Plausibility Judgments in Conceptual Change and Epistemic Cognition

Abstract

Plausibility judgments rarely have been addressed empirically in conceptual change research. Recent research, however, suggests that these judgments may be pivotal to conceptual change about certain topics where a gap exists between what scientists and laypersons find plausible. Based on a philosophical and empirical foundation, this article presents a theoretical model of the role of plausibility judgments in conceptual change (PJCC) with implications for epistemic cognition. The PJCC moves beyond the limitations of cold cognitive processing by incorporating the warmer constructs of affect, motivation, and motivated reasoning. We review recent research in plausibility judgments that informed the PJCC's development and discuss components of the model. Of particular note is the importance of using explicit critical evaluation to reappraise plausibility judgments that may have been originally made through implicit cognitive processes. We also suggest potentially productive areas of future research based on the PJCC model.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article emerged from the first author's doctoral dissertation while at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, with the second and third authors serving as dissertation committee co-chairs. We thank the other committee members, Dr. Gregory Schraw and Dr. Matthew Lachniet, both from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We also greatly appreciate Dr. Janelle Bailey from Temple University, Dr. Clark Chinn from Rutgers University, Ms. Shondricka Burrell from Temple University, and the many anonymous reviewers, who provided valuable feedback on the manuscript.

Notes

¹ In our working definition we are limiting the scope of plausibility judgments to explanations based on philosophical foundations (Rescher, 1976, 2003), argumentation theory (Walton, 2004), and particular relevance to conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). We acknowledge that plausibility judgments may be made about the quality of evidence and predictive statements, for example, but for the purposes of conceptual clarity, we are focusing our discussion to explanations.

² We cite some empirical studies relating plausibility to other constructs throughout our discussion (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, 2013; Lombardi et al., 2014; Lombardi, Sinatra, et al., 2013). In these studies, participants rated the plausibility of scientific statements about climate change (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, 2013; Lombardi et al., 2014), or alternative explanations about the causes of current climate change (Lombardi, Sinatra, et al., 2013), on a Likert scale from 1 (greatly implausible or even impossible) to 10 (highly plausible). This method closely followed earlier plausibility measures developed by Connell and Keane (2004, 2006). In rating the plausibility of alternative explanations, we acknowledge that participants may not have been defining plausibility as we do (i.e., judgment of potential truthfulness of an explanation). Participants’ personal definitions of plausibility may have been conflated with other notions, such as probability and believability. However, in these studies individuals would often rate two alternatives as highly plausible, which implicitly deviates from probabilistic reasoning and commitment to a belief.

³ A preliminary version of this model appeared in Lombardi et al., (2013). The preliminary version had some similarity to the current model with respects to the source validity preprocessing and formation of the plausibility judgment. However, both of these processes are extended and expanded upon here. Furthermore, the current model contains a major reconceptualization of the plausibility reappraisal feedback loop, as well as the potential for conceptual change outcomes.

⁴ We acknowledge that other explicit epistemic cognition processes may be dynamically linked to plausibility reappraisal, and potentially other aspects of the PJCC. For example, reflective evidence evaluation, which would not necessarily be a tentative judgment that is involved in plausibility appraisal or reappraisal, may also involve explicit epistemic cognition. When students list evidence for and against a model, this may not correspond directly to the plausibility characteristic as “potential truthfulness.” Plausibility reappraisal may therefore be one of a number of processes, some longer and more reflective, that involve explicit epistemic cognition. The tentative endorsement of plausibility judgments may occur iteratively, in a longer deliberative reflection (e.g., during long-term instruction).