Appropriated authority: a theory of transnational sport governance

ABSTRACT

The organisations regulating international sport comprise a distinct mode of transnational governance. Although domestic and international sport governing bodies are typically constituted as private entities, international sport’s (hyper-) nationalistic character and the degree to which these organisations are able to influence public policy suggest that their authority extends well beyond the private sector. This study advances a theoretical explanation of legitimacy and authority in transnational sport governance. To accomplish this task, the author builds on a theory of private authority, developed by Jessica Green, which posits two types of private authority (delegated and entrepreneurial) in international affairs. While transnational sport governing bodies first emerged as a form of entrepreneurial private authority, the author contends that these organisations today possess ‘appropriated authority’. These organisations operate as a de facto governing institution around which state preferences have converged and retain the legitimacy typically associated with delegated private authority, but they exercise this authority outside the constraints of the principal–agent relationship, which Green suggests is a necessary condition for state delegation of authority. In this article, the author argues that appropriated authority in transnational sport governance is a function of two distinct processes. First, through a process of legitimacy adoption, states come to acknowledge and share in perceptions of private sport organisations’ legitimacy to govern. Second, private authority in transnational sport is perpetuated by states’ ability to free ride (to capture low- or no-cost benefits of transnational sport), an arrangement that varies depending upon domestic regime type.

KEYWORDS:

• Sport governance
• international relations
• global governance
• private authority

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For instance, IOC members Carlos Nuzman (Brazil) and Lamine Diack (Senegal) have been recently implicated in a scheme to bribe other IOC members to vote for Rio de Janeiro as host of the 2016 Summer Olympics. Diack, a former president of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), is also alleged to have accepted bribes in exchange for covering up evidence of doping among Russian athletes. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is perhaps the most notoriously corrupt of the international sport federations. An investigation by American law enforcement authorities in 2015 resulted in the arrest of seven FIFA officials.

2. The term ‘international sport governance’ is avoided because of its governmental connotations within the field of international relations. Governments do not directly participate in ‘international sport’ (in the sense that athletes and teams are not diplomats or public officials), and international sport is not governed by ‘international organisations’ (in the sense that sport governing bodies are not intergovernmental).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Scott R. Jedlicka

Scott R. Jedlicka is an Assistant Professor in the Sport Management program at Washington State University. His research interests are in sport governance and policy. He currently studies the sources and uses of authority in international sport governance, as well as the influence of domestic regime type on state involvement in international sport.