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Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 7, 1984 - Issue 3
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Original Articles

Intelligence and the problem of strategic surpriseFootnote∗

Michael I. Handel Professor of National Security Affairs at the Department of National Security, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Pages 229-281 | Published online: 24 Jan 2008

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Stephen Coulthart & Abebe Rorissa. (2023) Growth, diversification, and disconnection: an analysis of 70 years of intelligence scholarship (1950-2020). Intelligence and National Security 38:6, pages 1003-1019.
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Nikki Ikani, Aviva Guttmann & Christoph O. Meyer. (2020) An analytical framework for postmortems of European foreign policy: should decision-makers have been surprised?. Intelligence and National Security 35:2, pages 197-215.
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Martha Whitesmith. (2019) The efficacy of ACH in mitigating serial position effects and confirmation bias in an intelligence analysis scenario. Intelligence and National Security 34:2, pages 225-242.
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Stephen Marrin. (2018) Evaluating intelligence theories: current state of play. Intelligence and National Security 33:4, pages 479-490.
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Or Arthur Honig. (2007) A New Direction for Theory-Building in Intelligence Studies. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20:4, pages 699-716.
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Stephen Marrin. (2007) At Arm's Length or At the Elbow?: Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20:3, pages 401-414.
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Uri Bar-Joseph. (2005) Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Thirty-Year Perspective. Journal of Israeli History 24:2, pages 251-266.
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Uri Bar‐Joseph & Zachary Sheaffer. (1998) Surprise and its causes in business administration and strategic studies. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 11:3, pages 331-349.
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JamesG. Blight & DavidA. Welch. (1998) The Cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance. Intelligence and National Security 13:3, pages 173-217.
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JamesJ. Wirtz. (1998) Organizing for crisis intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban missile crisis. Intelligence and National Security 13:3, pages 120-149.
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Abraham Ben‐Zvi. (1997) The dynamics of surprise: The defender's perspective. Intelligence and National Security 12:4, pages 113-144.
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David Kaiser. (1994) Conspiracy or cock‐up? Pearl Harbor revisited. Intelligence and National Security 9:2, pages 354-372.
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StephenJ. Cimbala. (1993) Nuclear weapons in the new world order. Journal of Strategic Studies 16:2, pages 173-199.
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JamesJ. Wirtz. (1991) Miscalculation, surprise and American intelligence after the cold war. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 5:1, pages 1-16.
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Abraham Ben‐Zvi. (1990) Intention, capability and surprise: A comparative analysis. Journal of Strategic Studies 13:4, pages 19-40.
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JamesJ. Wirtz. (1990) Deception and the tet offensive. Journal of Strategic Studies 13:2, pages 82-98.
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Ralph Bennett. (1990) Intelligence and strategy: Some observations on the war in the Mediterranean 1941–45. Intelligence and National Security 5:2, pages 444-464.
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MichaelI. Handel. (1990) Intelligence and military operations. Intelligence and National Security 5:2, pages 1-95.
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Abraham Ben‐Zvi. (1990) Between warning and response: The case of the Yom Kippur War. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 4:2, pages 227-242.
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JamesJ. Wirtz. (1989) The Intelligence Paradigm. Intelligence and National Security 4:4, pages 829-837.
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DavidT. Twining. (1989) Soviet strategic culture ‐the missing dimension. Intelligence and National Security 4:1, pages 169-187.
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David Jablonsky. (1988) The paradox of duality: Adolf Hitler and the concept of military surprise. Intelligence and National Security 3:3, pages 55-117.
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Michael Handel. (1987) The politics of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security 2:4, pages 5-46.
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T.L. Cubbage$suffix/text()$suffix/text(). (1987) The German misapprehensions regarding overlord: Understanding failure in the estimative process. Intelligence and National Security 2:3, pages 114-174.
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MichaelI. Handel. (1987) Introduction: Strategic and operational deception in historical perspective. Intelligence and National Security 2:3, pages 1-91.
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MichaelI. Handel. (1987) Technological surprise in war. Intelligence and National Security 2:1, pages 1-53.
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WilliamJ. Olson. (1986) The Iran‐Iraq war: A dialogue of violence* . Defense Analysis 2:3, pages 235-246.
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MichaelI. Handel. (1986) Clausewitz in the age of technology. Journal of Strategic Studies 9:2-3, pages 51-92.
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Emmanuel Karagiannis. Mass-casualty terrorism and strategic surprise in Mumbai and Paris: understanding the Islamist perspective. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 0:0, pages 1-17.
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Giangiuseppe Pili. A new theory of surprise – unraveling the logic of uncertainty and knowledge. Intelligence and National Security 0:0, pages 1-14.
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Alexandros Karakikes, Panagiotis Alexiadis, Theocharis Theocharopoulos, Nikolaos Skoulidas, Dimitrios Spiliotopoulos & Konstantinos Kotis. (2023) Towards Handling Bias in Intelligence Analysis with Twitter. Towards Handling Bias in Intelligence Analysis with Twitter.
Patrick M. Carr, E. Kyle Ebersole & J. L. Sturtz. (2023) Accuracy and Confidence of Strategic Intelligence in Cases of Inadequate Information: Implications for Acquisition of Collection Systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems 53:6, pages 3741-3749.
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Juan Antonio Martínez-Sánchez. (2022) Una aproximación psicosocial a las causas de los fallos de inteligencia. Revista Científica General José María Córdova 20:40, pages 909-926.
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Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern. (2022) The Trump Administration and the COVID ‐19 crisis: Exploring the warning‐response problems and missed opportunities of a public health emergency . Public Administration 100:3, pages 616-632.
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Gregory Winger. (2017) The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan, 1973–1978: Stuck in the Middle with Daoud. Journal of Cold War Studies 19:4, pages 4-41.
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Chong Guan Kwa. 2017. Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali. Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali 97 118 .
Alexander Morison & David Woods. (2016) Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations. Informatics 3:3, pages 16.
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Christoph O. Meyer & Florian Otto. (2016) How to warn: ‘Outside-in warnings’ of Western governments about violent conflict and mass atrocities. Media, War & Conflict 9:2, pages 198-216.
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K. Quek. (2015) Discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war: an analysis of China's prewar signaling behavior. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 15:2, pages 279-317.
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Charles F. Parker, Eric K. Stern, Eric Paglia & Christer Brown. (2009) Preventable Catastrophe? The Hurricane Katrina Disaster Revisited. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17:4, pages 206-220.
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Corine Cohen. (2007) Intelligence et Performance mesurer l'efficacité de l'Intelligence Economique et Stratégique (IES) et son impact sur la Performance de l'Organisation. Vie & sciences de l'entreprise N° 174 - 175:1, pages 15-50.
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Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern. (2005) Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise. Foreign Policy Analysis 1:3, pages 301-331.
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Peter Suedfeld & Susan Bluck. (2016) Changes in Integrative Complexity Prior to Surprise Attacks. Journal of Conflict Resolution 32:4, pages 626-635.
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Kai Quek. (2012) Discontinuities in China’s Signaling Behavior Upon Its Decision for War. SSRN Electronic Journal.
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