Obeying the rules or gaming the system? Delegating random selection for examinations to head teachers within an accountability system

Abstract

As education systems around the world move towards increased accountability based on performance measures, it is important to investigate the unintended effects of accountability systems. This article seeks to explore the extent to which head teachers in a large Norwegian municipality may resort to gaming the incentive system to boost their schools' measured performances. The question addressed in this article is whether the school's selection of examinees is in line with what relevant regulations prescribe (i.e. random selection), or whether it is subject to a cream skimming of pupils (i.e. selection of those examinees who would be high achievers) and thus inducing inflation in the school's average results. The results of this study show some indications of gaming the system, in terms of the sampling of pupils in mathematics, but also indications of obeying the rules regarding the sampling of pupils in other subject matters. This article discusses implications and directions for further research.

Keywords:

• game theory
• gaming
• accountability
• Norway

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the school governing body in the Norwegian local authority for providing us with the data to conduct this project. The views expressed are our own. Due to confidentiality requirements, we have been obliged to omit references to the local authority in the location where the survey was conducted.

Notes

1. Bevan and Hood (2006) mention a possible 'Nelson's eye' game in which both controllers and agents are interested in success and therefore collude.

2. Irrespective of the news story, there were plans for an independent investigation of the selection system within the local authority.

3. Much has been done concerning assessment for learning in the actual municipality; however, this issue is discussed elsewhere.

4. Bevan and Hood (2006) employ a division into four categories, which seems to have justification. In this study, we have an empirical basis for our categorization into only two groups: (1) head teachers who follow the rules of random selection (knights) and (2) head teachers who game the system (knaves).

5. The interdependence of decisions is anticipated by David Hume (2003, sect. V:3): ‘I learn to do service to another, without bearing him any real kindness, because I foresee, that he will return my service in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence to good office with me and others.’

6. FOR 2006-06-23 nr 724: Regulations for Education Act, http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/kd/xd-20060623-0724.html