The emergence of nonviolent nationalist movement among the tribes of Waziristan in Pakistan

Abstract

In the second decade of the 21^st century, the emergence of Pashtun Tahafuz (protection) Movement (PTM), among the tribes of Waziristan, rose to talk about the rights of Pashtuns after major military operations against the militants in doing so challenging government policies in the erstwhile tribal areas. The research has thoroughly investigated reasons of the emergence and popularity of PTM, its achievements and political ecosystem. The study has employed new social movement and asymmetric federalism theories. The study has argued that the protracted conflict coupled with government policies of securitization in erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and feeling of discrimination among the Pashtun youth has led to the creation of a pro-Pashtun movement in 2018. The movement has been kept nonviolent, promotes progressive values and provides an alternate platform for the youth to address grievances thus halting their enrollment within militant groups. The paper utilises ethnographic-based data collection tools, such as semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and personal observations to reach its findings.

IMPACT STATEMENT

This study considers the emergence of the PTM in the erstwhile FATA since 2018 with a special attention for (North and South) Waziristan which forms half of the territory of the erstwhile FATA and wherein the movement took its origin. Based on qualitative data and field research conducted in Waziristan (both North and South) between December 2019 and January 2020, the study explores the dynamics that turned the movement into a leading actor in the social and political life in Waziristan and beyond. The finding suggests that the emergence of PTM as a leftist, secular and peaceful movement progressively adds a new dimension to what was traditionally considered as the ‘Pashtun identity’, and that is defined by aggressivity, a strict adherence to Islam and the reference to an immutable cultural code known as Pashtunwali.

Keywords:

• Pashtun
• ethno-nationalism
• nonviolent movement
• Waziristan
• Pashtun Tahafuz Movement

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Read Robert, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

SUBJECTS:

• Asian Studies
• Anthropology
• Asian Politics
• Government
• Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns
• Anthropology - Soc Sci

1. Background and introduction

This region comprising Waziristan and tribal areas has been poorly understood in the West as well as in Islamabad (Hopkins & Marsden, 2012). This misunderstanding has led many renowned (local and foreign) scholars, historians and journalists to believe this region is famous only for revolts, agitation and militancy. Elisabeth Leake has noted that the area comprised of Waziristan and its surroundings have been generally remained out of state control from the colonial period into the 21^st century. Leake believes that the British and the Pakistani state has struggled to integrate this region into the mainstream (Leake, 2017). Hopkins argues that the tribal areas and Waziristan in particular has hosted many religious based revolts against the colonial intrusion in the 19^th century (Hopkins, 2009). Since 1947 and the inception of Pakistan as an independent state, the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)¹ remained a troubled area that have been iron-fisted by Islamabad. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent participation of tribesmen from Waziristan radicalized the youth therewith experience violent approaches firsthand. Since 2004, both the rise of militancy and the subsequent military operations have nurtured a conducive context for the tribal youth to become politically more active. This conflictual situation carries substantial economic² and social deteriorations for the local population as well as its displacement (Chughtai, 2013). Amid the chaos the tribal youth participation in violent activities was considered to be the main reason for the emergence of most violent militant organizations in the world.

Keeping in view the enormous youth budge, the federal government in 2017 tried to cope with this unstable situation by creating a FATA Youth Jirga [council]³ whose aim was to enroll a share of young tribesmen in the institutionalized political field and to therefore prevent them from indulging into politically more active. But this move had limited effects because the initiative was poorly implemented by the government (lack of funds and staff) and the tribal youth was not very interested in it. A year later the killing of a young man, Naqeebullah Mehsud, by Karachi police forces in what was later identified as a fake encounter (Shah, 2020) was the ultimate event that led to the formation of the Mahsud Tahaffuz Movement (‘Mahsud Protection Movement’, MTM).⁴ The MTM was subsequently renamed Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (‘Pashtun Protection Movement’, PTM) to be more inclusive of all the Pashtuns tribes.

This study considers the emergence of the PTM in the former FATA since 2018 with a special attention for (North and South) Waziristan⁵ which forms half of the territory of the tribal belt and wherein the movement took its origin. Based on qualitative data and field research conducted in Waziristan (both North and South) between December 2019 and January 2020, the study explores the dynamics that turned the movement into a leading actor in the social and political life in Waziristan. Primary data were collected through informal discussions and through 27 semi-structured interviews with members of the PTM and non-PTM tribal people as well as government officers. Interviews took place in South and North Waziristan and in the cities of Bannu, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar. Due to the sensitivity of the study, pseudonyms are used instead of real names, but professional occupation is indicated. In the first part, I introduce the historical context that led to the creation of the PTM. In the second part, I further present the movement in itself and introduce the reader to its political ecosystem in the third and last part. Ultimately the paper assumes that the emergence of PTM as a leftist, secular and peaceful movement progressively adds a new dimension to what was traditionally considered as the ‘Pashtun identity’, and that is defined by aggressivity, a strict adherence to Islam and the reference to an immutable cultural code known as Pashtunwali (Jan, 2010).

2. Methodology

The study is qualitative in nature, and I have collected primary data through semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and personal observations in the given area of research. To answer the main question of the study: What is the nature and dynamics of ethnicity based nonviolent movement that has emerged among the tribes of Waziristan? The respondents included members of tribal civil society in settled districts, leaders and activists of the PTM, tribal youth, tribal elders, professionals, businesspersons and government officers. Qualitative research is needed because the study needed in-depth analysis and understanding. Along with individual interviews and informal discussions, I also conducted focus group discussions of the students belonging to North and South Waziristan. To improve the study, secondary sources are also consulted such as articles on PTM in different newspapers, journals and reports.

2.1. Sample size

The purposive sampling strategy was selected in North and South Waziristan. Hence, twenty-seven identified people from tribal districts of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, settled districts of Bannu, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar were interviewed between 1 December 2019 to 10 January 2020. Moreover, the general rule of saturation (same response/information for a question asked) is also used in a survey type of query whether PTM is right or wrong in their demands and stance. Due to expected degree of homogeneity of the views, the sample saturated quickly.

2.1.1. Ethical considerations

Due to the sensitivity of topic, security of the participants was my primary concern. Since there is still a security situation and working on PTM is a sensitive subject, I have skipped certain parts/techniques such as details and method of approaching the interview respondents including recording. For example, after a formal consent a video record session, respondents said that they have lied in the interview. The respondents were having problem with written consent and video recording. After through thinking and taking help from scholarly work written on conflict methodology in the same area (Waziristan) (Dawar, 2021), I decided to take an informal consent and not to record (particularly video recording) interview sessions. Therefore, the interviews are conducted with the consent of the interviewees and pseudonyms are used instead of real names of locals. I did not follow the formal method of recording the discussion, as it would put them in an uneasy situation. Therefore, an informal chat in the local dialect was carried out in areas of research with the local respondents. This approach also helped me in gaining their trust and confidence, which resulted in developing a rapport with interviewees, which is an important component for any research.

2.2. Limitation of the study

Holding discussion on PTM is tantamount to anti-state and many were and still would be reluctant to discuss it with anyone outside their community or close circle; hence, I used purposive sampling in the North, South Waziristan and Tank due to security and other concerns. The interviewees, particularly tribal elders, businessmen, professionals, in these areas were reluctant to answer the questions regarding the movement. Due to heavy security presence, people were usually tense and activities were limited. However, with the assistance of my local connections and gatekeepers, I was being able to conduct interviews and informal discussions with local people. Prior experience of research in the area, ability to speak local language and understanding of local culture and traditions helped me overcome limitations to a much greater extent.

3. Theoretical framework

Social movements are not a new phenomenon. Western states (US and Western Europe) witnessed a number of protests/agitations against government policies and prevalent social practices since 1950s be that civil rights, feminist, environmental or anti-colonial social movement. Many authors including Phongpaichit (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1999) tried to develop theories regarding evolution, growth and future of social movements. The New/social-movement Theory (NSMT) operates when collective action takes place in the wake of discrimination to collective identity like ethnicity/gender (Buechler, 1995; Sen & Avci, 2016). NSMT is relevant in societies where there is a tussle between individual rights and state’s rights (McAdam et al., 1988) (middle or lower middle class in case of Pashtun nationalist uprising). NSMT asserts that in the effort against status-quo, leaders/members of social movements are usually skilled, educated and aware of their rights and duties. Traditional Social Movement Theory (SMT) functions on the basis of class exploitation by another (Marxist approach) (Welton, 1993), therefore, SMT is not suited for the study. NSMT better explains the contemporary social movements (Buechler, 1995; Sen & Avci, 2016) such as Pashtun nationalist movement because it focuses the rights of the individual citizens and its relationship with state excessive authority. In the region of Waziristan, excessive securitization and the security check points every few kilometers affected freedom of movement of the inhabitants whereby creating the environment of insecurity. Moreover, the personnel of military trained to maintain order in the area with no priority to give due regard to local culture and tradition were considered a threat to local tribal identity.

The dispensation of federalism and its asymmetrical trajectory can be taken into account while understanding the rise of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan (Ahmed & Khan, 2022). The concept of symmetry and asymmetry were discussed by Tarlton for the first time. Asymmetry can be understood where unit/province share more or less common concerns in the federal system, however, in the case of ‘symmetry’ unit/province do not share common concerns/features (Tarlton, 1965). According to Smith asymmetry exists where some federating units are more powerful than the others (Smith, 2005). In Pakistan, federating units such as Punjab province has more share in the power structure. The federal government is usually formed when a political party has secured majority in Punjab. Almost half of the percentage of the officers/personnel in judiciary, military and other important state intuitions are from Punjab. Therefore, Punjabi elite is usually held responsible for the backwardness of area such as the ex-FATA where right to vote to the inhabitants was given in 1997. Constitutionally, politicians/legislators from tribal areas were not allowed to make/amend law for their constituency. Since 1947, inhabitants of ex-FATA have been denied fundamental human rights. Ultimately in 2018, the region was merged into mainstream Pakistan, however, law implementation, execution and implementation are still a challenge.

4. Historical perspective: brief contextualization of the PTM’s creation

Although the legal regime was enforced by the then government after the approval of local community representatives (tribal elders) in the tribal belt since 1947 created frustration and a sense of deprivation among the local people in the long run. This already-tense situation was further aggravated by militant activities that developed in the area in the since 1980s and ultimately chaos started openly in 2000s.

4.1. Legal rule

In 1947, despite ruling now an independent country, the first government of Pakistan decided to apply to the erstwhile FATA a set of laws that was inherited from the British Empire: the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) (Hopkins, 2015). The FCR consisted of a special constitutional status that allowed arbitrary violence by government institution including physical state apparatus and their subsequent impunity.⁶ Under the aegis of President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the new Constitution that was enforced 1973 replicated the FCR (that was also kept enforced) in the form of Article 247. In addition, Art. 247 delineated the administration of the ex- FATA by placing it under a presidential regime: (Nichols, 2013) firstly, the region was governed by the President of Pakistan through his local representant, the Governor of the area; secondly federal civil servants were the administrative operative personnel for the area (Hopkins, 2020). Since its very origin this un-representative system mainly led by non-local civil servants had triggered frustration of local people against the Central State (Fozia & Khan, 2017; Mahsud et al., 2023). Throughout the decades after the creation of Pakistan, the situation kept worsening by the actual enforcement of FCR and Art. 247, because of the corrupted behavior of the administration. The deprivations caused due to legal framework in erstwhile FATA has validated and given rise to asymmetrical trajectory of federalism in Pakistan.

4.2. Hideouts for (foreign) militants

The 2001 ‘War on Terror’ added other dimensions to the historically volatile situation that was prevailing in the tribal belt. Because of its porous border with Afghanistan and its unprotected inner boundary with the neighboring Baluchistan province (Beattie, 2019), the territory of Waziristan was used by the outlaws/militants more frequently (Schetter, 2013). The area became a safe enclave in post 2001 period for the Arab, Uzbek, Chechen and Afghan militants who were thus able to easily enter or exit the Afghan war zone (Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016; Qazi, 2011). But after the fall of the Taliban regime, Waziristan-based militants melted with local ones and turned against the local administration/government (Abbas, 2010). It is because, under the immense pressure of US government Pakistan army penetrated into Waziristan early in 2003–2004 and initiated chain of military operations first in South Waziristan against the foreign militants. These foreign militants were under the protection of tribesmen as guests in their houses, in local culture known as Hamsaya, taking them by force and invading privacy of houses was considered a sheer disregard of local culture and traditions which gave rise to doubts and resentment among the inhabitants and local militants for the government forces (Mahsud, 2019). Eventually in December 2007, foreigner and local militants therefore re-organized locally within small groups that later amalgamated within the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement in Pakistan, TTP) (Abbas, 2008; Markey, 2013). TTP was created by Beitullah Mahsud (Abbas, 2009), a local tribesman. On the one hand, militants started being violently active against Islamabad (that is to say people or infrastructures that embodied the Pakistan State). On the other hand, they progressively superseded the (arbitrary) FCR rule of law by their (arbitrary) legal system. Militants enjoyed the support of the local clergy and were later joined by a small share of local unemployed and illiterate young men (Arshad, 2010).

But militants were not exclusively warmly welcomed by the tribal people. Local political chiefs thus voiced their concerns to the representants of the central State regarding the development of armed militancy in Waziristan. Nonetheless, in the post 2002 period the population get stuck between the violent attacks of militant organizations and the violent military operations directed by Islamabad. The central State responded to militancy by sending the Army in Waziristan, first to South Waziristan for it was the militancy’s hotbed (Mahsud, 2019). Consequently, despite the FCR being still enforced, on the ground it lost its raison d’etre because the military commandment’s orders overtook the civil agents’ power. Their authority was therefore curtailed. After years of military operations, in 2020 militancy is considered to be tamed in the former FATA. But the insurgency has had deep and long-term effects on the local society. However, with the resurrection of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021, sharp surge of militant activities has been noted in Waziristan which can attract yet again military actions. Along with the murder of numerous tribal chiefs, around one million tribesmen and women were compelled to migrate from their homeland (Hameed, 2015). In the localities they settled, and especially in urban areas, these new Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) faced discrimination and harassment from the residents as well as overall insecurity. People from Waziristan consequently experienced great distress and anxiety particularly the Mahsuds for they are the largest tribal group in South Waziristan [see footnote n°3]. Besides, a large chunk of the traditional leaders being murdered which created leadership vacuum.

5. Three crucial events

Before getting into the details of the events it is important to identify that there Waziristan host many tribes the three major and influential tribes are Mahsud, Wazir and Dawar, each of these tribes has provided leadership support to the PTM. Through personal communication with journalists, tribal elders, military officers and FGDs with PTM activists I have deduced that three events then led to the creation of the PTM. As a first step, in 2014, a video showing security personnel dancing in a ‘ganr khat’, a traditional female garment from the Mahsud tribe, provoked severe protests among the Mahsud tribesmen in Dera Ismail Khan. According to Ishtiaq Mahsud, a local journalist covering the tribal protests, dissents were followed by a massive social media campaign that forced the authorities to apologize for showing disrespect to the local culture.⁷ In personal communication with Ahmed Dar it was revealed that the military high command in district Peshawar was displeased with the way matter was handled by the officers on station. In the course of this event, analyzed through focused group discussions with PTM activists and local journalists, coupled with the long-lasting feeling of humiliation resented by the Mahsuds, Sailab Mahsud, a journalist, created the ‘Khat Tehreek’ [Shirt Movement] in order to preserve the Pashtun values. Slogans such as ‘Da Sanga Azaadi Da’ [What Kind of Freedom is This] and ‘Pakhtun Ta Zwandon Ghawaro’ [We Want Life for Pashtun] became popular and slowly awakened a new Pashtun nationalism. Local tribal elder including Muhammad Qayyum and Muhammad Hashim hailed Salib Mahsud as the Pashtun nationalist leader and a force behind the emergence of PTM. FGDs with PTM revealed that whenever the authorities detained PTM activists, it was Saliab Mahsud who came to the forefront to rescue. Naeem Tarar, a Lt Colonel posted in Dera Ismail Khan and Tank District in 2014–2015, highlighted the Manzoor Pashteen himself was released a couple of times from their custody due to the intervention of Salib Mahsud through campaigning and protest in front of press clubs in district Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. As a second step, in 2017, a landmine explosion in Shamkai, a village of South Waziristan, again triggered massive protests against the authorities because mines were buried in Waziristan’s soil by the Army to fight back militants. Muhammad Zeb, a bureaucrat serving in South Waziristan in 2016–2017 and Ishtiaq Mahsud, a local journalist, noted that for the first time, the protests were coordinated. Under the leadership of Manzoor Pashteen, a young Mahsud tribesman, Khat Tehreek evolved into the Mahsud Tahaffuz Movement (MTM) whose claims were broader than those of the Khat Tehreek in order to encompass all the historical issues faced by the Mahsuds.

As a third step, in January 2018 the death of Naqeebullah Mahsud at the hands of the Karachi police (Ali, 2018) this time prompted protests from Pashtuns all over the country. Torchbearers were the Mahsuds. All protestors gathered under the umbrella of the MTM.⁸ They launched a national campaign on social networks as well as on electronic and print media to demand justice for Naqeebullah Mahsud. But their claims went far beyond this death. Protestors asked for the release of 32000 tribesmen (Baloch & Bugti, 2018) that were arbitrary arrested by the security forces⁹ and they informed the rest of the country about the abuses that the tribal people had been subjected to for decades (Arsalan, 2018). Journalists A and B in district Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, Tribal elders including A and B in Dera Ismail Khan and Naeem Khan lawyer in district Tank have agreed on the fact that it was at the occasion of these demonstrations that the MTM changed its name for the PTM so that it better stands for the entire tribal population and not only for the Mahsuds. Nevertheless, a Mahsud retained the leadership because the PTM was placed under the direction of Manzoor Pashteen and benefitted from the support of Sailab Mahsud. FGDs with PTM activists highlighted that the PTM is actually an ethnic based Movement of Pashtuns in general and Mahsuds in particular. To answer the question on the roots of PTM and its torchbearers, personal communication with local administration and military officers revealed that without participation of the Mahsud tribesmen the movement will collapse like a house of cards. Ahmed Dar and Naeem Tarar, military officer in the area from 2015 and 2018–2019, were of the opinion that it is actually the participation of Mahsud tribe in PTM and TTP which led to success if participation of this tribe is rolled back both the movement/organization will collapse in a matter of days. After the historical overview of the PTM’s foundation, we will now go deeper into the movement’s ideology and its membership.

6. Inside the PTM

This second part will now explore the political manifesto of the movement. It will also give indications as to the members’ sociological profile. Those elements are crucial to weigh up the PTM’s success.

6.1. PTM’s ideology and strategy

Contrary to a political party, the PTM has no formal structure. A formal organized structure can be continently controlled by the government, it can lead to a bone of contention and discord among the PTM leadership. In addition, its members come from ‘ordinary’ background on the grassroot level, they do not come from political or landlord dynasties. Regarding its goals as well as its method, PTM’s inspiration is to be found in the pro-Pashtun nationalist and leftist Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (‘the Servants of God Movement’, KKM) that was created in 1929 by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka Bacha Khan (Banerjee, 2000). The KKM was operative in the settled areas, notably Peshawar, Mardan and Charssadda (Gandhi, 2008; Shah, 1999). At the time of British colonialism, the KKM aimed at social reform through non-violent actions. By using peaceful protests, the KKM was thus the first of its kind. According to Bacha Khan, non-violence was supposed to be diffused through education of both males and females (A. Khan, 2018). That is the reason why he established several schools in the settled Pashtun areas.¹⁰ Ultimately Bacha Khan tried to unite all the Pashtuns be they located on the Afghan or on the Pakistan side of the borders but Bacha Khan failed to attract the Afghans in his movement. There was a misconception among the Pashtun youth and power elite in Pakistan that KKM’s motto was ‘Lar Aw Bar Yao Afghan/Pashtun’ [roughly: ‘Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line are the same’]. In reality, there is no evidence to support the fact that slogan was ever used during the struggle of KKM. In any case, almost a century later, the PTM navigates in the same stream as the KKM (Akhtar, 2021).

Since 2018, the movement presents itself as a peaceful and secular one that puts the respect of Human Rights for the Pashtun as its core goal.¹¹ Its 6-point manifesto mingled immediate demands with long-term requests:

1. Police officer and people involved in Naqeeb’s killing should be punished;

2. A committee must be set up in order to evaluate extrajudicially killings and fake encounters committed by the authorities in the area;

3. The missing persons’ cases must be taken to the Court of Pakistan while forced disappearances must immediately end;

4. Waziristan ground should be cleared of landmines;

5. Local people should not be systematically suspected of being associated to or supporters of the militancy;

6. Inhumanity in the tribal belt must stopped (Saddique & Xiumei, 2019).

All these points contribute to defend the Pashtun identity and rights in connection with NSMT, that is to say to achieve tribesmen’ full equality with their fellow citizen within the state of Pakistan. Religious issues are never raised by the PTM. The movement considers that the state itself has ill-played with local people’s religious sentiments since 1979. According to the PTM’s narrative, ‘with the help of religious political parties in the 1980s, President Zia relied on tribesmen’s religious feelings to launch a ‘Holy War’ in Afghanistan against the USSR’ (Abbas, 2014). For the PTM, ‘this state of affairs crucially damaged the socio-political fabric of Waziristan’ (Ahmed, 2004). The movement considers the post-9/11 situation in Waziristan to be the outcome of this policy. Therefore, the main target of the movement’s claims is the State and government. The unprecedent blatant criticism on state institution is one reason for the popularity of PTM in public but it has led to the restriction of their coverage on electronic and print media. Claims are nevertheless limited to Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line (‘Lar Aw Bar Yao Afghan/Pashtun’), whereas at the domestic level, the PTM does not favor an inclusive approach of the tribal areas that would encompass different minorities. To reach its goal, the PTM choses a non-violent strategy and uses two types of actions: peaceful sit-ins, and demonstrations and electoral participation.

Albeit a loosely structured movement, the PTM enjoys strong supports outside Waziristan. An important share of the Pashtuns who lives in Pakistan outside the tribal areas participates to the multiples protests that took place across the country. The movement is hence successful in triggering people’s attention in Waziristan as well as in exporting itself outside the area. In Europe and in the United States, the Pashtun diaspora has also responded positively to the PTM’s project (Caron & Khan, 2022) and organize the same kind of non-violent protests (PTM Europe Holds Protests Against Pakistan, 2018). Electoral competition is another tool within the PTM strategy that proved to be fruitful. A few months after the PTM’s inception, Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir, two founders of the movement, decided to run for the general elections of Summer 2018. They contested seats in their homeland of North and South Waziristan and were elected to the National Assembly (NA) (Two PTM leaders make it to the NA, 2018). We will now meet the PTM’s leadership and explore its membership.

6.2. Sociological overview and prominent members

The sociology of PTM members differs from traditional political or religious parties. Most of the members are young, students for many, and comes from low or average economic background. As already stated, activists originate from the Pashtun group that is based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Baluchistan. Waziristan was the first bastion and continues to be the hotbed of the movement, specifically the city of Dera Ismail Khan District which is the stronghold for the Mahsuds (M. Pashteen and A. Wazir are settled there since 2009–2010 when they escaped the conflict that was ragging in (South) Waziristan. From Waziristan, the PTM’s audience then expanded throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Baluchistan because of the movement’s ability to raise issues such as unlawful imprisonment, extra judicial killings and harassment at the security check-posts, topics that have been abandoned for a long time by the existing political parties. In Waziristan, young Pashtuns think¹² that many of its supporters turned to the PTM because they do not consider the existing Pashtun leadership able to empower the Pashtun minority and/or enhance their rights within the Pakistan federal system.¹³ On the contrary, the PTM embodies a refreshing and promising opportunity in order for the locals to be more integrated politically and economically wise.

The three main leaders of the PTM are Manzoor Ahmed, aka Pashteen, from South Waziristan; Ali Wazir, from South Waziristan; and Mohsin Dawar, from North Waziristan – the two last ones being elected at the NA. Pashteen is the main orator of the movement and his speeches have helped the movement to gain attention in two main directions: on the one hand, he refers to a Pashtun (non-violent) nationalism and appeal to the Pashtuns’ pride; on the other hand, he directly addresses the Pakistan state. Pashteen also cleverly plays with his image by emulating Bacha Khan’s modest attire for instance. Moreover, the traditional cap that he always wears has now become the symbol of the Pashtuns’ peaceful protests.¹⁴ In addition, he is popular among the Pashtuns for refusing a reserved seat at the NA that was offered to him by Imran Khan’s government.¹⁵ Before joining the PTM Ali Wazir and Mohsin Dawar were active members of another pro-Pashtun and leftist party, the Awami National Party (ANP) [cf. infra]. Both of them took their distance with the ANP because the party failed to deliver any substantive improvements, directly and indirectly, for the cause of the people living in tribal areas (including IDPs living in the province) despite ruling the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province from 2008 until 2013.^{16, 17} Although, ANP did not govern former tribal areas directly but their silence on the atrocities and brutalities committed by the physical state apparatus against the Pashtuns both in tribal areas and KP province continued in the post 2006 period which pushed many important Pashtun nationalist members to revisit their affiliation. Regarding the movement, the former link of two of its leading members with the institutionalized political parties (here, the ANP) is telling because in Waziristan, most of the political men and their proponents now declare their support to the PTM. Examination of the leadership is also of a great importance in terms of ethnicity. For the first time indeed, a Pashtun-led movement is ruled by leaders of different tribes (a Mahsud, a Wazir and a Dawar) and from different place of origin (South and North Waziristan). Despite this diversity, there is no ethnic-wise cleavage within the PTM, and all the three leaders are respected without any interference of their ethnic background. Notwithstanding, Mohsin Dawar has left the movement because of political differences/reasons but the predicament for the rights of the tribesmen is continued. We will now end this second part by examining the movement’s successes as well as its limitations.

7. Achievements and limit

As already stated, the objectives of the PTM were twofold. On the one hand, they were related to concrete demands in the Naqeebullah case, and on the other hand, they encompassed those to address the general situation of the tribal areas. On the first aspect, 2018 demonstrations were successful: the Supreme Court took notice of Naqeebullah’s murder as well as of the missing persons. Hundreds of arrested men were subsequently released (Arsalan, 2018). Tribesmen also considered that this demonstration successfully cultivated a sense of responsibility among the security personnel who operated in the erstwhile FATA, especially in Waziristan. For instance, police operating in cities is deemed to be now more respectful while dealing with tribal people¹⁸ and Islamabad abolished the permit cards for the locals.¹⁹ On the second aspect, the movement played an important role to speed up mainstreaming process of erstwhile FATA initiated by the political/civil forces i.e., political parties, intelligentsia, civil society and the NGOs coupled with fast changing strategic importance triggered by the proposed US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent resurrection of Taliban thereby jolting the power-elite. This move was done as early as in May 2018. The central government passed the 25^th Amendment of the Pakistan constitution that revoked the Special Status of the FATA and merged the area within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Amendment was easily passed by the NA (Waseem, 2018) as well as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly with two-third majority (with 99-7 in favor). Furthermore, peaceful protests in Pakistan and in the Western world have helped the PTM to gain international attention (Aslam & Neads, 2021) from advocacy NGOs such as Amnesty International or Transparency International. Every so often, they publish reports of the Human Rights situation in tribal areas that are hoped to put pressure on Islamabad.

Despite this important attainment, some members are doubtful as to the long-run efficiency of the PTM’s exclusive pro-Pashtun attitude. The PTM restricting its claims to the sole Pashtun group while ignoring the plight of other ethnic minorities in Pakistan might therefore be detrimental for the movement’s image and struggle.²⁰ For instance, murders of Shia followers in Karachi, Quetta or Dera Ismail Khan are not condemned by the PTM. Ethnic minorities such as the Baluch-, the Sindhi- or the Urdu-speaking that also suffer from what they consider to be unfair state policies toward them, doubt the PTM’s aptitude to fruitfully questions the Pakistan power’s structure. They consider the PTM to be a strictly pro-Pashtun movement that does not carry the plight of other communities which suffers more or less the same fate/treatment.²¹ In that respect, the PTM leaders are confronted to a tricky situation. While they try to keep their non-violent position, virulent anti-Punjabi slogans were shout during the movement’s protests (Mallick, 2020), notably by the Pashtun youth. Punjabi elite can be held responsible for the Pakistan other minorities’ backwardness because ‘there is a debate about the backward areas in Southern Punjab’ (Mughal, 2020). Ultimately, the combination of strictly Pashtun nationalism and rejection of Punjabis could fuel the already existing communal strife in Waziristan. We will now end this discussion/analysis by exploring the PTM’s local and transnational ecosystem.

8. Political ecosystem of the PTM

Since its inception in 2018, the PTM has changed the political ecosystem it is embedded in – ‘political’ refers to non-violent institutionalized political parties and violent groups alike.

8.1. The local political landscape

Beyond its political ecosystem, the emergence and subsequent appeal among Pashtuns of the PTM can be explained by two main sets of reasons. The first one refers to the concrete situation of Pashtuns on the ground as stated in Part 1 of the study. The second set of reasons is the failure of the three pro-Pashtun organizations, the ANP, the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and the Qaumi Watan Party, in successfully opposing the government to obtain improvements of tribesmen’s socio-economic situation. These political parties prefer their own electoral interest rather than the development of the area (Qaiser, 2016). But more importantly, the field research shows that the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), two religious political parties, endure the same decrease of popularity especially among the young Pashtuns. Religious elite in Pashtun tribal region has been instrumental in various uprising against the colonial rule and enjoyed enormous public support since centuries (Haroon, 2007). Whereas since 1947 they have been very popular among the population of Waziristan (Borchgrevink, 2010) due to its high degree of religiosity (Haroon, 2008, 2012), the emergence of the PTM not only damaged the vote bank of religious political parties but also challenged their silence on the atrocities that have been brought by the conflict in the last two decades on the people of Waziristan.²² It is the first time in their history that these religious parties are that neglected by voters. This finding might seem paradoxical because until then, the armed militancy operating locally in the name of jihad had positive side-effects only on the religious parties.²³ But during the general elections in 2018, the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam lost seats to the PTM.

The rise of the PTM also has side-effects on the militancy for the movement seems to provide a way of exit for young militants and/or an alternative way to raise their voice and struggle against what they consider to be the oppressive state apparatus.²⁴ Consequently, enrollment in militancy decreases: in 2014 TTP counted around 35,000 fighters while they were only around 2,000 in 2020.²⁵ In addition, the PTM impacts the militant groups themselves. Many local militant factions indeed declare being sympathetic towards the PTM. Solidarity might be ethnic-based for the PTM as well as the militant groups are run by Pashtuns. Militants also condemned Naqeebullah Mahsud’s murder and announced their will to avenge this death.²⁶ The most striking case is Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, one of the TTP’s amir [chief], who publicly displays his support to the PTM by wearing the ‘Pashteen hat’. The militancy’s support to the PTM sometimes creates tensions within the militancy milieu for on an individual basis, not all the militants are of the same inclination towards the PTM. However, a clash is imminent between militant groups and PTM. In September/October 2022, PTM has registered protest in various areas in the tribal belt and Pashtun areas in Pakistan against the increasing militant activities. The most significant one was noted in October 2022 in Swat Valley where thousands of people came together staged demonstration and urged government to take concrete steps to end militancy in the region (Khaliq, 2022). This protest is significant because it is the first time PTM members have openly condemned militant groups/activities.

9. The (noxious) Afghan support

Despite calls from the PTM, Islamabad’s continuous lack of interest in improving the situation in Waziristan created a space for the Afghans to join in the movement. Kabul (under Ashraf Ghani) hence publicly declared its strong support to the PTM (Oxford Analytica, 2018; Threlkeld & Easterly, 2021). Kabul might be strategic in doing so since the Afghan authorities intend to use the Pashtuns to pressurize Islamabad. Same for the Western-based diaspora who displays its support to PTM by using the social networks (Khan & Shah, 2021) with the aim of damaging Pakistan’s image abroad. Along with the Pashtun group (which forms 42 to 45% of the Afghan population) (Barfield, 2022), the other ethnic minorities of Afghanistan also support the PTM (Jafri, 2021) for two main reasons. On the one hand, Kabul has territorial claims over some parts of the Pakistan tribal belt and beyond (Omrani, 2009; Rubin & Armstrong, 2003; Spain, 1961) that are shared by the population. On the other hand, a large bulk of Afghans blames Islamabad for the troubles that the successive governments have created in their country for decades (Hussain, 2008; Rashid, 2010). However, on the Waziristan ground people are of the opinion that the Afghan support might be detrimental to the PTM because the litigation between Islamabad and Kabul over the Durand Line combined with the deteriorated relationships between the two countries have exacerbated the crackdown on the PTM (extra judicial killings, harassment and imprisonment) (European Asylum Report Office, 2019). The Afghan support also nurtures rumors like the PTM taking support from India and other countries hostile to Pakistan (Shah, 2020). In addition, the Afghan backing creates a distress among the urban leftist supporters of the PTM that is the reason why they disapprove the slogan ‘Lar Aoo Bar Yoo Afghan/Pashtun’. Pretty well-integrated within the Pakistan power structure themselves, they feel that Pashtuns enjoy the same situation and are well integrated in various parts of Pakistan.²⁷ Pro-Afghan motto also somehow legitimates Kabul’s claims over tribal areas located in Pakistan, something that they strongly oppose. In addition, they fear that the Afghan public support will further cultivate hatred against Pashtuns living in other parts of the state.²⁸

The resurrection of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021 (Muraviev, 2022) has decreased the support and popularity of PTM in Kabul. The Taliban (TTP and Afghan Taliban) are radical Islamists and therefore detest Pashtun nationalism based on their progressive/secular approach. This development has also put NSMT to test the prediction of what future has in store for the social movements in this context. The completion of Pak-Afghan border fencing (Jones, 2009; Oztig, 2020) might have an impact in relation to cross-border militant activities. There is a good chance that TTP may start attacks on PTM demonstrations which might prove fatal for the security of state, unity and rights of the Pashtuns within Pakistan.

The study has not touched upon many important topics related to PTM particularly the developments in 2021–2022 the region and its impact on the movement and beyond. For example, in 2022 and onward period there is a sudden surge in militant activities in Waziristan and the tribal belt of Pakistan which can undermine and boost the influence of PTM. Another important area of research can be the awareness and community resilience build by the movement vis-à-vis militant resurrection. There is some interesting scholarly work done in the area of community resilience in Waziristan (Makki & Akash, 2022) but relevant questions can be raised in a larger context, for example, the tribal belt, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan province where youth is supportive to PTM. There is potential in nonviolent agitation (in nascent stages) in Baluchistan province against the power-elite (Ahmed & Khan, 2022) which can be important to study in relation to PTM.

10. Conclusion

We saw why, how and on which ground the PTM emerged as a staple actor in the political life in Waziristan and beyond, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces. In addition, by promoting non-violence, the PTM also transforms the traditional perception of the ‘Pashtun identity’. PTM is not emphasizing on religious issues which highlights the progressive nature of the movement. But the movement has many hurdles to face. The PTM is confronted to a boycott by the mainstream (electronic and print) media because of its blatant criticism on government institutions. Without their support, it will be increasingly difficult for the PTM to thrive and to successfully pursue its activities. This situation can be detrimental for the movement because it can affect its actual efficiency on the ground. The decrease of militant activities can be both positive and negative at the same time. Negative, because it can give Islamabad free hands to get rid of the PTM. Positive, because it can provide the PTM with opportunities to further organize the Pashtun people and therefore be more active in pressuring the authorities. Fourthly, the PTM must expand and strengthen its basis by attracting young urban Pashtuns. By doing so, the movement could take advantage of their networks and connections with state officials. The PTM has already lost the Afghan support due to the resurrection of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021 which can have negative impacts for the movement. In any case, social movements generally cannot sustain in the long-term take for example ‘Arab Spring’, therefore, this movement has the potential to engage in active politics. PTM has the potential to transform into a progressive political party. Along with severing the inhabitants of Waziristan and the Pashtun belt PTM, as a progressive group, can play an active role in the much-needed counter violent extremism in the region.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Muhammad Irfan Mahsud

Muhammad Irfan Mahsud is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad, Pakistan. Holding a PhD in Political Science from the University of Peshawar, his expertise encompasses research on violent and non-violent movements, ethnonationalism, religious militancy, radicalization, CVE, socio-political transformation triggered by forced migration, climate change and armed mobilization in Pakistan. In 2016–2017, Dr. Mahsud was honored with a PhD fellowship at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), USA. Proficient in qualitative research methodology, he has presented at international conferences, published in prestigious journals, and contributed to book chapters. Serving on peer review boards, Dr. Mahsud is a sought-after panelist on national television talk shows, providing insights on various issues. Engaged in research projects with UNDP, USAID, and the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, his dedication lies in advancing understanding and resolving complex peace and conflict matters in Pakistan and the broader region.

Notes

1 Until 2018, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was a semi-autonomous tribal region within the Pakistan federal system. Located in northwestern Pakistan, FATA consisted of seven Tribal Agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan) and six Frontier Regions (Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar, Tank). In 2018, the FATA were merged within the bigger state of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For greater clarity, the name “erstwhile FATA” is kept throughout the note rather than a reference to a given territory within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

2 Primary occupations in Waziristan are agriculture, pastoralism, mining, forestry and foreign remittances from the workers based in Gulf states. See Ahmed (2004). The rise of conflict in the post 2003-2004 period damaged the already fragile economic structure in Waziristan (Haider & Jameel, 2017).

3 The Jirga system is a Pashtun tribal tradition. Local life is ruled by a council of elders that is particularly active in conflict-settlements.

4 The Mahsud represent one of the most important tribal group in South Waziristan.

5 Waziristan was divided by the British rulers for administrative purpose. On the ground, there is no ethnic, linguistic or social distinctions to support the division of Waziristan in two parts.

6 “Under the FCR, an innocent individual can be imprisoned for the crimes of their kin, the government can displace entire villages without compensation, explanation, or warning, and individuals can languish behind bars for up to three years without any charges being filed” Akins (2020).

7 Muhammad Qayyum, tribal elder, interview, South Waziristan, 06 December 2019.

8 Naeem Khan, lawyer, interview, District Tank, 15 December 2019.

9 Muhammad Azam, a PTM activist, interview, District Tank, 17 December 2019.

10 Schools are still active (M.S. Khan, 2018).

11 Ishtiaq Mehsud, journalist in Waziristan, interview, District Dera Isamil Khan, 01 December 2019.

12 This input is based on the agglomeration of different interviews.

13 The Pashtun minority is not the sole group that feel un- or under- represented within the political system of Pakistan.

14 The traditional Mazari hat is now nicknamed the “Pashteen hat”.

15 Ishtiaq Mehsud, journalist in Waziristan, interview, District Dera Isamil Khan, 04 December 2019.

16 The ANP was also a partner of the Pakistan People’s Party in the central government led by Yousef Raza Gillani.

17 Ali Khan, former ANP activist now member of PTM, interview, District Dera Ismail Khan, 03 December 19.

18 Shaherullah, university student, interview, District Bannu, 07 December 2019.

19 Permit cards were issued by the government to the Mahsuds so that they can enter their area. Without a permit card, one was not allowed to access his area.

20 Muhammad Qayyum, tribal elder, interview, South Waziristan, 06 December 2019.

21 Naseer Noreen, professor in University of Peshawar, interview, District Peshawar, 02 January 2020.

22 Naseer Noreen, professor in University of Peshawar, interview, District Peshawar, 02 January 2020.

23 Soharab Khan, researcher student and a PTM activist, interview, North Waziristan, 23 December 2019.

24 Ishtiaq Mehsud, journalist in Waziristan, interview, District Dera Isamil Khan, 04 December 2019.

25 Ibid.

26 Sohail Muhammad, one of the PTM’s main leaders, interview, District Dera Isamil Khan, 04 December 2019.

27 Muhammad Khalil, retired bureaucrat at the top level, interview, South Waziristan, 21 December 2019.

28 Shaherullah, university student, interview, District Bannu, 07 December 2019.