The rightward shift and electoral decline of social democratic parties under increasing inequality

Figures & data

Figure 1. Social democratic vote share and Gini Index, 1965–2019.

Figure 2. Social democratic vote share by country, 1965–2019.

Figure 3. Social democratic economic position by country, 1965–2019.

Table 1. Aggregate-level regression results predicting social democratic vote.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
SD Economic Position	0.080	2.314**	−0.257
	(0.187)	(0.709)	(0.283)
SD Culture Position	−0.029	−0.006	−0.126
	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.153)
Gini t-1	0.094	0.011	0.125
	(0.243)	(0.232)	(0.258)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		−0.077**
		(0.025)
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			−0.074*
			(0.032)
Government Spending t-1	0.135	0.120	0.131
	(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.141)
GDP Growth t-1	−0.047	−0.070	−0.082
	(0.149)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Unemployment t-1	−0.612*	−0.572*	−0.591*
	(0.231)	(0.206)	(0.213)
Union Density	−0.096	−0.125	−0.108
	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Turnout	0.084	0.109	0.124
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.093)
SD Vote e-1	0.382***	0.394***	0.374***
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Incumbent	−0.625	−0.707	−0.558
	(0.790)	(0.804)	(0.745)
Disproportionality	−0.293**	−0.246*	−0.278*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.110)
Left Competitors e-1	−1.080	−1.066	−1.056
	(0.783)	(0.779)	(0.797)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	0.253	0.391	0.177
	(0.596)	(0.550)	(0.597)
Constant	11.410	12.708	7.871
	(12.733)	(12.085)	(13.539)
R^2 within	0.49	0.50	0.50
R^2 adjusted	0.80	0.80	0.80
N	280	280	280

Note: Beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Figure 4. Average marginal effects of inequality by social democratic economic position on their vote with 95% C.I. (Model 2).

Figure 5. Average marginal effects of social democratic socio-cultural position by economic position on their vote with 95% C.I. (Model 3).

Table 2. Individual-level regression results predicting social democratic vote.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.032	−0.032	−0.033	−0.032
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education	−0.141***	−0.141***	−0.140***	−0.141***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	−0.023***	−0.024***	−0.022**	−0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Rural	−0.180***	−0.181***	−0.176***	−0.180***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Union	0.369***	0.370***	0.370***	0.369***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Political Ideology	−0.322***	−0.322***	−0.322***	−0.322***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
SD Economic Position	0.024**	0.241***	−0.040***	0.032**
	(0.008)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.010)
SD Economic Position # Income				−0.003
				(0.002)
SD Culture Position	0.038***	0.042***	0.016*	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			−0.019***
			(0.003)
Gini t-1	−0.035	−0.016	0.008	−0.036
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		−0.007***
		(0.002)
GDP Growth t-1	0.039***	0.054***	0.052***	0.039***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment t-1	−0.020*	−0.017*	−0.044***	−0.020*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Union Density	−0.018**	−0.030***	−0.025***	−0.018**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Turnout	0.029***	0.029***	0.031***	0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Disproportionality	0.040***	0.060***	0.069***	0.040***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left Competitors e-1	−0.180***	−0.272***	−0.287***	−0.180***
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	−0.109***	−0.046	−0.002	−0.109***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Constant	2.154*	1.652	0.840	2.205*
	(0.921)	(0.938)	(0.954)	(0.922)
Variance	0.148**	0.227**	0.299**	0.148**
	(0.053)	(0.081)	(0.103)	(0.053)
Log Likelihood	−38852.15	−38844.6	−38826.02	−38851.34
AIC	77780.3	77767.2	77730.05	77780.68
BIC	78129.98	78126.08	78088.93	78139.56
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	73,281	73,281	73,281	73,281

Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Figure 6. Average marginal effects of inequality by social democratic economic position on their vote with 95% C.I. (Model 2).

Figure 7. Average marginal effects of social democratic socio-cultural position by economic position on their vote with 95% C.I. (Model 3).