Neorealism, Neoliberalism, Constructivism and the Role of Third Parties in the Disarmament of Civil Warring Factions

Abstract

This article reviews the explanations of the three major schools of international relations theory for the variation in success witnessed by third parties in the disarmament of civil warring factions. It concludes that, although rational theories like Neorealism and Neoliberalism have highlighted important aspects of the dynamics between the roles of third parties and disarmament, they provide only a partial analysis and must therefore be assimilated into a Constructivist framework.

Notes

 1. J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 2/2 (1950) pp.157–80.

 2. B. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35/1 (1993).

 3. Walter calls it a ‘security dilemma in the reverse’, see B.F. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’, International Security 24/1 (1999) p.134.

 4. B.F. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions From Violent Civil War’ Columbia International Affairs Online, (1997) p.2.

 5. B.F. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization (1997) p.340.

 6. B.F. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War’ in B.F. Walter and J. Snyder (eds), Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press 1999) p.46.

 7. Walter initially talks only of political and military guarantees, but includes territorial guarantees in later work.

 8. There is, of course, overlap between these two security dilemmas in those cases in which peace agreements envisage the formation of some form of unified armed forces.

 9. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’ (note 5) p.361.

10. B.F. Walter, Committing to Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002) p.28.

11. B.F. Walter, Committing to Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002) p.94.

12. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War’ (note 4) p.10.

13. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War’ (note 4). p.13.

14. Idem.

15. Other factors that might indicate a greater commitment to intervene include old colonial ties, strategic interests, economic investments, or alliance loyalties. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’ (note 5) pp.345–7.

16. C.A. Hartzell, ‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements of Intra-State Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 43/1 (1999) p.7.

17. M. Hoddie and C.A. Hartzell, ‘Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military-Power-Sharing Arrangements’, Journal of Peace Research 40/3 (2003) p.308.

18. Hartzell (note 16) p.4.

19. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 17) p.303.

20. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 17). p.305.

21. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 17). p.308.

22. Idem. p.308.

23. Idem. p.316.

24. See Hartzell (note 16) p.7; and S.J. Stedman, ‘Introduction’ in S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E.M. Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) pp.5–8.

25. Stedman (note 24) p.6.

26. Idem.

27. Walter claims that the British governor of Zimbabwe, Lord Soames, had authority to request additional British troops and therefore that the initial British troop deployment represented a ‘tripwire’ for further deployments. Stedman, however, argues that there is no evidence to suggest that this was indeed the British strategy at the time. See Walter, Committing to Peace (note 10) p.142; Stedman (note 24) p.7.

28. This is also the argument of Mark Peceny and William Stanley, explained later in this article.

29. C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie and D. Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables’, International Organization 55/1 (2001) p.193.

30. C. King, ‘Ending Civil Wars’, Adelphi Paper 308 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1997) p.57.

31. D. Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’, Adelphi Paper 320 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1998) p.11; M. Berdal and D.M. Malone, ‘Introduction’, in M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds), Greed and Governance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2000) p.4.

32. The term ‘spoilers’ was coined by Stedman in S.J. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security 22/2 (1997).

33. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 17) p.314.

34. Walter, Committing to Peace (note 10).

35. Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (note 29) p.203.

36. Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (note 29) p.193. Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild also found that the presence of a third party had a significant effect on the sustainability of peace. Their study showed that five years after the signing of a peace agreement, the survivor rate among settlements with an external assurance was 68 per cent, while the rate for settlements lacking such assurance was 32 per cent. See Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (note 29) p.200. See also C. Hartzell and M. Hoddie, Institutionalizing Peace: Power and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, American Journal of Political Science, 47/2 (2003).

37. A. Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security 20/1 (1995) pp.71–2.

38. A. Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security 20/1 (1995) p.73.

39. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p.141.

40. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) pp.165–6; and A. Wendt, ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’, in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1996) p.51.

41. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39) pp.169–70. For an explanation of the limitations of Neorealism and Neoliberalism as rationalist theories, as well as the recognition of these limitations by preeminent theorists in each tradition, see P.J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press 1996) pp.11–17.

42. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39) p.250.

43. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39). p.342.

44. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39). p.250.

45. R.L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P.J Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’ in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (note 41) pp.43–4.

46. B. Arfi, ‘Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity’, Security Studies, 8/1 (1998) p.160. Arfi's three ‘social identities’ do not correspond exactly to Wendt's. The principal difference seems to be Arfi's refusal to accept that a security dilemma can exist in a competitive culture. This is only possible if force is never expected to be used, which is not the definition used by Wendt. Arfi does not quite explain why groups who do not perceive each other as possible threats would still be concerned with relative gains.

47. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39) p.265.

48. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39). p.282.

49. This is a paraphrase of Wendt's most famous statement. See A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power-Politics’, International Organization 46 (1992).

50. Wendt, ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’ (note 40) p.50.

51. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39) p.327.

52. Idem.

53. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, op. cit., p. 25.

54. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39) p.186.

55. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (note 39). p.188.

56. Idem.

57. Idem.

58. Idem. p.210.

59. S. White quoted in D.L. Jones, S. White quoted in D.L. Jones p. 650.

60. M. Peceny and W. Stanley, ‘Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America’, International Organization 55/1 (2001) p.154.

61. M. Peceny and W. Stanley, ‘Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America’, International Organization 55/1 (2001). p.152. My emphasis added.

62. The importance of the US can be seen in its different approach to the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran peace processes. ‘Whereas [due to the end of the Cold War] the United States was later able to adopt a generous, low-profile, and nearly neutral stance in El Salvador, in Nicaragua it remained partisan, promoted winner-take-all values, and failed to promote democratic values among its former clients, the Contras’. This goes a long way to explain why the Nicaraguan domestic parties failed to internalize democratic values as quickly as their Salvadoran counterparts. The importance of the US can be seen in its different approach to the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran peace processes. ‘Whereas [due to the end of the Cold War] the United States was later able to adopt a generous, low-profile, and nearly neutral stance in El Salvador, in Nicaragua it remained partisan, promoted winner-take-all values, and failed to promote democratic values among its former clients, the Contras’. This goes a long way to explain why the Nicaraguan domestic parties failed to internalize democratic values as quickly as their Salvadoran counterparts. p.163.

63. The importance of the US can be seen in its different approach to the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran peace processes. ‘Whereas [due to the end of the Cold War] the United States was later able to adopt a generous, low-profile, and nearly neutral stance in El Salvador, in Nicaragua it remained partisan, promoted winner-take-all values, and failed to promote democratic values among its former clients, the Contras’. This goes a long way to explain why the Nicaraguan domestic parties failed to internalize democratic values as quickly as their Salvadoran counterparts. p.157.

64. Idem.

65. Idem. p.176.

66. Stedman, ‘Introduction’ (note 24) p.15.

67. Ted Hopf suggests that, as well as explaining the democratic peace, Constructivism should also be able to explain the peace that prevailed between non-democratic African and Latin American states. These he called ‘zones of authoritarian peace’. See T. Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security 23/1 (1998) p.192.

68. Within 17 weeks of the start of the UNITAF operation the Australians had confiscated nearly half of the 2,250 small arms and heavy weapons that UNITAF had seized as a whole by that time. See R.G. Patman, ‘Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993’, African Affairs 96 (1997) p.512.

69. J. Prendergast, Crisis Response (London: Pluto Press 1997) p.132.

70. For an explanation of how local cultural traditions can be utilized to encourage democratic transitions see B. Pouligny, ‘Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance’, International Peacekeeping, 7/3 (2000).

71. Stedman, ‘Introduction’ (note 24) p.15.