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Abstract
This article presents the outcomes of a research project conducted in two small towns in the Perm region. The study of power in the two communities focused on two major themes: (1) the composition of influential actors and institutions and the power hierarchy; (2) relationships between them and coalition building. The discovered configuration of actors and relationships between them demonstrate, on the one hand, quite a lot in common with European and North American communities, on the other hand, a number of features that reflect the systemic and institutional properties of Russian politics and society. The social base of the local power structure is very narrow. The local elite composed of the heads of the executive, business leaders, and the most influential representatives of urban and district legislatures actually holds all the power in the local community, having no serious opponents or a real alternative in the foreseeable future. This power structure is supported by informal institutions and personal relationships within the elite and between the elite and those who are forced to accept the existing system of relations; it allows them to successfully protect their personal and/or corporate interests. A wide range of opportunities to use official position and/or relationships with public officials for personal enrichment stimulates the formation of various kinds of coalitions for the furtherment of the personal interests of its members.
Acknowledgment
The research project ‘Power in the local Russian community’ has been supported by the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation, grant N 14-03-00151. We are grateful to anonymous referees for comments and valuable suggestions.
Notes
1. For evident reasons, there were no real opportunities to study power relations in Russia (USSR) before 1990s.
2. Other founders of the urban regime theory are Elkin (Citation1987) and Fainstein (Citation1994) However, it was Stone who convincingly demonstrated the advantages of the new theory.
3. We had no possibility to use a combination of the three classical (positional, reputational, and decisional) methods of identifying community leaders recommended by scholars. But through the interviews with positional leaders of the two communities, we collected information about their power reputation and role in decision-making processes. The reputational indicator, perhaps, was the most significant for the explanation of power structure in the towns since almost all the persons mentioned by the interviewees were respondents (experts).
4. Civic society actors in both communities occupy marginal positions in local politics. Though the general level of discontent and dissent is pretty high, people are not inclined to participate in community decisions: ‘Active people are absent,’ regrets one of the local experts.
5. The Chusovoy metallurgical plant.
6. We could not unambiguously identify which of the two public actors was more influential.
7. The power hierarchy and the rank order of the main actors in Kungur is less clear than in Chusovoy, where the political influence of the first three actors is comparable and experts’ evaluations of their power potential split.
8. Formally, the district administration is ‘higher’ than the town administration although there is no clear subordination between them.
9. The term has been introduced by Carl Friedrich to describe cases when the subject of power acts in accordance with a power holder’s will in fear of repercussions for doing otherwise (Friedrich Citation1937, p. 16–18).
10. Theorists of power explain such situations in terms of low resource mobilization (Wrong Citation2002).
11. Here we mean, first of all, a strong dependency of local government on regional and federal financing and a more centralized system of government (‘power vertical’) built in the last decade.
12. In Kungur, a few years ago, there was an association of entrepreneurs; but today it has collapsed, although formally it still exists.
13. That is regardless of the particular activities of its representatives as was the case in Latin American cities during the study of Delbert Miller (Citation1970).
14. Mainly because of the death of the local criminal leader.
15. Here, I am not taking into account the leadership of the city-forming enterprise in Chusovoy.
16. They really control business assets though formally the latter belong to members of their families and/or friends.
17. This is quite typical for European cities too, where government officials play a major role in local regime formation (Strom Citation1996, John and Cole Citation1998, p. 382–404, Harding Citation1999, Mossberger and Stoker Citation2001).
18. In European cities, this type of regime is less popular since the state remains a political center of gravity, the most important ties are vertical and horizontal links within the public sector, and organized business interests do not play the leading role that they do in American cities (Strom Citation1996, p. 475–477).
19. Business organizations are supposed to (voluntarily) participate in financing social programs and public events because they are ‘socially responsible’ and ‘care about society.’
20. Certainly, one should not assume that «growth machines» in America are guided solely by the desire to benefit community and its residents. Harvey Molotch, the founder of the ‘growth machines theory,’ argues that the benefits of growth are distributed extremely unequally, often at the expense of particular groups. Growth increases the exchange value of the territory and objects located on it but does not necessarily improve the living conditions of its citizens (Molotch Citation1976, Logan and Molotch Citation1987). However, in American and European cities there is a real public agenda which is not merely a cover for the personal enrichment of local influentials.
21. The plant is the major employer for the town, it provides jobs, and tax revenues.
22. Sharp conflict between the district administration and the plant’s leadership arose when the plant refused to support the district’s candidate in the mayoral election.
23. Recently one of them was arrested.
24. Such as ‘Central Atlanta Association’ in Stone’s Atlanta (Stone Citation1989), ‘Alegheny Conference of Community Development’ in Pittsburg during the study of Ferman (Citation1996), ‘Portsmouth and Southeast Hampshire Partnership’ described by Holman (Citation2007).