The Dialectic of Power in the Workings of University Autonomy

Abstract

I thank you for the honor of allowing me to speak at this symposium on the autonomy of universities. Let me try to discuss with you for a few minutes the dialectic of university autonomy or, more precisely, the dialectic of power in the workings of university autonomy. First, let me try to explicate these terms — dialectic, power, and workings — which I think reflect the reality of university autonomy. Let us begin with "dialectic." I use this term to indicate that autonomy is not a fact of legal or juridical order. University autonomy is not established by edict nor by any other act of authority. The autonomy of a university institution is, first and foremost, an empirical fact. Thus, in the extreme case, every university is potentially autonomous; yet at the same time every university is also potentially and — again, in the extreme case — in a sense correctively subject to an external authority that may at any time negate its autonomy. The reality of the autonomous university is situated somewhere between these two dialectical poles, whatever be the act of law that formally establishes or negates it.