Peacekeeping as Enterprise: Transaction, Consumption, and the Political Economy of Peace and Peacekeeping

ABSTRACT

This article develops the concept of peacekeeping as enterprise. It focuses on two dimensions of peacekeeping as enterprise: the first making a connection between peacekeeping as enterprise, via peacekeeping economies, to peace economies; the other focusing on the analytical utility of peacekeeping as enterprise, particularly in contrast to conceptualisations of peacekeeping as exceptional. It puts forth a conceptualisation of peacekeeping as (political-economic) exchange, rather than primarily a project of beneficence or, conversely, extraction. Such a conceptualisation deepens our understanding of how peacekeeping is lived and ‘works’ in practice, while also facilitating the study of how peace economies form and evolve.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Elena Stavrevska, Birte Vogel, Werner Distler, Michael Pugh, Morten Bøås, Roger Mac Ginty, and Knut Christian Myhre for their insightful comments and support. The assistance provided during fieldwork by Serge Kalume, Bennett Shabani, Papy Aridi, and W.T. is also gratefully acknowledged. Initial drafts of this article were written while I was employed by Fafo Research Foundation (Oslo).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In Jennings (2015), the term was ‘peacekeeping-as-enterprise’. That version has been changed in this article to a non-hyphenated coinage, to reduce the inherent gimmickry involved in hyphenated phrases.

2. Peacekeeping missions are not typically mandated to do development work, which is the purview of other agencies and organisations. But there is a common perception among local residents that peacekeeping and socioeconomic development are connected – and this perception is encouraged through certain activities of missions themselves, such as ‘quick-impact’ and infrastructure rehabilitation projects.

3. Whalan (2017) deftly illustrates the challenges to making unambiguous local legitimacy claims about peacekeeping and peacekeepers.

4. The term ‘local(s)’ in reference to people and places is complex and contested in peacekeeping and peacebuilding scholarship. I defer for the sake of simplicity to the general usage that connotes the status of ‘local’ with nationality, despite the imprecision that this implies. However, I also attempt to convey through my use of local that the analysis is rooted in specific places and among specific people – in other words, that I am referring to concrete practices enacted in, with, and on a particular place and populace.

5. On these occasions, I would pay the cover charge for the assistant and the first round of drinks, after which we would typically split rounds, stopping after three. I would also pay a higher fee (usually USD 20 more) than the normally agreed day-rate, to cover the extra hours worked.

6. See Jennings (Jennings 2016b, chapter 4; and Jennings, forthcoming) for a more detailed explanation of my approach to fieldwork.

7. UNMIL was established in 2003 and had a peak strength of approximately 15,000 uniformed and civilian peacekeepers. The mission was formally closed on 30 March 2018. MONUSCO is the successor to MONUC (established 1999, renamed in 2010), and had a mandated authorisation (through March 2018) of over 20,000 military, police, and civilian peacekeepers. Of Monrovia, Kinshasa, and Goma, Goma is the only locality that has endured persistent, and at times severe, outbreaks of violent armed conflict during the mission’s tenure.

8. On the use of case studies for theory development, see George and Bennett (George and Bennett 2005, p. 3–36); also Klotz (Klotz 2008, p. 52–53) on the effect of the status of the theory on case selection.

9. See for example: Whitworth (2004); Pouligny (2006), describing six peacekeeping missions; Higate and Henry (2004), describing Haiti and Liberia. Additionally, Autesserre’s (2014) Peaceland, which depicts similar phenomena to peacekeeping economies, is largely based on research the DRC but also draws on fieldwork from five other peacebuilding or peacekeeping missions.

10. Chiefly the humanitarian and development aid sectors. See for example: Duffield (2010); Smirl (2008, 2015)); and the collection of essays in Mosse (2011) and Fechter and Hindman (2011). On scope conditions, see also Jennings (forthcoming).

11. For critical political economy work on peacekeeping, see for example Agathangelou and Ling (2003); Pugh (2011); Goodhand and Sedra (2009); True (2012).

12. See for example, Pugh (2011); Richmond (2009, 2011)); Richmond and Mitchell (2012); Autesserre (2014); Fechter (2012) (on aid work); Higate and Henry (2009); Mac Ginty (2013) (on everyday peace); Smirl (2015); relatedly Enloe (2000, 2011)), McLeod (2015).

13. Autesserre’s ‘Peaceland’ (Autesserre 2014) is a related concept, focused more generally on civilian peacebuilding activities.

14. See: Jennings and Bøås (2015); Jennings (2015); Henry (2015); Edu-Afful and Aning (2015); Oldenburg (2015); Kohl (2015); Rolandsen (2015).

15. Unless otherwise noted, ‘peacekeepers’ in this article refers to international peacekeepers rather than local employees of peacekeeping missions.

16. Although see innovative work by Carnahan et al. (2006); Dumas (2011); and Beber et al. (2016).

17. MSA is determined through a standard formula devised by the central UN administration. Information on the MSA is available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/allowances/msa.htm.

18. Interviews with mission support sources in UNMIL (8 and 13 December 2011) and MONUSCO (21 March 2012).

19. Interview with UNDP official, Monrovia, 14 December 2011.

20. This section draws and expands upon Jennings (2016b).

21. International personnel working on internal mission security work in normal office premises; among an array of other tasks, they manage and oversee the national hires working in the guardhouses, as well as the subcontracted guards.

22. Sources: Private security personnel working UN mission installations in Monrovia (11 and 13 December 2011), Goma (21 and 22 March), and Kinshasa (24 July 2012).

23. Sources: See previous note; and UNMIL source, mission support section, Monrovia, 13 December 2011.

24. Sources: UNMIL peacekeeper, security section, Monrovia, 13 December 2011; manager at Delta Protection, Kinshasa, 24 July 2012; and MONUSCO peacekeeper, security section, Goma, 21 March 2012.

25. It is impossible to directly compare the monthly salary of a military, uniformed peacekeeper and a UN national hire, as military peacekeepers’ wages are set by their home countries. However, military peacekeepers earn monthly bonus pay from the UN on top of their normal wages, which in 2011 amounted to USD 1028 per month.

26. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point and providing this formulation.

27. Interview with Congolese professional, Goma, 19 March 2012.

28. Based on information from interviews with multiple UN and local sources in Kinshasa, Goma and Monrovia, 2011–12. In Liberia, non-citizens are prohibited from owning land, a difficulty circumvented through the use of long-term leases. See also Jennings (2015) on expatriate businesspeople in peacekeeping economies.

29. Interview with banker, Kinshasa, 18 July 2012.

30. Interview with Liberian professional, 8 December 2011.

31. A UN source with experience from Sierra Leone claimed that this was the case in Freetown, at least in the initial years following the bulk of the UN mission’s withdrawal in 2005–6. Interview with UNMIL official, Monrovia, 7 December 2011.

32. Observation made in the course of multiple discussions with Congolese professional, Goma, March 2012. A UN source in Goma also concurred with this assessment (interview of 21 March 2012).

33. Interview with banker, Kinshasa, 18 July 2012.

34. Interview with UNDP official, Monrovia, 14 December 2011.

35. This assessment was disputed by the Liberian professional involved in property management, who claimed, first, that mining companies have a geographically dispersed staff and a small footprint in Monrovia; and second, that they are too cheap to house their employees to such a standard. Interview, 8 December 2011.

36. In this section I focus on service work as found in entertainment venues, owing as noted to the visibility of, and physical imprint left by, the entertainment infrastructure. That said, ‘service’ also encompasses a much wider range of work, including domestic service, typically performed by women, and gardening/ maintenance work, typically performed by men. See Jennings (2014) for a more in-depth exploration of service work in peacekeeping economies; relatedly True (2012).

37. On the subject of sexual transactions and interactions between peacekeepers/ interveners and local residents, see relatedly Agathangelou and Ling (2003); Higate and Henry (2004); Henry (2013); Harrington (2010); Moon (1997); Jennings (2010, 2014)); Oldenburg (2015).

38. Interview with UNMIL source, 13 December 2011; similar sentiments as to the sexualisation and extremes of mission life were also voiced by multiple sources in all three field sites. See also Henry (2015).

39. The SUV has been also criticised in global North contexts for inducing exclusion and securitising everyday life (Campbell 2005).

40. These observations are made in the service of Mac Ginty’s innovative analysis of local and national actors’ uses of 4 × 4 vehicles, in which he argues that ‘the 4 × 4 should be seen as a vehicle of agency, resistance, mimicry, and hybridity in addition to the cliché of the white land cruiser as an object of intervention (Mac Ginty 2017, p. 2)’.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway, under Grant 207757.

Notes on contributors

Kathleen M. Jennings

Kathleen M. Jennings is head of research and development at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet). Her research focuses on UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, gender, and political economy.