The Case for Political Warfare: Strategy, Organization and US Involvement in the 1948 Italian Election

Abstract

This article analyzes US intervention in the Italian election of 1948 and the influence of the campaign on attempts to formulate a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to defeat Soviet Communism. The approach, which looked to utilize ‘all means short of war’, was subsequently dubbed ‘Political Warfare’. Due to the improvised nature of intervention in Italy, the US Ambassador in Rome, James C. Dunn, played a particularly significant role through his efforts on the ground and in helping to encourage a ‘perception of victory’ that surrounded the final outcome. The campaign in Italy contributed to the core of an emerging Political Warfare strategy, but one that overlooked the crucial contribution of Italian actors, which in the long term compromised both Italian–American relations and US attempts at expanding Political Warfare.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Scott Lucas and Mario Del Pero for their invaluable help and encouragement in writing this article. I also express gratitude to David Ellwood, Maria Ryan, Antonio Varsori and Irwin Wall for their comments and suggestions on previous drafts.

Notes

 [1] Speech to commemorate the arrival of the 500th AUSA (Aid USA) Ship in Taranto on 3 April 1948. Dunn, Addresses to Italy, 157–60.

 [2] John Lewis Gaddis is one of the few historians to emphasize the strategic importance of means and ends in the US approach to the Cold War, although, as exclusively considered by George Kennan. There is also little consideration of how the formation of a strategy interacted with the reorganized US foreign policymaking structure, and furthermore, the Italian case is not factored into the equation. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 23, 30–31, 53–86.

 [3] National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC [henceforth NARA], RG 59, Lot File 64 D 563, Box 11A. Policy Planning Staff Memo, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” 30 April 1948. A subsequent, sanitized version dated 4 May 1948 is available in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–50: “The Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment”: document no. 269. Available from http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/index.html INTERNET [henceforth FRUS Intell, followed by document number].

 [4] Dunn was careful not to impede the de facto Embassy to the Vatican led by Myron Taylor, although there remained close contacts between the US mission in Rome and the Holy See. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri [henceforth HSTL]. Oral History Interview. Graham Parsons (Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President of the United States to the Pope, 1947–48). Available from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/parsonsj.htm INTERNET. For more on Taylor's mission see, Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti. Other notable texts on the role of the Catholic Church in Italian politics include: Coppa, “Pope Pius XII and the Cold War”; Pollard, “The Vatican, Italy and the Cold War”; Hebblethwaite, “Pope Pius XII”; Poggi, “The Church in Italian Politics.”

 [5] The trials and tribulations of the DC–US relationship in this period are covered in: Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale, 117–285; Galante, “La scelta americana della Dc”; Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze, 217–68. For the post-election state of US–DC relations see: Del Pero, L'alleato scomodo.

 [6] Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra, 480–84; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 177–96.

 [7] Dunn also had a symbolic importance that went above and beyond his role in Italy as the State Department currently awards a ‘James Clement Dunn Award for Excellence’ to Foreign and Civil Service employees. The award is made in recognition of ‘leadership characterized by foresight, decisiveness, persistence, and persuasiveness [and] creative contributions to U.S. policy objectives or efficient and effective management’. State Department email to author, 12 January 2006.

 [8] HSTL. White House Central File: Official File, 1945–53: 1069. Box 1577. James Byrnes to Truman, 21 July 1946; Oral History Interview. John Wesley Jones (First Secretary of Rome Embassy, 1945–48). Available from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/jonesjw.htm INTERNET. For documentation on the Potsdam and CFM (Council of Foreign Ministers) conferences see: FRUS, 1945: “The Conference of Berlin” (2 vols); 1946: II, III, IV. In 1956 Dunn was appointed ‘Career Ambassador’ of the Foreign Service.

 [9] HSTL. WHCF, OF 20 Misc: Box 149. See in particular Mrs R. Dee to Truman, Mrs F. Reichard to Truman (both 14 June 1945), and H. and J. Kipnis to Truman (15 June 1945). The UNCIO saw representatives of 50 countries meet in San Francisco in April 1945 and draft the United Nations Charter, which was later signed on 26 June. After serving in Rome, Dunn led the US Embassy in Paris for a year from 1952, and subsequently became Ambassador to Spain between 1953 and 1955. Spain joined the UN in December 1955.

[10] HSTL. PSF, Subject File, Foreign Affairs: Box 158. Frederick Brown Harris, Chaplain of United States Senate to Truman, 21 February 1946. See WHCF, OF 233-A: Box 838, for numerous letters to Truman endorsing the candidature of Earl Brennan as Ambassador to Rome.

[11] Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 113, 119; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 142, 174; Miller, The United States and Italy, 224.

[12] NARA, RG59. Key to Secretary of State, 2 January 1947. 711.65/1-247; Deputy Director of Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to Secretary of State, 6 January 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 837–8; “De Gasperi Arrives Here Today by Plane for 5-Day Visit,” Washington Post, 5 January 1947; Ortona, Anni d'America, 175.

[13] Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 155. The Socialist movement split in January 1947 with the subsequent creation of the PSLI and Pietro Nenni's Socialists (PSI), who continued their close collaboration with the PCI. The latter two would go on to form the ‘Popular Democratic Front’ coalition for the 1948 election. For more on the split see: Caridi, La scissione di Palazzo Barberini, 175–267.

[14] Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem, 79–81; Di Nolfo, Le paure e le sperenze, 236–9; Galante, “La scelta americana della dc,” 121–6; Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 111–16; Miller, The United States and Italy, 215–23; Ortona, Anni d'America, 182–3; Segreto, “Finanza, industria e relazioni internazionali nella Riconstruzione.”

[15] Archivio Storico-Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affair Esteri (Historic-Diplomatic Foreign Ministry Archive), Rome. Direzione generale affari politici (1946–50): Stati Uniti [henceforth MAE, DGAE]. Box 11, Sforza to Washington, Paris, London and Moscow Embassies, 5 February 1947. N.03473.

[16] Filippelli, American Labor and Postwar Italy, 93–4; Ortona, Anni d'America, 182; Miller, The United States and Italy, 217–19.

[17] Of the 66 Embassy staff, only 21 had been in their position prior to January 1947. NARA, RG84, Box 223. 701.1. Embassy memo to Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 1948.

[18] Ortona, Anni d'America, 175.

[19] NARA, RG59. Dunn to Secretary of State, 11 February 1947. 865.00/2-1147. Dunn did not appear to notice that Saragat, like De Gasperi before him, was in desperate need of political support following the Socialist split. Financial support for the PSLI had also come from the US through Luigi Antonini, the Italian-American Labor Council and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, who had provided money for Saragat to break away and continued to supply funds. This included a famous ‘gift’ of $150,000 from David Dubinsky and the AFL in June 1947. Caridi, La scissione di Palazzo Barberini, 293–4; Filippelli, American Labor and Postwar Italy, 95–7; Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 73–4, 143.

[20] Many of the official US documents reveal much of the content of Dunn's correspondence relied on the DC and PSLI, whereby officials from both parties would stop by the Embassy and offer their interpretation of current events. Quote from National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC [henceforth NSA]. Oral History Interview. Mark Wyatt (CIA agent in Italy during the 1948 election campaign), Episode 3: Marshall Plan. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-3/wyatt1.html INTERNET; CNN Cold War TV series, 1995. Interview: Mark Wyatt. Available from http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/03/interviews/wyatt/ INTERNET.

[21] DCI (Vandenberg) to Intelligence Advisory Board, 20 June 1946; General Counsel of CIG (Houston) to Vandenberg, 13 June 1946; Memo for the File, 17 July 1946. FRUS Intell: 156, 196–7; National Security Act 1947, in Warner, CIA Cold War Records, 131–5.

[22] “History of the Central Intelligence Agency,” in United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [henceforth Church Committee]. Available from http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm INTERNET. Volume 7: Covert Action, Book 4: 4–15; Rudgers, Creating the Secret State, 129–30; Ranelagh, The Agency, 98–109; Andrews, For the President's Eyes Only, 164–9.

[23] The US Consulate in Milan passed many intelligence reports to the Rome headquarters during 1947, outlining alleged Communist insurrection plans. Many were subsequently relayed to Washington. Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 69.

[24] HSTL. Oral History Interview. J.W. Jones.

[25] NARA, RG59. Dunn to Secretary of State, 27 March. 865.00/3-2747.

[26] Emphasis added. Dunn to Marshall, 12 April 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 880; See also Dunn to Marshall, 7 May 1947. Ibid.: 895–7.

[27] NARA, RG84, Box 200, 701–11. Italy. Office of the Press Attaché (Caprio) to Dunn, “The Press in Italy,” 24 March 1947; ibid. Homer Byington Jr. (Secretary of Embassy) to Marshall, 4 April 1947; NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 30 April 1947. 865.00/4-3047.

[28] NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 2 May 1947. 865.00/5-247.

[29] Emphasis added. Dunn to Marshall, 3 May 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 889–92.

[30] Dunn to Marshall, 7 May 1947. Ibid.: 895–7.

[31] NARA, RG59. Conversation between Tarchiani and Freeman Matthews, 8 May 1947. 865.00/5-847.

[32] Memo of Conversation, 16 May 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 904–8; MAE, DGAE. Box 16, Tarchiani to Sforza, 31 July 1947. N.6901/1880.

[33] Formigoni, “De Gasperi e la crisi politica italiana,” 361, 378–84; Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze, 239–40. It is also important to note that the PCI and PSI, which saw themselves as the sole defenders of Italian sovereignty, were ready and willing to leave the government and form an opposition bloc. Miller, “Roughhouse Diplomacy,” 297.

[34] France was an altogether tougher and more complex situation than Italy, and much of the reasoning can be traced to the World War II experience of both countries. Italy experienced a drastically different status in the post-war period and while the issue of German reconstruction weighed heavily on US–French relations, it had relatively little significance to the American position regarding Italy.

[35] Irwin Wall also suggests that while the Italian case involved a ‘more intimate’ US role, Caffery was a bystander during the French split. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 67–8, 70–71.

[36] Furthermore, Caffery had been in his post for much longer and was thus better versed in French politics. Caffery had been appointed de facto Ambassador to the provisional French government in October 1944 and had previous postings in Paris between 1917 and 1922. Dur, Jefferson Caffery of Louisiana.

[37] Officials to the Holy See also note that concern for Italy was always greater than that for France. HSTL. Oral History Interview. Parsons.

[38] The US had numerous OSS agents in Italy during World War II, although the principal remnant from this period was James Jesus Angleton's X-2. While tremendously influential in building up clandestine networks in the post-war years, there is little to suggest Angleton had much influence in channelling secret funds during the 1948 election since the focus of his work was principally counterintelligence. For more on Angleton see: Winks, Cloak and Gown, 322–438; Naftali, “ARTIFICE.”

[39] Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 96–8, 102–5; Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 94–5, 104; Braden, “I'm Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral’”; Valentine, “The French Connection Revisited.”

[40] Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 87, 95.

[41] NARA, RG59. Conversations between Tarchiani and Matthews, 8 and 16 May 1947. 865.00/5-847. FRUS, 1947, III: 904–8; MAE, DGAE. Box 11, Tarchiani to Sforza, 16 September 1947. N.12637.

[42] NARA, RG 59. Dunn to Marshall, 28 May 1947 (both memos). 865.00/5-2847 FC. FRUS, 1947, III: 911–13; Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Ness) to Marshall, “Urgent request of Ambassador Dunn for assistance to new Italian government,” 3 June 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 913–14.

[43] MAE, DGAE. Box 11, Sforza to Washington, Paris and London Embassies, 16 June 1947. N.92899/C pr; Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, 124–40; Varsori, “Italian Diplomacy,” 77; Varsori, “De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza,” 102; Varsori, “Italy's Position towards European Integration.”

[44] PPS 1, “Policy with Report to American Aid to Western Europe,” 23 May 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 223–30. David Ellwood notes how this principle would come to be used in the mobilization of public opinion in Europe for the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1952, and has also detailed the use of propaganda in selling the ERP to Italians. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, 93; Ellwood, “The Propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War Context.”

[45] Dunn to Marshall, 17 June and 3 July 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 922–3; NARA, RG59. 865.00/7-347.

[46] Cabinet lunch, 23 June 1947. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 274–5; PPS, “Possible Action by the U.S. to Assist the Italian Government in the Event of Communist Seizure of North Italy and the Establishment of an Italian Communist ‘Government’,” 24 September 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 976–81; Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 80. Regardless of feasibility, the memo tapped into anti-Soviet ideologies already permeating the top rank of the US government and evidently made an impression. Forrestal and Marshall were eager to debate the issue and the paper subsequently featured in all three NSC directives toward Italy. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 309–10; Miller, The United States and Italy, 233.

[47] See for example: Miller, The United States and Italy; Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze.

[48] Dunn to Secretary of State, 17 and 22 September 1947. FRUS, 1947, III: 973–6.

[49] NARA, RG59. Lovett to Embassy, 28 August 1947. 865.00/8-2847. Numerous efforts to encourage the ‘Little Entente’ (PSLI, Italian Republican Party and Action Party) to join De Gasperi's government had proved fruitless. Dunn to Secretary of State, 26 and 29 July 1947. 865.00/7-2647, 865.00/2947. John Adams (Embassy Labor Attaché) to Secretary of State, 27 June 1947 (2 memos), 3 July, 2 August 1947. 865.00/6-2747, 865.00/7-347, 865.00/8-247. Dunn to Secretary of State, 28 August 1947. 865.00/8-2847.

[50] HSTL. PSF, Subject File, NSC Meetings: Box 176. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the NSC, 26 September 1947. Also noted in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 309–10.

[51] NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 6 November 1947. 865.00/11-647; Public Papers of Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office (USGPO), 1963: 475–9.

[52] HSTL. PSF, Subject File, NSC Meetings: Box 176. NSC 1/1, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” 14 November 1947. A debate on whether to include the term ‘covert and unvouchered funds’ had originally occurred during negotiations over the July 1947 National Security Act with CIG legislative officer Walter Pforzheimer withdrawing the clause from the CIA's original mandate in fear of Congressional disapproval. It was put aside with the intention of inclusion at a later date, which it was in the Central Intelligence Act of 1949. Jeffrey-Jones, “Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?,” 32.

[53] Filippelli, American Labor and Postwar Italy, 112; Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 81; Young, France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 167.

[54] Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” 17; Pons, L'impossibile egemonia, 189–234; Acting Director of European Affairs (Reber) to Lovett, 28 November 1947. FRUS, 1948, III: 727–9.

[55] Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterwaite) to Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber), “Suggestion of Embassy at Rome to Transfer US Troops from Italy to Libya,” 5 December 1947. Ibid.: 734–5.

[56] Dunn to Secretary of State, 5 December 1947. Ibid.: 736–7. De Gasperi subsequently requested the shipment of arms and ammunition be delayed until after the election in fear of the Communist propaganda that would result if the plan was revealed and the subsequent negative impact on the DC's own campaign. Leopoldo Nuti notes even though the proposed program of pre-election military assistance provided a positive psychological impact, ultimately it had no affect on the final election result. Nuti, L'esercito Italiano nel Seconda Dopo Guerra, 129–31.

[57] Dunn to Secretary of State, 17 December 1947. FRUS, 1948, III: 753.

[58] Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale, 170–71.

[59] Di Nolfo, Le paure e le sperenze, 259.

[60] Secretary of the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee (Mosely) to Lovett, 15 October 1947. FRUS Intell: 242.

[61] Church Committee, Vol.7, Book 1: 144, 153, 476–80; Clifford, Counsel to the President, 170; Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, 68–9, 72–3.

[62] Houston to Hillenkoetter, 25 September 1947. Hillenkoetter to SANACC, 22 October 1947. CIA Deputy Director (Wright) to Hillenkoetter, 4 November 1947. FRUS Intell: 241, 244, 247.

[63] NSC 4 and NSC 4-A. Souers to NSC, 9 December 1947. FRUS Intell: 252–3; Church Committee, Vol.7, Book 1: 49.

[64] Memo on discussion at 2nd Meeting of NSC, 14 November 1947. FRUS Intell: 250.

[65] NARA, RG 59. Dunn to Secretary of State, 21, 22, 23, 26 January 1948. 865.00/1-2248, 865.00/1-2348, 865.00/1-2648. FRUS, 1948, III: 819–22.

[66] NARA, RG59. Parsons to Secretary of State, 28 January 1948. Marshall to Rome Embassy, 6 February 1948. 865.00/1-2848, 865.00/1-2848 A/VS; Dunn to Marshall, 29 January 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 824.

[67] Dunn to Marshall, 7 February 1948. Ibid., 827–30.

[68] Ibid.

[69] NARA, RG59. Bonner to Lovett, 12 February 1948. 865.00/2-1248.

[70] Ibid. Dunn to Marshall, 12 March 1948, 865.00/3-1248 JAD; Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 95–6.

[71] Ruffini, who was linked to Bonner's conduit Gotshal, was ‘to form a small committee in New York of industrialists and bankers with European interests who might be willing to contribute to [the] DC’. NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 19 February 1948. 865.00/2-1948 A/VS. Dunn noted that Faravelli was in close cooperation with trade unionist Jay Lovestone, who ‘is at present endeavoring to raise funds in the US for the use of Saragat Socialists (PSLI) in forthcoming elections. We feel that it is of greatest importance that this group be aided and urgently recommend that Department be of all possible assistance to Lovestone’. Ibid. Dunn to Marshall, 30 January and 24 February 1948. 865.00/1-3048, 865.00/2-2448 (Memos 803 & 804); Office of Western European Affairs (Murphy) to Walter Dowling, Hickerson and Charles Bohlen, 2 February 1948. 865.00/2-2448. See also: Filippelli, American Labor and Postwar Italy, 131–4.

[72] Truman to Forrestal, 10 March 1948. Dunn to Marshall, 18 March 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 781, 787–8; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 48; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 223; Andrews, For the President's Eyes Only, 172; Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, 299–300.

[73] MAE, DGAE. Box 11, Unsigned to Sforza, 13 December 1947. N.44; Janowitz and Marvick, “US Propaganda and the 1948 Italian Elections,” 321–3; United States Declassified Document Reference System Woodbridge, CT, 1991. Lilly, Edward, “The Development of American Psychological Operations 1945–1951,” 19 December 1951. Document 2302, fiche 212–13; Faenza and Fini, Gli Americani in Italia, 281–3; Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 115–17; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 49–51; Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale, 178; Ellwood, “The 1948 Elections in Italy,” 306–9; Isnerghi, “Alle origini del 18 aprili.”

[74] Arnold Cortesi, “Report from Italy,” noted in Janowitz and Marvick, “US Propaganda and the 1948 Italian Elections,” 320–21.

[75] Dunn to Marshall, 5 March 1948. Marshall to Dunn, 24 March 1948 (2 memos). FRUS, 1948, III: 842, 866; NARA, RG59. Director for European Affairs to Marshall, “General Clark's Proposed Visit to Italy,” 24 March 1948. Dunn to Marshall, 24 March 1948. 865.00/3-2348 CS/A, 865.00/3-2448.

[76] Marshall to Embassy in London, 2 March. FRUS, 1948, III: 837–9; NARA, RG59. Douglas (Ambassador to London) to Marshall, 2 March 1948. 865.00/3-248; Caffrey to Marshall, 3 March. FRUS, 1948, III: 839–41. Douglas to Marshall, 6 March. Ibid.: 843–5; Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War,” 289; Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe, 163, 186–7. For the Soviet position regarding Trieste see: Pons, “Mosca, il PCI e la questione di Trieste.”

[77] HSTL. PSF, Subject File, NSC Meetings: Box 176. NSC 1/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” 10 February 1948.

[78] Ibid. NSC 1/3, 8 March 1948.

[79] FRUS, 1948, III: 777 notes 2–3. Truman did not even regularly attend NSC meetings, preferring to wait upon the Council's recommendations to make the final policy decision. Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” 360, 368.

[80] NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 26 March, 7 and 13 April 1948. 865.00/3-2648, 865.00/4-1348; RG84. Box 29, 800: Italy-Elections. Dunn to Marshall, 16 April 1948; FRUS, 1948, III: 868–70; NARA, RG59. Dunn to Lovett, 2 April 1948. 865.00/4-248. However, a month before the election and with tensions at a heightened state, Kennan dispatched an infamous memo from Manila suggesting the DC outlaw the PCI to prevent an electoral defeat, despite the strong probability of provoking a Civil War. Calmer heads prevailed and Hickerson promptly rejected the proposal. Kennan to Secretary of State, 15 March 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 848–9, note 3. The DC also made concerted efforts to gain a US pledge to intervene in case of any trouble following the election, although were continually informed that while assistance would be forthcoming, it would not include any military support. NARA, RG59. Dunn to Marshall, 17 April 1948, 865.00/4-1748; Lovett to Dunn, 20 April 1948, 865.00/4-2048 CS/A.

[81] Dunn to Marshall, 16 June 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 879–82. Dunn, Addresses to Italy. The book was a collection of speeches made by Dunn between 1947 and 1950. The idea arose when Jack L. Begon, President of the Daily American Publishing Company wrote to Dunn on 13 December 1949 asking if the paper could reprint a selection of the Ambassador's speeches in both Italian and English in a single volume.

[82] Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 101, 177–96; Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale, 178; Ellwood, “The 1948 Elections in Italy,” 307–8, 311, 316–18; Hebblethwaite, “Pope Pius XII,” 73.

[83] Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 100–137; Gedda, 18 aprile 1948, Chapters 16–17.

[84] Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 64.

[85] PPS, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare.”

[86] Memo to President of Discussion at 11th Meeting of NSC, 20 May 1948. FRUS Intell: 277; Miscamble, George F. Kennan, 106.

[87] Memo from Intelligence Survey Group to Souers, “Interim Report 2. Relations between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence,” 13 May 1948. FRUS Intell: 275; Grose, Gentleman Spy, 285.

[88] Kennan to Lovett and Marshall, 19 May 1948; Kennan to Lovett, 25 May 1948; Memo of Meeting, 28 May 1948; Souers to NSC, 2 June 1948; Kennan to Lovett, 8 June 1948; Hillenkoetter to Lay, 9 June 1948; Kennan to Lovett and Marshall, 16 June 1948; Memo to President of Discussion at 13th Meeting of NSC, 17 June 1948. FRUS Intell: 276, 279–81, 286–7, 289, 291.

[89] NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948; Kennan to Lovett, 30 June 1948. FRUS Intell: 292, 294; Miscamble, George F. Kennan, 108–9.

[90] New York Times, 23 April and 7 May 1948, noted in Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 52.

[91] Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 31; see also: Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 79–80.

[92] Recent scholarship has begun to consider the notion of a total approach to fighting the Soviet Union. See, Mitrovitch, Undermining the Kremlin; Lucas, “The Past, Present, and Futures of Public Diplomacy and Political Warfare.” For more on the cultural dimension to the Cold War see: Hixson, Parting the Curtain; Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?; Lucas, Freedom's War; Scott-Smith and Krabbendam, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe; Granville, “‘Caught with Jam on Our Fingers’.”

[93] PPS, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare”; Church Committee, Vol.7, Book 4: 25–31.

[94] Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 114–37, 154 note 58; Filippelli, American Labor and Postwar Italy, 118–35; Brogi, L'Italia e l'egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo, 67–104; Del Pero, “The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy”; Guasconi, L'altra Faccia della Medaglia.

[95] See Del Pero, L'alleato scomodo.

[96] Del Pero, “American Pressures and Their Containment,” 408–9.

[97] Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 25 June 1965. FRUS, 1964–68, XII: 113. Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/ INTERNET. For more on US dealings with Italy in the post-De Gasperi era see: Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra. For a summarized version in English: Nuti, “The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left”; Brogi, “Ike and Italy.”

[98] Church Committee, Vol. 7, Book 1: 22; Henry Kissinger in New York Times, 9 November 1975, noted in Faenza and Fini, Gli Americani in Italia: 295 note 6; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 301 note 110.