Colombia’s Peace Process: A Case Study of a Vexing Society Struggling for Institutional Adjustment

Abstract

After more than fifty years of guerrilla warfare, Colombia is enduring a peace process with the most important guerrilla group through a peace agreement signed by the end of 2016. Despite this achievement, the basic conditions determined by John Fagg Foster for institutional adjustment were not fulfilled, affecting the implementation of the accord and facing strong opposition from conservative sectors. The resistance of the institutional matrix of this country’s elites shows the difficulties and resistance to even moderate institutional changes in a society with a deep divide in political, social, and economic conditions. The case is unique, despite the obvious economic and social advantages of the peace deal and reveals the deep crucial role of traditional and ceremonial institutions in blocking social progress. The pandemic and the more conservative political orientation of the present government just worsened the difficulties amidst the current conditions, increasing the distance from the requirements established by J. Fagg Foster. An evaluation of the current process is presented and conclusions about possible outcomes are explored given the present upheaval and social movements we endure today.

Keywords:

• Colombia
• peace process
• institutional adjustment
• John Fagg Foster

JEL Classification Codes:

• B52
• O54
• P16

Notes

1 After the Independence in 1819, civil warfare plagued the country with nine big conflicts until the end of the nineteenth century, followed in the twentieth century by the period known as “The violence” which started in 1948 with the assassination of a popular leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and lasted until 1956, with 300,000 persons killed. The current leftist guerrilla warfare started in 1964.

2 In social sciences, there are many theories of social change. Here my theoretical approach is based on the Original Institutional Economics (OIE) that follows Veblen-Commons-Ayres’s tradition far different from Neoclassical Institutional Economics known as New Institutional Economics (NIE).

3 An English version of this work can be read in Parada (2006).

4 This number was in the press during the 1990s, but the topic has been ignored today.

5 During that day, with political participation of only 37.43% of the electoral census, 49.78% voted yes to the Peace agreement and 50.21% voted no. Nobody was expecting that result.

6 JEP: The initials in Spanish: Justicia Especial para la Paz.

7 In Colombia, the provinces are called departments.

8 A massacre involves at least three victims.

9 The Post-Agreement FARC group that rejected the Peace Agreement has around 3500–5200 members, 22 narco-paramilitary groups have 2,700–3,500 members and the ELN (National Liberation Army) has 3,000 combatants. Government forces have more than 450,000 members, being one the biggest armies in Latin America given the 50 million population of Colombia. Yet they are not able to guarantee the control of the territory.

10 Data were taken from the National Unit of Land Restitution of the government (www.restitucion detierras.gov.co).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jairo J. Parada

Jairo J. Parada is an associate professor of economics in the Department of Economics, Universidad del Norte. Barranquilla, Colombia.