Mayoral Leadership Matters: Lessons Learned From Mayoral Control of Large Urban School Systems

Abstract

“Mayoral takeover” has emerged as a major reform option for struggling urban districts since it was launched in Boston in 1992 and Chicago in 1995. This article examines the design, implementation, and the effects of mayoral-led school systems. Our research addresses issues that are critical to systemwide improvement: Are there variation in how mayors govern their schools? How can mayors “add values” to current school reform efforts in their cities? Have more resources been provided for teaching and learning? Is the public more confident in their city's school system? Are test scores improving? In addressing these issues of student outcomes and management improvement, we highlight lessons learned from our research project's mixed-methods approach, including case studies and statistical analyses using a multiyear database on a purposeful sample of 100 urban districts.

Notes

¹The Boston school community was highly polarized during the busing controversy in the 1970s. Since that time, the district's racial composition has changed dramatically from about 50% White to more than 80% minority in the 1990s. In this challenging context, then mayor Flynn in 1989 supported the passage of a referendum, approved by a very narrow margin of 50.8% to 49.2%, that gave the mayor direct control over the city school system. As a result, Boston's mayor appoints a 7-member board as opposed to the previous 13-member elected board.

²In 1995, the state of Ohio took over the Cleveland school district, removing the powers of governance from the local elected board of education and placed those powers in the hands of the state superintendent of public instruction. During this time, Mayor White used his office to support school board candidates and to seek broader support from the business community. Cleveland regained local administrative powers in 1998, when the federal court lifted the previous orders.

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