Lifeline at sea: Japan's policy toward the Indian Ocean Region

Abstract

The Indian Ocean emerged as a distant source of threat for Japan but became the lifeline of the Japanese economy after World War II. Japan attempted to reduce threats from the Indian Ocean by alliances, international law, and colonisation. History shows Japan can reduce threats in the Indian Ocean by allying with the dominant power there. As long as Japan is allied with the United States, a dominant power in the Indian Ocean, Japan does not maintain a strong presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Japan can indirectly but sufficiently influence the military balance in the Indian Ocean by restricting the naval reach of Asian land powers from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, given the relative decline of US power, Japan will continue to deploy small forces in the western choke points of the Indian Ocean, while increasing engagements with navies in the eastern choke points.

Keywords:

• value-oriented diplomacy
• Democratic Party of Japan
• US–Japan alliance
• Fukuda doctrine
• Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere

Notes

1. ‘Confluence of the Two Seas,' speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

2. Japan Maritime Public Relations Center, ed., Shipping Now 2009–2010, http://www.jsanet.or.=p/data/shipping.html.

3. In 1274 and 1281, Kublai Khan, leading massive Mongolian expeditionary forces, attempted to invade Japan from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, but the ‘divine wind’ or Kamikaze scattered and sank much of the invasion fleet on both occasions.

4. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty stated that if either country was attacked by another country, the co-signatory would maintain benevolent neutrality. If it was attacked by two or more countries, the co-signatory was committed to go to war on behalf of the ally.

5. In those days, Japan imported 80% of oil products, 90% of gasoline, and 70% of scrap iron from the United States.

6. The Japanese merchant marine lost 8.1 million tons of vessels during the war, with submarines accounting for 4.9 million tons (60%) of the losses. US submarines sank 700,000 tons of naval ships (about 30% of the total lost) including eight aircraft carriers, one battleship, and 11 cruisers.

7. Japan supplied 490,000 kilolitres of fuel in total – worth about $210 million – to vessels from 11 countries such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Pakistan on 794 occasions between December 2001 and November 2007. Japan provided 27,000 kilolitres of fuel on 144 occasions between February 2008 and January 2010.

8. For the details of value-oriented diplomacy, see Nobukatsu Kanehara (2011).

9. English text is available at http://www.sof.or.jp/en/topics/pdf/09_01.pdf.

10. According to a poll, 43% thought of the refuelling mission as necessary, while 41% thought it was unnecessary; The Asahi Shimbun, 5 November 2007.