Blue Economy and the Indian Ocean Rim

‘Blue Economy’ (BE) (broadly conceptualizing oceans as ‘shared development spaces’) has emerged as a powerful and contested concept of in many of those 27 countries which are part of, either as Members States or Dialogue Partners, the leading Track One regional governance organization: the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), with nearly half the world’s population by 2050, in geopolitical terms, is moving away from being identified as the ‘Ocean of the South’ to the ‘Ocean of the Centre’, and the ‘Ocean of the Future’ (Doyle & Seal, 2015); and its core position in terms of global trade, industry, labor, environment and security will increasingly shape the planet in the twenty-first century. It is clear that BE, combining geo-economic, geo-environmental and geo-strategic ordering principles – in all their diverse national and regional symbolic manifestations – will have profound implications on regional foreign policy interests in the next decade and beyond (Doyle, 2016).

The October 2014 IORA ‘Blue Economy’ Declaration signaled a commitment to encourage greater collaboration in a range of priority areas. Such a vision was encapsulated by principles for the peaceful, productive and sustainable use of the Indian Ocean and its resources. First articulated in 2010 by Gunter Pauli, (whose most recent book on BE is reviewed later in this edition), the concept of BE was first discussed by the United Nations at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 2012 (Rio + 20). Since then, it has emerged forcefully in Indian Ocean region discourse, and the discourse of many Indian Ocean region states. In 2014, Bangladesh hosted a major conference in Dhaka on the theme, proposing a Bay of Bengal partnership for BE. The IORA held a conference on Enhancing BE for Sustainable Development in September 2015. From this, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean Rim Association on Enhancing Blue Economy Cooperation for Sustainability emerged, focusing on sustainable development in the region, and placing fisheries and aquaculture as one of the priority sectors of the BE. The Indian Prime Minister Modi has also stated that BE would be a tool for developing India, and made it a feature of his vision for the sea in Security and Growth for All in the Region. James Alix Michel, former president of the Republic of Seychelles, has also recently published a book championing the concept (Michel, 2016) from the perspective of small island developing states (SIDS; also reviewed later in this volume).

As Michel noted, we are all joined in the global economy and we are all linked together by the oceans. Indeed, Michel invites us to reimagine ourselves as all being islanders, living on a blue rather than green planet. The image of the kaleidoscope is the compelling image used by Michel. Michel’s interpretation of BE is, as our book review symposium author show, a nuanced and complex one. In general, however, while the expression gains currency, there is no one clear definition or understanding of what BE is. In policy circles, at the core of the concept is the awareness of the maritime resources and their capacity to contribute to poverty reduction, improved human welfare and economic opportunity. With more or less emphasis, there is an accompanying awareness that marine resources must be used sustainably, and economic development derived from the maritime domain must be integrated with the sustainability, conservation and health of the marine ecosystem.

As the Indian Ocean Region is defined by a ‘maritime regionalism,’ BE seems ideally suited as a concept accentuating this maritime dimension of the region, in its pursuit of regional geo-economic, geo-environmental and geo-security goals. A focus on BE draws on the increasing awareness among Indian Ocean littoral states (and islands) of the economic potential of the maritime environment. This political and economic turn to the sea is evident in plans being formulated throughout the region to better govern and secure the Indian Ocean’s vast resources. This is a global phenomenon that has partly arisen in the wake of UNCLOS and partly as a new construction of sea space. As Steinberg (1999, p. 403) has argued the sea is no longer separate from land, no longer a two-dimensional space configured in terms of shipping lane security. It is now understood as a ‘resource-rich but fragile space requiring rational management for sustainable development.’ Understandably this move requires research which will improve our technical knowledge of the seabed, underneath the seabed, the sea column and the behavior of those whose livelihoods are dependent on the health of the ocean. As important, however, is research that will generate knowledge on the human relationships that are forming and evolving around the emerging political economy of ocean space (Doyle, 2016). Important research must also focus upon the complex architecture of governance required to construct a regional BE. It will need to concentrate on exploring the multiple strata of governing actors – state and non-state – the networks of knowledge, and ethical parameters which undergird the possibility of a regional BE.

At the same time, the population of Indian Ocean Rim Countries (IORCs) are in the process of dramatic growth and change, and by 2050, the Rim will include almost half of the planet’s people, fueled most recently by the rapid geopolitical and geo-economic rise of Africa. The IOR is of high economic, strategic and environmental significance. Half of the world’s trade already traverses through this region. In addition, the Rim possesses a variety of natural resources, both marine and terrestrial, which are vital for the well-being of its inhabitants, trade and environmental stability. The scope for the development of such resources – including food, livelihoods, tourism, minerals resources, bio-prospecting, the mining of seabed resources and ‘blue energy’ – is being realized especially by coastal and island developing states who are at the forefront of ‘Blue Economy advocacy’ (Doyle, 2016). Rio + 22 was part of the preparatory process for a global BE approach (UN, 2013), and the concept of the ‘blue revolution’ has been well articulated (Doyle & Haward, 2009, p. 304).

Regionally, the IORA, as well as many of its constituent Member States, acting alone and multi-laterally, have earnestly begun to place more emphasis on growing the BE in a sustainable, stable and inclusive manner. These emergent definitions of BE, however, are profoundly diverse, with each state understandably seeking to shape the narrative, in some part, for their own national interests. For SIDS, for example, the potential of the BE was explored in the Samoa Conference of September 2014 (UNECA, 2014), with the aim ‘to go beyond sustainability’ (Pauli, 2011). A BE Agenda is also being developed for India (Sakhuja, 2014). Its Ocean Policy Statement straddles social, environmental and security matters – proposing the sustainable use of ocean resources to benefit its society (Suarez de Vivero & Rodriguez Mateos, 2010). Not only did the new Prime Minister of India Mr Narendra Modi in 2014 reaffirm in his swearing-in speech the strategic necessity of developing a BE, but so too have the Governments of The United Arab Emirates and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, shared maritime and security challenges that threaten sea lines of communication and transportation in the Indian Ocean, including piracy, rising sea levels, drug trafficking and terrorism, are on South Asian BE agendas (Doyle, 2016).

Other BE issues identified by the IORA Council of Ministers include sustainable development of fisheries, judicious exploitation of minerals, harnessing renewable energy and encouraging coastal tourism, as a means to ‘stimulate growth and improve food and energy security’ as a ‘common source of growth, innovation and job creation’ (Sakhuja, 2014). Indonesia, with high-level meetings and conferences taking place for the last two or three years, also has a strong inclusive growth and poverty alleviation emphasis. Indonesia, therefore, along with Mauritius, Bangladesh and Seychelles are already in the process of establishing maritime economies. Bangladesh for instance has been active in establishing the Bay of Bengal Partnership for BE and has organized workshops advancing the proposal around the UN BE Initiative, involving India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka. The Seychelles delegation also re-emphasized the importance of defence and security integration and securing maritime ‘chokepoints’ – such as the Malacca and Lombok straits that remain a top priority for Australia’s security cooperation with Indonesia – alongside the task of creating regional networks that link maritime operations and facilitate coordination among regional actors including coastguards, police, customs and judicial officials.

With varied levels of success, Malaysia has also been developing BE since the mid-1980’s (Saharuddin, 2001). On the western shores of the Indian Ocean, the South African Development Community has for a number of years been focussed on ocean governance. In addition there are a number of African-based intergovernmental and NGO actors operating on the maritime sphere – the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission; the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa and the more regionally focussed Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Most importantly, the African Union (AU) has in 2012 published its 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, which documents the AU’s goal to establish a BE by prioritizing the establishment of a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa. As South Africa takes over the Chair of IORA in 2017, it has already prioritized BE as its rallying regional call.

In the Australian case, it developed its ocean policy originally in 1998 to fulfill two aims: the development of rights associated its exclusive economic zone and to ensure an ecologically sustainable approach to wealth creation in the maritime sphere (Westcott, 2000). Australian enthusiasm for the construction of an IOR maritime economy is building quickly upon these earlier foundations. As articulated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop (2014), Australia’s foreign policy, trade policy and foreign aid policy can all be now encapsulated under the principle of economic diplomacy. As well as building links between environmental diplomacy, security, prosperity and peace ‘dividends’, the Australian BE agenda prioritizes women’s empowerment and marine science. This latter approach clearly opens up a considerable space for a contribution from the humanities and social sciences.

Despite these variations, IORCs have come to the understanding that such diverse, profound and over-arching issues cannot be adequately sorted out in isolation or even bilaterally; that there needs to be a powerful commitment to regional solutions and governance structures. For example, IORA’s sub groups – the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group – have recently been given much stronger directives to provide expert advice to member states. Secondly, there is an evolving understanding that a secure and safe maritime domain is likely to be a profitable and prosperous one: and the languages and narratives of liberal economics, sustainable environmental management and capacity building to address geo-securities are increasingly being discussed and deployed in numerous governance challenges and the pursuit of diverse national and foreign policy projects.

Critically, littoral states are increasingly exercising sovereign power over coastal sea space. This is being undertaken through maritime spatial planning (MSP): the introduction of three-dimensional zoning techniques, configured largely through technical and scientific innovations (urgently required to build knowledge for planning to occur) that seek to rationalize and control the use of the sea. Far more than simply lines drawn on an abstract map, MSP is defined by its attempt to secure multiple uses for three-dimensional space – regulating human behavior on the seabed, the sea column and on the surface of the sea. The prevailing rationale for regulating competition for maritime space is that individual economic sectors in the sea are interdependent. These sectors include, coastal tourism, offshore oil and gas, deep sea shipping, short sea shipping, yachting and marinas, passenger ferry services, cruise tourism, fisheries, inland waterway transport, coastal protection, offshore wind farms, monitoring and surveillance activities, blue biotechnology, desalination, aggregates mining, marine aquatic products, marine mineral mining and ocean renewable energies. They rely on common skills and shared infrastructure, such as ports and electricity distribution networks. Maes (2008, p. 797) observed a growing tendency for fixed investments such as ‘wind and wave energy, cables and pipelines, coastal defence, port infrastructure, aquaculture and land extension’ to be vying for space in the sea with older mobile activities such as ‘fisheries, shipping, air transport, military use, water recreation’ etc. As Smith, Maes, Stojanovic, and Ballinger (2011) argue, static interests are generally more concerned with the use of the seabed, while mobile uses, including pelagic fish and shipping routes, utilize the water column and sea surface. Maritime planning layers ocean space so that multiple functions can be assigned simultaneously to the seabed, the column and the surface area. In addition, a strong environmentalist rationale is attached to the liberal economic model that frames maritime planning and blue economies (Young, 2010, p. 383).,

The need for economic growth in a global recession has doubtlessly fueled a sudden turn to the political economy of the sea. The 1982 UNCLOS framework came into force on 16 November 1996, has given rise to ‘a new world geopolitical configuration.’ In effect, the Convention offered 36 coastal states of the Indian Ocean (20 IORA Member States) over 7,000,000 sq. kms of sea space to explore and exploit, with archipelago states such as Indonesia, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles gaining control over expanses of sea space that far exceed their total land area (Forbes, 1995). A survey undertaken in 2013 found that 58.42% of world sea space is now under national jurisdiction (Suárez-de-Vivero, 2013). Perhaps realizing the tension that this legislation gives rise to regarding the understanding of the sea as the common heritage of mankind and the sea as a new site of sovereign jurisdiction, Article 123 of UNCLOS has been used as a legal basis for regional-based MSP by states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (Maes, 2008, p. 799). The legislation provides that such states should cooperate and coordinate with the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the sea. In addition it states that such cooperation should occur through an appropriate regional organization (Maes, 2008).

This edition focuses on some of the opportunities and challenges of BE. One of the key themes is addressing the complexity of the regulatory frameworks needed, at national, regional, and international level and challenges for regional cooperation and governance.

Techera explores the legal and policy frameworks around oceans governance and fisheries management, identifying barriers to regional responses. She argues that regional organizations in the Indian Ocean region would benefit from a more adaptive, flexible, integrated, holistic and collaborative approach to law and policy, and suggests that regional organizations, legislative models and treaties already functioning in the Pacific Ocean could serve as examples in the Indian Ocean Region.

Voyer et al. usefully disentangle some of the difficulty and fuzziness around the definitions of both BE and maritime security. The authors discuss the relationship between the two, which they describe as mutually co-dependent. They argue that maritime security – understood as including non-traditional security roles – is both an enabler of BE as well as itself a stimulator and source of economic development.

Potgieter discusses BE in the context of the South African government’s 9-point economic plan, Operation Phakisa. He distinguishes between the concepts of ‘blue economy’ and ‘oceans economy,’ and identifies significant opportunities as well as challenges for marine-based economic growth in South Africa.

Minnaar et al. survey the endemic and very harmful illegal harvesting of abalone over many years, situating the problem in international demand and supply drivers, the establishment and consolidation of international crime networks, and domestic economic, social and policy drivers and failures.

The research note by Hussain et al. provides a useful overview of the potential of marine resources in Bangladesh now that its maritime boundary dispute with India has been resolved, and identifies gaps in the relevant regulatory and governance frameworks of Bangladesh.

Finally, Bergin states that compared to the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean is the ‘wild west’ as far as regional fisheries management is concerned, and argues for a closer engagement between Australia and the rest of the IOR.

The Indian Ocean is a site where common but differentiated responsibilities transcend national interests – where overfishing, illegal activities, coastal development, climate change and sustainable development implies that structured international cooperation underpins all aspects of a maritime economy. IORA is ideally placed to provide this regional leadership and coordination in the Rim for the twenty-first century.

Additional information

Funding

This edition of JIOR draws upon the research of a much larger project entitled ‘Building an Indian Ocean Region’ DP 120101066, which is funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Projects Scheme for funding in 2012–2018. In addition, specific funding for this issue has been generously provided by the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.