Science Review 98/2 (2004) pp.346–51, John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2007) pp.37–64; Amy R. Poteete, Marco A. Janssen and Elinor Ostrom, Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princton UP 2010) pp.34–37, Dietrich Rueschemeyer ‘Can One or Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains’? in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds) Comparative Historical Analyses in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP 2003) pp.305–36.

29. For the only exception that this author is aware of, see: David J. Maxwell, ‘Local Politics and the War of Liberation in North-East Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern Studies 19/3 (1993) pp.361–86.

30. Gerring (note 28) p.346.

31. Richard Snyder, ‘Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method’, Studies in Comparative International Development 36/1 (2001) pp.93–110.

32. On the political development of the PDCI one-party state see: Aristide Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1964).

33. See Francis Akindès, ‘Côte d'Ivoire: Socio-political Crises, ‘Ivoirité’ and the Course of History’, African Sociological Review 7/2 (2003) 11–28.

34. One the politics of the Guéï coup, see Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal, Côte d'Ivoire. L'année Terrible, 1999–2000 (Paris: Karthala 2002).

35. Human Rights Watch, The Best School: Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch 2008).

36. 500 CFA equals approximately $1.

37. International Crisis Group, Côte d'Ivoire: Garantir un Processus Électoral Crédible (Brussels: ICG 2008) Africa Report No. 139, p.19.

38. Global Witness Organization (note 4) p.34.

39. International Crisis Group (note 37) p.18.

40. For more on the organization of the FN see Moussa Fofana, ‘Des Forces Nouvelles Aux Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire: Comment une Rébellion Devient Républicaine’, Politique Africaine 122/juin (2011) pp.169–73.

41. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Security Council Resolution 1842 (9 Oct. 2008) pp.47–50.

42. Global Witness Organization (note 4) pp.33–45; United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire (12 Apr. 2010) pp.55–58.

43. United Nations Security Council (note 41) p.55.

44. Global Witness Organization (note 4) pp.33; United Nations Security Council (note 41) p.55.

45. United Nations Security Council (note 41) pp.58–65.

46. International Crisis Group, Côte d'Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace? (Brussels: ICG 2007) Africa Report No. 127, p.2.

47. Ibid. p.4.

48. Francesca Adeva, ‘La branche armée du MPCI pas concernée’ Les Temps 24 Mar. 2006.

49. ‘C'est un Appel Courageux’. Simplice Allard, ‘La guerre a véritablement commencé entre ouattara et soro’, Les Temps 22 Feb. 2008.

50. ‘Nous sommes des arbitres dans le processus de paix. Dakoury et venu pour manger, qu'il mange et qu'il se taise. S'il veut partir, qu'il parte. D'ailleurs, c'est une arriviste qui ne sait pas comment les FN ont été crées’, Ibid.

51. ‘Les Délégués FN demandent la démission de soro’, Nord-Sud Quotidien 16 Apr. 2009.

52. Koffi Serges and Nomel Essis, ‘Guillaume Soro sous les feux de critique, Nord-Sud Quotidien 1 Aug. 2007.

53. Pierre Englebert, ‘Whiter the Separatist Motive’? in Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn (eds) African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2007) p.61.

54. International Crisis Group (note 37) p.15.

55. Ibid. p.13.

56. ‘Face à notre misère, ils font étalage de leurs richesses et même leurs chiens sont mieux traités que nous’; Alain Bouabre, ‘Quand la rébellion refuse de mourir’, Soir Info 28 Dec. 2007.

57. Kisselminan Coulibaly, ‘Soro est contre nous’ ‘Ce qui s'est passé a Vavoua est petit’, Soir Info 10 Jul. 2008.

58. Didier Depry, ‘La crise s'accentue entre Soro et ses combattants’, Notre Voie 22 Aug. 2008.

59. Marcel Konan, ‘Des démobilises attendant toujours’, Nord-Sud Quotidien 26 Feb. 2009; International Crisis Group (note 37) p.9.

60. See for example, in Bouna: Mazola, ‘Wattao et Fofié rassurent les éléments’, L'Expression 9 Jun. 2010; Jean Goudalé, ‘Les Forces Nouvelles continuent de rançonner les populations à Bouna’, Notre Voie 20 Aug. 2008, in Séguéla: Touré Moussa, ‘Les dessous de L'attaque de Séguéla, Nord-Sud Quotidien 25 Nov. 2008, in Vavoua, Delmas Abib, ‘Vavoua toujours aux mains des hommes’ de Zakaria Koné, Le Nouveau Réveil 1 Jul. 2008, and in Bouaké, Ladji Abou Sanogo, ‘Les dozos se révoltent’, Soir Info 26 Dec. 2007.

61. George Savonnet, ‘Installation des Lobi dans le Nord-est Ivoirien et Développement Agro-pastoral’, a report prepared for the Compagnie Ivoirienne pour le développement des textiles (1985) p.23.

62. For a history of Bouna and North-Eastern Côte d'Ivoire, see Savonnet (note 61); ‘La Colonisation du Pays Koulongo (Haute Côte d'Ivoire) par les Lobi de Haute-Volta’, Cahiers d'Outre Mer (1962) pp.79–102; ‘J.L. Boutillier, Les Effets de la Disparition du Commerce Précolonial sur le System de Production Koulongo’, Cahier O.R.S.T.O.M. 8/3 (1971) pp.243–53; Bouna, Royaume de la savane ivoirienne: Princes, marchands et paysans (Paris: Karthala 1993).

63. Ibid.

64. Joë Abalo, ‘Les populations racontent leur misère aux émissaires de Soro’, Le Nouveau Réveil 24 Oct. 2007.

65. Author Observations, January 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

66. Abalo (note 64); Sylla Arouna, ‘Affrontement entre jeunes et des soldats FN’, Soir Info 22 Oct. 2007.

67. Arouna (note 66). Interview, radio/government worker, Bouna 19 Jan. 2011; Interview, local politician, Bouna 17 Jan. 2011.

68. See Lanciné Bakayoko, ‘Soro S'engage à réduire les barrages routiers’, Nord-Sud Quotidien 22–23 Sept. 2007; Serge Armand Didi, ‘Pourquoi Soro Guillaume a intérêt a désarmer ses combattants,’ Notre Voie 7 Mar. 2008; Djama Stanislas, ‘Soro Met la Pression Sur Ses Soldats’, Nord-Sud Quotidien 24 Apr. 2008.

69. Interview, NGO Worker, 27 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

70. Interview, NGO worker, 27 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

71. Abalo (note 64).

72. Interview, FN administrator, 28 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

73. Interview, FN administrator, 22 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

74. Interview, FN administrator, 6 Feb. 2011, Bouna, Côte d'Ivoire.

75. This echoes Stephen Lubkemann's criticism of the treatment of civil wars as ‘violent things’ which privilege ‘the most dramatic, acute, and outrageous manifestations of violence’ at the expense other, equally significant wartime political and social process. See Stephen C. Lubkemann, Culture in Chaos: An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2008) p.10.

76. Ana Arjona, ‘One National War, Multiple Local Orders: An Inquiry into the Unit of Analysis of War and Post-war Interventions’ in M. Bergsmo and P. Kalmanovitz (eds) Law in Peace Negotiations. FICHL Publication Series No. 5 (Oslo: Peace Research Institute in Oslo 2009) p.1.

77. Quoted in Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP 2001) p.99.