Fighting fisheries crimes in the fisheries industry: Practical training reflections of the efficacy of Namibia’s fisheries law enforcement

Abstract

Fisheries crimes pose a significant challenge to Namibian and international law enforcement organisations and/or agencies. Such crimes are typically distinguished by illegal actions that, in certain instances, are transnational and organised in nature. Illegal shipping of marine resources, illegal fishing, corruption, money laundering, and document and tax fraud are all examples of fisheries crimes. Fighting fisheries crimes in the twenty-first century is a vital priority for ensuring long-term development and protecting marine resources for future generations. It is an essential component of sustaining a justifiable blue economy, as well as resource sharing and beneficiation, which helps underprivileged groups like small-scale fishers to profit from Namibia’s exploitation of marine resources. Effective fisheries law enforcement is required in Namibia to combat fisheries crimes. To achieve efficacy in fisheries law enforcement in Namibia, traditional policing methods and instruments, as well as knowledge of law, criminology, police science, and fisheries management and conservation, are required. This is far from the case, as fishery inspectors and observers are routinely underfunded and undertrained, both financially and technologically. As a result, the goal of this study is to look into the effectiveness of fisheries law enforcement in Namibia in the twenty-first century. Data from the author’s Fisheries Law Enforcement training session, which took place from November 28 to 12 December 2022, in Walvis Bay, Namibia, was utilised to assess Namibia’s readiness in combatting fisheries crimes. The implemented training received excellent response from participants. However, the training showed significant shortcomings in Namibia’s fisheries law enforcement. As a result, recommendations on how to strengthen fisheries law enforcement in Namibia will be made in this article.

Keywords:

• fisheries crimes
• fisheries law enforcement
• sustainable development
• conservation of marine resources
• marginalised groups
• blue economy
• Namibia

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The Namibia fisheries sector is crucial for the country’s economic and developmental aspirations. It has significant vested interests from politicians, local and international investors, local communities, traditional authorities and many other stakeholders. It is therefore imperative that Fisheries Inspectors, Fisheries Observers and relevant local law enforcement agents are equipped with the requisite skills to enforce fisheries laws and ensure compliance with the same. This development would ensure that there is a balanced and/or sustainable exploitation of marine resources for the benefit of all Namibians. However, current evidence suggests that whilst the Government of the Republic of Namibia has done well to develop policies and laws to regulate and inform marine resource exploitation, several gaps, and challenges still exist in the area of fisheries law enforcement. These gaps serve as reason why cases of corruption inform Namibia’s lucrative and yet highly complex fisheries sector.

1. Introduction

Namibia has witnessed a wide range of fisheries crimes orchestrated from both the national and international spheres. Fisheries crime refers to a wide range of acts perpetrated on land and at sea along the value and supply chain of the fisheries industry. Document fraud, tax evasion, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, and illegal fishing are just a few examples. Highly qualified and resourced fisheries inspectors, observers, and police officers are required in any jurisdiction to combat fisheries crime. Their abilities in detecting and combating fisheries crime will result in successful prosecutions for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as fraud, money laundering, and illegal fishing, among other fisheries offences. As of October 2022, Namibia has embarked on an ongoing training programme for fisheries inspectors and observers on how to combat fisheries crimes and effectively enforce fisheries laws. This is being done through the recently established FishForce Academy which aims at ensuring that fisheries inspectors and observers possess the requisite legal and technological skills to gather relevant evidence for successful prosecution of criminals.¹

Dereck Klazen, Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, recently stressed the significance of providing at least N$ 58,4 million for marine and inland monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) measures to combat fisheries crime in Namibia. Klazen’s proposal was advanced in parliament at the budget proposal session for the 2022/2023 financial year. MCS’s role is to ensure the protection of aquatic resources. The increased financing of MCS is expected to result in the prosecution of perpetrators of organised crime and/or illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities within Namibia’s exclusive economic zone and on inland water bodies. Moreover, reinforced MCS might help reduce transnational fisheries crimes committed by foreign industrial factory trawlers fishing illegally in Namibian waters. MCS will reinforce existing marine patrols by Namibian fisheries inspectors and Namibian police officers aboard the Sea Shepherd Global vessel Ocean Warrior aimed at defending protected coastal zones.²

It is imperative to note that from a law enforcement perspective, crime syndicates in the fishing industry are involved in a wide range of criminal offences classified as organised crime. Article 2(a) of the Palermo Convention defines organised crime as a “serious crime” committed by an organised group of three or more individuals for financial or other material gain. A “serious crime,” according to Article 2(b) of the Palermo Convention, is one that is punishable by at least four years in prison or a more severe penalty. According to the 2004 Annual European Union Organised Crime Report, organised crime refers to the collaboration of more than two people suspected of committing severe criminal offenses for profit and/or power over a lengthy or indeterminate period of time. In terms of fisheries crimes in Namibia, the Fishrot saga is a textbook example of organised crime in the country’s fisheries sector. The case was still being heard at the time this article was written. The Fishrot saga will be discussed in a little more detail later in this article. In reality, whether or not organised crime is established in the fisheries industry, law enforcement will face challenges due to the frequency of fisheries crime in Namibia and the rest of the world.

It should be noted that organised crime, as a component of fisheries crime, can take two distinct forms. First, it can occur in the fishing industry and its subsidiary business operations (for example, human trafficking or illegal fishing). Second, organised crime that extends to the fishing industry may originate elsewhere but be channelled through the sector as a cover for other criminal activities (UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Smuggling contraband through the fishing industry, according to Parks, is an example of organised crime. Organised criminal syndicates enter the fishing industry in this context to launder money from criminal activities or to create a plausible cause to remain at sea in order to criminally market goods (Parks, 2014).

Fisheries crime refers to criminal offences committed across the value chain of fisheries. This includes the preliminary stage, such as vessel insurance and registration, as well as at-sea activities such as harvesting and catch paperwork, as well as landing, processing, transportation, commerce, and sale (FAO, 2019; UNODC, 2017, 2019). Thus, crimes can be perpetrated at sea, on land, in cyberspace, or at the coastal interface. One thing they all have in common is that they are all motivated by profit, that is, they are all economic crimes perpetrated by white-collar criminals (UNODC, 2019). Most fisheries crimes cases are transnational, which adds to the complexity of jurisdictional obscurity. Many of these offences are committed or sustained (in whole or in part) extraterritorially, on the high seas and in other places beyond national jurisdiction, like regional waters (NA-FIG 2017).

Fisheries law enforcement must thus be viewed within the wider context of compliance. Compliance can be defined quite simply as the ideal situation where the regulated community complies with the applicable legislation. In the context that the author looks at compliance, that means the situation or state where both the fishing industry and citizens comply with the fisheries laws of Namibia. While there are other tools available to promote compliance, such as incentives (for example, providing for a tax rebate where there is full compliance) and self-regulatory and voluntary measures (for example, persons belonging to a professional body, and subjecting themselves to a code of conduct of such a body), this article deals with enforcement measures as a tool to regulate the fisheries sector. Enforcement measures are therefore the “stick” that is used where there is non-compliance. This allows for some form of “punishment” or consequence where someone fails to comply with the fisheries laws. The main enforcement measure in this context in Namibia is criminal prosecution, but the use of other mechanisms such as informal, administrative and civil measures are applicable. The goal of this article is to explain the importance of combating fisheries crime in Namibia. It emphasises the importance of fisheries law enforcement training for fisheries inspectors, observers, and other crime-fighting organisations such as the Namibia Police Force (NAMPOL). The article emphasises the need of facilitating the acquisition of knowledge, understanding, and practical skills related to the enforcement of marine living resource legislation and other legislation important to conducting enforcement action in Namibia’s marine fishing environment.

2. Background of the study

Fisheries crime can negatively impact coastal states’ populations as well as the rule of law, undermine peace and security, jeopardise food security, and negatively influence fishing communities. A variety of organised criminal activities undermine regional and global peace and security (UNSC United Nations Security Council, 2019). Piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other violent crimes such as ship hijackings, instances involving “shooting on boats,” hostage-taking and kidnapping for ransom, fuel and gas robbery and smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, illegal fishing, and maritime terrorism, are all included (UNSC United Nations Security Council, 2019). In addition, the ability of the states in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region to pursue socio-economic growth is severely hampered by these illegal activities. Insurance rates for cargo ships working in the marine sector are likely to rise as a result of criminal activities. This is likely- to hamper trade, slow the flow of goods and services, and cost businesses and governments money.

An estimated 17 percent of the animal protein consumed globally comes from fisheries resources, with developing states having the highest per capita consumption (FAO, 2018). According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, it is critical to reduce illegal fishing in order to prevent food insecurity and diminished livelihoods in coastal communities (UNGA UN General Assembly, 2012). Several factors influence how crime is perceived in fishing communities in Namibia and beyond. Luderitz, Walvis Bay, Henties Bay and Swakopmund communities are particularly susceptible to being recruited by criminal networks that operate in the fisheries industry. Moreover, coastal communities such as the marginalised Topnaar community are also susceptible to recruitment into criminal networks since they have few alternatives to fishing for a living. Equally, due to a lack of viable alternative sources of income, small scale fishermen and their communities who are not recognised by the Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000 (MRA) are more likely to resort to poaching and related fisheries crimes as a result of exclusion from the text of the applicable coastal legislation. The recognition of the small-scale fisher communities is currently limited to the Inland Fisheries Act 1 of 2003 and the recently adopted National Plan of Action for Small Scale Fisheries in Namibia (NAPOA-SSF 2022–2026).

The detrimental economic effects of organised crime in the fishing industry are borne by bona fide fishing companies (Grynberg et al., 2023). Preliminary evidence from the sub judicare Fishrot saga, which will be discussed latter in this work, has revealed that networks involved in organised fisheries crime are able to drastically reduce their expenses and conceal unlawful profits, providing them an unfair advantage over legitimate business operators whom they can essentially drive out of business (Grynberg et al., 2023). Foreign companies have the ability to take over local fishing businesses in Namibia and undercut domestic rivals (Grynberg et al., 2023, pp. 153–168). The use of vulnerable migrants and poorly paid migrant workers by foreign-registered fishing fleet has often led to local fishing firms violating national crewing regulations by recruiting underpaid migrant workers to their fishing fleet.

Fisheries crime in Namibia cannot be ignored (Grynberg et al., 2023). It contributes to the overall global outlook of the adverse effects of fisheries crime. Large-scale overfishing, as a form of fishing crime, significantly limits the amount of commercially exploitable fish stocks. A sizeable amount of the Namibia and global catch, worth billions of dollars, is lost as a result of illegal or unreported fishing. The illegal and unreported fishing leads to significant financial losses with the annual illicit income from illegal and unreported marine fishing being measured to be worth billions of United States dollars (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). According to Sumaila and Bawumia (2014), globally, there could be an annual illegal fish trade involving between 7.7 and 14.0 million metric tons of unreported fish captures.

Fisheries crime in fisheries can harm the marine environment and associated ecosystems. Small-scale fisherman struggling to sustain their livelihoods are known to fish illegally in Namibia, a development which is contributing to marine resources depletion. Further, the use of illegal fishing nets can lead to the severe damage to the larger marine ecosystem. As a result, fisheries law enforcement becomes an essential component of combating fisheries crime in Namibia. All law enforcement officers in Namibia, including fisheries inspectors and observers, must be rigorously as well as regularly trained in fisheries law enforcement. Pursuing a sustainable ocean economy necessitates balancing the use of ocean space and resources on the one hand, with the long-term carrying capacity of the country ocean’s ecosystems on the other (Kraemer, 2017). According to the Rio process’s three-pillared concept of sustainable development, a sustainable ocean economy is based on the economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable use of the ocean (UN, 2012). Such sustainable use of the ocean must benefit all Namibians including the marginalised coastal communities and small-scale fisher communities. The United Nations Agenda 2030 and Namibia’s Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP) I (HPP I [2016/17–2019/20]) and II (HPP II [2021–2025]) both expand on the three dimensions of sustainability to include five areas of vital importance: people, prosperity, peace, partnership, and planet. These areas should guide coordinated interagency policy interventions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN General Assembly Resolution 2015).

Namibia’s efforts to attain the SDGs may be seriously hampered by the complex and wide-ranging implications of fisheries crime. Addressing the scourge of fisheries crime is important for achieving a number of SDGs, including SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), and SDG 14 (life below water). According to Kercher (2018), SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) is seen as a key enabler of the other SDGs. Its targets, such as promoting the rule of law (16.3), reducing illicit financial and arms flows and organised crime (16.4), reducing corruption and bribery (16.5), and developing effective, accountable, and transparent institutions (16.6), are particularly relevant when addressing the various forms of organised crime in finance. Fisheries crime in Namibia undermines the country’s commitment to sustainable development, and particularly to a sustainable ocean economy. Fisheries crime has negative economic, social, and environmental repercussions and undermines the attainment of a sustainable ocean economy. Fisheries crime is thus pervasive and has negative consequences on coastal and marginalised communities in Namibia.

3. Fisheries crimes

Marine fisheries in Namibia are governed and/or regulated by the Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000 and are subject to multilateral treaties, international maritime law, and management measures created by regional fisheries management agencies. The legal tools mentioned aim to reduce illegal fishing in Namibia. Fishing without the necessary license or permit in a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone, participating in transhipment in violation of coastal or flag state law, harvesting more fish than the designated legal quota, and fishing for species that are legally protected are all examples of illegal fishing in Namibia (Grynberg et al., 2023, p. 101, 124, 153, 190). Many illegal fishing operations take place at sea, where they are governed by a complicated legal system that is mostly based on the maritime zone in which the vessel is located, the nationality (flag) of the vessel, and, to a lesser extent, the owner and crew of the vessel (FAO Legal Office, 2019).

To reduce fisheries crime, Namibia must impose severe criminal penalties for fishing offences. For particularly serious offences, section 52 of the Marine Resources Act (MRA) makes provision for asset forfeiture upon conviction by a competent court (section 54) as well as fines ranging from 500 000 to 2 000 000 Namibian dollars. The MRA specifies that when determining the gravity of an offence, the court must consider the monetary value, “of any advantage or potential advantage which such person has or could have gained in consequence of that offence, and, in addition to any other penalty that may be imposed in respect of that offence, impose a fine equal to three times the value so determined, which fine may be recovered as a civil judgement” (section 53). The MRA does not, however, explicitly state that the court must consider the fact that a crime was committed recurrently, abroad, or as a component of organised crime.

Illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU fishing) is also related with various types of criminal offences along the fisheries value chain (especially fraud) (De Coning, 2016; Grynberg et al., 2023, pp. 95–100; Republic of Namibia, 2007; Shigwedha, 2022). As a result, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) believes that, regardless of whether or not unlawful fishing is criminalized in a state, IUU fishing is a high-risk indicator of fisheries crime (INTERPOL, 2018). Fisheries crimes include a variety of other criminal offenses. The sections that follow will provide a quick overview of some of the criminal offenses related with the fisheries industry in Namibia and around the world.

3.1. Fraud

One of the major business risks in Namibia’s corporate governance environment is fraud (See the Corporate Governance Code for Namibia (NamCode) clause 3.6. See also Haukena v S, 2019 NAHCNLD 145 (5 December 2019) and S v Bezuidenhout and Another (14 of (2010)) (2017) NAHCMD 257 (7 September 2017)). The fishing industry in Namibia is susceptible to fraud (EAGLEfm, 2022). Fraud refers to deliberate misrepresentation or concealing of facts for undue benefit (UNODC, 2017). Fraud is a common law offence in Namibia that is defined by case law, legal precedents, academic analysis, and judicial interpretation. Fraud in Namibia is therefore defined as the willful and illegal making of a false representation that causes actual or potential harm to another (section 47 of the Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003). The act of forging a document, or making a false statement on one, is generally considered a form of fraud. Namibia’s fisheries value chain generates a substantial amount of documentation, which increases the risk of fraud and forgery. This is especially true for documents that have a lot of money attached to them, such fishing licenses, landing permits, and certificates of vessel registration. False vessel registration documents that blatantly copy and paste material from Google Translate and use standard word processing software can be submitted at ports (Grynberg et al., 2023, p. 153; NA-FIG (North Atlantic Fisheries Intelligence Group), NA, 2017). Criminals use fishing vessel identity fraud to quickly change the identity of their vessel by, for instance, giving multiple fishing vessels in a fleet the same name and operating them all under the same fishing license, flying the incorrect flag in port, or physically concealing or painting over a vessel’s name to make it anonymous (North, 2017). Falsifying inquiries into a vessel’s illicit activities by re-registering it with new flag states is a practice known as “flag-hopping,” which is closely related to vessel identity fraud (North, 2017). Namibia relies on the Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003, the Whistleblower Protection Act 10 of 2017, the Witness Protection Act 11 of 2017, corporate legal liability principles, corporate governance provisions under the NamCode, The Companies Act 28 of 2004 and books and records provisions, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN General Assembly, 2003), and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU African Union, 2003) as legal instruments to combat the scourge of fraud in the country. As proven by the sub judice Fishrot case, Namibia’s success rate in combating fraud and corruption in the fisheries industry remains uncertain. The Fishrot case will be briefly outlined in the next section.

3.2. Corruption

Namibia’s weaker ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the country’s ongoing deterioration in corruption ratings. Out of 180 nations, Namibia’s ranking dropped from 56th to 58th in 2020, primarily as a result of the Fishrot fishing industry corruption scandal. Giving, seeking, or receiving an improper benefit with the intent to influence someone functioning as an official for a private or public institution constitutes an act of corruption (UN (General Assembly), 2003, Chapter III). In most instances, bribery is associated with corruption (UN (General Assembly), 2003, Articles 15 and 17). However, the definition of corruption also applies to other criminal offences such as theft/embezzlement (Article 17) and misuse/abuse of power (Article 19). There are many distinct ways that corruption in Namibia’s fishing industry manifests. One of the most pervasive types of corruption in the fishing industry is using one’s position to influence the issuance of fishing permits to organisations or businesses in which one has a personal financial interest (Standing, 2008, 2015; UNODC, 2017, 2019). This is type of corruption is commonly known as the abuse of one’s position. Other forms of corruption in Namibia include fishing companies’ use of shell businesses in other countries (such as the Pacific Islands) and banking institutions in neighbouring countries to smuggle bribes in exchange for fishing licenses (Wilhjalmsson, 2019). Furthermore, officials may accept bribes in order to disregard irregular crew work licences, which could encourage the use of forced labour on fishing vessels as part of human trafficking (UNODC, 2019). In terms of ship registration, several businesses that operate ship registries on behalf of flag states have frequently secured the rights to do so through unscrupulous and/or corrupt means (UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011).

Fines paid to fisheries authorities without independent scrutiny, revenues from fines not properly accounted for by the responsible authority, or bribes paid to lower penalties are all examples of corruption in the context of monitoring and inspection (INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization, 2014). On land or at sea, fisheries inspectors or law enforcement officers may be offered bribes to ignore the illegal fishing/catching of fish, particularly lucrative species like abalone (UNODC, 2017, 2019). In fishing ports around the world, including Namibia, bribery is common. For instance, fisheries inspectors may approve obviously falsified landing data. Bribery is rampant throughout the fisheries value chain (UNODC, 2017), as recently demonstrated by the Namibia Fishrot scandal. The Fishrot scandal centres around the Icelandic fishing company Samherji bribing Namibia government officials in exchange for fishing rights (Briccetti & Popovich, 2021). As at the time of writing this article, the matter was still sub judice. Ten (10) former businessmen, legislators, and attorneys are facing bribery and corruption charges for allegedly siphoning an estimated US$ 10 million from Namibia’s fishing industry. A state-owned fishing company, National Fishing Corporation of Namibia (FISHCOR), is accused of transferring fishing quotas from private Namibian firms to other local companies where the accused 10 officials had financial stakes (Kleinfeld, 2019). These latter companies were connected to Samherji, the largest fishing company in Iceland, which is accused of paying the ruling party (South West Africa People’s Organisation) officials bribes of around millions of dollars in exchange for privileged access to Namibia’s productive fishing grounds (Kleinfeld, 2019). By registering its business in tax havens like Mauritius and Cyprus, investigative journalists discovered that Samherji was evading paying taxes in Namibia (Kleinfeld, 2019).

To combat corruption in Namibia’s fisheries industry, the involvement of parties such as NAMPOL’s Organised Crime Unit and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), as well as fisheries inspectors, is critical to ensuring thorough investigations, evidence collection, and subsequent successful prosecution of such offences (See also Namibia’s Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003). Often, such cases will be prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 29 of 2004.

3.3. Tax crime in the fishing sector

The Namibia Revenue Agency (NamRa) has been defrauded of over N$ 136 million through provisional tax refunds, a major rise from the N$ 36 million reported in mid-2022 when the agency decided to impose a moratorium on refunds in a bid to crack down on fraudsters. This demonstrates that Namibia is currently confronting substantial issues related to tax fraud and evasion. The breach of tax and revenue regulations, including income tax, value added tax, property tax, business tax, and other types of state levies and charges, including customs duties, is referred to as tax crime, sometimes known as tax evasion or tax fraud. If the offenses are considered crimes by the law, they qualify as tax crimes. Tax crime can be difficult to detect and prove since not all jurisdictions demand disclosure of beneficial ownership of bank accounts and corporations. These territories, which are frequently referred to as “tax havens” or “secrecy jurisdictions,” maintain the gray area between lawful tax planning and criminal tax evasion (Galaz et al., 2018; Shaxon, 2011). As is evidenced by the Fishrot scandal, Namibia’s fishing industry lends itself to tax evasion, misreported or underreported tax, and unreported tax. Given the ease with which criminals in the fisheries can change a vessel’s country of origin and identity, as well as use fictitious companies as registered owners, it would appear that profit-shifting, that is, channelling profit to shell companies in tax havens to avoid paying tax in the country where the profit was generated, is common among these actors (North, 2017). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a significant amount of tax revenue is lost due to tax crime in the fisheries industry, undermining the sector’s benefits for development. Developing nations are particularly negatively impacted, according to the OECD. According to a recent assessment, the combined potential tax revenue losses from the likely illicit seafood trade in Asian and African marine resources represent for 72 to 74 percent of the trade’s overall tax revenue losses, or $1.6 to $3.1 billion annually (Sumaila et al., 2020).

3.4. Other crimes related to the fisheries industry in Namibia

A variety of additional crimes are committed in Namibia’s fisheries industry. Money laundering is one of them. Following the Fishrot affair, the operations of the Icelandic corporation Samherji centred upon tax evasion and money laundering. According to reports, the amount labelled as suspicious by Namibia’s Financial Intelligent Centre in relation with the Fishrot saga is roughly US$650 million, or N$10 billion. The Palermo Convention defines money laundering as the purposeful concealment or disguise of the illegitimate origins of criminal proceeds (UN, 2004, Article 6). The recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF 2012–19), an intergovernmental body that promotes legislative and regulatory reforms to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system, detail universal standards of application towards its goals, including that all countries designate serious crimes as “predicate offences” (i.e. offenses that are a component of a “primary” crime) to money laundering. Many offenses committed by organized crime groups in the fishing industry will be considered severe crimes and consequently predicate offenses.

Crime in the labour market in another type of fisheries crime. Labour market crime in the fisheries ranges from breaches of work and safety regulations to fraud, tax evasion, document forgery and deception. In extreme cases, crimes in the labour market include abduction, unlawful confinement, physical injury, culpable homicide, murder and sexual abuse, as well as forced labour and human trafficking. The Namibia Food and Allied Workers Union’s Walvis Bay branch has often condemned unfair labour practices in Namibia’s snoek industry. The union has often called on fishing companies to end unfair labour practices which include “no work no pay”, working without employment contracts, pay rates of only N$20 per day for seagoing employees, working environments that are not conducive and the deduction of fishing tool costs from employees’ salaries (Niilenge, 2021). Such practices are comparable to forced labor, which is against Article 9 of Namibia’s Constitution which prohibits forced and compulsory labour. According to the ILO (ILO (International Labour Organization), 1930, Article 2(1)), forced labour refers to “any employment or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” It frequently occurs as a result of human trafficking, also known as “trafficking in persons” (ADF, 2022; ILO International Labour Organization, 2016), which is roughly defined as the acquisition and exchange of human beings for the purpose of exploitation (UN, 2004, Annex II).

Drug trafficking is also another example of fisheries crime in Namibia. Drug trafficking refers to the illicit trade, involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale, of substances subject to drug prohibition law. Fishing vessels are ideal modes of transport for drugs for the same reasons that the sector is vulnerable to security offences at sea (Belhabib et al., 2020). Fishing boats can be used as mother ships, a base station from which smaller boats traffic drugs to and fro, support vessels (providing fuel and supplies) for go-fast boats transiting trafficking routes (as is common in the Caribbean), or smaller fishing boats can traffic drugs directly to and from coastal landing sites in smaller quantities, frequently transhipping drugs to mother ships or other vessels (UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Drug trafficking on fishing vessels is sometimes combined with the transit of other illegal products (Hamukuaya, 2020). Because the smell impedes the effectiveness of drug detector dogs, illicit drugs are hidden among or inside deep-frozen fish, and enforcement officers are hesitant to inspect frozen fish, which would necessitate thawing the product (potentially damaging it and providing grounds for compensation claims if their suspicions prove unfounded) (UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011).

Another type of fisheries crime is smuggling. It refers to the illegal transportation of otherwise lawful products from one jurisdiction to another, which is frequently done to evade customs or other duties. Given the large maritime area in which it operates and the related law enforcement issues, the fishing business provides ideal cover for smuggling. Fuel smuggling has been linked to fishing vessels and fishermen all around the world. Migrant smuggling is defined as assisting a migrant in unlawfully entering a country in exchange for a (direct or indirect) cash or material gain (UN, 2004, Annex III, Article 3(a)). The use of fishing boats to smuggle migrants is said to be common (ADF, 2022). Although not formally documented, public media reports on the use of fishing vessels in migrant smuggling are common (de Klerk, 2022a).

3.5. Complexities around the highly contested terrain of marine resources in Namibia

The marine resources sector is fraught with numerous complexities which adversely impact on fisheries law enforcement and compliance (Grynberg et al., 2023). The courts in Namibia have had occasion to address challenges around the highly contested terrain of marine resources. Reference has already been made to the sub judicare Fishrot matter in the introductory parts of this article. The Courts in Namibia have also grappled with this complex matter in other cases such as the National Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v African Selection Fishing (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd & Others (paragraphs 11–14) and Seaflower Pelagic Processing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources (paragraph 59) reveal the complexities that are often associated with the allocation of fish quotas in the industry. In this Seaflower case, in particular, the Deputy Judge President (DJP), Honourable Angula remarked as follows:

… the undertaking by Fishcor to make available 50 000 mt (metric tonnes) every year for 15 years would only be possible under a corrupt environment and would not be viable under a regime where there is strict compliance with the law, particularly with the provisions of the MRA. [Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000] (paragraph 59)

The Ehika Fishing (Proprietary) Limited v Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources case also gave a forum for discussing the complexity of determining fish quota allocations and administrative interference in the process. In this instance, the applicant had horse mackerel fishing rights issued by the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, which were valid for seven years beginning on 1 January 2012 and ending on 31 December 2018 (paragraph 2). The minister extended the applicant’s said fishing rights for a further three years, terminating on 31 December 2021 (paragraph 2). In his letter informing the applicant about the extension of the fishing rights, the minister stated that, despite the extension of the rights, no fishing quota would be allocated until the issues concerning “equity participation and the beneficiation of fishermen’s widows” were resolved (paragraph 2). Dissatisfied with the minister’s decision, the applicant-initiated review proceedings, seeking an order to examine and set aside the minister’s decision (paragraph 3). The minister originally resisted the application; nevertheless, the parties were able to settle the disagreement, and the settlement agreement was made a court order. The current conflict between the parties stems from the interpretation of that court order. According to the applicant’s interpretation of the court order of 5 May 2020, in addition to directing the minister to allocate to the applicant fishing quotas for the year 2020, it also directed the minister to allocate to the applicant fishing quotas for the year 2018/2019 that the minister had held in reserve (paragraph 4). The minister disagreed with the applicant’s understanding. As a result, the applicant initiated the contempt proceedings. Angula DJP ruled that under the Marine Resources Act, No. 27 of 2000, the minister does not have the authority to maintain in reserve fishing quotas that have already been assigned for commercial harvesting. Further, Angula DJP went on to rule that under the Marine Resources Act of 2000, the minister has no legal authority to issue fishing quotas retroactively.

The Confederation of Namibian Fishing Associations v Environmental Commissioner Teofilus Nghitila phosphate mining case adds to the myriad challenges that come with implementing fisheries legislation and maintaining compliance in Namibia. Phosphate mining is seen as a lucrative enterprise, with interests competing with those of Namibia’s fisheries sector. In this case, the Namibia Marine Phosphate (PTY) LTD (NMP) attempted to engage in marine phosphate mining through its “Sandpiper Project” in this case, NMP aimed to do so in a location off the Namibian coast, in the Atlantic Ocean around 120 kilometers south-southwest of Walvis Bay and between 40 to 60 kilometers west of Conception- and Meob Bay (paragraph 1). It obtained the necessary mining license, ML 170, for this purpose. The mining licence area is 25.2 km wide (at its widest point) and 115 km long (at its longest point), covering an area of 2233 km2 (paragraph 2). The proposed mining activities will take place offshore through the dredging of phosphate-enriched sediments in sea depths ranging from 190 to 275 meters in the Sandpiper-1 (SP-1) mining zones (paragraph 3).

The mining license area is located on the outer shelf to the south west of Walvis Bay, inside the Northern Benguela of the Benguela current Large Marine Ecosystem. The Benguela has a great degree of variability across a wide range of temporal and geographical ranges. It is a vital centre for marine biodiversity and food production. Its unique bathymetry, hydrography, chemistry, and trophodynamics combine to make it one of the world’s most productive ocean basins (paragraph 9). The Benguela’s high primary productivity supports a major worldwide (and local) reservoir of biodiversity and biomass of zooplankton, fish, seabirds, and marine mammals, while near-shore and offshore sediments contain rich mineral deposits. Namibia values these living and non-living resources on economic and geopolitical grounds (paragraph 9). Geier J held that not having applied in the prescribed manner for an environmental clearance certificate during the relevant time, currently being without an Environmental Clearance Certificate, it is hereby declared in accordance with the provisions of section 57 as read with sections 27(1) and (3) of the Environmental Management Act, 7 of 2007 that NMP was not to be entitled to undertake a “listed activity” until such time that it had obtained a valid Environmental Clearance Certificate in relation to such activity or activities. After the ruling by the court, the offshore phosphate mining issue appeared to have gone mute but is now resurfacing with strong proponents of offshore phosphate mining considering it a necessity for Namibia’s economy (Chamber of Mines, 2023; De Klerk, 2022b; Tlhage, 2022). Issues around sustainable resource management, environmental impact and related adverse effects on traditional coastal communities and marginalised groups appear not have a long-lasting influence on the ultimate decision to be taken by the policy makers (Amukwa, 2022; De Klerk, 2022c). Such complexities inform fisheries law enforcement and compliance in the sector as the relevant law enforcement officials have to contend with complex governmental, multinational and political interests influence the marine resources sector.

4. Methodology

This is mostly a qualitative study that was informed by a desk examination of fisheries crimes and law enforcement in Namibia and around the world. Furthermore, the study incorporated feedback from participants at a Namibia FishForce Academy, Fisheries Law Enforcement program that the author organized in Walvis Bay, Namibia, in 2022. The Nelson Mandela University FishForce Academy, the University of Namibia, the Norwegian government, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation all provided support and funding for the training of 22 individuals (Namibia-Angola Office). Table 1 shows the breakdown of the participants:

Table 1. Participants who attended the fisheries law enforcement training

Organisation	Role of participant (s) in the organisation	Number of Participants	Nationality
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources	Fisheries Inspector	11	Namibians
Namibia Defence Force	Namibia Navy	2	Namibians
Fisheries Observer Agency	Fisheries Observers	7	Namibians
Ministry of Justice	Legal Officers	2	Namibians

The concepts of sources of law, the function of international law in assuring the implementation of fisheries regulations and combating corruption, administrative justice, and Namibian laws relevant to the enforcement of fisheries laws were all introduced to the trainees. To gauge the participants’ comprehension of the material presented, additional exercises, an assignment, and a test were provided. Their performance in the assessments and feedback in the practical sessions provided insight into Namibia’s fisheries law enforcement strengths and weaknesses. Because the participants represented all of Namibia’s coastal areas, their input was critical in developing tangible results and conclusions on how to strengthen fisheries law enforcement in Namibia and minimize the scourge of fisheries crime in the country.

The subjects who were deliberately chosen nationwide as part of the establishment of the Namibia FishForce Academy are not at danger as a result of this research. The main goal of the training was to use participant comments to create a roadmap for enhancing Namibia’s fisheries law enforcement outside of the specific trained groups. Strategic officials from Namibia’s coastal communities who hold positions as fisheries inspectors, fisheries observers and the navy were deliberately selected for the training. Further to the findings in this article, each participant is expected to publish a chapter detailing their practical experiences in fisheries law enforcement emanating from the training sessions in a special book project designed to bring to light the prospects and challenges of fisheries law enforcement in Namibia with a view to addressing the concerns mentioned throughout the training.

The research thus did not warrant participant consent, request of waiver or alteration of same. No identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens were used from the participants. The rights and welfare of the subjects will not be adversely affected in any way. Through the Namibia FishForce Academy, the subjects or legally authorized representatives will be provided with the research findings from this paper which will inform institutional and policy direction around fisheries law enforcement in Namibia, as was the intended objective for conducting the training. The research is also being done under the auspices of the Global One Ocean Hub Project, through the University of Namibia which has cooperation agreements with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources which enables the researcher to use data from events such as the training in order to inform policy developments in the country.

The participants profiles are provided in Table 2 below. Table 2 provides an overview of the participants’ length of service, level of education and work-related experience in the area of fisheries law enforcement.

Table 2. Profile of participants at the training

Organisation	Portfolio	Number of Participants	Participants’ level of education	Years of experience in the fisheries law and enforcement sector	Prior Training in Fisheries Law Enforcement
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources	Fisheries Inspector	11	A minimum of NQF 7 in Namibia – equivalent to a Bachelor’s Degree	A minimum of 5 years for 5 of the participants and over 20 years for 6 of the participants. Three of the 6 participants with over 20 years’ experience in the sector were nearing the retirement age of 60.	At least two previous trainings had been attended by the participants at a national level, though little to minimal inhouse training was conducted
Namibia Defence Force	Namibia Navy	2	A minimum of NQF 7 in Namibia – equivalent to a Bachelor’s Degree	Both participants had an average exceeding 10 years in the sector	Not much institutional training had been received with this training being the participants’ most recent in the area of fisheries law enforcement
Fisheries Observer Agency	Fisheries Observers	7	A minimum of NQF 7 in Namibia – equivalent to a Bachelor’s Degree	All the participants had more than 5 years’ experience in the sector	At least one training had been attended at national level with occasional institutional engagements been done but not at the expected level.
Ministry of Justice	Legal Officers	2	A minimum of NQF 8 in Namibia – equivalent to an Honours Degree with a highest qualification for one of the legal officers being an NQF 9 – equivalent to a Master of Laws degree	One of the participants had just above three years in the sector and the other had just over five years in the sector.	This was the first training of this nature for both participants.

From the information presented in Table 2, it is evident that the participants selected for the training had the requisite qualifications and work-related experience to engage with the content of the fisheries law enforcement training. However, there was clear indication that previously, not many previous trainings of a similar nature, or inhouse had been offered to the participants. This was a key shortcoming observed from the participants’ profiles. Further, none of the participants, expect for the officials from the Ministry of Justice, had any sufficient working knowledge of the law in practice though they are expected to implement the same. In their respective work stations, they also did not have in house legal advisors to rely upon for clarity in terms of any grey areas as regards the enforcement and compliance of fisheries laws was concerned. They relied on the Ministry of Justice for clarity in interpreting, enforcing and compliance of fisheries laws. As such, the participants did not have specialised fisheries law and compliance experts at their disposal in executing their daily functions.

4.1. Course content covered

The training covered a number of key issues that are critical to fisheries law enforcement from a national, regional and international levels. Key topics focused on included the following:

1. Compliance and enforcement in the fisheries sector – in this regard, a discussion of what constitutes compliance and enforcement was undertaken. The concepts enforcement tools, criminal enforcement, administrative enforcement, civil enforcement and the links between commercial and organised crime were articulated.

2. Regional and International dimension of fisheries law enforcement and compliance – In this section of the training there was an engagement with the relevant regional and international agreements informing fisheries law enforcement and compliance. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), regional fisheries agreements and related protocols were discussed, as were other relevant organisations and agreements such as CITES. International and regional assistance processes and procedures pertaining to fisheries crimes, law enforcement and investigations were also discussed. Special emphasis was made to the significance of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the International Criminal Police Organization’s key roles in fighting international and regional fisheries crimes.

3. Other areas covered included the role of the 1990 Constitution of Namibia, Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000, Fisheries Inspectors, Fisheries Observers, other law enforcement agents in fighting and/or combating fisheries crimes. The legislative aspects regulating fraud and corruption in the marine resources sector were discussed. Principles of administrative justice were also engaged with to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of the current marine resources administrative framework (from both a policy and regulatory perspective).

In covering the course content set out above, specific measurable objectives were set out to be achieved in the training. The objectives were as follows:

• (a) To discuss the following enforcement concepts with reference to applicable fisheries legislation in Namibia:

  • (i) Enforcement tools;

  • (ii) Criminal enforcement;

  • (iii) Administrative enforcement; and

  • (iv) Civil enforcement.

• (b) To ascertain if international, continental and regional agreements applicable to fisheries law enforcement reflect the reality and challenges created by a world of borders and commons.

• (c) To explain the significance of the 1990 Constitution of Namibia, the Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000 and other applicable legislation in combating fisheries crimes in Namibia.

• (d) To analyse the adverse effects of corruption and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing on the sustainable utilization and conservation of marine resources in Namibia.

To test participants’ levels of mastery, proficiency and overall understanding of the set objectives, a take home assignment and test were given. The performance of the participants in these assessments is presented later in this article. Further to the assessments, discursive and/or interactive sessions were used by the author as mechanisms for measuring the existent levels of understanding of the participants on the set objectives. The participants’ levels of understanding regarding the set objectives are presented in the findings section of this paper.

5. Fisheries law enforcement

In order to combat fisheries crime in Namibia, it is necessary to first distinguish between formal and informal enforcement methods when engaging in the discourse of fisheries law enforcement. Criminal enforcement (prosecution of fisheries crimes), administrative enforcement (issuance of directives and compliance notices, or suspension or cancellation of a right, licence, or permit), and civil enforcement are examples of formal enforcement tools.

Informal enforcement instruments are those that can aid in enforcement but are not officially mandated by legislation. This includes offering oral or written warnings to violators, as well as producing inspection reports noting non-compliance and giving the transgressor an opportunity to correct instances of non-compliance. While it has no direct legal consequences, issuing formal written warnings (or producing inspection reports) may be sufficient in some situations to make a transgressor comply. The added benefit is that if the transgressor persists in his or her behaviour, he or she will not be able to use ignorance of the law as a defence, and such behavior will be considered extenuating circumstances if the transgressor is later prosecuted and convicted for noncompliance.

Enforcement must be viewed in the wider context of compliance. Compliance is essentially the ideal circumstance in which the regulated people comply with the applicable legislation. In the context of this article, compliance refers to the scenario or state in which both the industry and citizens follow the country’s fishing rules (EWEAEPPP England and Wales Environment Agency Enforcement and Prosecution Policy, Policy, 2008). While there are other tools available to promote compliance, such as incentives (for example, providing a tax rebate if full compliance is achieved) and self-regulatory and voluntary measures (for example, persons belonging to a professional body and subjecting themselves to such a body’s code of conduct), this module focuses on enforcement measures as a tool to regulate the fisheries sector (EWEAEPPP England and Wales Environment Agency Enforcement and Prosecution Policy, Policy, 2008). As a result, enforcement measures are the “stick” that is employed when there is noncompliance. This allows for some kind of “penalty” or consequence if someone violates the fishery laws. The following principles underpin effective enforcement:

• Proportionality: the enforcement action taken must be proportionate to the risks posed to the resource and to the seriousness of any breach of the law;

• Consistency: this means taking a similar approach in similar circumstances to achieve similar ends, but also recognising that decisions are based on a variety of variables, and that a certain amount of discretion is necessary to function effectively;

• Transparency: the regulated community must clearly understand what is expected from them, and what they can expect of enforcement officials; and

• Targeting: regulatory effort is directed primarily towards transgressors whose activities lead, or may lead, to serious damage to the resource (EWEAEPPP 2008).

Effective enforcement action can achieve the following:

• Consistent and transparent enforcement action serves as a deterrent, and can create a culture of voluntary compliance in the long run;

• While damage has often already been caused prior to the taking of enforcement action, such action can halt further damage;

• Administrative notices and supplementary orders, where available, can ensure that loss or damage is compensated, and rehabilitation takes place (where possible) (EWEAEPPP 2008).

6. National legislation

As indicated in Article 95(l)25 in, among other things, the “environment” and “nature conservation,” the national parliament and regional and local government legislatures have concurrent legislative powers. “nature conservation,” on the other hand, expressly excludes “national parks, national botanical gardens, and marine resources,” all of which fall within exclusive national competence, which means that only the national legislature can pass legislation dealing with these issues.

6.1. The Constitution

The Constitution therefore serves as the basis for the protection of the environment. However, the “environment” itself is not a legal subject, nor the holder of any rights. It requires a human enforcer. In this context, it is the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFRMR), Fisheries Inspectors (FIs), and Fisheries Observers (FOs), as well as other agencies such as NAMPOL, environment officers (and in the case of prosecutions, together with the Prosecutor-General or state advocate) that has the duty to enforce and protect this right. Article 95(l) of the Namibian Constitution, provides as follows:

The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following – (l) Maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future; in particular, the Government shall provide measures against the dumping or recycling of foreign nuclear and toxic waste on Namibian territory.

Article 95(l) is written in anthropocentric language, as one would expect from a constitutional clause. The environment does not gain any rights; the right is granted to the individual. The protection of the environment is thus a human right of all people. This provision, on the other hand, is quite progressive in that it applies the principle of intergenerational equality: it is a right of the current generation as well as future generations, at least insofar as the current generation has a right to have the environment protected for the benefit of future generations. The promotion of conservation and the sustainable use of fisheries resources should be stressed in the context of the fisheries resource.

6.2. Human rights and its consequences for fisheries law enforcement

Article 18 of Constitution of Namibia (1990) Constitution guarantees the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair, and is particularly relevant in the context of administrative enforcement action based on environmental legislation, such as the issuance of a directive or compliance notice. The right will be applicable in the MRA when the procedure in Section 41 is used to cancel or suspend rights, licenses, or permits.

Other provisions in the Bill of Rights, such as the right to dignity (article 8), the right to equality and freedom from discrimination (section 10), the right to privacy (article 13), and the rights of arrested, detained, and accused persons (article 11), are also highly relevant due to the powers granted to FIs and FOs under the MRA to inspect, search, seize, arrest, and investigate. These rights are violated when FIs and FOs use their powers to search, seize, and arrest.

These rights can only be limited in so far as Article 22 of the Constitution allows for such limitation “in terms of a law of general application to the degree that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. As a result, these rights are not absolute, and the MRA includes measures that limit them, such as the ability of FIs and FOs to examine places with a search warrant.

To enforce fisheries legislation, FIs and FOs will violate some of these rights, such as searching a residence or arresting a person—this is necessary to enforce the law. The FIs and FOs may only act strictly within the scope and boundaries of their authority. If the FIs and FOs do not strictly act within their authorities, there is the possibility of civil claims for rights infringement, or evidence gathered in violation of a constitutional right may be found inadmissible by a court. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that when infringing on a person’s right to privacy, for example by searching their home with a search warrant for evidence of a contravention of the MRA, the FIs and FOs is protecting the right to have the environment protected as set out in Article 95(l).

7. The Marine Resources Act

The MRA regulates marine fish conservation and exploitation (section 1 of the MRA). It is necessary to check if a term is defined in section 1 whenever it appears in an MRA provision. A notable example is “marine resources,” which, according to the common or biological definition, excludes, to mention just three, whales, abalone, and algae. However, section 1’s definition of “marine resources” states that it includes “all marine organisms, including, but not limited to, plants, vertebrate and invertebrate animals, monerans, protists (including seaweeds), fungi and viruses, as well as guano and anything naturally derived from or produced by such organisms.”

7.1. Application of the MRA

The MRA applies to Namibian waters. The territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of Namibia as established by the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia Act 3 of 1990, as well as the sea bed up to the high-water mark, are all considered to be Namibian waters under section 1 of the MRA. The MRA applies to all persons within Namibian seas, whether or not they are Namibians (See section 32 of the MRA) as well as fishing activities by foreign vessels up to the border of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Further, the MRA applies extraterritorially to all local fishing vessels, even in the high seas (forming the basis of what is referred to as “flag state control”. The MRA does not apply to fish found in water that has never been a part of the Namibian sea (Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia Act 3 of 1990). However, fish discovered in river mouths or estuaries that are, even if only intermittently, connected to the sea will be covered by the MRA. The definition of “Namibian waters” in section 1 supports this by defining them to include tidal lagoons and rivers “in which a rise and fall of the water level occurs as a result of the tides.”

The MRA also makes provision for administrative matters (See sections 1-3 of the MRA). The Minister may, from time to time, establish general policies on the conservation and utilisation of marine resources in order to maximise benefits accruing to all Namibians, both present and future. Section 2 provides for the management of maritime resources. Most importantly, Section 3 provides for the appointment of fishery inspectors (FIs) and section 4 for the powers of FIs. A fisheries inspector may, at any time and without a warrant -

1. board any vessel and inspect such vessel, its fishing gear, cargo and stores, any marine resources aboard and any document or other item required to be kept under this Act, and may, for the purposes of that inspection, stop that vessel;

2. enter any premises, other than a dwelling house, or any vehicle, in which marine resources or any fishing gear are kept or are being transported, as the case may be (Section 4 of the MRA).

Sections 52–60 deal with offences and proceedings. Section 52 specifically states that any person who, as the owner, lessee, charterer, or master of a foreign flag vessel, uses or allows a foreign flag vessel to be used in Namibian waters for harvesting marine resources without the authorisation of a valid licence in respect thereof is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N$2 000 000. Furthermore, any person who, being the owner, the lessee, the charterer or the master of a Namibian flag vessel, uses such vessel to harvest marine resources, or allows it to be so used, without the authorisation of a valid licence in respect thereof shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N$2 000 000. The participants believe that the fines levied are ineffective deterrents for a fishing sector that earns billions of dollars annually. This is an outdated section of the MRA that should be revised to include harsh penalties and jail terms.

7.2. Fisheries inspectors’ powers

The powers of FIs are crucial to ensuring Namibia has an efficient fisheries law enforcement regime. Section 4 of the MRA grants FIs extensive powers. This implies that the MRA grants FIs rights of inspection, search, and seizure in relation to all foreign vessels within Namibia’s EEZ, as well as all local fishing vessels, including on the high seas. Section 56 of the MRA grants Namibian courts (the High Court and Magistrate’s Courts) jurisdiction over any citizen or person ordinarily resident in Namibia. Beyond Namibian waters, FIs have the right of hot pursuit under Article 111 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Section 4(3)(a) &; (b) of the MRA). A FI may therefore, without a warrant, stop, board, and search any foreign fishing vessel pursued outside Namibian waters that he or she has reasonable grounds to believe has been used in the commission of an offence in Namibian waters, and can bring such a vessel and crew to any harbour or port in Namibia. In the case of hot pursuit, the powers of search and seizure of foreign vessels therefore extends to the high seas (and the EEZ of another country, but not the territorial sea of another country).

7.3. Powers of inspection

FIs are authorized to stop and examine any local fishing vessel (including those on the high seas) and any foreign fishing vessel in Namibian waters without a warrant (Section 4). FIs may direct that a vessel be directed to a port or harbour for the purpose of conducting a search. The MRA allows for inspection of fish processing establishment (Section 4(b)). It is important to note “fish processing establishment” must be extended to include vessels, vehicles, and buildings where any substance or commodity is manufactured from fish using any method (Section 4(b)). In terms of section 4(b), at any reasonable time, FIs have the authority to visit and examine any fish processing establishment or any other site where fish products are housed or stored. Inspections of fish processing plants and restaurants can also be done under this clause. There is also provision for the comprehensive inspection power over cars or airplanes. Airplanes are included because the definition of vehicle in section 1 of the MRA is extended to include, “ … any conveyance capable of transporting goods or persons”. Any fish detected during an MRA inspection or search may be sampled by a FI.

7.4. Powers to search

FIs can search vessels, vehicles and aircraft and seize any property without a search warrant as set out in section 4 of the MRA. FIs also have the following powers to act without a warrant with regard to vessels, vehicles and aircraft:

• To stop, enter and search based on a reasonable suspicion that an offence is being committed;

• To enter and search with consent;

• To enter and search where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant would be issued, but that the delay that may be caused by applying for a warrant would defeat the object of the entry or search (Section 4).

The MRA authorises a FI to enter and search premises without a warrant. The MRA does not explicitly provide that a FI can apply for a search warrant, but it seems implicit in the power to execute a search warrant (Section 4 of MRA; See also Section 22 of CPA). Premises can be entered and searched without a warrant:

• With the consent of the person in control of such premises;

• Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant will be issued, but that the delay that may be caused by applying for a warrant would defeat the purpose of the entry or search.

However, in practice and in terms of section 21(a) of the CPA, there are certain circumstances in which a warrant may need to be obtained through and with the assistance of the NAMPOL. In terms of section 20 of the CPA, an article to be seized with a search warrant must be, “ … concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence, whether within Namibia or elsewhere”. However, in terms of section 4(2)(b) of the MRA, seizure can also be done by a FI without a warrant. This may be a grey area in the two pieces of legislation that may need to be addressed for practical operational purposes.

7.5. Inspections v Investigations

The MRA does not define the term “inspection”. However, such an action is commonly recognized as a routine activity to ensure compliance. When a FI has a suspect that a violation has occurred, she or he cannot rely on the authority to conduct a warrantless inspection—such an action will not be normal, nor will it easily confirm compliance. When responding to a suspicion of noncompliance, the FI would undertake an investigation (rather than an inspection), which would necessitate conducting a search (rather than an inspection visit), with the goal of obtaining evidence (as opposed to ascertaining compliance). Different prescriptions apply, and a different procedure must be followed un such a case, implying that a search warrant must be obtained (unless it falls under one of the exceptions set out above). Failure to follow the necessary procedure when a search is required (for example, pretending it is a normal inspection and so not requiring a search warrant) increases the probability that the evidence uncovered will be considered unconstitutionally obtained and hence inadmissible. Evidence as provided for in section 57 of the MRA is a crucial component of ensuring the successful prosecution of offenders. The major goal of establishing the FishForce Academy in Namibia was to ensure that FIs and FOs acquire the essential skills to secure evidence that leads to successful convictions of offenders in an environment where many have evaded liability for fisheries offences.

The court confirmed the position in law that an inspection is a routine activity that can take place without a warrant where the legislation allows for it, but where there is a suspicion that an offence has been committed, a warrant must be obtained, save for the exceptions where a delay will frustrate the objects of the search, or with permission (in terms of the CPA, and MRA) (See the recent case of Els v Minister of Safety and Security (HC-MD-CIV-ACT-OTH- 5161 of 2020) (2022) NAHCMD 557 (14 October 2022) para 41. See also the Supreme Court case of Government of Republic of Namibia v Ndjembo (SA 39 of 2017) [2020] NASC 56 (30 November 2020)). The court ruled that warrantless routine inspections generally meet constitutional muster and consequently are valid. Statutory provisions that provide for warrantless “targeted inspections” (a search) are however unconstitutional and invalid. The situation is different where a FIs enters premises on an inspection (that is, without a suspicion of non-compliance), and then find evidence of a transgression. In such a scenario, because the entry on the inspection was lawful, any further actions that follow, of course within the powers granted to the FIs, will remain lawful—the inspection then “becomes” an investigation (or search). All evidence then gathered remains admissible, as the initial entry remains lawful.

7.6. Seizure under the MRA

Seizure occurs in both cases of warrantless inspections and searches, under Section 4 of the MRA. This includes the authority to seize:

• With consent; or

• Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant would be issued, but that the delay that may be caused by applying for a warrant would defeat the object of the seizure; or on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that it was used in the commission of a crime or that it was illegally harvested (in the case of fish) (Section 4).

A vessel, its gear, equipment, stores, and cargo may be seized, as well as a vehicle or aircraft used in the execution of the offence; fish or fish products taken, produced, or possessed in violation of the MRA; prohibited gear; log books; records, and “anything” that could be used as evidence (Section 4).

7.7. Powers of a peace officer

A FI “shall in the exercise of his or her powers in terms of the MRA, be deemed to be a peace officer as defined in the Criminal Procedure Act”. This means that a FI can arrest a person on a Schedule 1 offence falling within his or her mandate (almost all offences under the MRA and regulations issued under it are Schedule 1 offences), and also has the power to issue an admission of guilt fine under the CPA (See Sections 38, 42, 44, 63 and 112 and Schedules 3, 4 and 5 of the CPA).

7.8. Handling of seized vehicles, vessels and aircraft

On application, seized vessels, vehicles, and aircraft may be released by the court until the conclusion of judicial procedures (Section 55(8) of the MRA). To begin, the application must be filed with “the court which will hear the matter,” which is the criminal court where the case is heard (Section 56 of the MRA). Second, note that it can be brought by the “master, owner, charterer, or agent”- the accused or person in whose possession the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was cannot bring such an application unless he or she is one of the abovementioned persons, and an accused cannot bring such an application if the vehicle is subject to a hire purchase agreement, as the financial institution is the owner in such a case. Third, and most significantly, this defined method means that once a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft has been seized under the MRA, a police officer is not authorized to release it under the CPA.

The court determines the amount of security by adding the maximum fine for the alleged offence, as well as foreseeable costs and expenses, to the value of the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, but can determine a lesser amount where there are “special and exceptional circumstances” to do so (Section 4(b) of the MRA). A forfeiture order for the security also serves as a forfeiture order for the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft. There should be no issue to releasing the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft on nominal security if it belongs to an innocent third party, but keep in mind that the registered owner is not always the genuine owner. Security can also be used to pay a fine after being discharged for forfeiture. If the owner or person in possession of such a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft is convicted, the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft may be impounded until the fine is paid. The State is not liable for the confiscated items’ loss, damage, or degradation. Following a conviction, the court may order the forfeiture of vessels, cars, aircraft, equipment, and gear.

8. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

International and regional treaties reflect the realities and problems posed by a world divided by borders and commons. The term “commons” refers to territories that are not under the jurisdiction of any government. A few thoughts on this in the context of fishing include the following: 1) Illegal fishing has a global impact on food security; 2) Countries must agree on what sections of the sea “belong” to each country; and 3) The high seas are not within any country’s authority; 4) Unrestricted access to a common property resource frequently leads to over-exploitation of natural resources or environmental degradation; and 5) The illegal trade in marine items, such as abalone, frequently crosses international borders. The executive in Namibia is responsible for negotiating and signing international and regional agreements, although they are only binding on the country after ratification by both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (See section 63(2)(d) of the Namibian Constitution). In this article a discussion on one such agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will be done. The UNCLOS’ application in Namibia is subject to the provisions of Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia which states that, “general rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia”. The UNCLOS was ratified by the United Nations Council for Namibia, on behalf of Namibia in 1983. The UNCLOS is therefore binding on Namibia. However, there are also non-binding “soft law” instruments in existence which are applicable to Namibia such as the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Emphasis will be placed on the UNCLOS in this article and not the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.

Glazewski describes the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as “perhaps the most elaborate world order bargain reached by the international community” (Glazewski, 2005, p. 40). In 1983, Namibia became the fifth country to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This global “Constitution of the Oceans” was adopted in 1982 after nearly 10 years of difficult deliberations. The United Nations Council for Namibia ratified it on Namibia’s behalf. Although the Namibian Constitution does not claim the territorial waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the baselines (roughly corresponding to the low water mark) as part of Namibian territory (as permitted by UNCLOS), all Namibian law applies to the territorial waters, rendering this issue purely academic (Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia Act 3 of 1990).

UNCLOS therefore inter alia determines the “borders” at sea and has to be incorporated into domestic legislation. Those relevant to Fisheries Inspectors are internal waters (Section 2 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia Act 3 of 1990): This constitutes all waters landward of the determined baselines (more or less corresponding to the low water mark) and includes harbours. Internal waters form part of South African territory and the normal rules of jurisdiction apply. Territorial waters (Section 1 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia Act 3 of 1990): This extends seaward to 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the baselines. Having discussed the key provisions of the MRA and relevant aspects of the UNCLOS, the next section looks at the findings of author which emanate from the observations of participants who attended the fisheries law enforcement training in Walvis Bay, Namibia, in the year 2022. As already alluded to, the training informs the writing of this article in so far as the effectiveness of fisheries law enforcement in Namibia is concerned.

9. Findings from the fisheries law enforcement training

The participants demonstrated a basic awareness of Namibian fishing rules and regulations. Nonetheless, many were unsure about the role of Namibia’s constitution in combating corruption. There were various obstacles that hampered the participants’ willingness to implement fisheries law and ensure compliance. These are as follows

1. Corruption, intervention by superiors, insufficient understanding of the law, lack of money, lack of contemporary technology and/or equipment, limited training offered in the area of fisheries law enforcement, and fear of huge business backlash were among the identified problems. It is therefore not debatable that in identifying, investigating, and successfully prosecuting fisheries crime, Namibia faces a number of fisheries law enforcement challenges. Such enforcement challenges are exacerbated by the concealment and usage of convenience flags in the fishing industry. Another key challenge is the low national attention assigned to fishing crime at the governmental and operational levels.

2. In Namibia, law enforcement officers and fishery observers pointed out that limited ministerial and/or departmental budgets and resources push law enforcement agencies to prioritise investigation of cases deemed critical in any given context. As a result, all crimes associated with the fisheries value chain will not be investigated because in selected instances they will not be regarded as a high priority. Investigations will therefore not take place under such circumstances.

3. Participants identified lack of institutional and logistical support around capacity building and conducting of daily inspectorate and observatory routines as issues adversely impacting on fisheries law enforcement and compliance in Namibia. In particular, FIs cited the need for specialised training as peace officers on a regular basis to enable them to effectively carry out their duties. Further, all the participants indicated that the knowledge gap in the area of fisheries law enforcement and compliance needed to be closed by offering FIs, FOs and other relevant law enforcement officers with formal training at the level of a postgraduate diploma level, to cover the specialised aspects of the training from a transdisciplinary perspective.

4. Participants identified a lack of cooperation between government departments and agencies on a national, regional, and international scale as another major barrier to fisheries law enforcement in Namibia. Because of the worldwide nature of the fishing business, key actors are dispersed across several jurisdictions, with individuals ultimately responsible for and benefiting from criminal acts frequently residing in states other than those where the activities are taking place. This can make it difficult to determine whether state has jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged offences (NA-FIG 2017, 66). Successful prosecution of fisheries crime is extremely difficult without a strong level of information-sharing and collaboration among law enforcement authorities, particularly cross-border mutual legal aid. (UNODC, 2017, pp. 28–29).

5. Another key concern that the participants raised was that there is a general reluctance to criminalise fisheries crime at the national level in Namibia. Whilst the language of the law makes provision for fisheries crime, it is difficult for fisheries inspectors, NAMPOL and fisheries observers to investigate and prosecute fisheries crime effectively due to interferences by superiors. This problem has been emphasised in reports and outcome documents of UNODOC and NA-FIG (NA-FIG 2017, 66; UNODC, 2017, p. 14). Namibia has not adequately criminalised offences committed by their nationals onboard foreign fishing vessels at sea or passed legislation regarding offences onboard stateless vessels. The result is that fisheries crime at sea (beyond national waters) is often not investigated or prosecuted (NA-FIG 2017, 66).

6. To maintain effective control over huge and frequently remote marine areas, efficient at-sea monitoring by patrol boats requires significant infrastructure and resources (UNODC 2011, 131). Namibia, being a state heavily reliant on the fishing industry, has relatively limited maritime law enforcement resources. The country lacks capacity in law enforcement and criminal justice, especially in financial investigations and at-sea monitoring. Due to funding and technological limitations, FIs and FOs lack the capacity to detect many types of fisheries crime, investigate, and successfully prosecute the offences. These are key problems that must be addressed in terms of combating fisheries crime (UNODC, 2019, p. 49).

7. The lack of accurate information about the beneficial ownership of vessels and legal entities operating in the fishing sector, as well as unreliable and out-of-date information on vessel identities and global movements, including at-sea transhipments, impede investigations into organised fisheries crime (UNODC 2011, 132, 137). The ability of criminal networks to easily invest, disguise, and launder the proceeds of their crimes in financial secrecy jurisdictions around the world, particularly through the use of corporate structures such as anonymous shell companies and tax havens, limits FIs’ ability to “follow the money” and recover the proceeds of crime and secure restitution (UNODC 2011).

8. Further to the above highlighted findings on challenges encountered in Namibia’s fisheries law enforcement efforts, another crucial finding was made. This finding is related to the knowledge of FIs and FOs regarding the applicable laws applicable to the fisheries industry. Assessments were required in order to assess participants’ knowledge of fisheries law. The participants were given an assignment and a test that assessed several facets of Namibian fisheries law enforcement. The results of the two assessments are shown in Table 3 below.

   Table 3. Performance of participants in the fisheries law written assessments

   Institution	Assignment				Did not submit assignment	Test				Did not write the test
   	0–50%	51–64%	64–74%	75% and above		0–49%	50–64%	65–74%	75% and above
   MFMR	-	6	-	4	1	1	5	3	1	1
   FO	1	2	2	2	-	2	3	2	-
   Ministry of Justice	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
   NAVY	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1

According to the data presented above, the majority of the participants’ performance was average in the assignment because they were able to rely on the course guide and online resources to answer the assignment question. The assignment question sought to assess participants’ knowledge of laws applicable to Namibia’s fisheries industry (with a particular emphasis on the blue economy). A test was given on the last day of the training. The test had the same types of questions as the assignment. The performance was not as encouraging as the performance on the assignment. Despite having served for at least five (5) years, the majority of the evaluated participants struggled to answer common questions about fisheries law enforcement in Namibia. Furthermore, the participants appeared to underestimate the significance of constitutional requirements in fisheries law enforcement. Their knowledge of the legislation regulating marine resources and transboundary maritime operations was inadequate. Further, participants’ knowledge of international norms and/or rules regulating fisheries crime was limited. The shortcomings in the level of knowledge could be attributed to a notable lack of in-house training and refresher courses on fisheries law enforcement as a means of preventing fisheries crime. Based on the findings presented in the findings section, the recommendations section advances proposals to improve fisheries law enforcement in Namibia.

10. Recommendations

The following are the participants driven and author validated recommendations emanating from the week-long training and the discussions advanced in this article:

1. There is need to offer regular training on fisheries law enforcement outside of the training offered. In house training must be offered at regular intervals and more funding is needed to run trainings on fisheries law enforcement in Namibia. Such training must be extended to management level officials and not just low-ranking police officers, FIs and FOs.

2. There is need for exchange programmes to be conducted, specifically for FIs, FOs and other law enforcement and compliance officials, with other officials in similar capacities in Southern African, Africa as a whole and other parts of the world. This can allow for a practical sharing of experiences and the technical level on how law enforcement and compliance can be practically and not just theoretically improved.

3. Legislative reform may be required to improve the current enforcement levels which are not sufficiently deterrent. In particular, there is need to develop mechanisms for reinforcing the current policy and regulatory framework around fighting corruption in the fisheries sector. Particular emphasis must be placed on strengthening Namibia’s ability to curb both national and international criminal activities related to the fisheries sector.

4. There is need to improve the salary scales and conditions of service of FIs and FOs and other related incentives so that they are not prone to corruption. When these officials conduct inspections and observations, in particular on foreign fishing vessels, they are at the mercy of the fishing crew who are led by captains who carry huge sums of money. Any infractions observed will be swept under the carpet as these officials can be enticed with foreign currency which far exceed their meagre salaries and subsistence allowances for the period they are on board such fishing vessels.

5. To combat fisheries crime, Namibia needs to forge various forms of intergovernmental cooperative enforcement strategies to combat fisheries crime. The numerous offences that fall under “fisheries crime” call for collaboration from Namibia’s governmental agencies in order to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of criminal networks. As such, fisheries law enforcement trainings must be extended to other stakeholders or key participants in the fisheries sector such as immigration officials, police, members of the security cluster and academics, policy makers, amongst others.

6. There is need to improve on the institutional and logistical support around capacity building and conducting of daily inspectorate and observatory routines as issues adversely impacting on fisheries law enforcement and compliance in Namibia. In particular, FIs and FOs need to be granted regular specialised training as peace officers to enable them to effectively carry out their duties.

7. Regional and global cooperation also plays a vital role in enhancing the investigation of organised crime in fisheries. A multilateral team of experts and INTERPOL must be invited in future trainings to help facilitate information-sharing, analyses and possible prosecution of the offenders in various jurisdictions.

8. In order to help engage the criminal law enforcement track and hinder criminal operators’ capacity to include fines in the cost of doing business, many nations throughout the world have criminalised fishery offences and applied deterrent penalties. Namibia should consider Ghana’s and South Africa’s measures to ensuring deterrent penalties for fisheries crime. For example, the Ghanaian courts in certain circumstances, impose a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment for the illegal export of fish under the terms of the Fisheries Act 625 of 2002 (See for example section 127). In South Africa violations of almost all the provisions of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 amount to a criminal offence and are punishable by a fine of up to 5 million rand ($338,000) (See section 58(3)).

9. There is need for inter-ministerial capacity-building exercises to broad the knowledge and honing the abilities of FIs, FOs, police and prosecutors in Namibia’s to strengthen their capacity to fight fisheries crime in the country’ fisheries industry. Accredited professional courses aimed at increasing law enforcement capacity to detect and punish crimes throughout the fisheries value chain must be provided by the recently established Namibia FishForce Academy, which is currently administered by the University of Namibia’s Sam Nujoma Campus at Henties Bay. The participants at the 2022 Walvis Bay training vigorously advocated for fisheries law enforcement training at diploma level.

10. Due to the transnational nature of fisheries crime, Namibia’s law enforcement authorities must supplement their technical know-how with strong international networks established to facilitate fast and accurate information gathering as well as intelligence-led law enforcement actions. This is made possible by international government organizations like UNODC and the INTERPOL Fisheries Crime Working Group as well as global initiatives like the International Symposiums on Fisheries Crime, which was replaced by the Global Blue Justice Conferences which started in 2020.

11. There is need for Namibia to invest in the latest equipment and vessels that will enable law enforcement officials to maintain effective control over huge and frequently remote marine areas. Efficient at-sea monitoring by patrol boats requires significant infrastructure and resources. If this is done, fisheries law enforcement and compliance can become practical in high level commercial fishing activities and cross border fisheries activities.

12. A specialised postgraduate diploma must be offered by the University of Namibia in the are area of Fisheries Law enforcement and compliance. Lessons can be drawn from the Nelson Mandela University in South Africa, which has been running a FishForce Academy as part of the One Ocean Hub Global Project. The Nelson Mandela FishForce Academy has been run in partnership with the Norwegian Government. This has enabled the Nelson Mandela University to offer certificate and diploma programmes on matters pertaining to fisheries law enforcement and compliance as cost recovery programmes. The participants at the Namibia Fisheries Law Enforcement and Compliance training emphasised the need for the training to be offered as a postgraduate diploma programme as its content was pertinent to FIs and FOs daily operations. This is a proposal that has already been extended to the Director of the FishForce Academy in Namibia for further engagement with the University of Namibia Management.

11. Conclusion

Fisheries crimes pose a serious challenge to Namibia and global law enforcement agencies. Such crimes are often characterised by criminal actions that are international and organized in nature in some cases. Fisheries crimes include illegal shipping of marine resources, illegal fishing, corruption, money laundering, and document and tax fraud. Combating fisheries crimes is a crucial priority for Namibia in the twenty-first century for ensuring long-term development and safeguarding marine resources for future generations. The fisheries law enforcement training in Namibia mentioned in this article was so important in the attempt to reduce fisheries crime in Namibia. The fisheries law enforcement training program was timely. The participants reported average to below-average awareness of the regulations governing Namibia’s fishing industry, but more has to be done. Continuous in-house training in fisheries law enforcement is required. Legislative reforms may also be required to guarantee that FIs and FOs’ ability to carry out their tasks is smoother and more practicable in the circumstances.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplemental material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2286043

Additional information

Funding

This project was funded by Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Namibia-Angola Office), the Nelson Mandela University (FishForce Academy) as part of the Global One Ocean Hub Project, the Namibia Fish Force Academy and the Norwegian Government, through cooperation agreements- entered into by the parties.

Notes on contributors

Tapiwa Victor Warikandwa

Tapiwa Victor Warikandwa – LLB, LLM, LLD (University of Fort Hare, South Africa). At the University of Namibia’s School of Law, Dr Warikandwa teaches as a Senior Lecturer. He has particular expertise in several areas, including international trade law, environmental law, constitutional law, mining law, legal anthropology, property law, labour law, and marine law. He has edited numerous books and published articles in varying disciplines as well. He is the Global One Ocean Hub Project’s RP1 Lead Researcher in Namibia. Prior to coming to Namibia, Dr. Warikandwa worked as a legal officer and later legal advisor in the Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare in Zimbabwe. He was also a post-doctoral fellow at the Nelson Mandela School of Law at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and later senior lecturer at the same institution. Dr Warikandwa also completed an ordinary and advanced training in Labour Law Making at the International Labour Organization’s International Training Centre in Turin Italy.

Notes

1. This article grew out of a training program for Fisheries Law inspectors and observers in Walvis Bay, Namibia. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the University of Namibia, the FishForce Academy at Nelson Mandela University in South Africa, and the Norwegian Government all contributed to the training. The training was the first in a series of courses for fisheries inspectors and observers at the newly established Namibia FishForce academy, which is based at the University of Namibia’s Sam Nujoma Campus and headed by Dr Samuel Mwafila. Dr. Mwafila deserves special recognition for organizing the training. Professor Jacob Nyambe, Executive Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Management, and Law, who seconded me on the project, deserves special recognition. The project was also carried out as part of the author’s research obligations on the One Ocean Hub Global Project, for which he is a Lead Researcher for RP1, which focuses on legal studies related to the economic mainstreaming of small-scale fisheries and the responsible exploitation of marine resources as part of the blue economy discourse.

2. LLB, LLM, LLD (University of Fort Hare, South Africa), Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Commerce, Management and Law, University of Namibia, and RP1 Lead Researcher, One Ocean Hub Project, Namibia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000–0001–5792–5635, corresponding author, Email: [email protected].