Where Should We Look for Mental Representations? On the Need for Epistemic Ethics

Abstract

Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.

Keywords:

• Aristotle
• Crick
• Distributed Processing
• DST
• Dynamic Systems Theory
• Epistemic Ethics
• Koch
• Neuroscience
• Ramsey

Notes

1. This assumes, of course, that the calling one has chosen is actually worth doing. Being the best possible terrorist or serial killer would also require following a specific set of maxims (choose explosives that are difficult to detect, etc.), but in these cases, one would have a moral obligation to not follow those maxims.

2. Kant did believe that there were intuitions that were not received from the sense organs, such as space and time, and that these intuitions were what provide the foundation for mathematical truths. However, these intuitions, like empirical intuitions, did not provide any contact with things in themselves, but were rather the abstract form of empirical intuitions. Indeed Kant, unlike almost everyone else who accepted this criterion, was willing to bite the bullet and admit that it requires us to concede that we never get to see things in themselves at all.

3. The word “reductionism” also refers to many other principles that are still strongly defended. Richard Dawkins, for example, says that reductionism is “just another name for an honest desire to understand how things work” (Dawkins, 1986, p. 13). In this paper, I will only be discussing the specific form of reductionism discussed in the Quine quote above, which I will call “epistemic reductionism.”

4. “Neurode” is the connectionist AI term for the electronic element that performs the function of a neuron in a biological brain.