A revolution in military learning? Cross-functional teams and knowledge transformation by lessons-learned processes

ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the widespread development of lessons-learned processes within NATO member-states. However, practitioner guidance and military innovation studies are yet to properly investigate the insights of management studies about best-practice in lessons-learned processes. In particular, they have failed to identify the activities which enable militaries to “transform” knowledge, by effectively combining new knowledge with existing organisational knowledge. Drawing upon the academic literature on cross-functional teams and original interview research, this article examines the organisational activities which improve the crucial “remedial action” phase of lessons-learned processes. It breaks new ground by identifying six key dimensions of lessons-learned process cross-functional teams and the organisational activities which enhance their performance. In doing so, the article improves understanding about the team processes and wider organisational activities which shape lessons-learned process effectiveness. It also examines the challenges associated with encouraging well-informed oversight of lessons-learned processes by the civilian and military leadership. The article concludes by identifying a number of important research agendas on lessons-learned processes.

KEYWORDS:

• Absorptive capacity
• cross-functional teams
• knowledge transformation
• lessons-learned processes
• military learning
• NATO

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Tom Dyson is a Reader in International Relations at the Department of Politics, International Relations, and Philosophy, Royal Holloway College, University of London. At the time of writing he was also a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces. His most recent book is Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A New Model for Lessons-Learned Processes.

Notes

1 On the Israel Defence Force: Marcus (2015), on the US army: Chua et al. (2006), on the British army: Catignani (2014), Egnell (2011), Foley et al. (2011), on the British and German armies Dyson (2019b). On learning processes and public sector performance, see Piening (2013).

2 The project was subject to review by the British Army and MOD, which examined the potential for harm to participants and to the reputation and security of the armed forces. All British military personnel were provided with a list of interview questions in advance of the interview, an overview of the project’s objectives and information about the purposes to which the data would be put. Any potential risks associated with participation were also discussed with British Army interview partners, who signed an interview consent form. The project was also subject to an internal review by the German Ministry of Defence, which examined the potential for harm to participants and to the reputation and security of the Bundeswehr. Interview partners at the Bundeswehr and JALLC were provided were provided with information about the objectives of the research project before the interview, the research questions, and purposes to which the data would be put. Any potential risks associated with participation were also discussed with interviewees before the interview.

3 NATO Standard Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, Edition C, Version 1, 2019, Section E, point E.2, p. 149.

4 Kier (1995, pp. 69–70) defines organisational culture as: “ … basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed or communicated to the members of an organization”. On the impact of organisational culture on the creation, dissemination and use of knowledge within organisations, see: de Long and Fahey (2000) and Horowitz (2010, p. 10).

5 NATO Standard Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, Edition C, Version 1, 2019, Section E, point E.2, p. 149.

6 Corporate strategic alliances involve the “ … exchange, sharing, or co-development or products, services, procedures, and processes” (Serrat 2017, p. 640).

7 The LELWG was replaced in 2018 by the Operational Lessons Integration Group (OLIG), which in 2020 was replaced by the Operations and Training Lessons Integration Group (OTLIG). An Army Lessons Steering Group (ALSG) chaired by Brigadier Army Staff has also been established. Its role is to direct the resolution of lessons and elevate unresolvable lessons to the 3* Army Organisational Learning Committee, which can further elevate issues to the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB).

8 Jointness refers to the effective integration of service branches.

9 “Perceived organisational support” refers to the extent to which employees believe that an organisation values their contributions and wellbeing.

10 The concept of strategic culture refers to the impact on defence and security policy-making of norms embedded within key political and social institutions, both within and outside the defence and security policy sub-system (Bloomfield 2012).

11 The civilian-military gap refers to social distance between the military and the public, and between the military and government (Hines et al. 2015, p. 692).

12 On the challenges of applying a diversity of research methods within military organisations, see Carreiras et al. (2016, p. 198).

Additional information

Funding

The research was funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation [grant number AZ 05/KF/15].