Addiction in existential positive psychology (EPP, PP2.0): from a critique of the brain disease model towards a meaning-centered approach

ABSTRACT

Addiction is widely considered to be a chronic brain disease. Under this view, neuroscientists have spent lots of resources to study the brain and identify pharmacological targets to palliate addiction. However, the brain disease model presents serious epistemological and practical limitations. Firstly, this article collects important critiques to the medical model and calls for a more pluralistic approach to addiction. Secondly, we discuss the problematic self-regulation of people with addiction from an existential positive perspective (also termed PP2.0). People with addiction, whether it is related to substance abuse, gambling, internet surfing, shopping or eating, usually manifest existential struggles that could account for the development and maintenance of their addiction. Relational problems, evasion of guilt and responsibility, and a lack of meaning in life have been evidenced in the literature. At the base of this psychological problem, there are both an inability to cope with the dark side of life and a maladaptive search for positive emotions that cannot be naturally obtained from meaningful social interactions. Finally, the meaning-centered approach (MCA) is proposed for addiction recovery. MCA helps clients find a purpose in life and integrate into society. This existential positive approach can be a fundamental complement for mainstream addiction treatments.

KEYWORDS:

• Addiction
• existential
• positive psychology
• PP2.0
• meaning
• pluralism
• brain disease model

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David F. Carreno

David F. Carreno is a PhD candidate and lecturer at the Department of Psychology at University of Almeria, Spain. He also works as a psychotherapist and counsellor.

José Antonio Pérez-Escobar

José Antonio Pérez-Escobar is a PhD candidate in philosophy of science at ETH Zürich, Switzerland. He has a formal academic background in psychology, neuroscience and philosophy.