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Abstract
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 Turkey has undergone double regime transitions. First, tutelary democracy ended; second, a competitive authoritarian regime has risen in its stead. We substantiate this assertion with specific and detailed evidence from 2015 election cycles, as well as from broader trends in Turkish politics. This evidence indeed confirms that elections are no longer fair; civil liberties are being systematically violated; and the playing field is highly skewed in favour of the ruling AKP. The June 2015 election results and their aftermath further confirm that Turkey has evolved into a competitive authoritarian regime.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks are due to Hazan Sucu for her valuable research assistance. We would also like to thank Karabekir Akkoyunlu, Tim Dorlach, Samuel Greene, Kerem Oktem, Ziya Onis, Osman Savaskan, Feryaz Ocakli, Andreas Schedler and participants at the interdisciplinary workshop on the ‘Political Economy of Contemporary Turkey’ (July 30–31, 2015), the inaugural symposium ‘Consortium of European Symposia on Turkey’ (October 1–3, 2015) and the ‘Rise of Competitive Electoral Authoritarian Regimes’ panel at APSA 2015. We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Notes
1. “Erdogan: 400 vekil alinsaydi durum farkli olurdu.” Cumhuriyet, September 8, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/video/video/363925/Erdogan__400_vekil_alinsaydi_farkli_olurdu.html#.
2. For Hurriyet’s official response to this charge, see “Hurriyet ve Erdogan’in 400 vekil sozu.” Hurriyet, September 8, 2015. http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/faruk-bildirici_484/hurriyet-ve-erdogan-in-400-vekil-sozu_30020005.
3. “PKK Attacks kill Soldiers in Southeastern Turkey.” BBC, September 7, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34169988; “AK Parti milletvekili saldirganlara boyle hitap etti: 1 Kasim’dan sonra defolup gidecekler.” Hurriyet, September 7, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/30007675.asp; and “Boynukalin Hurriyete saldiriyi boyle savundu: Bir dokunulmazligi kaldirdik.” Radikal, October 21, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/boynukalin-hurriyete-saldiriyi-boyle-savundu-bir-dokunulmazligi-kaldirdik-1456745/.
4. “Polis polisin gorev yapmasini engellerse.” Hurriyet, September 12, 2015. http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/mehmet-y-yilmaz_148/polis-polisin-gorev-yapmasini-engellerse_30052858.
5. Scholars have noted the proliferation of hybrid regimes – cases that are neither fully democratic nor authoritarian – in the post-cold war period. See Levitsky and Way. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; and Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” For a recent analysis, see Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession.”
6. Muftuler-Bac and Keyman, “The Era of Dominant-party Politics”; Turam, “Are Rights and Liberties Safe?”; Önis, “Sharing Power,” 100–122; Önis, “Monopolising the Centre”; Özbudun, “AKP at the Cross-roads”; Lancaster, “The Iron Law of Erdogan”; and Tas, “Turkey.”
7. See Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession”; and Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary.”
8. We adapt Dahl’s seven criteria – elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy – as the minimum requirements of democracy. Dahl, Polyarchy. Except for having elected officials, inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office, Turkey no longer satisfies these minimum criteria of democracy. Elections are no longer fair, while freedom of information, expression and association have been systematically curtailed by the AKP government, as discussed in detail in the rest of the paper.
9. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, Appendix.
10. Levitsky and Way. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 51–65; and Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
11. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5.
12. Özbudun, “AKP at the Cross-roads”; Söyler, “Informal Institutions”; and Tas, “Turkey.”
13. Taskin, “Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy”; Özbudun, “AKP at the Cross-roads”; Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary”; Önis, “Monopolising the Centre”; and Çinar and Sayin, “Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy.”
14. Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 170. See also Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. The concept of electoral authoritarianism better captures regime change in Turkey, yet it hides the difference between this new regime and hegemonic authoritarianism. All electoral authoritarian regimes conduct regular elections. In competitive authoritarian regimes – a subset of electoral authoritarianism – however, the outcome of elections is uncertain, as the June 2015 elections in Turkey show. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, in contrast, elections are manipulated and rigged to prevent any surprises at the ballot box. For a discussion of their differences, see Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 173–175.
15. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
16. Tas, “Turkey.” Özbudun was the first scholar to apply this term to the Turkish context. However, similarly to Tas, we disagree with Özbudun’s depiction of 1990s Turkey as a ‘delegative democracy’. Unlike delegative democracies, where incumbents hold excessive powers and carry weak horizontal accountability, the civilian leadership in Turkey at that time was not dominant over the military and thus failed to limit its reserve domains.
17. For the effect of polarisation in Turkish politics, see Yardimci-Geyikci, “Gezi Park Protests.”
18. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy.”
19. Lancaster, “The Iron Law of Erdogan.”
20. Moreover, institutionalisation of this de facto situation and transfer of executive power to the elected president requires a new constitution. That is why Erdogan does not refrain from violating the norms of impartiality and campaigning in favour of the AKP, with the aim of attaining a qualified majority in parliament.
21. Similarly to the Turkish case, both Hungary and Thailand recently witnessed the rise of conservative populist leaders who, once in power, began to remove democratic restraints on the executive, manipulated the electoral system, and curtailed the democratic space available to opposition. As a result of a standoff between large segments of the urban middle classes and the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, over questions of executive outreach and corruption, the military has twice staged a coup over the past decade – in 2006 and 2011. This conflict between Thaksin’s movement and the military at times resembled the AKP’s struggle against the Turkish military during its first term. For a comparison of the two cases, see Zarakol, Revisiting Second Image Reversed; and McCargo and Zarakol, Turkey and Thailand. Winning a landslide victory in the 2010 Hungarian general elections with 53% of the vote, Victor Orban’s Fidezs party used its parliamentary super-majority to revise the electoral system, adopt a new constitution and change the composition of the Constitutional Court.
22. Söyler, “Informal Institutions.”
23. We define tutelary democracy as a type of diminished democracy, in which the elected government’s power is restrained by the military (or another veto player such as the Constitutional Court), which intervenes in the political process through informal and usually extra-constitutional channels. For more on this concept, see Wigell, “Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’.”
24. The National Security Council was established after the first military intervention in 1960 to institutionalise the military’s oversight over civilian politicians. The power and responsibilities of the council were expanded with the 1980 intervention, which allotted substantial power and influence to the military in a wide range of political decisions from security to education.
25. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey,” 44; Söyler, “Informal Institutions,” 325; and Gürsoy, “The Changing Role of the Military,” 749.
26. Aydinli, “Turkey under the AKP,” 103.
27. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey,” 50; Sarigil, “Civil–Military Relations;” and Satana, “Transformation of the Turkish Military.”
28. Of course, these reforms succeeded in effectively reducing the role of the military in Turkish politics, partly thanks to support given by a group in the military who sided with democracy. Aydinli, “Turkey under the AKP.” Unfortunately, however, scholars who accepted the validity of these exposed coup plots with few reservations were oblivious to the gross injustices committed during the lengthy trials that followed. Much of the evidence initially presented against the officers proved to be fabricated. Instead of leading to democratic consolidation, these trials polarized society, eroded the rule of law, and were eventually dropped by the AKP government, which no longer saw the trials as serving its partisan interests. See Gürsoy, “The Changing Role of the Military.”
29. Carkoglu and Toprak, Religion, Society and Politics.
30. See Akturk, Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood.
31. On the party’s rise to predominance, see Gumuscu, “The Emerging Predominant Party System”; Ayan Musil, “Emergence of a Dominant Party System”; Taskın, “Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy”; and Cınar, “Local Determinants.”
32. Gumuscu and Sert, “The March 2009 Elections.”
33. An Islamic preacher by profession, Fethullah Gulen is the leader of a pseudo-religious movement that oversees a large network of schools in more than 80 countries, including the USA, where the movement is the largest operator of charter schools in the country. In the past decade Gulen’s followers have reached positions of influence in the state bureaucracy, judiciary and academia and are well-organised among businessmen and journalists. Once close allies during the struggle against the Kemalist establishment, the Gulenist movement and Erdogan’s AKP began to clash after 2011, reportedly over the question of power sharing. This rift triggered a contentious fight between the two groups after late 2013, with Erdogan using his political capital to weed out Gulen sympathisers in the bureaucracy and to co-opt or destroy the main Gulenist actors in the media, business and education. For more information on Fethullah Gulen and his movement, see Turam, Between Islam and the State ; and “Who is Fethullah Gulen?” City Journal, Autumn 2012. http://www.city-journal.org/2012/22_4_fethullah-gulen.html.
34. Dogan and Rodrik, Yargı, Cemaat ve Bir Darbe Kurgusunun Icyuzu; and Dogan and Rodrik, “A Harvard Economist.”
35. For details on the 2010 referendum, see Özbudun, “AKP at the Cross-roads”; Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary”; and Kalaycioglu, “Kulturkampf in Turkey.”
36. On the importance of a level playing field for democratic outcomes, see Levitsky and Way, “Why Democracy needs a Level Playing Field.”
37. Clearly, Turkey is not a full authoritarian regime since nation-wide elections continue and there is no large-scale falsification of results; no major opposition party is routinely excluded from competition; and repression is not yet sufficiently widespread to force opposition groups underground. For details, see Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, Appendix.
38. Ibid.
39. Tol and Hjerno, “Turkey’s General Elections”; and Ciddi, “Turkey’s September 12, 2010, Referendum.” http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/12/turkey%E2%80%99s-september-12-2010-referendum/.
40. Independent researchers who conducted analyses of the preliminary results in the Ankara municipality race detected a positive relationship between the AKP–CHP vote margin and invalid vote share, even after controlling for fixed effects related to district- (ilce) and voting-station- (alan) level factors. Erik Meyersson, “Trouble in Turkey’s Elections.” April 6, 2014. http://erikmeyersson.com/2014/04/06/trouble-in-turkeys-elections; Cem Say, “Istatistik bilimi, secimlerde CHP’ye karsi guclu hile ihtimalini gosteriyor.” Cumhuriyet, April 7, 2014. http://www.cmpe.boun.edu.tr/~say/cum7nis.htm; and Arbatli, Cemal, “What happened in 2009 Ankara Elections?” April 30, 2014. http://ekonomisiyaset.blogspot.ru/2014/04/what-happened-in-ankara-2009-elections.html.
41. “Ankara’da 24 saatlik skandal.” Cumhuriyet, April 1, 2014. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/56167/Ankara_da_24_saatlik_skandal.html; and “Antalya’da tartisilan fotograf.” April 2, 2014. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/antalyada-tartisilan-fotograf-26132116.
42. For instance, formal complaints by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) to get an official recount were rejected by local, provincial and supreme electoral boards.
43. Ezgi Basaran, “Secim sonuclarina guvenilmeyeceginin somut kanitini buldum.” Radikal, June 3, 2014. http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/secim_sonuclarina_guvenilemeyeceginin_somut_kanitini_buldum-1195251.
44. “Oy ve Otesinin altindan da Feto cikti.” Sabah, October 21, 2015. http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/10/21/oy-ve-otesinin-altindan-da-feto-cikti.
45. “Secim sonuc degerlendirmeleri.” Oy ve Otesi, November 3, 2015. http://oyveotesi.org/1-kasim-2015-genel-secimleri/1-kasim-2015-secim-sonuc-degerlendirmeleri/.
46. “HDP’nin Mitingi Basbakanin programina takildi.” Milliyet, April 24, 2014. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hdp-nin-mitingi-basbakan-in/siyaset/detay/2049275/default.htm.
47. “Insan Haklari Dernegi Genel Merkez Aciklamasi.” June 6, 2015. http://www.ihd.org.tr/hdpye-yonelik-bombali-ve-silahli-saldirilari-kiniyor-sorumlulari-lanetliyoruz/.
48. For a fairly comprehensive list of attacks on the HDP and the number of party members detained or arrested, see “HDP’ye yapilan saldirilar ve cezasizlik sistemli mi?” T24, May 18, 2015. http://t24.com.tr/haber/hdpye-yapilan-saldirilar-ve-cezasizlik-sistemli-mi,296981. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this source to our attention.
49. “Istanbulda 15 HDP uyesi tutuklandi.” Radikal, October 6, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/istanbulda_15_hdp_uyesi_tutuklandi-1446014; and “Ankarada HDP’ye operasyon.” IMCTV, October 6, 2015. http://www.imctv.com.tr/ankarada-hdpye-operasyon-23-gozalti/.
50. The chief prosecutor in Ankara reported that the attacks on the peace rally were carried out by an ISIS cell in Turkey. “Ankara Bassavciligi: Ankara saldirilarini ISID duzenledi.” BBC, October 28, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151028_ankara_saldiri_savcilik.
51. “HDP secim mitinglerini iptal etti.” IMCTV, October 16, 2015.
52. “YSK’dan Erdogan itirazlarina red.” Hurriyet, May 6, 2015, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28928070.asp; and “YSK’da iki cesur yurek.” Cumhuriyet, May 15, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/276875/YSK_de_iki_cesur_yurek.html.
53. “AKP’de esbaskanlik donemi.” Diken, May 18, 2015. http://www.diken.com.tr/akpde-es-baskanlik-sistemi-davutoglu-ve-erdoganin-mitingleri-birbirlerini-tamamliyor/.
54. “Vali ve Komutan AKP adayiyla secim turunda.” Taraf, May 20, 2015. http://www.taraf.com.tr/politika/yok-artik-bu-kadar-da-olmaz-vali-ve-komutan-akp-adayiyla-secim-turunda/.
55. “Davutoglu’ndan skandal mektup.” Zaman, June 2, 2015. http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_davutoglundan-skandal-mektup_2297870.html.
56. “Hollanda: Davutoğlu imzalı mektuba soruşturma.” BBC Turkce, October 20, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151020_hollanda_sorusturma_davutoglu.
57. “MHP says Istanbul Municipal Police tore Campaign Banners.” Today’s Zaman, May 11, 2015. http://www.todayszaman.com/national_mhp-says-istanbul-municipal-police-tore-campaign-banners-takes-legal-action_380429.html.
58. “Main Opposition CHP’s Truck Towed Away.” Hurriyet Daily News, May 29, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/main-opposition-chps-election-truck-towed-away-in-erzurum.aspx?PageID=238&NID=83172&NewsCatID=338.
59. “Mahkeme, MHP’nin hirsiz afislerini suclu buldu.” October 25, 2015. http://www.rotahaber.com/siyaset/mahkeme-mhp-nin-hirsiz-afislerini-suclu-buldu-h532785.html; and “MHP’nin Osmanlica hirsiz pankarti kaldirildi.” Cumhuriyet, December 29, 2014. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/175773/MHP_nin_Osmanlica__Hirsiz__pankarti_kaldirildi.html#.
60. “AK Partili belediye MHP secim burosunu muhurledi.” Cihan, May 10, 2015. http://www.cihan.com.tr/tr/ak-partili-belediye-mhp-secim-burosunu-muhurledi-1783044.htm.
61. Reporters without Borders also highlighted biased broadcasting by the TRT and confirmed the existence of political pressure on the critical media outlets. See http://en.rsf.org/turkey-ban-sought-turkish-authorities-try-22-05-2015,47922.html. For more details on the AKP’s colonisation of TRT, see Dagistanli, 5N1Kim.
62. “OSCE Secim Gozlem Misyonu Raporu.” October 22, 2015. http://www.osce.org/tr/odihr/86845?download=true.
63. “TRT'de konuk dağılımı: AKP 37, CHP, HDP ve MHP 0.” Radikal, October 30, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/trtde-konuk-dagilimi-akp-37-chp-hdp-ve-mhp-0-1462892/.
64. “OSCE Secim Gozlem Misyonu Raporu.” October 22, 2015. http://www.osce.org/tr/odihr/86845?download=true.
65. “Ahmet Hakan’a saldirmakla suclanan 7 zanlı adliyeye sevkedildi.” BBC Turkce, October 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151004_ahmethakan_adliye.
66. “AKPM’nin 7 Haziran Raporu aciklandi,” T24, June 22, 2015. http://t24.com.tr/haber/akpmnin-7-haziran-raporu-aciklandi,300483.
67. “Turkey’s state run TV refuses to air CHP Ad targeting Government.” Hurriyet Daily News, April 11, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-state-run-tv-refuses-to-air-chp-ad-targeting-govt.aspx?pageID=517&nID=80920&NewsCatID=338.
68. “Fetih Soleni icin ogrenci ve ogretmenlere zorunlu gorev.” Radikal, May 28, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/fetih_soleni_icin_ogrenci_ve_ogretmenlere_zorunlu_gorev-1367989.
69. “Seçimde iki kat örttüler.” Cumhuriyet, June 15, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/ekonomi/299587/Secimde_iki_kat_orttuler.html.
70. “Ortulu odenek bilancolari.” Cumhuriyet, December 20, 2014. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/167583/Ortulu_Odenek_Bilancolari.html.
71. “CHP warns YSK about PM’s Possible Use of Discretionary Fund for Race.” Today’s Zaman. July 3, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/national_chp-warns-ysk-about-pms-possible-use-of-discretionary-fund-for-race_352026.html.
72. Whereas Erdogan’s campaign fund received over 55 million lira’s-worth of donations, his closest rival, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, could muster only 8.5 million lira. “Erdogan bagis miktarini acikladi.” Hurriyet, August 9, 2014. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26971638.asp.
73. “Iste gercek faiz lobisi Zorlu’dan AKP’ye 40 bin Ramazan kolisi.” Sol, July 27, 2013. http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/iste-gercek-faiz-lobisi-zorludan-akpye-40-bin-ramazan-kolisi-haberi-77078.
74. “AKP’nin yeraltı prensi Gurkan.” Taraf, May 16, 2014. http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/huseyin-ozay/akpnin-yeralti-prensi-gurkan/29765.
75. “Ihale icin iscileri mitinge goturduk.” BBC, August 19, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/08/150819_soma_dava.
76. For details of the case, see “Deniz Feneri e. V. davasına Turkiye’de ceza yok.” Hurriyet, May 14, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/28998561.asp.
77. In December 2013 Turkish police arrested the sons of three then cabinet ministers, the general manager of a state bank, an AKP mayor and several businessmen accused of influence-peddling, tender-fixing, bribery, embezzlement and gold smuggling to Iran.
78. For a list of businessmen and their donations to TURGEV, see “9 soruda Turgev.” November 16, www.diken.com.tr/9-soruda-turgev.
79. “99 milyon 999 bin 990 dolar bağışmış.” Cumhuriyet, April 9, 2014. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/59069/99_milyon_999_bin_990_dolar_bagismis.html#.
80. “SDP baskani Ayhan Ogan Ogun Habere konustu,” January 9, 2014. http://www.ogunhaber.com/haber/sdp-baskani-ayhan-ogan-ogunhabere-konustu-haberi-237313h.html.
81. Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis.
82. For a detailed assessment of the structure of the media sector and freedom of the press in Turkey, see Kurban and Sözeri, “Caught in the Wheels of Power.”
83. As the Freedom House report asserts, “newspapers critical of the government have been subjected to tax inspections on a regular basis, with papers such as Taraf receiving huge tax fines, while pro-government newspapers such as Sabah are not subjected to similar scrutiny. Taraf newspaper reported that it faced three tax inspections over the past eight months and had incurred fines which it argued were selectively applied and not faced by the pro-government media.” Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis.
84. European Commission, “Turkey 2009 Progress Report”; and European Commission, “Turkey 2010 Progress Report.”
85. Soon after the sale of these newspapers, Dogan Media negotiated a settlement with the government and restructured its tax fine.
86. Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis.
87. “Cemaate yakin kanallar Turksat platformlarindan cikarildi.” Al Jazeera Turk, October 12, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/cemaate-yakin-kanallar-turksat-platformlarindan-cikarildi; and “Kanaltürk bütün programlarını bitirdi.” Radikal, November 17, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/kanalturk-butun-programlarini-bitirdi-1474152/.
88. “Mustafa Varank’tan Cumhuriyet’e tepki: Gurur duydum.” Star, October 24, 2015. http://haber.star.com.tr/medya/mustafa-varanktan-cumhuriyete-tepki-gurur-duydum/haber-1064988.
89. For more details, see Dagistanli, 5N1Kim. A number of these calls, personally made by Erdogan, were leaked in the early months of 2014, indicating the unprecedented level of control and pressure over the mainstream media.
90. “TRT’nin 25 günlük siyasi bilançosu: AKP tek başına iktidar.” Radikal, October 27, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/trtnin-25-gunluk-siyasi-bilancosu-akp-tek-basina-iktidar-1460331/.
91. For cases, see Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis, 8–9.
92. “Medya Gozlem Raporu 2014.” October 15, 2015 and “Medyanin 3 yili,” March 4, 2015. Both on Bianet, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/medya/162748-medyanin-3-yili-grafik-ozet.
93. Lowen, “The Problem with insulting Turkey’s President Erdogan.” BBC, April 16, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32302697.
94. Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Reports: Turkey. The government publicly defended the detention of journalists in cases like KCK and Ergenekon, equating journalistic activities with acts of terrorism.
95. Arsan, “Sivil Itaatsizlik Baglaminda Bir Arastirma.”
96. Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis. See also Dagistanli, 5N1Kim.
97. European Commission, “Turkey 2010 Progress Report.”
98. “12 soruda Deniz Feneri davası.” Radikal, September 11, 2008. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/12-soruda-deniz-feneri-davasi-898145/.
99. We thank Selver Sahin for this link. “10 Issues Turkish Media is banned from Reporting On.” Hurriyet Daily News, November 27, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/10-issues-turkish-media-is-banned-from-reporting-on.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74904&NewsCatID=339.
100. For further details, see “World Press Freedom Index,” http://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details/TUR.
101. For an assessment of the AKP government’s internet regulations, see Kinikoglu, “Evaluating the Regulation of Access.”
102. Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis.
103. For more details, see http://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/; and “Özgürlük için Basın Ekim 2015 raporu açıklandı.” November 20, 2015. http://tr.pressforfreedom.org/ozgurluk-icin-basin-ekim-2015-raporu-aciklandi/.
104. “12 ve 13 yaşındaki 2 çocuğa dava.” Hurriyet, October 27, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/12-ve-13-yasindaki-2-cocuga-dava-40006868?utm_source=sm_tw&utm_medium=free&utm_term=post&utm_content=&utm_campaign=12-ve-13-yasindaki-2-cocuga-dava-40006868_.
105. “Statistics,” Insan Haklari Daire Baskanligi. http://www.inhak.adalet.gov.tr/istatistik/istatistikler.html. For an interview conducted with a Turkish judge at the European Court of Human Rights on Turkey’s growing human rights violations under AKP rule, see “AİHM Başkan Yardımcısı Işıl Karakaş: Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret davası Avrupa’da yok.” Hurriyet, September 27, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/aihm-baskan-yardimcisi-isil-karakas-cumhurbaskanina-hakaret-davasi-avrupa-da-yok-30174841.
106. HRW, Turkey’s Human Rights Rollback.
107. “CHD tutuklu ogrenci raporunu acikladi.” Cumhuriyet, October 5, 2011. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/287758/CHD_tutuklu_ogrenci_raporunu_acikladi.html; and European Commission, “Turkey 2011 Progress Report.”
108. HRW, Turkey’s Human Rights Rollback.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. “TMMOB’un vize yetkisi Cevre Bakanligi’na verildi.” CNN Turk, July 10, 2013. http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/ekonomi/genel/07/10/tmmobun.vize.yetkisi.cevre.bakanligina.verildi/714804.0/; and “Turkey’s Rebellious Chamber to attend Meetings abroad only with Permission from Ministry.” Hurriyet Daily News, December 25, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76092&NewsCatID=341.
112. “Maliye’den Koc sirketleri Tupras ve Aygaz’a ani denetim.” Radikal, July 24, 2013. http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/maliyeden-koc-sirketleri-tupras-ve-aygaza-ani-denetim-1143226/; and “Koca destek veren Boydak’in sirketlerine vergi denetimi.” Radikal, November 29, 2013. http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/koca-destek-veren-boydakin-sirketlerine-de-vergi-denetimi-1163560/.
113. “Sivil itaatsizlik ve kaosa tesvik kirmizi kitapta.” Haberturk, April 7, 2015. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1062804-sivil-itaatsizlik-ve-kaosa-tesvik-kirmizi-kitapta.
114. “Ic Guvenlik Yasasi neleri değiştirecek?” Hurriyet, March 28, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ic-guvenlik-yasasi-neleri-degistirecek-28579002.
115. For details, see Amnesty International, “Adding Injustice to Injury.”
116. Needless to say, this outcome ‘requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy.’ Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 168.
117. For an analysis of the June 2015 elections, see Canyas et al., “Turkey’s 2015 Parliamentary Elections.”
118. Kalaycioglu, “Turkish Popular Presidential Elections.”
119. Sinan Ciddi, “The End of Turkey’s Experiment with Democracy.” Huffington Post, November 16, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sinan-ciddi/the-end-of-turkeys-experiment-with-democracy_b_8575748.html.
120. “Turkish Election Campaign Unfair, say International Monitors.” Guardian, November 2, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/02/turkeys-elections-campaign-unfair-say-international-monitors.
121. “Joint Mission finds Turkish Journalists under Severe Pressure.” Committee to Protect Journalists, October 22, 2015. https://cpj.org/blog/2015/10/joint-mission-finds-turkish-journalists-under-seve.php.
122. “On Post-election State Violence in Turkey.” September 11, 2015. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22620/on-post-election-state-violence-in-turkey.
123. “Deep Divisions in Turkey as Election Nears.” Pew Research Center, October 15, 2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-as-election-nears/.
124. Kemal Kirisci, “Is Civil War coming to Turkey?” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/23-is-turkey-civil-war-coming-kirisci-ekim?cid=00900015020149101US0001-0925.
125. “Nokta dergisine polis baskını.” BBC Turkce, September 14, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/09/150914_nokta_dergisi. Just four days before the crucial parliamentary election, government trustees were sent in to the pro-Gulen Koza Ipek group – including its media outlets – with the purpose of replacing its senior management. Amnesty International, “Turkey”; “Caretakers take over two Gülen-linked Dailies after TV Channels.” Hurriyet Daily News, October 29, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/caretakers-take-over-two-gulen-linked-dailies-after-tv-channels-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90483&NewsCatID=341; and “Court seizes Control of Gülen-linked Industry, Media Group.” Hurriyet Daily News, October 27, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/court-seizes-control-of-gulen-linked-industry-media-group.aspx?PageID=238&NID=90372&NewsCatID=509.
126. “Gezici Araştırma’nın anketörlerine gözaltı.” Cumhuriyet, September 19, 2015, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/372763/Gezici_Arastirma_nin_anketorlerine_gozalti.html#.
127. “AKP'li Şahin ve Yılmaz'dan halka tehdit.” Gercekgundem, October 26, 2015. http://www.gercekgundem.com/siyaset/164147/akpli-sahin-ve-yilmazdan-halka-tehdit.
128. “TBMM Başkanı İsmet Yılmaz: ‘Koalisyona muhtaç ederseniz, iş bulmak zor olur’.” Hurriyet, October 26, 2015. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/koalisyona-muhtac-ederseniz-is-bulmak-zor-olur-40006382.
129. “Davutoğlu’ndan Van’da tehdit gibi sözler: Beyaz toroslar dolaşacak.” Cumhuriyet, October 20, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/391353/Davutoglu_ndan_Van_da_tehdit_gibi_sozler__Beyaz_toroslar_dolasacak.html#.