Framing Arab socio‐political space: state governmentality, governance and non‐institutional protestation

Abstract

This article proposes a framework for understanding the reconfiguration of socio‐political space in the Arab world in the last 15 years through the interplay between states', civil societies' and contestation movements' actors which correspond respectively to state governmentality, governance and non‐institutional protestation. A special focus will be on the emergence of the figure of the expert who will compete with the elected elite. This reconfiguration has occurred in a context of transformation of nation‐state sovereignty and citizenship and the emergence of new elites which cohabit and compete with the old ones. Citizenship has taken different forms including the emerging form of flexible citizenship and non‐citizenship in the Arab world.

Keywords:

• Arab world
• contestation movements
• governmentality
• governance
• expert
• flexible citizenship

Notes

1. ‘Bargain’ is defined by the authors as a simple, repeated game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic benefits and political rights are simultaneously determined according to the opportunity costs the regime faces in providing these ‘goods’.

2. The post‐Washington consensus differs fundamentally from the Washington consensus. While the latter made economic growth the main goal of development, the new consensus moves away from the classical neo‐liberal, market‐friendly approach and places sustainable and democratic development at the heart of the agenda. The post‐Washington consensus admits to market imperfections and supports social safety nets, social capital and institution building to stabilize imperfections. Yet, many of these revisions remain within the sphere of the liberalization paradigm, insofar as they represent different ways to extend a model consisting of a reduced role for the state and the expansion of markets as a mechanism for distributing and allocating goods.

3. Supporters of Mir Hussein Moussavi, the presidential challenger whom President Ahmedinejad claims to have defeated with 63.4% of the vote.