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Social Epistemology
A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy
Volume 22, 2008 - Issue 3: Contrastivism
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Articles

The Contrast‐sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions

Pages 235-245 | Published online: 16 Dec 2008

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Read on this site (5)

Chris Tweedt. (2018) Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge. Social Epistemology 32:4, pages 219-227.
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Sarah Sawyer. (2014) Contrastive Self-knowledge. Social Epistemology 28:2, pages 139-152.
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Dylan Dodd. (2011) Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:4, pages 665-685.
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Joel Buenting. (2010) An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims. Social Epistemology 24:2, pages 99-104.
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Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong. (2008) A Contrastivist Manifesto. Social Epistemology 22:3, pages 257-270.
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Articles from other publishers (21)

Da Fan. (2022) From contrastivism back to contextualism. Synthese 201:1.
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Ryan W. Davis & Jessica Preece. (2021) Individual Valuing of Social Equality in Political and Personal Relationships. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13:1, pages 177-196.
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Jon Bebb. (2021) Demarcating Contextualism and Contrastivism. Philosophy 97:1, pages 23-49.
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Michael Cohen. (2019) Reducing Contrastive Knowledge. Erkenntnis 86:6, pages 1547-1565.
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Giorgio Volpe. (2020) A Contrastivist Response to Gerken’s Arguments for False Positives. Acta Analytica 36:2, pages 311-322.
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Justin Snedegar. (2018) Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100:3, pages 682-702.
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Federico Luzzi. 2019. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge.
Seth Chin-Parker & Alexandra Bradner. (2017) A contrastive account of explanation generation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 24:5, pages 1387-1397.
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Michael Roche & William Roche. (2017) Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters. Erkenntnis 82:5, pages 975-992.
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Brian Kim. (2015) IN DEFENSE OF SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM. Episteme 13:2, pages 233-251.
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Jessica Brown. (2016) Contextualism about Evidential Support. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92:2, pages 329-354.
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Justin Snedegar. (2015) Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought. Philosophy Compass 10:6, pages 379-388.
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Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer. (2015) Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes. Noûs 49:2, pages 201-234.
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Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. (2015) Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question. Theoria 81:2, pages 97-125.
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Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar. (2012) One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89:1, pages 102-124.
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SAMUEL C. RICKLESS. (2014) The Contrast- In sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88:3, pages 533-555.
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Justin Snedegar. (2012) Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons. Philosophical Studies 166:2, pages 231-242.
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Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe. (2012) Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs 46:4, pages 675-708.
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Martijn Blaauw. (2012) Defending Contrastivism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2:1, pages 59-64.
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Steven Luper. (2012) Contrastivism and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2:1, pages 51-58.
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Arash Pessian. (2010) Reference to the best explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41:4, pages 363-374.
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