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ABSTRACT
Against the background of the research project on “De-and Re-stabilizations of the European Border Regime”, analyzing the recent political attempts by the EU and its member states to regain control over its borders and the movements of migration after the so-called “European refugee crisis” in 2015, this article discusses Turkey’s role and position within international migration flows and the EU-driven border regime. Reflecting on the recent history of Turkey’s migration and border politics, we argue that academic accounts, which tend to reduce Turkey’s role to a simple extension of the EU border regime, are insufficient to explain the current state of affairs in Turkey. Rather, the article sheds light on the contested and multilayered nature of the Turkish migration regime, which can be partly read as reactions to the European Union, but also as an effect of its own foreign and national policy interests. The outcome is a highly hybrid political formation causing ambiguous legal, social, and political limitations for migrants and refugees, reflected in their journeys and in social and political realities, which are discussed as exemplified in the migratory stories of two migrants.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 When we speak of the migration and border regime, we hint at the fact that both regimes are interrelated; but whereas the migration regime consists of more factors than border policies like gender and work relations, the border regime also comprises more aspects than governing migration, such as the regulation of trade (Walters Citation2011).
2 The British government asked for sanctions against Turkey, in the event of Turkey not adopting stricter measures against the uncontrolled movements on the Aegean Sea and the land borders along the Evros River (Hess and Karakayali Citation2007).
3 The White Paper of former British Prime Minister Blair from the year 2002, titled “Secure Border, Safe Haven”, not only transformed the question of the security of the external borders into a question of national survival but also strongly argued for the intensification of border controls by externalizing them into North African transit-states and erecting ex-territorial camps. This move was discursively legitimized by drawing extensively on humanitarian arguments of rescue and protecting lives by putting forward the idea of setting up camps in the North African deserts. Thus, Blair formulated a political strategy, which at the time was heavily critiqued and defined as a breach of taboo towards the legal understanding of the European Asylum Law. Nevertheless, externalization has gradually become one of the central guidelines/rationalities of the EU-European border regime, best manifested in its central place within the Global Approach on Migration 2005 and its successor, the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility 2011.
4 In a similar vein, the notion of “buffer zones” implies this directionality and object status of the countries concerned.
5 The multi-sited research project has been financed by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation (http://transitmigration-2.org/).
6 Before conducting research in Turkey, we visited the Greek island Chios in order to understand the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement and living conditions of the refugees stranded there (http://transitmigration-2.org/findings/). Additionally, our research was based on longstanding contacts with migrant communities in Turkey, which had been established during a former research project (Heck Citation2013). These contacts have been maintained through Whatsapp and Facebook, regular meetings and conversations during the last few years. Both the flexibility and non-formal approach of ethnographic research enabled us to get a broader picture of, and deep insights on, migrant realities.
7 By applying the notion of “securitarian-humanitarian dispositive”, we refer not only to the growing literature on humanitarianism within border studies (Fassin Citation2007; Cuttitta Citation2014; Ticktin Citation2011), but also to the insight that securitarian policies are highly interwoven and entangled with humanitarian policies, best reflected in the case of Greece and the transnational attempts to stabilize and enforce a specific highly restrictive asylum system.
8 For the sake of our line of argumentation, we have chosen these two migratory biographies. We would like to thank our friend Omran Alkasser, who introduced us to many Syrians, made translations and supported us during our research. We also owe thanks to Muana Elaka, who shared with us his experiences during his journey. All names are pseudonyms. Since both individuals are still in the process of migrating, we will not be specific on their biographical details.
9 In 2003, a strategy on the development of the economic relations was compiled by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, and in 2005 the Turkish government declared the “Year of Africa.” In the following years, the Turkish state put significant effort into a range of different measures to intensify relations with various African states (www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa).
10 Turkey has also abolished visa requirements with countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, and Serbia, which have been also on the EU's blacklist (Canefe Citation2016, 23).
11 In response to Iraqi refugees at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey intensified its border enforcement and introduced restrictive asylum regulations after 1993 (Sahin Mencutek Citation2012, 140).
12 Furthermore, the government announced that visa restrictions would not apply to Syrian refugees crossing the Syrian-Turkish border by land to flee the war zones in Syria (Hürriyet Daily News, January 10, Citation2016).
13 In 2015, 91,611 persons were apprehended or rescued at sea during 2,430 search-and-rescue missions conducted by the Turkish authorities in the Aegean Sea (UNHCR Citation2016a).
14 According to the UNHCR statistics, in July 2016 1,920 migrants reached the Greek islands, and in August the figures increased to 3,447 (UNHCR Citation2016b, 2).
15 There are fewer migrants and refugees from other countries in the city, since Izmir is not a “satellite city” as designated and assigned by the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs. Satellite cities are locations where all asylum seekers in Turkey are officially obliged to reside for the entire duration of their stay in the country.
16 We have chosen the migratory biography of Omran, since it is typical of forced migration of many single men, in their mid-30s, who have been involved in some kind of political activities in Syria. Omran's biography is also typical of families that have been separated, since women and children are often compelled to leave first.
17 Only about 240,000 Syrian refugees, that is 10 percent of the Syrian refugee population, live in the camps that are mostly situated along the Syrian border and run by AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey).
18 The latter category has priority within the scope of the 1:1 procedure defined in the Turkey-EU deal.
19 We have chosen the migratory biography of Muana, since his case is typical of the social and juridical conditions of non-European black asylum seekers in Turkey. Moreover his example illustrates very precisely the effects and consequences that the EU-Turkey deal has on migrants’ lives and their migratory movements.
20 The primary aim of this first registration is to record basic information on behalf of the UNHCR and then file a case to be evaluated by the UNHCR personnel. In parallel, asylum seekers have to complete a second registration with the DGMM in Ankara.
21 Even though the implementation depends on the attitudes of local officials, refugees are expected to prove their presence by regularly visiting local Foreigners’ Police Departments, reporting two or three times a week.
22 The ultimate decision is made after the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) interviews have been completed by the UNHCR. Then applicant needs travel documents to be granted by the DGMM, which evaluates each applicant's file separately in order to proceed with resettlement. There are documented cases where applicants cannot obtain the travel documents and be resettled, although they are granted refugee status. This is due to their unregistered status in Turkey, since they left the satellite city at some point. The UNHCR has a differentiating policy of application and interviews for different nationalities.
23 In 2012, new asylum applicants to UNHCR Turkey numbered 26,500; in 2015, the number of new asylum applicants increased to 133,300 (UNHCR Citation2015, 40).
24 The only exception is Iraqi refugees, whose cases are evaluated by the UNHCR under the scope of a procedure termed “simplified RSD” (Interview with UNHCR official, October 16, 2016).
25 An example is the case of a certain Congolese refugee, Christian Kinangu, whom we met several times in Istanbul. Although he was accepted as a refugee by the UNHCR in 2012, he, with his wife and two children, has been waiting for resettlement since 2012, in economic and juridical precarious conditions.