The impact of radical right parties on family benefits

Figures & data

Table 1. Radical right governance (incl. supporting parties of minority cabinets).

Country	Parties	Years in government
Austria	FPÖ (radical right from 1986), BZÖ	2000–06
Denmark	DFP	2002–11*, 2015*
Finland	PS	2015
Greece	LAOS	2012
Hungary	KDNP, FIDESZ (radical right from 2006)	1990–94, 2010–15
Italy	LN	1994, 2001–06, 2008–11
Latvia	TB	1996–97
Netherlands	PVV	2011–12
Norway	FrP	1985–86*, 1990*, 2003–05*, 2013–15
Poland	PiS, LPR	2006–07
Slovakia	SNS	1992–98, 2006–10
Slovenia	SDS (radical right from 2003)	2005–08, 2012–13
Sweden	NyD	1992–94*
Switzerland	SVP (radical right from 1999)	2000–2007, 2009–2015

Figure 1. Public spending on family allowances (FA) and childcare (CC) as percent of GDP in 26 countries (1980–2015). Note: Data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.

Table 2. Determinants of spending on family allowances (FA) and childcare (CC).

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	FA	FA	CC	CC
Radical right governance	0.0273	0.0925	−0.0274#	−0.0303
	(0.0220)	(0.0606)	(0.0155)	(0.0428)
Radical right governance × migrant stock (logged)		−0.0326		0.00147
		(0.0282)		(0.0200)
Migrant stock (logged)	0.172**	0.174**	−0.0932**	−0.0934**
	(0.0455)	(0.0455)	(0.0337)	(0.0338)
Left-party share of cabinet seats	0.0566**	0.0580**	0.0522**	0.0521**
	(0.0197)	(0.0197)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)
Center-party share of cabinet seats	0.0434	0.0468	0.0175	0.0173
	(0.0311)	(0.0312)	(0.0221)	(0.0222)
Trade union density	0.240	0.234	0.741**	0.742**
	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Share of female legislators	−0.273	−0.281	0.435**	0.436**
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Share of population under 15	1.009	1.067	−1.624*	−1.628*
	(0.865)	(0.867)	(0.647)	(0.648)
GDP per capita (USD, divided by 1,000)	0.0209**	0.0209**	0.00309	0.00308
	(0.00267)	(0.00267)	(0.00190)	(0.00190)
Unemployment rate	0.0163**	0.0166**	−0.00705**	−0.00707**
	(0.00304)	(0.00305)	(0.00223)	(0.00224)
Real GDP growth	−0.00916**	−0.00914**	−0.00299#	−0.00300#
	(0.00210)	(0.00210)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)
Spline 1	−0.0329**	−0.0329**	0.00315	0.00315
	(0.00591)	(0.00591)	(0.00488)	(0.00488)
Spline 2	0.0275*	0.0283*	0.0316**	0.0315**
	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)
Spline 3	−0.0868#	−0.0902#	−0.0948*	−0.0946*
	(0.0484)	(0.0484)	(0.0406)	(0.0407)
Constant	65.08**	65.23**	−5.918	−5.927
	(11.77)	(11.75)	(9.707)	(9.713)
σcountry	0.408**	0.406**	0.262**	0.262**
	(0.0622)	(0.0619)	(0.0395)	(0.0395)
σcabinet	0.215**	0.215**	0.158**	0.158**
	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.00748)	(0.00748)
σyear	0.0260**	0.0257**	0.0304**	0.0304**
	(0.00681)	(0.00684)	(0.00506)	(0.00506)
σresidual	0.0833**	0.0833**	0.0579**	0.0580**
	(0.00295)	(0.00295)	(0.00209)	(0.00209)
N (countries)	26	26	26	26
N (cabinets)	307	307	297	297
N (observations)	760	760	727	727

Estimates from cross-nested mixed-effects models, using restricted maximum likelihood estimation; all independent variables lagged by one year; standard errors in parentheses.

#p < 0.1.

*p < 0.05.

**p < 0.01.

Figure 2. Average marginal effects of radical right governance by migrant stock. Note: AMEs with 95-percent confidence intervals. Grey bars at the bottom show distribution of the migrant stock variable. Note that this variable has been logged to eliminate right-skewness.

Table 3. Determinants of the margin between spending on family allowances (FA) and childcare (CC).

Model	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	FA–CC	FA–CC
Radical right governance	0.0557*	0.126#
	(0.0278)	(0.0764)
Radical right governance × migrant stock (logged)		−0.0353
		(0.0356)
Migrant stock (logged)	0.262**	0.265**
	(0.0610)	(0.0610)
Controls (see Table 2)	YES	YES
σcountry	0.507**	0.505**
	(0.0800)	(0.0796)
σcabinet	0.282**	0.282**
	(0.0133)	(0.0133)
σyear	0.0367**	0.0366**
	(0.00884)	(0.00884)
σresidual	0.104**	0.104**
	(0.00377)	(0.00378)
N (countries)	26	26
N (cabinets)	297	297
N (observations)	727	727

DV: FA spending minus CC spending; estimates from cross-nested mixed-effects models, using restricted maximum likelihood estimation; all independent variables lagged by one year; standard errors in parentheses.

#p < 0.1.

*p < 0.05.

**p < 0.01.