Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles approach to counterinsurgency?

ABSTRACT

Rwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.

KEYWORDS:

• Rwanda
• counterinsurgency
• peacekeeping
• civilian protection
• Mozambique

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Rick Orth, Emilia Columbo, Marco Jowell, Brittany Hall, and Tertius Jacobs for sharing insights, comments, and feedback that informed and improved this article. The author is also indebted to Focus Group intelligence-driven risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400

Notes

1. Kisangani and Pickering, African Interventions, 4–5, 8–11; Bode and Karlsrud, ‘Implementation in Practice’, 465; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 1–2, 11–3.

2. Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 12, 156; Harig and Jenne, ‘Whose Rules? Whose Power?’ 662–5.

3. Abiola et al ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–60.

4. Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’.

5. Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM): December 2021 (21 December 2021), 6–7; CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 2–4

6. This analysis draws heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado conflict observatory (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/) and Focus Group risk management company (https://focusholding.net/). Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; referenced products remain proprietary materials subject to applicable use and disclosure restrictions.

7. Keeler, Kigali Principles.

8. Paul et al, ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric’.

9. Whereas Kigali seeks stability in Mozambique, CAR, and its various peacekeeping engagements, high-level regime defectors have indicated that the regime prefers a chronic but manageable modicum of disorder in eastern Congo – see Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280–1.

10. Ruffa, Military Cultures, 31–5.

11. Abiola et al, ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–9; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 2.

12. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.

13. Peacekeeping Data: Fatalities, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (accessed 9 February 2022). Fatalities include 32 in Darfur, 16 in CAR, and nine in South Sudan.

14. Jenna, ‘Don’t Blame Authoritarianism’; Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore’, 242.

15. Anna, ‘Police Used “Excessive Force”’. Charbonneau and Nichols, ‘Rwandan Peacekeepers Shooting Protesters’.

16. International Peace Institute (IPI), ‘Accountability System’; Nichols, ‘U.N. Reaction to Malakal Violence’; Wells, A Refuge in Flames.

17. Sieff and Amur, ‘Peacekeepers Made Major Errors’; Lynch, ‘UN Peacekeepers Accused of Child Abuse, Bestiality, and Cowardice’.

18. ‘The Kigali Principles’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

19. Keeler, Kigali Principles.

20. The principles were not uncontroversial. See UN, ‘Opinions Divided over Protection of Civilians’.

21. ‘RDF Deploys Level 2 Hospital’ The New Times; ‘RDF Completes Level Two Hospital Deployment’, IGIHE.

22. Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Special Forces’ Operation in CAR’.

23. Rolland, ‘Bullets and Panic’.

24. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7.

25. Shield, ‘Rwandan Military Effectiveness’.

26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: The Hidden Violence’; Human Rights Watch, World Report; Rever, Praise of Blood, 131–152.

27. Stearns, Glory of Monsters, 250–266.

28. Jackson, Defeat in Victory.

29. Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 21–24.

30. Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships’, 56–7; Lyall, ‘Inferior Counterinsurgents?’ 169–70; Byman, ‘’Death Solves All Problems’’, 14–7; Heuser and Shamir, ‘Universal Toolbox’, 369.

31. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 1–2, 6; CLM: August 2021 (15 September 2021), 1–2, 4–5;

32. The Islamic State-affiliated insurgency in Cabo Delgado initially self-identified by the name Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma but is known locally and referred to throughout this paper as al Shabaab; it should not to be confused with the al Qaeda-linked group of the same name which operates from Somalia.

33. Deliberate out-of-area deployments include Niassa, Mueda, Macomia, Nangade, and Ancuabe - CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Cabo Ligado Weekly (CLW hereafter): 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 2; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 2; CLM: June 2022 (15 July 2022), 5. Regarding hot-pursuit operations, see CLW: 21–27 March (30 March 2022), 1.

34. As characterized by Friesendorf, Rwanda has thus been effective in reducing both negative and positive threats to the civilian population - How Western Soldiers Fight, 13.

35. See CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.

36. Reports of Mozambican security force abuses, misbehavior, and self-enrichment are rife. See – ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 6; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 7; CLW: 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 3; CLW: 23–29 May 2022 (31 May 2022), 5; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.

37. See – CLW: 9–15 August (17 August 2021), 2; ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLW: 28 March − 3 April 2022 (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 4–10 April (12 April 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 2; 2021 Country Reports, U.S. State Department, 10.

38. For positive comparisons and reflections of poor public confidence in SAMIM and FADM, see CLW: 11–17 October (19 October 2021), 2; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 7; CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.

39. CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.

40. CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 6; ‘Interview with Cristóvão Artur Chume’, Chatham House, 6 April 2022.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/interview-cristovao-artur-chume.

41. CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Columbo, ‘Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge’, 5; ‘Intelligence and Military Exasperated by Omnipresent Rwandan Forces in Cabo Delgado’, African Intelligence, 18 July 2023, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2023/07/18/intelligence-and-military-exasperated-by-omnipresent-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado,110004637-eve.

42. Biddle, Military Power, 2–5, 17–19. Biddle’s concept was developed in relation to conventional, interstate warfare but has been usefully adapted to analysis of counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and non-state armed group military behavior – see Ruffa, Military Cultures, 19–20; Biddle, Nonstate Warfare.

43. See, inter alia Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 65–66, 84; Krepinevich, Army and Vietnam, 10–15; Kilcullen, Accidental Guerilla, 136.

44. Lyall and Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, 67–106.

45. Divergent views tend not to take issue with the value of contact patrolling, arguing instead that mechanization is less strictly determinative than Lyall and Wilson assert or that the relative merits of information collection and protected firepower vary with the kinetic capability of the insurgent adversary. See Smith and Toronto, ‘All the Rage’, 519–28; Caverley and Sechser, ‘Military Technology’, 704–20; Van Wie and Walden, ‘Troops or Tanks?’ 1032–58.

46. Ruffa, for instance, employs vehicle-to-soldier ratios and detailed data on patrol frequency and timing – Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 199–225; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 391–422.

47. See comments by General Patrick Nyamvumba, then-Chief of Defence Staff for the RDF, during U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) panel discussion ‘Implementing the “Kigali Principles” for Peacekeeping’, 14 December 2016, https://www.usip.org/events/implementing-kigali-principles-peacekeeping. See also Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 306.

48. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 9 August 2021–13 May 2022 (see Supplementary Online Material).

49. Regarding RPA’s early adoption of the Toyota 4-Runner with outward-facing truck-bed seating as a standard troop carrier, see Odom, Journey, 189–190.

50. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 3 January 2021–5 January 2021 (see Supplementary Online Material).

51. Lamarque, Insulating the Borderland, 102, 132–134, 138–139, 145–146, 152; 218–222; Author’s personal observations, Kigali, April 2021 – February 2022.

52. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 8, 11–12.

53. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 2 September 2021, 9:25 AM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1433420940667281410?s=11; Karuhanga, ‘Cabo Delgado: Rwandan Forces Help’; The New Times (Rwanda) (@NewTimesRwanda), Twitter, 20 October 2021, 1:57 AM, https://twitter.com/NewTimesRwanda/status/1450702733095415815; CLW: 18–24 October (26 October 2021), 2; ‘Rwanda Security Forces, Mozambican Security Organs and Residents of Palma Conduct Community Work in Palma Town, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique’, Rwanda MoD official website, 27 November 2021, https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rwanda-security-forces-mozambican-security-organs-and-residents-of-palma-conduct-community-work-in-palma-town-cabo-delgado-province-mozambique; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 29 January 2022, 2:09 PM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1487503170247008260?s=11.

54. Regarding medical care, see Mugwiza, ‘Rwandan Medics Treated 788 Patients’; Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Medics Are Overwhelmed’; Karuhanga, ‘What Rwandan and Mozambican Forces Are Doing’. With respect to dynamic activities, see CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3–4; ‘Mocimboa da Praia Residents Return’, DefenceWeb.

55. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’; Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight; Day et al, Assessing the Effectiveness, 18–9, 70–1.

56. Comments by Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, before European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 26 January 2022, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/subcommittee-on-security-and-defence_20220126–1345-COMMITTEE-SEDE; CLW: 27 September − 3 October 2021 (5 October 2021), 1; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 3–5; CLW: 14–20 February 2022 (23 February 2022), 2–3; CLM: February 2022 (17 March 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 5–6; CLW: 13–19 June (22 June 2022), 2.

57. Regarding SAMIM troop limits, resource shortfalls, and morale problems, see CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7; Focus Group Weekly (abbreviated hereafter as FGW), Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; ‘SAMIM Seemingly Going Nowhere’, DefenceWeb. Charles Onyango-Obbo has suggested that the Tanzanian army’s lackluster performance is politically motivated; Fernando Lima suggests the same regarding SAMIM as a whole – see Onyango-Obbo, ‘In Mozambique’s War’; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 8–9. This seems unlikely, however, in light of the adverse impacts Tanzania and other contributors could incur as spillover effects from a worsening insurgency – see comments by Emilia Columbo in The Red Line podcast ‘Mozambique: The Campaign Against Cabo Delgado’, episode 80, October 17, 2022, https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/post/episode-80-mozambique-the-campaign-against-cabo-delgado.

58. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.

59. See comments by South African defense analyst John Stupart in interview with Lester Kiewit, ‘SA Troops in Mozambique. What’s Been Happening?’ The Morning Review (CapeTalk567AM), 14 July 2022, https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/449673/sandf-losing-battle-against-insurgents-in-mozambique-says-military-journalist.

60. On SANDF long-range patrolling and its aftermath, see Fabricius, ‘Wars Can’t Be Fought on the Cheap’; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.

61. ‘Security Alert 221,027-ARA001: Insurgent Attack on Macomia Town’, Focus Group, 27 October 2022. Regarding reinforcement, reference the long-awaited arrival of the SANDF’s Combat Team Alpha – FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.

62. Up to 45 insurgent-led attacks are reported to have occurred in Macomia District between September 2022 and March 2023, none of which appear to have elicited a response from the SANDF battlegroup stationed there - FGW Issue 452, 8–15 March 2023. Regarding the delta in tactical posture and deterrent effectiveness between the RDF and SAMIM overall, see FGW Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; ‘Mozambique Situation Report 220,304-ARM001: Insurgents Attack Nangade, While Sporadic Activity Occurs in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia’, Focus Group, 4 March 2022; FGW Issue 408, 6–13 April 2022. Regarding deficient SAMIM back-stopping during RDF offensives in neighboring districts, see CLW: 30 May − 5 June (7 June 2022), 2.

63. Interview with western security official, Kigali, August 2021.

64. Onyango-Obbo, ‘Mozambique’s Swahili-speaking Region’; Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 15. Swahili was used by both the RPF and its institutional parent, the Ugandan National Resistance Army, as a bridge language to facilitate communication between various non-indigenous members – see Bell, ‘Military Culture and Restraint’, 507–508, and the documentary film The 600: The Soldiers’ Story, directed by Laurent Basset and Richard Hall, Great Blue Productions, 2019.

65. Rubin, ‘Islamic State Isn’t Defeated’; CLW: 28 March − 3 April (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3.

66. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–30; Meyer, ‘Flipping the Switch’, 252.

67. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 6.

68. Regarding the distinction between contact and communication in the context of foreign intervention, see Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 32.

69. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’.

70. Comments by Lionel Dyck, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. DAG’s efforts were confounded despite extensive measures to mitigate the possibility of civilian casualties. Per Dyck, DAG embarked Mozambican officers as host-nation riders aboard their aircraft during operations and cleared all engagements through these counterparts prior to opening fire.

71. Harding, ‘The Battle of Palma’; Beaumont, ‘Total Chaos‘; Amnesty International, ‘What I Saw is Death’, 17.

72. Martin, ‘Paramount-supplied Military Hardware’; de Cherisey, ‘Mozambique’s Bush War’.

73. RDF-connected use of air and artillery-delivered fires appears restricted to remote or cordoned areas. Examples include bombardment of insurgent forest bases Siri 1 and Siri 2 near Mbau in mid-August 2021 and difficult-to-reach insurgent positions on southern bank of the Messalo River on 25 September 2021 – see AIM/TVM, ‘Mozambique: ‘Most Important Mission Yet to Come’, Club of Mozambique; ‘Major Ambush on Militants’, Club of Mozambique; Cabo Delgado (@DelgadoCabo), Twitter, 26 September 2021 9:37 AM, https://twitter.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1442121253297410058.

74. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.

75. Rwanda’s current SAMIM and FADM counterparts are also largely ground-bound, similarly equipped, and have recourse to FADM helicopter air support yet have struggled to match the RDF’s performance in simultaneously responding to insurgent violence, avoiding civilian harm, and gaining public trust. The South African contingent of SAMIM brought a handful of additional air assets – initially comprising two Oryx troop transport helicopters and a C-208 Caravan reconnaissance aircraft – but in insufficient numbers to support a more air-enabled concept of operations. See ‘South African National Defence Force Has Reportedly Arrived in Mozambique: Darren Olivier’, SABC News, YouTube video, 26 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wbzWBj80TAw.

76. Regarding RDF marksmanship, see Morgenstein, ‘Speak Softly’.

77. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.

78. Al Shabaab insurgents often move and camp in company with kidnapped civilians and supporters, hence the challenge of avoiding collateral casualties is particularly demanding in Cabo Delgado – see FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2021.

79. Castelli and Zambernardi, ‘Force Protection and its Trade-offs’, 45–9. In US military parlance, this is often discussed in terms of a tension between risk-to-mission and risk-to-force.

80. For an alternative theory of ‘troop reticence’ in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping – albeit one based on a rather selective and charitable survey of the Indian experience – see Podder and Roy, ‘Use of Force to Protect Civilians’.

81. See discussion of ‘costly compliance’ in Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 36–7.

82. Losses reported in Karuhanga, ‘Nyusi: Kagame Understood Mozambicans’ Suffering’. For hints of higher numbers, see CLW: 19–25 July (28 July 2021), 3; CLW: 26 July − 1 August (3 August 2021), 2; CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022, 8. Kigali’s official reluctance to divulge casualty data in Mozambique is a marked departure from its public affairs posture in peacekeeping, where deaths are freely acknowledged and duly commemorated – see Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.

83. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 4, 7.

84. FGW, Issue 395, 8–15 December 2021.

85. CLM: March 2023 (17 April 2023), 2; CLW: 13–19 September (21 September 2021), 2–3; International Crisis Group (ICG), Winning Peace, 7; FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2022. Regarding the effects these technologies impose on counterinsurgent risk calculus, see also Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–5.

86. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 6.

87. ICG, Winning Peace, 5; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 5–6.

88. The abusive and extortionate tendencies of federal authorities toward inhabitants of the northern province, and the skewed recruiting of security forces from the south, are long-standing – see Baker, ‘Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique’, 145–54. See also references to checkpoint shakedowns and past police brutality in Onyango-Obbo, 3 April 2022; ICG, Winning Peace, 5, 10.

89. CLW: 13–19 June, 22 June 2022, 3; FGW Issue 422, 13–20 July 2022; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.

90. Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado; ICG, Winning Peace, 8. See also discussion of the establishment of a joint Intelligence Fusion Centre for intelligence sharing with SAMIM and Mozambican authorities – CLW: 11–17 April (20 April 2022), 4. For a test of the force structure thesis that failed in much the same manner, see Scarinzi, ‘Force Structure and Counterinsurgency’, 212–5.

91. Comments by Joe van der Walt, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. Regarding the relationship between human sources and predictive intelligence, see Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 12–13, and comments by Joe van der Walt in FGW Issue 400, 9–16 February 2022.

92. ‘Security Situation Update 220,606-SEC001: Insurgent Activity Increases and Expands, While Attacks Resume in Mocimboa da Praia and Palma’, Focus Group, 6 June 2022.

93. Damman, ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.

94. Ibid.; Beswick, ‘The Risks of African Military Capacity Building’, 212–231; Beswick, ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, 739–54; Liégeois and Deltenre, ‘Astuteness in Commitment’, 421–35. For a more recent treatment in much the same vein, see Cannon and Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Deployments’, 9–13

95. ‘TotalEnergies Puts Construction Group Close to Kagame on Mozambique LNG Short List’, Africa Intelligence, 1 March 2022; Nhachote, ‘Rwanda Eyes the Spoils of War’; Umurerwa, ‘Rwanda, Mozambique Sign Agreements to Reinforce Justice’.

96. ‘How Kigali is Exporting its Military Expertise Across Africa’, Africa Intelligence, 10 December 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_diplomacy/2021/12/10/how-kigali-is-exporting-its-military-expertise-across-africa,109710456-ar2; Handy, ‘African “Smart Power”’; Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’, United Nations, ‘Speakers Warn Security Council’. The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting Kigali’s courting of diplomatic support from allies and partners in other corners of the continent.

97. Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’, 322–34.

98. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.

99. Harding and Burke, ‘Russian Mercenaries’; Rubin, ‘Rwanda Is Fixing Peacekeeping’.

100. ICG, Rwanda’s Growing Role, 6 Questioned by committee members about Rwandan dissident arrests and disappearances elsewhere in Mozambique, Bléjean confirmed no complaints had been registered about RDF misbehavior or humanitarian violations in the conflict zone – see testimony before European Parliament of 26 January 2022.

101. Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 280–281 Bareebe, An Army with a State or a State with an Army?, 242–244; Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 58, 222–3.

102. See discussion of the role of political commissars, inspectors general, intelligence officers, and presidential loyalists and informants in Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 282, 284, and Jowell, ‘Civil-Military Relations’. See also similar distinction between internal monitoring for political purposes versus domestic crime prevention in Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 162.

103. Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 10–11, 30.

104. Chemouni, ‘Rwandan Decentralization’, 17–25. Per Chemouni, the RPF substitute service delivery for alternative forms of legitimacy that are unavailable to its urban, ex-patriate, and ethnic minority ruling elite.

105. Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army.

106. On the importance of small unit leadership to counterinsurgency and peacekeeping effectiveness, see Tripodi, ‘Peacekeepers, Moral Autonomy, and the Use of Force’, 214–32; Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 9; Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’.

107. Shamir, Transforming Command.

108. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 283.

109. See comments by Valentine Rugwabiza, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN, during IPI panel discussion ‘Lessons from the Implementation of the Kigali Principles’, 29 May 2020, https://www.ipinst.org/2020/05/poc-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-kigali-principles#8 and discussion of efforts to instill a ‘bias to action’ at the RDF Training Academy in Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 29.

110. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 10.

111. USIP panel discussion 14 December 2016.

112. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 164; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 135, 190. See Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 11, 30; Jones, 244.

113. See Ruffa’s examination of culture’s influence on force employment – Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’. Regarding culture’s role in the exercise of battlefield restraint in an American context, see Kahl’s discussion of the ‘annihilation-restraint paradox’ in ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 37–45.

114. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166; Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 301–302; Holmes, ‘Enhancing Operational Effectiveness?’ 14–16; Kühnel Larsen and Struwe, ‘Military Capacity Building’, 3–4.

115. See Wax, ‘In Darfur, Rwandan Soldiers Relive Their Past’.

116. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166. In the typology sketched by Ruffa’s subject militaries, the Rwandan ‘operational style’ would appear to constitute a compromise or hybrid case incorporating elements of both the deterrence- and humanitarian-oriented models – see Ruffa ’What Peacekeepers Think’, 217.

117. ‘RDF in Peacekeeping Mission’, Rwanda MoD official website, https://www.mod.gov.rw/rdf/peacekeeping; Wilen, ‘From “Peacekept” to Peacekeeper’, 7–10. Most references regard peacekeeping but regime officials have described and justified the Cabo Delgado mission using the same language, explicitly linking the intervention to foundational themes of protection, atrocity prevention, and self-sacrifice – see Mwara, ‘Rwanda Sees Another Darfur Moment’; ‘DIGP Namuhoranye Briefs Police Officers’, Taarifa; Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado.

118. For insights from organization theory establishing a correspondence between organizational image, member identification, and individual performance, see Dutton et al, ‘Organizational Images and Member Identification’, 239–240, 246, 255, 260.

119. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’.

120. For a typology of norm transmission, see Oksamytna and Wilen, ‘Adoption, Adaptation or Chance’, 2357–2374.

121. Stearns, From CNDP to M23, 19, 25, 32–33, 44, 46–47, 54–55; ‘Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians’, Human Rights Watch.

122. ‘Diplomatic Cat and Mouse’, Africa Intelligence: ‘UN Experts Say Rwanda Intervened’, Reuters.

123. ‘Rwanda Says Two Soldiers’, Reuters.

124. Thomson, Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace, 235–236; Clark, ‘Rwanda’s Recovery’, 36–37.

125. Regarding the deep aversion to social disharmony within Rwanda, see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 187–194; 244. Regarding a cultivated sense of insecurity and portrayal of the FDLR as a persistent threat, see ibid., 228, and Andrea Purdeková et al, ‘Militarisation of Governance’, 168. Further underscoring the sense of danger and complicating its realistic appraisal, the term ‘FDLR’ is applied liberally within Rwanda to various enemies of the state regardless of affiliation with the actual militia – see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 250.

126. Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280.

127. Ibid., 330, 420.

128. Regarding veneration of war-time experience and inter-generational transmission of knowledge and beliefs across age cohorts within the RDF, see Matisek’s discussion of value models held by RPA-era ‘patriots’ and ‘new RDF’ members, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 307–10.

129. On the RDF’s internally perceived responsibility to safeguard social cohesion see Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation, 192.

130. Joyce, ‘Soldiers’ Dilemma’, 48–90.

131. Burgess, ‘From Failed Power Sharing’, 92–99; Krebs and Licklider, ‘United They Fall’.

132. See especially the RDF’s aspiration to recover a (possibly apocryphal) ideal of pre-colonial cohesion – Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 284, 287–8. Also, Mathys, ‘Bringing History Back In’, 473–4.

133. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 100–106.

134. Hedlund, ‘There Was No Genocide’, 32–34; Davey, ‘A Soldier’s Journey’, NPI 2568.

135. Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.

136. Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 394; Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 210–1.

137. See comments by Jason K. Stearns during CSIS livestream discussion with Mvemba Phezo Dizolel, ‘Addressing Rising Tensions Between the DRC and Rwanda’, YouTube video, 10 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0_rFrmKbbA.

138. Orth, ‘Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Insurgency’; Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 104–5, 251.

139. Author video interview with Focus Group analysts Brittany Hall and Tertius Jacobs, 18 October 2022.

140. CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2–3.

141. ‘Rwandan Police Kill’, Reuters; ‘Rwanda police shoot dead’, BBC News.

142. Stearns, The War That Doesn’t Say Its Name, 80–3.

143. See Damman’s description of ‘Janus-faced’ state in ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.

144. Chemouni and Mugiraneza, ‘Ideology and Interests’, 115–140; McDoom, ‘Securocratic State-Building’, 535–567.

145. Engelhardt, ’Democracies, Dictatorships’, 58; Lalwani, Selective Leviathans; Ucko, ‘The People Are Revolting’.

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Ralph Shield

Ralph Shield is a senior researcher with the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) at the US Naval War College. He previously served as an intelligence officer, defense attaché, and foreign military advisor. His earlier work has appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and the Journal of Southern African Studies (forthcoming). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent official positions or assessments of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.