Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

ABSTRACT

Previous literature explains peace negotiations mainly with country-level factors or events related to the countries where the peace efforts take place. This closed polity approach contrasts with contemporary peace processes where the actors and demands transcend nation-state boundaries. This paper challenges this dominant understanding in the peace process literature and focuses on the role of the rebel groups’ transborder kin connections in affecting peace process dynamics. By studying the Kurdish Peace Process conducted between the Government of Turkey and the PKK, the paper argues that the transborder kin connections can both remedy and exacerbate bargaining problems acute to peace processes.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Han Dorussen, Mehmet Gurses, Tobias Bohmelt, Ismene Gizelis and two anonymous referees for commenting on the earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. I define Transborder kin groups as ‘groups that possess the same ethnic origin and live densely on opposite sides of the borders’. Following Cederman et al. (2013), I shorten transborder kin groups as TEK groups.

2. According to Cunningham et al. (2013) Non-State Actor Data, among 342 rebel groups fighting between 1946 and 2008; 87% of them were weaker, 0.1% could attain parity, 0.03% were stronger.

3. Peace negotiations elevate rebel status to political figures, signal other potential challengers that violence is rewarded. Consequently, all governments refuse political settlements but instead label the rebels as ‘terrorists’ and try to win the war.

4. Current literature on the transnational dynamics of civil wars is mostly concerned with how such factors contribute to conflict onset (Salehyan 2009, Cederman et al. 2013), duration (Cunningham 2010), increasing rebel demands (Jenne 2007). Few studies look at their effect on conflict settlement (Gurses 2015, Arslan 2018) and settlement implementation (Furstenberg 2012, Arslan 2018).

5. Scholars who look at the transnational dynamics of the Kurdish Conflict are mostly concerned with the Kurdish diaspora (Eccarius-Kelly 2019) and how diaspora shapes the Kurdish culture, politics and nationalism (Van Bruinessen 2000, Natali 2004), military and political mobilisation (Adamson 2013), the role of media in this process (Keles 2015).

6. The outside option has been conceptualised in various ways such as the actors’ option to go to war (Fearon 1995, Gent 2011); any economic or political option instead of violent mobilisation (Gates 2002) or rebel groups’ different tactical choices (Bueno De Mesquita 2013).

7. It could be argued that since the rebel groups are weaker, a cooperative TEK groups would not help them towards achieving their aims. Data suggests otherwise. While only 0.03% of the rebel groups (1946–2008) are stronger, 10% of them won the war and 24% received significant concessions. (Cunningham et al. 2013).

8. Before the imprisonment of the PKK Leader, former President Turgut Ozal, PM Necmettin Erbakan, military officials attempted to speak with him through intermediaries including Jalal Talabani, Sabri Ok and Muzaffer Ayata. Between 1999–2005 the talks were conducted face to face by the military (Candar 2012a, Dicle 2017).

9. 2009 process was the result of a series of back-channel talks that started in 2005. It was conducted between the PKK members (Zubeyir Aydar, Sabri Ok, Adem Uzun; Remzi Kartal; Sozdar Avesta and Mustafa Karasu), Pro- Kurdish Party DTP (Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk) and National Intelligence Agency (Emre Taner and Hakan Fidan). Abdullah Ocalan was the most important veto player but he was not present in the talks. Process was facilitated by Jalal Talabani, Norwegian Government, London and Geneva-based conflict resolution centres (Dicle 2017).

10. The KCK executive members Sabri Ok and Cemil Bayik’s statements about the failure dates back to 2014, the PM’s denial about the Dolmabahce agreement again dates back to March 2015 (Al Jazeera 2014, Calislar 2014, Cumhuriyet 2015). Similarly, according to Dicle (2017) Ocalan’s acknowledgement of the failure also dates back to March 2015.

11. My emphasis is on the ‘leverage’ created by this cooperation and the government’s inability to contain. My argument is that in the Kurdish Peace Process, this leverage was created by the PKK-PYD alliance which the government was unable to prevent. This is not to discredit the role of the Iraqi Kurdish Groups who contributed to the process by mediation efforts. But, first mediation comes after the decision to negotiate, second, success of mediator depends on its power over the civil war parties (Svensson 2007) and since Iraqi Kurds are economically dependent on Turkey they are far from ensuring compliance.

12. Similar arguments have been made in the literature. Jenne (2007) argues that such opportunities increase rebels’ demands and made them radicalise. Fürstenberg (2012) argues that they give the rebels the power to walk away.

13. Then, why the actors negotiate despite the possibility of this incompatibility? In peace processes, resolving the incompatibility depends on the quality of the settlements which (despite back-channel talks) cannot be ‘perfectly’ known in advance.

14. PYD is an offshoot of PKK but it is not an extension of it (Gurses 2018). Both groups are members of the same umbrella structure, the KCK. They follow Ocalan’s democratic autonomy ideology and have similar political and military structures (Kaya and Lowe 2017). However, PYD, as with other groups in the KCK structure has an autonomous rather than imposed decision-making mechanism and its claims strictly covers Syria (Kaya and Lowe 2017). As PKK is listed as a terrorist group; it is this autonomous structure and its ability to cooperate with other groups within SDF in Syria that made the PYD as a potential ally for the US during anti-ISIS campaign.

Additional information

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Sinem Arslan

Dr. Sinem Arslan is a Research Fellow at the Michael Nicholson Centre for Conflict and Cooperation of the University of Essex. She completed her PhD at the University of Essex and holds Master’s degrees from the London School of Economics and Bogazici University. By using qualitative, quantitative, and GIS mapping techniques, she investigates the dynamics of political violence comparatively. Her research specifically focuses on the transnational dynamics of civil wars, civil war peace processes, and terrorism within the context of civil wars.