The Illusion of ‘Peace Through Power-Sharing’: Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War

Abstract

Conflict managers around the world cling to the hope that power-sharing decreases the risk of civil war in post-conflict societies. Distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts, we analyse the origin and effectiveness of power-sharing institutions (PSI) and power-sharing arrangements (PSA). Our examination reveals that power-sharing is largely a consequence of the institutional legacy and of the war outcome. While PSI such as proportional representation or federalism cannot prevent a war from recurring, PSA in the form of grand coalitions reduces this risk marginally. However, granting autonomy to a rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns violent again. Our results suggest that constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper has been presented at a workshop of Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 8–9 March 2012, at the ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, 1–4 April 2012, as the concluding lecture of the 7th CEU annual doctoral conference, Budapest, 25–27 April 2012, and the 2nd EPSA conference, Berlin, 21–23 June 2012. The authors thank the Leibniz and DAAD foundations for travel support and conference participants and especially Mathias Basedau, Håvard Hegre, Friedrich Kratochwil, Sabine Kurtenbach, Andreas Mehler and Carsten Schneider as well as two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments. Replication material can be found at the following homepage: http://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/en/gschneider/working-papers/replication-data/.

Notes

^1. According to Bormann and Golder's dataset Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, which we introduce later, Argentina used PR for the first time during the legislative elections of 7 July 1963, Sri Lanka on 15 February 1989.

^2. A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1977).

^3. J. Horowitz, Power-Sharing in Kenya: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes (Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War 2008); B. O'Leary, ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments’ in S. J. R. Noel (ed.) From Power Sharing to Democracy. Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2005); T. D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. (Washington, WA: United States Institute of Peace 1996); and A. Wimmer, R. J. Goldstone, D. L. Horowitz, U. Joras, and C. Schetter, Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism. (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield Publishers 2004).

^4. G. Schneider and N. Wiesehomeier, ‘Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus’, Journal of Peace Research 45/2 (2008) pp.183–203.

^5. I. S. Lustick, D. Miodownik, and R. J. Eidelson, ‘ Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?’ American Political Science Review 98/2 (2004) p.209.

^6. Lijphart (note 2).

^7. P. Norris, Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2008).

^8. Horowitz (note 3); O'Leary (note 3); Sisk (note 3); and Wimmer (note 3).

^9. M. Reynal-Querol, ‘Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars?’ European Journal of Political Economy 21/2 (2005) pp.445–65.

^10. J. Esteban and D. Ray, ‘On the Measurement of Polarization’, Econometrica 62/4 (1994) pp.819–51.

^11. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4).

^12. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1985) and D. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1991).

^13. Lustick et al. (note 5).

^14. J. D. Huber, ‘Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?’ American Journal of Political Science 56/4 (2012) pp.986–1001.

^15. This suggests in his view quite ironically that Horowitz (note 12) should have advocated proportional representation rather than vote-pooling institutions in order to depoliticize ethnicity.

^16. Hartzell and Hoddie defined power-sharing provisions broadly as ‘rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power’ C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables’, International Organization 55/1 (2001) pp.183–208. The main goal of power-sharing provisions included in peace agreements is to ensure that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, which in turn will help minimize the danger of war recurrence.

^17. Walter finds that territorial and political power-sharing pacts increase the chance that a peace agreement is both signed and implemented. Jarstad and Nilsson, as well as DeRouen et al. demonstrate that military and territorial power-sharing expands the duration of such agreements, while Hartzell and Hoddie stress that multiple power-sharing provisions in settlements play an important role in the durability of peace. B. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002); A. K. Jarstad and D. Nilsson, ‘From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25/3 (2008) pp.206–23; K. DeRouen, L. Jenna, and P. Wallensteen. ‘The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements,’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 26/4 (2009) pp.367–87; and C. Hartzell and M. Hoodie, ‘Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Resolution of Civil Wars (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press 2007).

^18. J. B. Adekanye, ‘Power Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political Systems’, Security Dialogue 29/1 (1998) pp.25–36; H. M. Binningsbø and D. Kendra, ‘Using Power Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone’, Africa Spectrum 44/3 (2009) pp.87–107; A. K. Jarstad, ‘ The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace’, Africa Spectrum 44/3 (2009) pp.41–62; Norris (note 7); P. G. Roeder and D. Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press 2005); J. S. Spears, ‘Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power’, Third World Quarterly 21/1 (2000), pp.105–18; and S. Vandeginste, ‘Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error’, Africa Spectrum 44/3 (2009) pp.63–86.

^19. D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson, ‘Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review 91/5 (2001) pp.1369–401.

^20. B. Mukherjee, ‘Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolutions of Some Civil Wars, But Not on Others?’ International Studies Quarterly 50/2 (2006) pp.479–504.

^21. DeRouen et al. (note 17); Hartzell and Hoddie (note 17); Jarstad and Nilsson (note 17); Walter (note 17); Mukherjee (note 20); M. Mattes and B. Savun, ‘Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design’, International Studies Quarterly 53/3 (2009) pp.737–59; S. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security 22/2 (1997) pp.5–53; S. Stedman, S. John, D. Rothchild, and E. Cousins, (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (New York, NY: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002); and Walter (note 17).

^22. R. H. Wagner, ‘The Causes of Peace’ in R. Licklider, Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press 1993) pp.235–68; R. Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993’, American Political Science Review 89/3 (1995) pp.681–90; D. Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2010); and T. D. Mason, Sustaining the Peace after Civil War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2007).

^23. DeRouen et al. (note 17); Mukherjee (note 20); Mattes and Savun (note 21); Hartzell and Hoodie (note 17); and I. Svensson. ‘Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/3 (2009) pp.449–69.

^24. see Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4); A. Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not-So-Obvious Relationship’, African Affairs 108/432 (2009) pp.453–73.

^25. J. Elster ‘Constitution Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea’, Public Administration 71/1–2 (1993) pp.169–217.

^26. C. Boix, ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’, American Political Science Review 93/3 (1999) pp.609–24, for instance advocated the position that ethnic and religious fractionalization promotes the adoption of proportional representation; T. Brambor, W. Clark, and M. Golder. ‘Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses’, Political Analysis 14/1 (2006) pp.63–82, challenge this result.

^27. Norris (note 7). For more about definitions and classification of different types of electoral systems, see A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, and A. Ellis, International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System (Stockholm: International IDEA Design 2005).

^28. A. Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 2004’, Journal of Democracy 15/2 (2004) pp.96–109.

^29. A. Reynolds, ‘Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World’, World Politics 51 (1999) pp.547–72.

^30. e.g., Horowitz (note 15).

^31. Norris (note 7).

^32. M. Cammett and E. Malesky, ‘Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance’, Journal of Conflict Resolution December 56/6 (2012) pp.982–1016.

^33. B. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) and B. Reilly, ‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) pp.156–70.

^34. Horowitz (note 15).

^35. Q. L. Quade, ‘PR and Democratic Statecraft’ in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds) Electoral Systems and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press 2006).

^36. For a more extensive discussion about the pros and cons of broad inclusion, see A. K. Jarstad, ‘Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy Transitions: Theories and Concepts’ in A. K. Jarstad and T. Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) pp.17–36.

^37. T. R. Gurr, People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2000) and Stedman (note 21).

^38. D. Slater and E. Simmons, ‘Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia’, Comparative Political Studies 46/11 (2013) pp.1366–93.

^39. A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press 1999) p.185.

^40. D. Treisman, The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2007).

^41. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4).

^42. Hartzell and Hoddie (note 17).

^43. D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild. Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (1996) pp.41–75; M. S. Saideman, D. J. Lanoue, M. Campenni, and S.Stanton, ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985–1998’, Comparative Political Studies 351 (2002), pp.103–29.

^44. Alfred A. Stepan, ‘ Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’, Journal of Democracy 10/4 (1999) pp.22–3.

^45. N. G. Bermeo, ‘ The Import of Institutions’, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) p.108.

^46. Jenna J. Bednar, ‘Federalism as a Public Good’, Constitutional Political Economy 16/2 (2005) pp.189–205.

^47. J. Darby and J. Madhav, Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix: A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Their Implementation, 1989–2006, Paper presented at 53rd annual convention of ISA, San Diego, USA, 2012.

^48. T. Chapman and P. G. Roeder, ‘Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions’, American Political Science Review 101/ 4 (2007) pp.677–91.

^49. T. Christin and S. Hug, ‘Federalism, the Geographic Location of Groups, and Conflict’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 29/1 (2012) pp.93–122.

^50. Lake and Rothchild, for example, find that regional autonomy can only serve as an interim solution, unclear are the long-term prospects for peace achieved initially by regional autonomy. D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, ‘Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements’ in P. G. Roeder and D. S. Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power And Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005).

^51. J. Kreutz, ‘How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 47/2 (2010) pp. 243–50.

^52. The UCDP definitions are available online at < http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55267_Codebook_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_1.0.pdf>.

^53. Technically, the statistical analysis uses the conflict dyad as a unit of analysis. In other words, each line in our dataset is a separate conflict termination based on the UCDP dataset. As some countries experienced several, often overlapping conflicts with different rebel groups within their borders, only taking into account one conflict with one rebel group would result in the omission of many important conflict ends and the subsequent constitutional choices. An exclusive focus on particularly intensive conflicts would also bias the results as peace accords with one rebel group often overlap with continuing wars a government leads against other insurgent troops. The selection of those conflicts for which peace years do not overlap with war years of other conflicts is not a convincing choice either, as it would exclude several important conflicts from our analysis. We therefore decided to treat each conflict in our sample as equally important.

^54. N. Bormann and M. Golder, ‘Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011’, Electoral Studies 32 (2013) pp.360–69. The codebook is available online at < https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3_codebook.pdf>.

^55. A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy 2000); see also J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland, ‘Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited’, Public Choice 2010 143/1–2 (2010) pp.67–101.

^56. P. Keefer, DPI2010. Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions (Development Research Group, World Bank 2010) and T. Beck, G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh, ‘New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions’, World Bank Economic Review 15 (2001) pp.165–76 describe an earlier version of this resource. The Institutions and Election Project (IAEP), which is described in P. M. Regan, R. W. Frank, and D. H. Clark (eds) ‘Political Institutions and Elections: New Datasets’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 26/3 (2009) pp.320–37, is available online at < http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html>. Note that we used common resources like the CIA World Factbook to update or complement these sources where necessary.

^57. Available online at < www.ucdp.uu.se/database>.

^58. T. R. Gurr, ‘Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security’, Mediterranean Quarterly 1/1 (1990) pp.82–98; R. Licklider, Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York, NY: New York Univeristy Press 1993); and Chaim C. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security 20/4 (1996) pp.136–75.

^59. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (note 16).

^60. Horowitz (note 12).

^61. Ibrahim I. A. Elbadawi, Civil Wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights and Economic Growth, Paper presented at the World Bank's conference on ‘Civil Conflicts, Crime and Violence,’ Feb., Washington, DC, 1999.

^62. For example, J. G. Montalvo and M. Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars’, UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 770 (2004).

^63. A. O. Hirschman, ‘The Paternity of an Index’, American Economic Review 54/5 (1964) p.761.

^64. Esteban and Ray (note 10).

^65. Reynal-Querol (note 9); J. Esteban and G. Schneider, ‘Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues’, Journal of Peace Research 45/2 (2008) pp.131–41, among others, provide a non-technical introduction to these measures.

^66. We used the EPR-ETH data (Version 2.0) thatare available in research-ready country-year and group-year format from the GROW^up Research Front-End data portal, online at < http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/growup/epr-eth>.

^67. The first presidential elections also relied most often on the same rules. Interestingly, however, Argentina changed its electoral system three times after violent internal episodes: from Plurality (PL) to Electoral College (EC) in 1958, from EC to Absolute Majority (AM), and again to EC in 1983. We find one change from Plurality to Absolute Majority (Columbia, 1994) and one from Qualified Majority (QM) to AM (Guatemala, 1999), respectively.

^68. See Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4).

^69. Conflicts with NMSP (1 January 1959–31 December 1963) and SNUF (1 January 1962–31 December 1963) in Myanmar led to separatist autonomy of Mons and Shans, or conflict with MIM in the Philippines to separatist autonomy of the Moro people (Bangsamoro).

^70. Huber (note 14).