Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden? The Consequences of Failed Mediation in Civil Wars

Abstract

Despite the frequent failure of mediation efforts, the potential negative impact of this outcome on conflict dynamics in civil wars has not been systematically studied. Starting from the assumption that the failure of mediation may cause the conflict parties to conclude that non-violent strategies are ineffective, we develop a rationalist model to explain under what conditions mediation failure might lead to the escalation of violence. Shifts in the degree of negotiability of the conflict parties' goals and in the balance of their internal structure (relative strength of hardliners and moderates) are taken as explanatory variables. We test our hypotheses with a qualitative comparison of 23 cases of failed civil war mediation from around the globe. While shifting goals are rarely observed, it is shown how the strengthening of hardliners in the wake of mediation failure has significant explanatory power.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to Margit Bussmann, Gerald Schneider, Mitja Sienknecht, Karin Aggestam and the other participants in panels at the DVPW conference in Munich (October 2011) and at the ISA 53rd Annual Convention in San Diego (April 2012), where we presented earlier versions of this paper. Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and to Francesca Fuoli for her research assistance. The financial assistance provided by the German Foundation for Peace Research is gratefully acknowledged here.

Notes

^1. Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank and Aysegul Aydin, ‘Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 46/1 (2009) pp.135–46.

^2. Karl DeRouen Jr, Paulina Popieszna and Jacob Bercovitch, ‘Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 48/5 (2011) pp.663–72, p.666.

^3. For example, Kyle Beardsley, ‘Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems’, American Journal of Political Science 52/4 (2008) pp.723–40.

^4. Jayadeva Uyangoda, Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics (Washington, DC: East-West Center 2007) p.viii.

^5. For example, Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed, ‘Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking’, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 (2002) pp.487–501.

^6. For an overview, see Marieke Kleiboer, ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 40/2 (1996) pp.360–389; Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2009) Ch.3.

^7. Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, ‘Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation’ in: Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds), International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (Abingdon: Routledge 2009) pp.27–9; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Young, Victor Asal and David Quinn, ‘Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 47/3 (2003) pp.279–301; Zeev Maoz and Lesley G. Terris, ‘Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation’ in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds) International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (Abingdon: Routledge 2009); Kyle Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ‘Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50/1 (2006) pp.58–86.

^8. Isak Svensson, ‘Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace’, Journal of Peace Research 44/2 (2007) pp.177–94; Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation’ in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.) Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1996); Derrick V. Frazier and William J. Dixon, ‘Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000’, International Interactions 32/4 (2006) pp.385–408; Andrew Kydd, ‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation’, American Journal of Political Science 47/4 (2003) pp.597–611.

^9. I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford UP 1985); J. Michael Greig, ‘Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45/6 (2001) pp.691–718; Bercovitch and Gartner (note 7).

^10. Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1992); Janice Gross Stein, ‘Image Identity and Conflict Resolution’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall (eds) Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace 1996).

^11. J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, ‘Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy’, International Interactions 32/4 (2006) pp.355–84, p.362.

^12. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank 2001) 186.

^13. Beardsley (note 3).

^14. Marie Olson Lounsbery and Alethia H. Cook, ‘Rebellion, Mediation, and Group Change: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Hypotheses’, Journal of Peace Research 48/1 (2011) 73–84.

^15. J. Michael Greig, Poisoning the Well or Laying the Groundwork? The Impact of Failed Mediation in Dyadic Wars, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17 Feb. 2010.

^16. Kleiboer (note 6) pp.361–2; Jacob Bercovitch and Leah Simpson, ‘International Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements: Improving Conflict Management and Implementation’, Peace & Change 35/1 (2010) pp.71–4.

^17. Bercovitch and Jackson (note 6) pp.45–6.

^18. Svensson (note 8); Regan et al. (note 1) p.140; DeRouen et al. (note 2).

^19. Branislav L. Slantchev, ‘How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace’, American Journal of Political Science 48/4 (2004) pp.813–29; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, ‘Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes’, American Journal of Political Science 48 /2 (2004) pp.296–313.

^20. Suzanne Werner, ‘Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/3 (1998) pp.321–43; Elizabeth A. Stanley, ‘Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace’, International Security 34 /1 (2009) pp.42–82.

^21. Scott Gates, ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/1 (2002) pp. 111–30, p.127; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke and Lee J. M. Seymour, ‘Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/1 (2012) pp.67–93.

^22. Greig and Diehl (note 11).

^23. Beardsley (note 3).

^24. Stanley (note 20) p.54.

^25. Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2009); James Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization 49/3 (1995) pp.379–414.

^26. While these are highly simplified assumptions, they are useful as a way to develop general hypotheses and can be subject to systematic empirical scrutiny.

^27. Stanley (note 20) p.53.

^28. Zeev Maoz and Randolph M. Siverson, ‘Bargaining, Domestic Politics, and International Context in the Management of War: A Review Essay’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25/2 (2008) pp.171–89, p.174.

^29. Barbara F. Walter, ‘Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict’, International Studies Review 5/4 (2003) pp.137–53; Monica Duffy Toft, ‘Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War’, International Security 31/4 (2007) pp.97–131.

^30. Maoz and Siverson (note 28) p.174; Jacob Bercovitch and Karl DeRouen Jr, ‘Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process’, Armed Forces & Society 30/2 (2004) pp.147–70.

^31. Stanley (note 20) p.50.

^32. Ibid. pp.49–50, 81; Cunningham et al. (note 21).

^33. Joe D. Hagan, ‘Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory’, International Studies Review 3/2 (2001) pp.5–46, p.13.

^34. Ibid. p.12.

^35. Margaret G. Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework’, International Studies Review 3/2 (2001) pp.47–81, pp.57–8.

^36. Ibid. p.56.

^37. Cunningham et al. (note 21).

^38. Cunningham et al. (note 21) indicate that growing numbers of politically relevant factions in a rebel group increase the likelihood of violence, especially between the factions. We argue that mediation failure can be a factor that exacerbates tensions within the conflict parties.

^39. Fearon (note 25).

^40. Zartman (note 9); Greig (note 9).

^41. The controls were coded on the basis of Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports, complemented by a literature review.

^42. The mechanisms can be different: fighting multiple rebel groups might weaken the government, but internecine fighting between rebel groups might weaken the rebels as well. See Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson, ‘Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 57/3 (2012) pp.604–28.

^43. Svensson (note 8); Frazier and Dixon (note 8); Kydd (note 8); Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman, ‘Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/2 (2012) pp.155–82.

^44. Wilkenfeld et al. (note 7); Maoz and Terris (note 7); Beardsley et al. (note 7); Bercovitch and Gartner (note 7) pp.27–9.

^45. Bercovitch and Gartner (note 7) p.28.

^46. Stanley (note 20) p.56.

^47. Svensson (note 8).

^48. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39/5 (2002) pp.615–37.

^49. For example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: CUP 2006).

^50. The alternative datasets from ACLED and the UCDP/GED dataset are more limited in terms of both their geographical scope and period of investigation.

^51. Unless otherwise indicated, all information in the empirical section of this paper derives from EIU reports.

^52. Svensson (note 8) p.180.

^53. (De-)escalation dynamics entailing a difference of less than 20 deaths might lead to erroneous conclusions, due to potential problems of data quality and coding. The main findings remain stable, however, if we drop all cases with difference of less than 20 deaths (see Table 1).

^54. Erik Melander and Ralph Sundberg, Climate Change, Environmental Stress, and Violent Conflict – Test Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, 16–19 Mar. 2011.

^55. Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Havard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen, ‘Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data’, Journal of Peace Research 47/5 (2010) pp.1–10.

^56. While these dynamics are not wholly comparable, a cross-check of ACLED event data with UCDP GED data on Angola supports our analysis – also in terms of battle-related deaths.

^57. Svensson (note 8).

^58. We grouped the event data on the basis of calendar weeks.

^59. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Angola: 4th Quarter 1998 (London: EIU 1998) p.11.

^60. Peter Körner, ‘Angola’ in Rolf Hofmeier (ed.) Afrika-Jahrbuch 1998. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Afrika südlich der Sahara (Opladen: Leske und Budrich 1999), p.336.

^61. EIU (note 59) p.11.

^62. Körner (note 60) p.337.

^63. Ibid. p.338; Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, DC: USIP 2007) p.232.

^64. Greig and Diehl (note 11) p.356.

^65. Cunningham et al. (note 21).

^66. Fjelde and Nilsson (note 42).